UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.  Docket No. ER22-___-000

Order No. 2222 Compliance Filing of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
Motion for Extended Comment Period

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February 1, 2022
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February 1, 2022

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, N.E. Room 1A
Washington, D.C. 20426

Re:  PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Docket No. ER22-___-000
Order No. 2222 Compliance Filing of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
Motion for Extended Comment Period

Dear Secretary Bose,

In compliance with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC” or the “Commission”) Order No. 2222 and associated orders, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) hereby submits proposed revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”), the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“Operating

1 Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020) (“Order No. 2222”). See Order No. 2222 at P 360 (“[A]fter consideration of the comments submitted, we will require each RTO/ISO to file the tariff changes needed to implement the requirements of this final rule within 270 days of the publication date of this final rule in the Federal Register.”). See also Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Notice of Correction in Federal Register of Compliance Deadline, Docket No. RM18-9-000 (Oct. 29, 2020) (“Notice is hereby given that the deadline to submit filings to comply with Order No. 2222 has been corrected and is July 19, 2021.”). See also Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 175 FERC ¶ 61,013 at P 5 (2021) (“We grant MISO’s, SPP’s, and PJM’s requests for extension, until April 18, 2022, April 28, 2022, and February 1, 2022, respectively, to submit their filings in compliance with the requirements of Order No. 2222”). See also Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2021) (“Order No. 2222-A”); Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 175 FERC ¶ 61,227 (2021) (“Order No. 2222-B”).
Agreement”), and the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region (“RAA”).

As discussed below, PJM respectfully requests that the Commission grant an effective date of February 2, 2026 for the Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA revisions proposed herein, and an effective date of July 1, 2023 for a limited subset of revisions.

In addition, given the breadth and scale of this compliance filing, PJM respectfully requests, pursuant to Rule 212 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, an extension of the standard twenty-one day comment period, from February 22, 2022 to April 1, 2022, in order to provide PJM stakeholders with additional time to develop their responsive pleadings in this proceeding.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In Order No. 2222, the Commission amended its regulations to remove barriers to the participation of distributed energy resource (“DER”) aggregations in the energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators (“RTOs/ISOs”). In doing so, the Commission articulated two threshold jurisdictional determinations that provide the framework under which PJM has structured its compliance approach.

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2 The Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA are currently located under PJM’s “Intra-PJM Tariffs” eTariff title, available here: https://etariff.ferc.gov/TariffBrowser.aspx?id=1731. Terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Tariff, Operating Agreement, and the RAA.

3 Specifically, with respect to the proposed revisions specific to a DER Aggregator offering a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, PJM respectfully requests an effective date of July 1, 2023. See Attachment A included in this filing. This will allow Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resources to participate in the 2026/2027 Delivery Year BRA.

4 18 C.F.R. § 385.212.
First, the Commission found that sales of injected electric energy by DER aggregators for purposes of participating in an RTO/ISO market are wholesale sales subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under Federal Power Act (“FPA”) section 201, and that market rules governing sales in RTO/ISO markets by DER aggregators from demand resources (e.g., demand response and energy efficiency) are practices “affecting” wholesale rates, subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under FPA section 205. In doing so, the Commission determined that it had sufficient authority to issue regulations removing barriers to the participation of DER aggregations in RTO/ISO markets.

Second, the Commission also acknowledged the jurisdictional exclusion of FPA section 201 relating to “local distribution facilities,” and recognized the “vital role for state and local regulators with respect to retail services and matters related to the distribution system, including design, operations, power quality, reliability, and system costs.” Accordingly, the Commission determined that “nothing in this final rule preempts the right of states and local authorities to regulate the safety and reliability of the distribution system” and that “all distributed energy resources must comply with any applicable interconnection and operating requirements.”

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7 Order No. 2222 at P 39.

8 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities . . . used in local distribution . . . ”).

9 Order No. 2222 at P 44.

10 Id. at P 44.
These threshold jurisdictional determinations acknowledge that, at its core, Order No. 2222 represents an exercise in cooperative federalism, designed to simultaneously coordinate and respect the corresponding statutory authorities of the Commission and Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authorities (“RERRAs”), as defined by Congress. By extension, PJM and its stakeholders have worked diligently since the inception of Order No. 2222 in September 2020 to develop a compliance approach that balances both the needs of DER Aggregators to access and participate in PJM’s markets on a level playing field with other resource types, and the essential rights of RERRAs and distribution utilities to ensure safe and reliable operations on the distribution system. These extensive discussions have yielded a comprehensive Order No. 2222 compliance approach with the following key elements, among many others.

i. *A new market participation model called the “DER Aggregator Participation Model.”*

PJM’s proposal is structured around a new participation model called the “DER Aggregator Participation Model.” This model augments existing participation models in PJM, which DERs can also use to access wholesale markets, including Economic Load Response/Demand Resource, Energy Efficiency, Energy Storage Resource/Capacity Storage Resource, and the generator model. Consistent with the Commission’s specifications in Order No. 2222, the DER Aggregator Participation Model accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of an aggregation, does not place any restrictions on resource or technology type for market participation, and allows both homogenous and heterogeneous DER to aggregate for participation in all markets for which they are technically capable of providing services.
ii. Newly defined terms associated with the participation model.

The DER Aggregator Participation Model defines a new entity, the “DER Aggregator” (the Market Participant and PJM Member), who participates in PJM’s energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets using a “DER Aggregation Resource” (the “resource” interfacing directly with PJM market systems for purposes of providing energy and ancillary services), which is comprised of at least one “Component DER” (the underlying DER device(s)). DER Aggregation Resources must be capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW, and individual Component DER may not exceed 5 MW. A DER Aggregation Resource may, either by itself or grouped together with other DER Aggregation Resources, provide capacity by forming a “DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” and satisfying a minimum capacity market offer of 100 kW.

The following diagram illustrates the general interaction of these newly defined terms under the proposed DER Aggregator Participation Model.

Figure PJM-1
iii. Pre-registration coordination activities.

The process of bringing Component DER to PJM in order to register them as a DER Aggregation Resource begins with an “up-front” bilateral coordination between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility, prior to the initiation of formal registration activities with PJM. This bilateral coordination is designed to facilitate communication between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility for purposes of determining key locational and data components that will be needed for the submission of the DER Aggregator’s registration to PJM. This process was developed in direct response to concerns from PJM stakeholders regarding the ability of the parties to successfully and accurately determine these locational and data components and complete the necessary reliability studies within the Commission-prescribed 60-day timeframe.11 This bilateral coordination process also preserves a distinct role for the RERRA, which may adjudicate disputes between the parties. It is also conceptually similar to the strong encouragement of coordination prior to the initiation of formal registration review under the California Independent System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) Distributed Energy Resource Provider Program, which the Commission specifically cited to in Order No. 2222 as an example of a program that “is transparent, provides specific review criteria that the distribution utilities should use, and provides adequate and reasonable time for distribution utility review.”12 Pre-

11 Order No. 2222-A at P 72.

12 Order No. 2222 at P 293, n. 709. See, e.g., Distributed Energy Resource Provider Participation Guide with Checklist, Version 1.0 at p. 7 (Aug. 26, 2016) (“The DERPA requires that the DERP obtain concurrence from the applicable Utility Distribution Company (UDC) / Metered Sub System (MSS) that there are no concerns with any DERAs wholesale market participation. This review and concurrence review process will have a thirty (30) business day turnaround timeframe. It is anticipated that the DERP will have contacted the applicable UDC/MSS prior to submitting a UDC/MSS concurrence letter for processing. It is strongly encouraged that the DERP work with the UDC/MSS in advance of the 30-day concurrence review to reduce or eliminate the identification of concerns during the 30-day
registration coordination is completed once the DER Aggregator has obtained all data necessary to begin the formal review process at PJM.

iv. **60-day registration review period.**

The proposed model incorporates a registration process that includes a 60-day period for distribution utility review of the proposed DER Aggregation Resource, with specific review criteria explicitly stated in the Tariff and Operating Agreement. Within the review period, the distribution utility may examine the proposed registration for reliability impacts, and make a recommendation with supporting rationale to PJM regarding whether or not the registration should be approved, approved with certain limitations, or denied. After receiving the distribution utility’s recommendation, PJM will have 15 days to approve or deny the registration.

v. **Locational requirements that support reliable operations, energy price formation, and are as geographically broad as technically feasible.**

The participation model will implement a “nodal” model for energy market participation, and simultaneously permit a “multi-nodal” model for capacity and ancillary service-only DER Aggregation Resources. As explained in the Bielak Affidavit included with this filing as Attachment E, PJM’s decision to require that DER Aggregation Resources participating in the energy market be defined nodally, rather than multi-nodally, is fundamentally predicated on an analytical determination that, based on PJM’s unique system topology, congestion patterns, and operating practices, a multi-nodal model would raise significant concerns regarding PJM’s ability to maintain compliance with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) mandatory Reliability Standards TOP-001, R1, R12, and R14, as well as IRO-009, R1, R2, R3, conferral period.”) (emphasis added).
and R4, and lead to degradation in accurate market pricing and operational constraint control. In determining that a nodal-aggregation model for energy dispatch was as geographically broad as technically feasible, PJM also considered: (1) a comparison with the existing Demand Response model; (2) an evaluation of a significant penetration of DER Aggregation Resources in PJM markets; and (3) an analysis of the accuracy and viability of distribution factors.

Importantly, the ability to aggregate DER more broadly for purposes of dispatch and market performance will exist for market services that are not priced and/or dispatched nodally—specifically capacity and ancillary services. In particular, DER Capacity Aggregation Resources may pool DER Aggregation Resources to develop a larger portfolio within a modeled capacity zone, and ancillary service-only aggregations may aggregate Component DER within a distribution utility footprint for purposes of dispatch and performance. PJM believes that these multi-nodal approaches to capacity and ancillary services will allow DER Aggregators to aggregate Component DER across a broad geographic area, and enhance overall opportunities for performance management.

vi. Enabling retail and wholesale participation, while preventing double-counting.

The proposed participation model contains provisions that: (1) allow Component DER that participate in one or more retail programs to also participate in PJM’s wholesale markets; (2) allow Component DER to provide multiple wholesale services; and (3) include appropriate “double-counting” restrictions on the Component DER’s participation in PJM markets through DER Aggregation Resources, which are narrowly designed to avoid accounting for and/or compensating a Component DER more than once for the same product. PJM will properly account for the different services that Component DER will provide in its markets through the registration process,
verifying any retail or existing wholesale activities for the Component DER and restricting wholesale participation under the DER Aggregator Participation Model where needed.

**vii. Energy market self-scheduling.**

PJM’s proposal allows DER Aggregators to self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resources into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, and permits DER Aggregators to offer a dispatchable range in submitting such bidding parameters.

**viii. Balanced metering and telemetry requirements.**

PJM’s proposal regarding metering and telemetry requirements effectively balances PJM’s need for metering and telemetry data for settlement and operations with the need to avoid undue burdens on DER Aggregators. For example, PJM will require telemetry values for a DER Aggregation Resource, but will not require telemetry at the individual Component DER level. Instead, the telemetry values can either be an aggregate of telemetry from the individual Component DER, or calculated values for resource operations. PJM believes that this approach will ensure that PJM has the operational visibility it needs, while simultaneously avoiding excessive costs to DER Aggregators.

With respect to meter data, PJM’s proposed language requires that DER Aggregators provide all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the existing standard metering requirements under Operating Agreement, Section 14, but specifies that DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers will only be required to provide aggregated meter data for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation
Resource, thereby relieving DER Aggregators of the burden of having to assemble meter data for every individual mass market customer.

ix. *A coordination framework that balances market access with safe and reliable distribution system operations.*

PJM’s proposed model includes a coordination framework that simultaneously balances the needs of DER Aggregators to access PJM’s markets, and the needs of distribution utilities to preserve the safety and reliability of their distribution systems. Regarding registration coordination, PJM has established specific review criteria upon which the distribution utility may recommend approval, rejection, or approval with operational limitations, of a proposed registration. PJM’s proposed language requires deference to “the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities.”

This deference is an acknowledgement that PJM has no expertise or operational vision into the planning and operation of distribution facilities, and is consistent with PJM’s normative operating practice of avoiding actions that may adversely impact distribution system reliability. To ensure that distribution utilities may not prevent the participation of DER Aggregators by virtue of simply not providing any engagement or feedback in the review process, PJM has also included an “auto-approval” mechanism, whereby PJM will approve the registration if the distribution utility fails to respond, after PJM provides final notice to the distribution utility prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period.

Regarding real-time operations coordination, DER Aggregation Resources will by default be responsible for interfacing in real-time with PJM operations, responding to dispatch signals,

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13 See Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b).
and providing telemetry for real-time output. However, PJM’s proposal also contemplates that during the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource may be assigned to an entity other than the DER Aggregator, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the distribution utility and/or the rules and regulations of any RERRA. PJM’s proposal provides the necessary latitude to the DER Aggregator, the distribution utility, and the RERRA, to specify with whom the responsibility for physical operation lies, and acknowledges whatever reasonable arrangement the parties agree to.

During the Operating Day, a distribution utility may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, when necessary to maintain safe and reliable operations on the distribution system. When overrides are necessary, the distribution utility will operate its system and the Component DER in a manner that maintains reliability, whether that be directly or through the DER Aggregation Resource’s dispatch operator. In light of the fact that (1) local distribution facilities are excluded from the Commission’s general rate and transmission jurisdiction under FPA section 201, (2) the Commission has disclaimed all jurisdiction over the physical interconnection of Component DER to distribution facilities for purposes of participating exclusively in a DER Aggregation Resource, and (3) the legal means through which a distribution utility will initiate override are subject to state and local jurisdiction, PJM proposes to textually incorporate by reference in its proposed Tariff and Operating Agreement language the numerous, non-jurisdictional means through which a distribution utility may initiate override—i.e. “pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution
company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.”

This approach should also address transparency concerns for DER Aggregators, as each DER Aggregator is required to attest in their DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement (“DAPSA”) that they are in compliance with “any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.” When overrides occur, DER Aggregators will need to update their applicable bidding parameters and capability to PJM via Markets Gateway. DER Aggregators will still be responsible for fulfilling market obligations, and will not be excused from penalties or deviations resulting from distribution utility override.

Lastly, PJM’s DER Aggregator Participation Model memorializes specific roles for RERRA involvement in the areas of: (1) interconnection of Component DER; (2) adjudication of disputes in pre-registration bilateral coordination between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility; (3) an option for adjudication of disputes in the registration process, if applicable; (4) an option to directly influence and oversee the operational relationship between the distribution utility, the DER Aggregator, and the Component DER, for purposes of physically dispatching DER Aggregation Resources and/or the Component DER therein; and (5) an option to oversee the conditions under which a distribution utility may override PJM’s dispatch for purposes of preserving distribution system reliability, and the ability to adjudicate disputes arising under that oversight.

As referenced above, PJM’s compliance approach to Order No. 2222 is one of balance. DER Aggregator participation in PJM charters new territory with respect to (1) the operational and

14 Id. at 1.4B(f).
jurisdictional interface between the distribution and transmission systems, (2) emerging technology integration and ensuring fair and reliable markets, and (3) grid modernization, evolution, and operational flexibility. As illustrated by the detailed proposal set forth below, DER aggregation participation in wholesale markets is complex, the issues wide-ranging, and many answers to specific DER use cases still unknown. For these reasons, the framework being put forward is a foundation for DER Aggregator participation in wholesale markets that will need to evolve over time, as experience is gained by all parties.

II. STAKEHOLDER PROCESS

In 2017, PJM established a DER Subcommittee in its stakeholder process as a means of directing a growing number of topics associated with DER wholesale market participation to a focused stakeholder body. Just prior to the Commission’s issuance of Order No. 2222, PJM re-organized the DER Subcommittee and the Intermittent Resources Subcommittee into a new group, called the DER and Inverter-based Resources Subcommittee (“DIRS”). The DIRS was established in August 2020, and immediately began discussing Order No. 2222 compliance efforts with stakeholders in October 2020, the month after the Order’s September release. The DIRS began meeting monthly to work through the compliance directives, and also established separate, monthly workshops focused on the coordination efforts necessary between PJM and distribution utilities. Between the monthly DIRS meetings, and monthly “EDC Coordination Workshops,” PJM convened a total of thirty-three meetings with stakeholders to work through the complex issues associated with Order No. 2222 compliance.

15 More information about the DIRS, including posted materials and meeting minutes, may be found here: https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/subcommittees/dirs.aspx.
In addition to meetings with the DIRS, PJM worked closely with state commissions through an ad-hoc Order No. 2222 task force within the Organization of PJM States (“OPSI”) to ensure that state commission staff and PJM staff were actively communicating on the evolving PJM compliance proposal, and that state commission input and concerns were considered throughout the stakeholder process. The Order No. 2222 task force met twelve times leading up to this filing.

A staggering number of personnel hours from across the PJM stakeholder community have been spent on the development of this compliance filing. PJM is grateful for the constructive dialog, expertise, and direct input received to date, which has yielded a proposal that PJM believes to be fully compliant with the directives of Order No. 2222. Looking beyond the immediate compliance phase of this proceeding, PJM expects significant dialogue with stakeholders to continue on many issues that emerged in the course of stakeholder discussions, but which are not directly encompassed by a specific directive in Order No. 2222.

One example is with respect to dispute resolution processes that RERRAs may need to develop independently, as a result of Order No. 2222. It is important to recognize that certain disputes may arise as a result of a DER Aggregator’s participation in PJM’s markets that may be better suited for RERRA adjudication. For example, if a distribution utility overrides PJM’s dispatch of a DER Aggregation Resource or Component DER therein to maintain the safety and reliability of distribution facilities, pursuant to the applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the distribution utility and/or the rules and regulations of RERRA, PJM believes that the applicable RERRA would be the correct forum to adjudicate that dispute, as PJM does not possess the requisite technical expertise regarding planning, owning or operating distribution
facilities to determine whether or not the override was appropriate. While distribution utility override could result in a PJM non-performance penalty for the DER Aggregator, it would not be within PJM’s purview to determine the operational propriety of such override in the first instance. In coordination with PJM states (OPSI), PJM acknowledges that Order No. 2222 represents new and uncharted territory for distribution and transmission system coordination. In many areas of the PJM Region, RERRAs may need to independently establish new procedures, polices, and/or methods of evaluation for utility operations, as a result of Order No. 2222.

Another area of continued discussion within the PJM stakeholder body is how to address any potential conflict of interest between distribution utilities and DER Aggregators. In Order No. 2222, the Commission affirmed that “market participation agreements for distributed energy resource aggregators should not preclude distribution utilities, cooperatives, or municipalities from aggregating distributed energy resources on their systems or even microgrids from participating in the RTO/ISO markets as a distributed energy resource aggregation.”16 Accordingly, PJM’s DER Aggregator Participation Model does not prohibit a distribution utility from forming its own DER Aggregation Resources. This is consistent with current practice today, where certain distribution utilities participate in the PJM demand response program with their own load reduction resources. However, unlike the PJM demand response program, the DER Aggregator Participation Model will (1) allow Component DER to inject onto the grid, and (2) require a greater level of distribution utility coordination to ensure safety and reliability. This sets up a scenario in which a distribution utility—the entity responsible for physically operating its distribution facilities and overriding PJM dispatch of other DER Aggregators—may also be competing against other DER Aggregators.

16 See Order No. 2222 at PP 340 and 353.
connected to those same distribution facilities. In coordination with PJM states (OPSI), PJM acknowledges concerns regarding this potential conflict of interest and anticipates continued dialogue on how state and local law may address this issue.

Beyond these, PJM anticipates continued dialogue with stakeholders on the following issues that emerged in the course of stakeholder discussions, but which are not directly encompassed by a specific directive in Order No. 2222.

- The potential for a more holistic legal framework between PJM and distribution utilities;
- Mechanics of the DER aggregation registration and utility review process;
- New roles and responsibilities regarding settlement procedures, training and potential obligations for DER Aggregators, as well as other entities with existing critical roles in the settlement process;
- Coordinating cyber security standards, protocols, and best practices between PJM, states, utilities, and aggregators; and
- Evolving DER policy and grid modernization efforts at the state level, and their associated impact on the PJM DER Aggregator Participation Model.

PJM looks forward to continuing collaboration and dialogue with its stakeholders on these important issues in the future.

III. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED TARIFF, OPERATING AGREEMENT, AND RAA REVISIONS

For ease of reference, PJM has compiled into the following table the individual compliance directives identified by the Commission in Order No. 2222, the specific Paragraph of Order No. 2222 in which a given compliance directive is located, and the corresponding sections of the PJM
Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA that have been amended in response to each compliance directive.

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<td>Tariff, Definitions C-D; Operating Agreement, Definitions C-D</td>
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<td>Allow DER aggregators to register DER aggregations under one or more participation models that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the DER aggregations.</td>
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<td>Tariff, Definitions C-D; Operating Agreement, Definitions C-D</td>
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<td>Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b)</td>
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<td>RAA, Schedule 6.2</td>
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<td>Do not prohibit any particular type of DER technology from participating in DER aggregations, and allow for heterogeneous DER aggregations.</td>
<td>141-142</td>
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<td>Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b)</td>
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<td>Allow DERs that participate in one or more retail programs to participate in its wholesale markets; allow DERs to provide multiple wholesale services; include any appropriate restrictions on DER participation in PJM markets through DER aggregations.</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b), (h); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), (h)</td>
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<td>Establish a minimum size requirement for DER aggregations that does not exceed 100 kW.</td>
<td>171</td>
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<td>Propose a maximum capacity requirement for individual DERs participating in PJM markets through a DER aggregation or, alternatively, explain why such a requirement is not necessary.</td>
<td>179</td>
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<td>Allow a single qualifying DER to avail itself of the proposed DER aggregation rules by serving as its own DER aggregator.</td>
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<td>Address locational requirements for DER aggregations.</td>
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<td>Address distribution factors and bidding parameters for DER aggregations.</td>
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<td>Address information and data requirements for DER aggregations.</td>
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<td>Address metering and telemetry requirements for DER aggregations.</td>
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<td>Incorporate a comprehensive and non-discriminatory process for timely review by a distribution utility of the individual DERs that comprise a DER aggregation.</td>
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<td>Incorporate a process for ongoing operational coordination.</td>
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<td>Specify how PJM will accommodate and incorporate voluntary RERRA involvement in coordinating the participation of aggregated DERs in PJM.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Address modifications to the list of resources in a DER aggregation.</td>
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<td>Address market participation agreements for DER aggregators.</td>
<td>352</td>
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For details, please refer to the referenced pages:
- Tariff, Definitions C-D: Operating Agreement, Definitions C-D
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(c); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(c)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(d); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(d)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b), (e); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), (e)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(e); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(e)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(f); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(f)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b), (f), and (o); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), (f), and (o)
- Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b)
- Tariff, Attachment N-4.
| Amend market rules as necessary to effectuate the “opt-in” mechanism for small utilities. | 65 |
| Market rule conforming revisions. |  |

| Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g) |  |

| Tariff, Definitions A-B; Operating Agreement, Definitions A-B |
| Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.2; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.2 |
| Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d), (f), (j), (m); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d), (f), (j), (m) |
| Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A.5(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A.5(b) |
| Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A.6(b); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A.6(b) |
| Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.2; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, 6.4.2 |
| Tariff, Attachment Q |
| Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2), section 6.6A(c), section 10A(c), section 11B |
| RAA, Definitions |
| RAA, Schedule 9.1 |
Descriptions of, and justification for, the proposed Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA revisions addressing each compliance directive are provided in seriatim in the following subsections A-R.

A. **Allow DER aggregations to participate directly in RTO/ISO markets, and establish DER aggregators as a type of market participant.**

i. **Commission Directive**

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to have tariff provisions that allow DER aggregations to participate directly in PJM’s markets, and establish DER aggregators as a type of market participant.¹⁷

ii. **PJM Compliance**

In compliance with this directive, PJM proposes to add to its Tariff and Operating Agreement a new definition for the term “DER Aggregator,” which is defined as:

“**DER Aggregator**” shall mean an entity that is a Market Participant that: (i) uses one or more DER Aggregation Resources to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model; and (ii) has a fully-executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement.

This definition directly incorporates the commonly-used and broadly-applicable term “Market Participant” from the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement, which can include, among other things, a Market Buyer, a Market Seller, or an Economic Load Response Participant. By extension, a DER Aggregator must also be a PJM Member, consistent with the requirements of those distinct definitions.¹⁸ The term “DER Aggregator” also directly integrates the Commission’s

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¹⁷ Order No. 2222 at PP 129-30.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Operating Agreement, Definitions M-N. A “Market Buyer” is defined as “a Member that has met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection and/or PJMSettlement in Tariff, Attachment Q, and that is otherwise able to make purchases in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.” A “Market
definition of “distributed energy resource aggregator” codified in 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(11) of the Commission’s regulations, which defines the term as “the entity that aggregates one or more distributed energy resources for purposes of participation in the capacity, energy and/or ancillary service markets of the regional transmission organizations and/or independent system operators.”

The term “DER Aggregator” is intended to refer to the legal entity that is the Market Participant—meaning the entity that is providing services into PJM’s energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets. To describe the market resource that a DER Aggregator uses to provide those services, PJM proposes to create a new definition called “DER Aggregation Resource,” which is defined as:

“The DER Aggregation Resource” shall be comprised of one or more Component DER. A DER Aggregation Resource is used by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A DER Aggregation Resource is capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW. The market participation eligibility of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.

A DER Aggregation Resource, or multiple DER Aggregation Resources together, may provide capacity in PJM. DER Aggregation Resources that seek to provide capacity are described by a new term, called “DER Capacity Aggregation Resource,” which is defined as:

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Seller” is defined as “a Member that has met reasonable creditworthiness standards established by the Office of the Interconnection and/or PJMSettlement in Tariff, Attachment Q, and that is otherwise able to make sales in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.” See also, Operating Agreement, Definitions E-F. An “Economic Load Response Participant” is defined as “a Member or Special Member that qualifies under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.5A, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A to participate in the PJM Interchange Energy Market and/or Ancillary Services markets through reductions in demand.”
“DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean one or more DER Aggregation Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model, capable of satisfying a minimum capacity market offer of 100 kW, or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets, such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan, for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year and all subsequent Delivery Years.

A DER Aggregation Resource is comprised of at least one “Component DER,” which is defined as:

“Component DER” shall mean any resource, within the PJM Region, that is located on a distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter, and is used in a DER Aggregation Resource by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER may not exceed 5 MW.

The definition of Component DER incorporates the Commission’s technology-neutral definition of “distributed energy resource,” as codified in 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(10) of the Commission’s regulations.19

The interrelationship between these core terms can be visualized by the following diagram.

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19 See also Order No. 2222 at P 114.
B. Allow DER aggregators to register DER aggregations under one or more participation models that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to allow DER aggregators to register DER aggregations under one or more participation models in PJM’s tariff that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the DER aggregation. The Commission explained that PJM may comply with this requirement by: (i) modifying its existing participation models to facilitate the participation of DER aggregations; (ii) establishing one or more new participation models for DER aggregations; or (iii) adopting a combination of those two approaches.
ii. **PJM Compliance**

In compliance with the Commission’s directive to allow DER aggregators to register DER aggregations under one or more participation models that accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of the DER aggregation, PJM proposes to create a new participation model, called the “DER Aggregator Participation Model,” to be located in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B. As identified in its introductory paragraph, this section contains the rules and procedures through which DER Aggregators may register and participate in PJM’s energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets.  

Importantly, the DER Aggregator Participation Model is contemplated as an additional participation model for DERs to participate in PJM. This model is not a replacement to any existing PJM participation models, including but not limited to Economic Load Response, Emergency Load Response, energy efficiency, and/or the generator model. DERs that meet the requirements for participation in other PJM models will be able to participate under those existing rules, and not use the DER Aggregator Participation Model to participate in PJM. For example, an aggregation of DER that strictly modifies load (i.e. demand response resources) can continue to provide capacity, energy and/or ancillary services through the demand response participation model.

The DER Aggregator Participation Model will allow for DER Aggregators to aggregate one or more Component DER to establish DER Aggregation Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources to participate in the PJM energy, capacity and/or ancillary service markets,

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22 See Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(a); Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(a).
where technically capable of doing so. Consistent with the Commission’s specifications described above, the DER Aggregator Participation Model does not place any restrictions on resource or technology type for market participation, and allows both homogenous and heterogeneous Component DER to aggregate to form DER Aggregation Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources for market participation.

Under PJM’s proposed rules, registration is a pre-requisite for eligibility to utilize the DER Aggregator Participation Model. This process is described in new proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b). During the course of PJM’s stakeholder discussions, strong concerns were expressed over the ability of the DER Aggregator and applicable distribution utility to successfully and accurately determine certain locational and data components necessary for the DER Aggregator’s registration with PJM, and complete the necessary reliability studies in a manner that would ensure safe and reliable operations on applicable distribution facilities, within the Commission-prescribed 60-day timeframe.23 This difficulty centers on the fact that the distribution system topology in PJM is extraordinarily diverse and complex, and does not have an existing unified ‘mapping’ to corresponding transmission facilities. In other words, there is no centralized model that directly correlates distribution circuits to transmission busses.

It became apparent during the course of discussions that without some kind of “up-front” bilateral coordination between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility to obtain the locational and data components necessary for the DER Aggregator’s registration, distribution

23 Order No. 2222-A at P 72.
utilities risked recommending rejection of an aggregation to PJM, solely on the basis of an inability to complete these essential activities within the 60-day timeframe.

In order to avoid this discriminatory outcome for DER Aggregators, and simultaneously ensure that distribution utilities can maintain safe and reliable operations of their distribution facilities, PJM proposes to require that a DER Aggregator coordinate bilaterally with the applicable distribution utility to obtain and verify the following key locational and data components, prior to initiating the registration review process.

Prior to the initiation of the registration review process by the Office of the Interconnection, a DER Aggregator shall obtain and verify, through good faith efforts and in coordination with the applicable electric distribution company, and, if necessary, any relevant Transmission Owner, the following location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection:

i. With the express written consent of the applicable Component DER, the electric distribution company customer account number and associated physical and transmission system electrical location information of the applicable Component DER, including compliance with applicable PJM and electric distribution company metering and telemetry requirements;

ii. Evidence of approval to interconnect, including but not limited to a finalized interconnection agreement, with the applicable Component DER, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, to the distribution system for identified megawatts, and identification of participation in an electric distribution company program that recognizes grid withdrawals and/or injections, including but not limited to a net energy metering program.
These locational and data components are essential for PJM to accurately model Component DER in both operations and planning, and by extension are necessary for the DER Aggregator to initiate a registration. Such encouragement of coordination prior to initiating formal registration review is currently contemplated in the CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Program, which the Commission specifically cited to in Order No. 2222 as an example of a program that “is transparent, provides specific review criteria that the distribution utilities should use, and provides adequate and reasonable time for distribution utility review.”

Because PJM contemplates that the bilateral discussions between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility will focus on subject matter that is generally outside of PJM’s core competency, PJM has included language requiring that disputes over their pre-registration coordination be addressed with the RERRA.

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

24 Order No. 2222 at P 293, n. 709. See, e.g., Distributed Energy Resource Provider Participation Guide with Checklist, Version 1.0 at p. 7 (Aug. 26, 2016) (“The DERPA requires that the DERP obtain concurrence from the applicable Utility Distribution Company (UDC) / Metered Sub System (MSS) that there are no concerns with any DERAs wholesale market participation. This review and concurrence review process will have a thirty (30) business day turnaround timeframe. It is anticipated that the DERP will have contacted the applicable UDC/MSS prior to submitting a UDC/MSS concurrence letter for processing. It is strongly encouraged that the DERP work with the UDC/MSS in advance of the 30-day concurrence review to reduce or eliminate the identification of concerns during the 30-day conferral period.”) (emphasis added).
The registration review process formally begins after: (1) PJM has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement ("DAPSA") on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) PJM has received a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) the pre-registration activities described above have been completed.  

The registration review process shall commence after: (1) the Office of the Interconnection has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) the Office of the Interconnection receives a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) pre-registration activities have been completed, consisting of the DER Aggregator obtaining and verifying the location and data components described above needed for its registration.

Once PJM has reviewed the registration and verified that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation, PJM will notify the relevant distribution utility, which will initiate the 60-day review process whereby the distribution utility can review and verify the following specific pieces of information.

The Office of the Interconnection shall review the registration and data submitted therein for completeness, and verify that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as defined under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement and Manuals. The DER Aggregator shall only submit a registration for Component DER that are under contract for the term of the registration, and only one DER Aggregator may operate Component DER at a specific location. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the DER Aggregator’s registration through the appropriate PJM system. A single registration shall only

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25 Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b).
be comprised of individual Component DER in the same state, electric distribution company, Transmission Zone, and pricing point unless otherwise noted below. Upon receipt of notification by the Office of the Interconnection, the electric distribution company may, within 60 calendar days, review and verify, as applicable, the registration and the following information contained therein:

i. Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity;

ii. The specific PJM markets in which the DER Aggregation Resource plans to participate and, if applicable, the effective and termination dates for participation;

iii. The electric distribution company customer account number(s) which represent Component DER location(s) and related information, as defined in the PJM Manuals;

iv. Participation of the Component DER in an electric distribution company’s retail program at the time of registration, and whether such participation precludes participation of the Component DER in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM, and as defined in the PJM Manuals;

a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets
the applicable requirements for energy market or capacity market participation.

v. The DER Aggregator’s participation in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets complies with the rules and regulations of any applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority;

vi. The Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority allows the participation of any applicable Component DER that are also end-use customers of an electric distribution company, in accordance with the provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g)

vii. The participation of the Component DER in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets do not pose a threat to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system, the public, or electric distribution company personnel.

In the event that the distribution utility identifies concerns based on these factors, proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b) state that the distribution utility and the DER Aggregator may resolve those concerns bilaterally, or through the applicable RERRA (or otherwise in accordance with applicable state or local law), prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. If the distribution utility’s concerns are resolved within the 60-day review period, the distribution utility may recommend that PJM approve the registration. If the distribution utility’s concerns are not resolved within the 60-day review period, the distribution utility may recommend that PJM: (i) reject the registration; (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration; or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.
If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In the event that the electric distribution company’s concerns are resolved within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may recommend that the Office of the Interconnection approve the registration. In the event that the concerns identified by the electric distribution company are not resolved, the electric distribution company may, within the 60 calendar day review period, recommend that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) reject the registration, (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration, or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.

Within fifteen calendar days of the conclusion of the 60-day distribution utility review period, PJM will apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration. In the event that the distribution utility does not provide any comments or recommendations, PJM will approve the DER Aggregator’s registration, following a final notice within the 60 calendar-day review period.
Within fifteen calendar days, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and shall either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration based on the Office of the Interconnection’s review of the registration and receipt and review of the electric distribution company’s comments and recommendation, with deference given to the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities. To the extent that no comments or recommendations are provided by the electric distribution company, including after the Office of the Interconnection provides final notice to the electric distribution company prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve the DER Aggregator’s registration.

Once the registration process is complete, the DER Aggregator will be permitted to participate in the PJM capacity, energy and ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model in the following manner.

First, regarding the PJM capacity market, DER Aggregators will be able to use one or more DER Aggregation Resources within a defined zone or sub-zonal Locational Deliverability Area (“LDA”) to form a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource.26 The capacity value of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource will be determined as a summation based on the underlying Component DER27 within the DER Aggregation Resources linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, and will set the maximum MW value that can be offered into the Base Residual Auction (“BRA”), Incremental Auction, or used in a FRR plan. DER Aggregation Resources will not have to meet

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26 As referenced above, a “DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” is defined as “a DER Aggregation Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model, or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets, such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan.”

27 Note that Component DER capacity values will be calculated based on existing requirements for the specified technology (e.g. Effective Load Carrying Capability).
the Offer Requirement for Capacity Performance Resources, and will be able to elect to participate in the capacity market as DER Capacity Aggregation Resources. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource capacity value will be calculated based on the technology type and site configuration of the underlying Component DER within the underlying DER Aggregation Resources. Existing business rules will be applied to the underlying Component DER. DER Aggregators will be able to offer up to the maximum DER Capacity Aggregation Resource calculated capability into the capacity market.

For example, a homogenous DER Capacity Aggregation Resource consisting of two energy storage Component DER within the underlying DER Aggregation Resources will have the following capability calculation:

(1) Energy Storage UCAP = ELCC Class Rating*Effective Nameplate Capacity*(1-EFORd)

DER Capacity Aggregation Resource = ∑ DER Aggregation Resources in (1)

Figure PJM-3
Taking another example, a heterogeneous DER Capacity Aggregation Resource consisting of one energy storage Component DER and one demand response Component DER within the underlying DER Aggregation Resources will have the following capability calculation:

(1) Demand Response = Nominated capability up to the PLC at customer site

\[
\text{Energy Storage UCAP} = \text{ELCC Class Rating} \times \text{Effective Nameplate Capacity} \times (1 - \text{EFORE})
\]

\[
\text{DER Capacity Aggregation Resource} = \sum \text{DER Aggregation Resources} \text{ in (1)}
\]

**Figure PJM-4**

DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that have a capacity commitment in PJM will be subject to the following requirements: (1) Day-ahead Energy Market must-offer requirement, based on the Component DER technology as currently described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d); (2) annual simultaneous testing requirements; and (3) non-performance assessments, in accordance with the underlying generation and load reductions being provided. PJM will evaluate expected and actual performance of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in two parts: generating
Component DER, and load reduction Component DER, in addition to any applicable existing requirements for capacity resources.

DER Aggregators may offer a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource into the PJM capacity market, prior to the Component DER being registered with PJM, given that the DER Aggregator has a PJM-approved DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan. Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resources are resources that do not currently have the capability to provide generation or load reduction in PJM through Component DER within the underlying DER Aggregation Resources, but are scheduled or planned to be capable of providing generation or load reduction through DER Capacity Aggregation Resources before the start of the Delivery Year.

PJM is not establishing an Emergency or Pre-Emergency DER Aggregation Resource, similar to the Emergency or Pre-Emergency demand response program currently in PJM. Given the distinction of DER Aggregation Resources, their ability to inject onto the distribution system, and their ability to locate anywhere on the distribution system, it is important for PJM to have visibility and control of these resources, and to be able to use these resources to meet system demand and constraint control, and not only access these MWs during emergency events.

DER Aggregators will be able to participate in the PJM energy market as energy-only resources, or participate in the PJM energy market in addition to and in coordination with the PJM capacity and ancillary service markets.

To participate in the PJM energy market, DER Aggregators will be able to aggregate Component DER to form DER Aggregation Resources, which will be the resource in the PJM energy market. PJM will not make commitment decisions for DER Aggregation Resources, and DER Aggregators will need to schedule DER Aggregation Resources into the market as either a
fixed megawatt value or with a dispatchable range, representing each DER Aggregation Resource’s parameters. The “no-commitment” model being proposed will allow PJM to support a potentially large number of DER Aggregation Resources participating in PJM markets. Given the defined locational requirements (see Section III.H below) and 100 kw minimum market offer, PJM will need to implement a no-commitment model in order to maintain performance of the market clearing and dispatch engines.

DER Aggregators will be required to submit both price and cost-based offers for DER Aggregation Resources. DER Aggregation Resources will follow applicable cost development requirements and guidelines currently enforced in PJM. DER Aggregators wanting to reflect a non-zero cost into the PJM energy market will need to have an approved Fuel Cost Policy on file with PJM. For homogenous DER Aggregation Resources consisting of Component DER that have the technology type documented in PJM Manual 15 (e.g., CT, battery, etc.), DER Aggregators should follow the documented cost development guidelines for submitting Fuel Cost Policies. Heterogeneous DER Aggregation Resources, or homogenous DER Aggregation Resources that consist of Component DER that do not have the technology type documented in PJM Manual 15 (e.g., demand response), will have a default cost-based offer of $0. PJM believes that this is appropriate in light of the fact that it provides operational flexibility for DER Aggregators to meet performance requirements in a variety of ways, using the resources available to them. In the event that a DER Aggregator wanted to submit a non-zero cost-based offer, it would be able to utilize PJM’s Manual 15, section 1.8 cost methodology and approval process to obtain an exception to its cost methodology calculation.28

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28 PJM recognizes that a $0 cost-based offer may not always accurately represent the DER Aggregation Resources’ costs, and encourages DER Aggregators or other PJM stakeholders to bring a problem statement to the PJM Cost
To participate in the PJM ancillary services markets, DER Aggregators will be able to aggregate Component DER to form DER Aggregation Resources. The DER Aggregation Resource will be able to participate in regulation or reserves, in addition to capacity and energy participation, or as “ancillary service only” resources, participating exclusively in regulation and/or reserves. Ancillary service only DER Aggregation Resources will have the opportunity to aggregate Component DER more broadly, up to utility boundaries for market participation. All DER Aggregation Resources will need to meet existing capacity and performance requirements for the ancillary service markets.

C. Do not prohibit any particular type of DER technology from participating in DER aggregations, and allow for heterogeneous DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required that PJM’s rules not prohibit any particular type of DER technology from participating in DER aggregations, and that PJM revise its tariff to allow different types of DER technologies to participate in a single DER aggregation (i.e., allow heterogeneous DER aggregations).\(^{29}\)

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with the Commission’s directive that PJM’s rules not prohibit any particular type of DER technology from participating in DER aggregations, and that PJM revise its tariff to

\(^{29}\) Order No. 2222 at PP 141-42.
allow different types of DER technologies to participate in a single DER aggregation (i.e., allow heterogeneous DER aggregations), PJM has drafted its rules to ensure both of these outcomes.

As referenced above, PJM’s definition of “Component DER” is technology-neutral, and the DER Aggregator Participation Model is structurally designed to account for the physical and operational characteristics of the DER Aggregation Resource through the identification of the underlying capabilities of the Component DER in the registration process, and through the definition of “DER Aggregation Resource,” which specifies that “[t]he market participation eligibility of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.”

Moreover, the definition of “DER Aggregation Resource” explicitly states that a DER Aggregation Resource “shall be comprised of one or more Component DER,” thereby ensuring the accommodation of heterogeneous DER aggregations in PJM. Beyond this, resources may continue to participate in PJM’s energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets via existing participation models, including Demand Response, the Energy Storage Resource Participation Model, or the generator model, so long as those resources met the associated requirements and criteria.

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30 “Component DER” shall mean any resource, within the PJM Region, that is located on a distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter, and is used in a DER Aggregation Resource by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER may not exceed 5 MW.

31 “DER Aggregation Resource” shall be comprised of one or more Component DER. A DER Aggregation Resource is used by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A DER Aggregation Resource is capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW. The market participation eligibility of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.
D. Allow DERs that participate in one or more retail programs to participate in its wholesale markets; allow DERs to provide multiple wholesale services; include any appropriate restrictions on DER participation in PJM markets through DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In order to avoid duplicative compensation for the same service, and still permit participation in multiple wholesale, or both wholesale and retail programs, the Commission in Order No. 2222 required PJM to revise its tariff to: (i) allow DERs that participate in one or more retail programs to participate in its wholesale markets; (ii) allow DERs to provide multiple wholesale services; and (iii) include any appropriate restrictions on the DERs’ participation in PJM markets through DER aggregations, if narrowly designed to avoid counting more than once the services provided by DERs in PJM markets.\(^\text{32}\)

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with this directive, PJM proposes new language in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4(B)(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4(B)(h), which includes explicit rules addressing each of these three items, and reads as follows:

A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources containing one or more Component DER that also participate in one or more retail programs. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of a retail program, including but not limited to a Component DER participating in a retail net energy metering program.

\(^{32}\) Order No. 2222 at P 160.
A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources that provide multiple services in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER shall not be registered with multiple DER Aggregation Resources, or participate as part of another Market Participant outside of the DER Aggregator Participation Model. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of another wholesale sale.

PJM will properly account for the different services that underlying Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource will provide in its markets through the registration process, verifying applicable retail activities identified in the registration process for the Component DER, and restricting wholesale participation where needed to avoid compensating Component DER twice for the same product.

The PJM Region encompasses fourteen distinct state jurisdictions, and retail programs may differ among entities within these jurisdictions. For that reason, PJM is not attempting to identify every specific retail program that may have restrictions in the text of the PJM Tariff or Operating Agreement, but will provide, strictly as a convenience to PJM Members and for informational purposes only, additional, specific detail on retail programs and wholesale participation, including any appropriate restrictions on the participation of Component DER in PJM markets through DER Aggregation Resources, in the PJM Manuals.33

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33 *City of Cleveland v. FERC*, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“As we observed earlier, there is an infinitude of practices affecting rates and service. The statutory directive must reasonably be read to require the recitation of only those practices that affect rates and service significantly, that are realistically susceptible of specification, and that are not so generally understood in any contractual arrangement as to render recitation superfluous.”).
For example, most net energy metering retail programs compensate for energy at those sites. The energy compensation for these sites would correspondingly restrict participation in the PJM energy and capacity markets. Specifically, energy market participation would result in explicit double compensation at those sites for the same product (energy). Capacity market participation for DER Aggregation Resources via DER Capacity Aggregation Resources would need to fulfill energy participation requirements, and because Component DER in a net energy metering retail program are unable to provide energy in PJM, they would not be able to meet the capacity requirements, resulting in their inability to participate. Ancillary services would not be restricted for net energy metering sites, and participation would be allowed, assuming all operational requirements can be met. Ancillary services, specifically regulation and reserves, are services that are being provided above and beyond retail compensation, and would otherwise not be provided absent wholesale market participation.

Importantly, PJM’s proposed Tariff and Operating Agreement language does not foreclose the possibility that retail net metering programs could be designed in a manner that would allow participation in PJM’s capacity and energy markets without triggering the concerns described above. Accordingly, PJM has included a provision in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b) to account for this distinct possibility.

a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff
approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets the applicable requirements for energy market or capacity market participation.

Additional retail programs will be evaluated as they evolve and participation eligibility will be documented in the PJM Manuals.

E. Establish a minimum size requirement for DER aggregations that does not exceed 100 kW.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to implement a minimum size requirement not to exceed 100 kW for all DER aggregations.34

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with this directive, PJM has memorialized the minimum size requirement for purposes of energy and ancillary services market participation in the definition of “DER Aggregation Resource:"

“DER Aggregation Resource” shall be comprised of one or more Component DER. A DER Aggregation Resource is used by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A DER Aggregation Resource is capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW. The market participation of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational

34 Order No. 2222 at P 171.
characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.

Similarly, PJM has memorialized the minimum size requirement for purposes of capacity market participation in the definition of “DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:”

“DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean one or more DER Aggregation Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model, capable of satisfying a minimum capacity market offer of 100 kW, or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets, such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan, for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year and all subsequent Delivery Years.

F. Propose a maximum capacity requirement for individual DERs participating in PJM markets through a DER aggregation or, alternatively, explain why such a requirement is not necessary.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission directed PJM to propose a maximum capacity requirement for individual DERs participating in its markets through a DER aggregation or, alternatively, to explain why such a requirement is not necessary.35

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with the Commission’s directive that PJM propose a maximum capacity requirement for individual DERs participating in its markets through a DER aggregation, PJM proposes to establish a cap of 5 MW on the maximum capacity of individual Component DER participating in a DER Aggregation Resource. Component DER that are greater than the maximum capacity requirement of 5 MW would be required to participate through a different applicable participation model in PJM markets (e.g. the generator model, demand response model,

35 Id. at P 179.
etc.). PJM proposes to codify this maximum capacity requirement in the definition of “Component DER:”

“

Component DER” shall mean any resource, within the PJM Region, that is located on a distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter, and is used in a DER Aggregation Resource by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER may not exceed 5 MW.

The maximum capacity of 5 MW for any Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource appropriately balances the removal of barriers to the participation of small Component DER with PJM’s operational and visibility needs, both from a planning and operations perspective. Specifically, when dealing with a resource larger than 5 MW, PJM requires greater visibility via individual telemetry and greater operational control in order to maintain reliability. One illustration of this is the fact that the PJM interconnection process already provides a fast-track process for small resources. Under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart G, section 112A, inverter-based energy resources 5 MW or less are eligible for a fast-track process. The fast-track process details the steps and criteria by which smaller projects that satisfy the “screens process” may be able to interconnect to the distribution system in an expeditious manner. By contrast, projects that do not meet the screens test for fast-track processing may be subject to cost allocation for network impacts, and therefore reasonably should be studied under the applicable interconnection queue process.

Another illustration of this principle is the fact that 5 MW is the current level for establishing a contribution to a previously-identified upgrade. By extension, if PJM were to set
the threshold for Component DER beyond 5 MW, it would create a potential path for larger projects to avoid cost allocation that others in the interconnection queue would be subject to.\footnote{See PJM Manual 14A, section B.3.1 ("Network Upgrades are identified to maintain system reliability. Individual Local & Network Upgrades which cost less than $5,000,000 All New Service Customers with active New Service Requests in an individual New Services Queue will be allocated a cost for these Network Upgrades based upon the following criteria . . . contingent to the individual New Service Request contributing MW impact being greater than 5 MW AND greater than 1% of the applicable line rating.").}

**G. Allow a single qualifying DER to avail itself of the proposed DER aggregation rules by serving as its own DER aggregator.**

1. **Commission Directive**

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to allow a single qualifying DER to avail itself of the proposed DER aggregation rules by serving as its own DER aggregator.\footnote{Order No. 2222 at P 185.}

2. **PJM Compliance**

In compliance with this directive, PJM has memorialized the ability of an individual resource to serve as its own aggregator in the definition of “DER Aggregator:”

“DER Aggregator” shall mean an entity that is a Market Participant that: (i) uses one or more DER Aggregation Resources to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model; and (ii) has a fully-executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement. PJM has also included the concept of single-resource aggregations in the definition of “DER Aggregation Resource:”

“DER Aggregation Resource” shall be comprised of one or more Component DER. A DER Aggregation Resource is used by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model; and (ii) has a fully-executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement.
services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A DER Aggregation Resource is capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW. The market participation eligibility of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.

H. Address locational requirements for DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to establish locational requirements for DERs to participate in a DER aggregation that are as geographically broad as technically feasible. The Commission specified that PJM must provide a detailed, technical explanation for the geographical scope of its proposed locational requirements in its compliance filing.

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with this directive, PJM has developed locational requirements for DER Aggregators to aggregate Component DER to form DER Aggregation Resources for participation in PJM’s energy, capacity and ancillary services markets. To ensure that DER Aggregation Resources are allowed to be defined as geographical broad as technically feasible, PJM proposes a nodal model for energy participation, and simultaneously a multi-nodal model for capacity and ancillary services-only DER Aggregation Resources. PJM’s locational requirements are correspondingly defined based on market participation, as described in the following table.

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38 Id. at P 204.

39 Id.
To codify these requirements, PJM proposes to incorporate the following language into Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(c) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(c):

All Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource shall interface with the same primary pricing node, except: (i) in the case of a DER Aggregation Resource that only provides ancillary services and is less than or equal to 5 MW, the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are in the same state and service territory of a single electric distribution company; and (ii) in the case of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource(s) linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are located within a defined zone or sub-zonal Locational Deliverability Area.

PJM’s decision to require that DER Aggregation Resources participating in the energy market be defined nodally, rather than multi-nodally, is fundamentally predicated on a determination that, based on PJM’s unique system topology, congestion patterns, and operating practices, a multi-nodal model would raise significant concerns regarding PJM’s ability to maintain compliance with NERC mandatory Reliability Standards TOP-001, R1, R12, and R14,
as well as IRO-009, R1, R2, R3, and R4, and lead to degradation in accurate market pricing and operational constraint control.

Due to its size and complexity, the PJM Transmission System almost always experiences constraints on Bulk Electric System (“BES”) facilities. As described in the Bielak Affidavit, the primary tool PJM Dispatchers will utilize in relieving these constraints is off-cost “constraint control.” During this process, PJM’s Real-Time Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (“RT-SCED”) engine will analyze system conditions, and determine the most cost-effective dispatch scenario for relieving a given constraint. RT SCED will then present this case to the PJM Dispatcher for selection. An essential component of RT SCED’s analysis is the unique distribution factor (“DFAX”) of each Pnode on the Transmission System, which provides the Dispatcher with an accurate reading of the precise amount of constraint control that can be provided from a given Pnode.

However, under a multi-nodal model, RT SCED would, by definition, examine multiple Pnodes, each with its own unique DFAX, and synthesize an average DFAX across those multiple Pnodes. RT SCED would not be able to accurately assess which specific Component DER interface with which specific Pnode, because the DER Aggregation Resource containing those Component DER would no longer be associated with a defined Pnode. As a result, the case presented to the Dispatcher would provide dramatically less accurate information regarding the amount of constraint control that could be relied upon from a given DER Aggregation Resource.

As Affiant Bielak notes, “direct correlation between adjusting price and constraint relief is a fundamental requirement of wholesale markets,” and “[i]f nodal control erodes in favor of diffuse

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40 Bielak Affidavit at PP 14-15.
response from larger aggregations, LMP changes will no longer directly correlate with constraint relief, and PJM cannot reliably operate a power market on the bulk power grid.”

Moreover, such erosion may directly impact PJM’s ability to comply with NERC mandatory Reliability Standards TOP-001, R1, R12, and R14, as well as IRO-009, R1, R2, R3, and R4, which among other things require PJM to maintain System Operating Limits (“SOLs”) and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (“IROLs”) at all times. Because PJM uses generation dispatch for constraint relief to maintain operating limits within the bounds permitted by these NERC standards, incorporating resources on the PJM system that are unable to be precisely used for constraint control would constitute removing a critical tool for PJM Dispatch.

PJM conducted additional analysis to examine the impact of allowing DER Aggregation Resources to be distributed among multiple Pnodes on: (1) energy market pricing and dispatch; and (2) operational constraint control. Results of this analysis showed that, even in geographically close locations, there is a strong disparity between pricing and constraint impacts at different pricing nodes. In other words, this analysis demonstrates that seemingly close Pnodes are not electrically equivalent, and therefore cannot be aggregated together as a single resource for purposes of energy market participation. PJM presented the results of this analysis to stakeholders at the DIRS. For example, at the March 31, 2021 meeting of DIRS, PJM staff presented an example of nodes that are geographically in the same town, but have different electrical impact on

41 Id. at P 19.

42 Id. at P 20.

43 See presentation, available here: 20210331-item-06-dera-proposal.ashx (pjm.com)
the PJM system.\textsuperscript{44} In this case, for a real-time constraint, there are two nodes that help the constraint, and two nodes that hurt the constraint. If PJM were to dispatch this resource in aggregate, it would be suboptimal and may serve to further constrain the impacted facilities. The resources at the “help” nodes would not provide as much relief, and more concerning, the resources at the “hurt” nodes can still operate as part of the aggregate dispatch.

\textbf{Figure PJM-6}

![Node Impact Table]

In another example PJM Staff presented to stakeholders at the January 5, 2022 DIRS,\textsuperscript{45} PJM analyzed two nodes, at the same transmission substation, with different underlying electrical connections. A real-time constraint, miles away from this substation, resulted in one node having a 20\% help on the constraint, while the other node had a 12\% help on the constraint. This 40\% difference in impact to constraint control is significant to operations, because, as described above, PJM Dispatchers require accurate, granular data regarding the specific amount of constraint control that can be expected from each specific Pnode to utilize off-cost constraint control and maintain SOLs and IROLs.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} at Slides 30-35.

\textsuperscript{45} See presentation, available here: 20220105-item-06-constraint-distribution-factor-differences-information-only.ashx (pjm.com)
In summary of these analyses, PJM found that if DER Aggregation Resources were aggregated multi-nodally for purposes of energy market participation, PJM would not be able to rely on DER Aggregation Resources to effectively manage constraints on the system. Having a market resource that cannot be effectively used for constraint control would take an important tool out of PJM’s operational toolbox, and by extension may impact PJM’s ability to maintain compliance with NERC mandatory Reliability Standards.

Further, in determining that a nodal aggregation model for energy dispatch was as geographically broad as technically feasible, PJM considered a number of factors, including: (1) a comparison with the existing Demand Response model; (2) an evaluation of a significant penetration of DER Aggregation Resources in PJM markets; and (3) an analysis of the accuracy and viability of distribution factors. Each of these considerations is described below.

First, regarding a comparison with the existing demand response model, PJM’s demand response market allows for multi-nodal aggregation of load reduction resources, and these aggregations are primarily mapped and dispatched at the zonal Pnode. This is a supportable model for demand response, given the exclusive load reduction activity that occurs when these resources are dispatched. However, as Affiant Bielak notes, this model cannot be relied upon for accurate constraint control, and would not be extendable to injection resources under the DER Aggregator Participation Model.\(^{46}\)

Second, regarding an evaluation of a significant penetration of DER Aggregation Resources in PJM markets, PJM is operating under the assumption that a significant number of DER Aggregation Resources will utilize the DER Aggregator Participation Model in the coming

\(^{46}\) Bielak Affidavit at P 21.
years, and by extension, the assumption that these resources will have a significant impact on PJM dispatch and operations. This assumption is strongly supported by data illustrating the changing resource mix in the PJM region.

**Figure PJM-7**

![Figure PJM-7](image)

As generation technologies shift to more renewable and distributed generation options, some of the fundamental assumptions about load change. Distribution-connected generation and load reduction technologies create non-homogeneous load response across transmission zones, which increases the risk of forecast error and undermines the fundamental assumptions behind scheduling generation and never needing to schedule load for constraint control. PJM’s proposed approach of a nodal framework for energy market participation will ensure that resources on the distribution system will respond to wholesale prices more directly, thereby clarifying the distinction between supply and demand and protecting PJM’s ability to perform constraint control. Nodal aggregations will also allow for adjusting LMP at a nodal level, and by extension create a predictable impact on transmission constraints. This direct correlation between adjusting price and constraint relief is a
fundamental requirement of wholesale markets, and will be reinforced by the adoption of a nodal model for energy market participation. If nodal control erodes in favor of diffuse response from larger aggregations, LMP changes will no longer directly correlate with constraint relief, and PJM cannot reliably operate a power market on the bulk power grid.

Third, regarding an analysis of the accuracy and viability of distribution factors, a multi-nodal aggregation would require PJM Dispatchers to have comparable visibility of impact of the underlying nodes in a DER Aggregation Resource. This would presumably be accomplished through distribution factors. PJM’s assessment is that the application of distribution factors would be a complex undertaking, and would raise question regarding implementation. Moreover, the information and control PJM would require at the nodal level, even in a multi-nodal aggregation, could be burdensome. Specifically, distribution factors would be required to be sent for each of the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource. In addition, to enable PJM to have the ability to see what impact is on each of the applicable nodes, additional exploration would also be needed to dispatch one part of the DER Aggregation Resource, but not the others. This would allow accurate constraint control, but by definition would remove the ability of a DER Aggregator to use the entire DER Aggregation Resource for performance. Additionally, distribution factors would be required in the Day-ahead Energy market, which would require DER Aggregators, ahead of time, to determine how the underlying Component DER will operate against PJM dispatch. DER Aggregators would have limited ability to change those distribution factors in real-time to minimize market manipulation opportunities.

After considering these factors, PJM has determined that a nodal aggregation model for energy dispatch is as geographically broad as technically feasible. However, PJM’s proposed
participation model will explicitly allow for multi-nodal aggregations in the context of capacity and ancillary service-only participation, because these kinds of aggregations do not raise the same system reliability or market pricing concerns as in the energy market. Specifically, for PJM’s capacity market, DER Capacity Aggregation Resources will be able to aggregate within a defined zone or sub-zonal LDA. PJM’s capacity market currently clears resources in these defined areas, and allowing the aggregations to span those areas will not impact the market clearing price. For PJM’s ancillary service markets (regulation and reserves), Component DER will be able to form DER Aggregation Resources within a defined utility footprint. PJM’s regulation market sets a clearing price on an RTO basis, and PJM’s reserve market sets a clearing price based on defined reserve zones (ex. RTO and MAD). With this broader defined market pricing, and ancillary service participation not used for constraint control, there are no technical concerns to more broadly aggregating in this specific context.

I. Address distribution factors and bidding parameters for DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to establish market rules that address distribution factors and bidding parameters for DER aggregations. The Commission further required that PJM incorporate appropriate bidding parameters into its participation models as necessary to account for the physical and operational characteristics of DER aggregations. In meeting this requirement, that Commission specified that PJM must either: (1) incorporate appropriate bidding parameters that account for the physical and operational characteristics of

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47 Order No. 2222 at P 225.

48 Id. at P 227.
DER aggregations into its one or more new participation models for such aggregations; and/or (ii) adjust the bidding parameters of the existing participation models to account for the physical and operational characteristics of DER aggregations.\(^{49}\)

\[\text{\textit{ii. PJM Compliance}}\]

In compliance with this directive, PJM affirms that it will not be requiring distribution factors for DER aggregations, given the nodal dispatch for energy, as described above.\(^{50}\)

Regarding bidding parameters, proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(d) will allow DER Aggregators to self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resources into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, as described in the PJM Manuals. Because a Component DER is defined in part as “any resource, within the PJM Region, that is located on a distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter . . .” the specific bidding parameters for each conceivable technology type are not “realistically susceptible to specification” in the text of the Tariff and Operating Agreement, and accordingly are better suited for the PJM Manuals under the Commission’s Rule of Reason policy.\(^{51}\)

DER Aggregators will be eligible, at their election, to offer a dispatchable range in submitting bidding parameters into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market.

\(^{49}\) Id.

\(^{50}\) Id. at P 225.

\(^{51}\) City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“As we observed earlier, there is an infinitude of practices affecting rates and service. The statutory directive must reasonably be read to require the recitation of only those practices that affect rates and service significantly, that are realistically susceptible of specification, and that are not so generally understood in any contractual arrangement as to render recitation superfluous.”).
This is consistent with current practice today, where market resources are able to reflect their current capability to PJM via market parameters; economic minimum, economic maximum, and ramp rate.

Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(d) reads as follows.

A DER Aggregator shall self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resource into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, as described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall be eligible, at their election, to offer a dispatchable range in submitting bidding parameters into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market.

J. Address information and data requirements for DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to establish market rules that address information and data requirements for DER aggregations. Specifically, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to: (1) include any requirements for DER aggregators that establish the information and data that a DER aggregator must provide about the physical and operational characteristics of its aggregation; (2) require DER aggregators to provide a list of the individual resources in its aggregation; and (3) establish any necessary information that must be submitted for the individual DERs. The Commission also directed PJM to revise its tariff to require DER

52 Order No. 2222 at P 236.

53 Id.
aggregators to provide aggregate settlement data for a DER aggregation and to retain performance data for individual DERs within a DER aggregation for auditing purposes.\(^{54}\)

\[\text{ii. PJM Compliance}\]

In compliance with this directive, PJM’s proposed pre-registration and registration processes in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b) describe in specific detail the types of information and data that a DER Aggregator must provide regarding the physical and operational characteristics of its DER Aggregation Resource and the underlying Component DER, as described above in Section III.B. This language also specifically contemplates the submission of a list of Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource,\(^{55}\) and describes in detail the information that must be submitted for those Component DER, as previously discussed and recited above in Section III.B.

Regarding the Commission’s directive that PJM revise its tariff to require DER aggregators to provide aggregate settlement data for the DER aggregation, and to retain performance data for individual DERs in a DER aggregation for auditing purposes, PJM proposes the following language in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(e) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(e), to directly address these instructions.

A DER Aggregator shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 and the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall retain performance data for individual Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource for auditing purposes, in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

\(^{54}\) Id.

\(^{55}\) See, e.g., “Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Aggregated Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity.”
K. Address metering and telemetry requirements for DER aggregations.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address metering and telemetry hardware and software requirements necessary for DER aggregations to participate in PJM’s markets.56 Acknowledging the need to balance PJM’s need for metering and telemetry data for settlement and operational purposes with not imposing unnecessary burdens on DER aggregators, the Commission provided PJM with flexibility to establish its metering and telemetry hardware and software requirements, and required that PJM explain in its compliance filing why such requirements are just and reasonable and do not pose an unnecessary and undue barrier to individual DERs joining a DER aggregation.57

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with the Commission’s directive, PJM proposes to add the following language in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(e), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(e).

A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource shall provide telemetry for each DER Aggregation Resource participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, in accordance with the technical specifications described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource may provide telemetry for the

56 Order No. 2222 at P 262.

57 Id. at P 263.
individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource. This telemetry shall represent one or more values indicative of the total electrical output of the DER Aggregation Resource and inclusive of all underlying Component DER.

A DER Aggregator shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Section 14 and the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall retain performance data for individual Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource for auditing purposes, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator is responsible for ensuring that Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. For non-interval metered residential DER Aggregation Resources, the DER Aggregator must ensure that a representative sample of Component DER have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. For DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers, DER Aggregators shall provide aggregated meter data to the Office of the Interconnection for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource. The measurement systems shall comply with the applicable electric distribution company accuracy requirements for meters, and/or as described in the PJM Manual 01. Additional details for the configuration of such measurement systems under various specific configurations are specified in PJM Manual 14D.

The metering equipment shall meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy, or otherwise have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including potential transformers and current transformers) and the metering equipment and associated data shall meet the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals.

PJM has established telemetry and metering requirements for DER Aggregation Resources which are both necessary for PJM settlement and operations, and simultaneously mindful of unnecessary burdens for DER Aggregators. Regarding telemetry, PJM will require telemetry
values for a DER Aggregation Resource, and will not require telemetry at the individual Component DER level. Instead, the telemetry values being provided by the DER Aggregator for the DER Aggregation Resource can either be an aggregate of telemetry from the individual resources, or calculated values for resource operations. Further, DER telemetry will be required on a 1-minute scan rate, except where the service the DER Aggregation Resource is providing requires faster scan data (e.g., regulation). PJM’s telemetry requirements are described in the following table.

**Figure PJM-8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Telemetry</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>1 minute data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Only</td>
<td>&lt;10 MW</td>
<td>No real-time telemetry required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>≥10 MW</td>
<td>1 minute data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>2/10 second data</td>
<td>+/-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>1 minute data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to meter data, PJM’s proposed language requires that DER Aggregators provide all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the existing standard metering requirements under Operating Agreement, section 14. PJM is also requiring that DER Aggregators ensure that Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis, and that for non-interval metered residential DER Aggregation Resources, the DER Aggregator must
ensure that a representative sample of Component DER have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. The integrated hourly kWh metric is necessary to allow both PJM and retail billings to be settled accurately. Importantly, PJM’s metering language states that DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers shall only be required to provide aggregated meter data for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, thereby relieving DER Aggregators of the burden of having to assemble meter data for individual customers. Lastly PJM’s language specifies that metering equipment must meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy, or otherwise have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment. This requirement establishes an important “backstop” to ensure the establishment of a baseline level of accuracy for DER Aggregators.

For both metering and telemetry, PJM’s language reserves a sufficient amount of detail to the PJM Manuals. PJM believes that this is appropriate, in light of the broad definition of Component DER and multitude of configurations that may exist across PJM’s fourteen distinct state jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions therein.  

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58 City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“As we observed earlier, there is an infinitude of practices affecting rates and service. The statutory directive must reasonably be read to require the recitation of only those practices that affect rates and service significantly, that are realistically susceptible of specification, and that are not so generally understood in any contractual arrangement as to render recitation superfluous.”).
L. **Incorporate a comprehensive and non-discriminatory process for timely review by a distribution utility of the individual distributed energy resources that comprise a distributed energy resource aggregation.**

i. **Commission Directive**

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address coordination between PJM, the DER aggregator, the distribution utility, and the RERRA.\(^{59}\) As part of this coordination, the Commission directed PJM to modify its tariff to incorporate a comprehensive and non-discriminatory process for timely review by a distribution utility of the individual DERs that comprise a DER aggregation, which is triggered by initial registration of the DER aggregation or incremental changes to a DER aggregation already participating in the markets.\(^{60}\) The Commission specified that PJM must coordinate with distribution utilities to develop a distribution utility review process that includes criteria by which the distribution utilities would determine whether (1) each proposed distributed energy resource is capable of participation in a DER aggregation; and (2) the participation of each proposed DER in a DER aggregation will not pose significant risks to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system.\(^{61}\) PJM is required to demonstrate on compliance that its proposed distribution utility review process is transparent, provides specific review criteria that the distribution utilities should use, and provides adequate and reasonable time for distribution utility review.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{59}\) Order No. 2222 at P 278.

\(^{60}\) Id. at P 292.

\(^{61}\) Id.

\(^{62}\) Id. at P 293.
ii. **PJM Compliance**

In compliance with this directive, PJM coordinated with distribution utilities, DER Aggregators, RERRAs, and other PJM stakeholders through the PJM DIRS and DIRS EDC Coordination Workshops, which have been held monthly since October 2020. Through this process, PJM has developed a comprehensive registration process that will simultaneously balance the needs of DER Aggregators to access PJM’s markets, and the needs of distribution utilities to preserve the safety and reliability of their distribution systems.

PJM’s proposal is described in proposed Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b). As described above in Section III.B., the process begins with a framework that allows DER Aggregators to coordinate with the applicable distribution utility to obtain and verify certain location and data components that will be needed for the DER Aggregator to submit their registration to PJM.

Prior to the initiation of the registration review process by the Office of the Interconnection, a DER Aggregator shall obtain and verify, through good faith efforts and in coordination with the applicable electric distribution company, and, if necessary, any relevant Transmission Owner, the following location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection:

i. With the express written consent of the applicable Component DER, the electric distribution company customer account number and associated physical and transmission system electrical location information of the applicable Component DER, including compliance with applicable PJM and electric distribution company metering and telemetry requirements;

ii. Evidence of approval to interconnect, including but not limited to a finalized interconnection agreement, with the applicable Component DER, in accordance with any
applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, to the distribution system for identified megawatts, and identification of participation in an electric distribution company program that recognizes grid withdrawals and/or injections, including but not limited to a net energy metering program.

As referenced above in Section III.B, these locational and data components are essential for PJM to accurately model Component DER in both operations and planning, and by extension are necessary for the DER Aggregator to initiate a registration. Such encouragement of coordination prior to initiating formal registration review is currently contemplated in the CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Program, which the Commission specifically cited to in Order No. 2222 as an example of a program that “is transparent, provides specific review criteria that the distribution utilities should use, and provides adequate and reasonable time for distribution utility review.”

Because PJM contemplates the bilateral discussions between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility focusing on subject matter that is generally outside of PJM’s core competency, PJM has included language requiring that disputes over this pre-registration coordination be addressed with the RERRA, or otherwise in accordance with state and local law.

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the

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63 Order No. 2222 at P 293, n. 709. See, e.g., Distributed Energy Resource Provider Participation Guide with Checklist, Version 1.0 at p. 7 (Aug. 26, 2016) (“The DERPA requires that the DERP obtain concurrence from the applicable Utility Distribution Company (UDC) / Metered Sub System (MSS) that there are no concerns with any DERAs wholesale market participation. This review and concurrence review process will have a thirty (30) business day turnaround timeframe. It is anticipated that the DERP will have contacted the applicable UDC/MSS prior to submitting a UDC/MSS concurrence letter for processing. It is strongly encouraged that the DERP work with the UDC/MSS in advance of the 30-day concurrence review to reduce or eliminate the identification of concerns during the 30-day conferral period.”) (emphasis added).
Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

As referenced above in Section III.B, the need for pre-registration coordination was identified during the course of PJM’s stakeholder discussions. During the course of PJM’s stakeholder discussions, strong concerns were expressed over the ability of the DER Aggregator and applicable distribution utility to successfully and accurately determine certain locational and data components necessary for the DER Aggregator’s registration with PJM, and complete the necessary reliability studies in a manner that would ensure safe and reliable operations on applicable distribution facilities, within the Commission-prescribed 60-day timeframe. This difficulty centers on the fact that the distribution system topology in PJM is extraordinarily diverse and complex, and does not have an existing unified ‘mapping’ to corresponding transmission facilities. In other words, there is no centralized model that directly correlates distribution circuits to transmission busses.

It became apparent during the course of discussions that without some kind of “up-front” bilateral coordination between the DER Aggregator and the distribution utility to obtain the locational and data components necessary for the DER Aggregator’s registration, distribution utilities risked recommending rejection of an aggregation to PJM, solely on the basis of an inability to complete these essential activities within the 60-day timeframe. PJM’s proposed language is designed to avoid this unconstructive outcome, and also clarifies that disputes on these matters are

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64 Order No. 2222-A at P 72.
not actionable under the FPA, but instead should be resolved pursuant to state or local law, preferably by the RERRA.

After the DER Aggregator has coordinated with the applicable distribution utility to obtain and verify the specified location and data components that will be needed for the DER Aggregator to submit their registration to PJM, the registration review process will begin. This process is described in detail in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b).

The registration review process shall commence after: (1) the Office of the Interconnection has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) the Office of the Interconnection receives a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) pre-registration activities have been completed, consisting of the DER Aggregator obtaining and verifying the location and data components described above needed for its registration.

The Office of the Interconnection shall review the registration and data submitted therein for completeness, and verify that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as defined under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement and Manuals. The DER Aggregator shall only submit a registration for Component DER that are under contract for the term of the registration, and only one DER Aggregator may operate Component DER at a specific location. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the DER Aggregator’s registration through the appropriate PJM system. A single registration shall only be comprised of individual Component DER in the same state, electric distribution company, Transmission Zone, and pricing point unless otherwise noted below. Upon receipt of notification by the Office of the Interconnection, the electric distribution company may, within 60 calendar days, review and verify, as applicable, the registration and the following information contained therein:
i. Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity;

ii. The specific PJM markets in which the DER Aggregation Resource plans to participate and, if applicable, the effective and termination dates for participation;

iii. The electric distribution company customer account number(s) which represent Component DER location(s) and related information, as defined in the PJM Manuals;

iv. Participation of the Component DER in an electric distribution company’s retail program at the time of registration, and whether such participation precludes participation of the Component DER in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM, and as defined in the PJM Manuals;

   a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

      1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

      2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets the applicable requirements
for energy market or capacity market participation.

v. The DER Aggregator’s participation in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets complies with the rules and regulations of any applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority;

vi. The Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority allows the participation of any applicable Component DER that are also end-use customers of an electric distribution company, in accordance with the provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g)

vii. The participation of the Component DER in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets do not pose a threat to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system, the public, or electric distribution company personnel.

If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitratted or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In the event that the electric distribution company’s concerns are resolved within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may recommend that the Office of the Interconnection approve the registration. In the event that the
concerns identified by the electric distribution company are not resolved, the electric distribution company may, within the 60 calendar day review period, recommend that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) reject the registration, (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration, or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.

Within fifteen calendar days, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and shall either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration based on the Office of the Interconnection’s review of the registration and receipt and review of the electric distribution company’s comments and recommendation, with deference given to the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities. To the extent that no comments or recommendations are provided by the electric distribution company, including after the Office of the Interconnection provides final notice to the electric distribution company prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve the DER Aggregator’s registration.

PJM’s proposed language related to registration directly addresses the Commission’s directives in Order No. 2222. Specifically, Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b) enumerate the specific criteria by which the distribution utility can determine: (1) whether each proposed Component DER is capable of participation in a DER aggregation, and (2) that the participation of each proposed Component DER in a DER Aggregation will not pose significant risks to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system. These review criteria were developed in close coordination with PJM

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65 Order No. 2222 at P 296.
stakeholders and the specific PJM staff who will be charged with implementing the review process. In the event that the distribution utility identifies concerns based on its review of the enumerated criteria, PJM’s language makes available the dispute resolution process under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5, as required by the Commission, but also allows the parties to resolve their dispute bilaterally or in accordance with state or local law, if appropriate. If these concerns remain unresolved, the distribution utility may recommend that PJM: (i) reject the registration; (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration; or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration. These options are consistent with the Commission’s specifications in Order No. 2222.

Following the 60-day utility review process, PJM proposes a fifteen calendar day window to apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER and approve or reject the registration. PJM’s proposed language specifically states that PJM will defer to “the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities.” This statement is an acknowledgement that PJM has no expertise or operational vision into the planning and operation of distribution facilities, and is consistent with PJM’s normative operating practice of avoiding actions that may adversely impact distribution system reliability. To ensure that distribution utilities may not prevent the

66 Id. at P 299.

67 Id. at P 297 (“In addition, the distribution utility should have the opportunity to request that the RTO/ISO place operational limitations on an aggregation or removal of a distributed energy resource from an aggregation based on specific significant reliability or safety concerns that it clearly demonstrates to the RTO/ISO and distributed energy resource aggregator on a case-by-case basis.”).
participation of DER Aggregators by virtue of simply not providing any engagement or feedback in the review process, PJM has also included an “auto-approval” mechanism, whereby PJM will approve the registration if the distribution utility fails to respond, after PJM provides final notice to the distribution utility prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period.

PJM’s registration process also contemplates that the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource may be required to be assigned to an entity other than the DER Aggregator, to comply with applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any RERRA.

During the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource will be assigned to the electric distribution company, the DER Aggregator, or another entity, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

The ability for a party other than the Market Participant to serve as a “dispatch agent,” directly interface with PJM operations, receive PJM dispatch instructions, and provide applicable telemetry, is currently available for all resources operating in PJM today. However, during the stakeholder process, it became apparent that distribution utilities and RERRAs may promulgate their own local rules necessary to ensure safe and reliable operations on the distribution system. In light of the Commission’s disclamion of jurisdiction over the physical interconnection of Component DER, and the DER Aggregator’s mandatory attestation that they are and will remain in full compliance with local rules in their DAPSA, PJM believes that its proposed language provides the necessary latitude to the DER Aggregator, the distribution utility, and the RERRA, to
specify with whom the responsibility for physical operation lies, and acknowledges whatever reasonable arrangement the parties agree to.

M. **Incorporate a process for ongoing operational coordination.**

i. **Commission Directive**

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address coordination between PJM, the DER aggregator, the distribution utility, and the RERRA.68 As part of this coordination, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to: (i) establish a process for ongoing coordination, including operational coordination, that addresses data flows and communication among itself, the DER aggregator, and the distribution utility; and (ii) require the DER aggregator to report to PJM any changes to its offered quantity and related distribution factors that result from distribution line faults or outages.69 The Commission further directed PJM to revise its tariff to include coordination protocols and processes for the operating day that allow distribution utilities to override PJM’s dispatch of a DER aggregation in circumstances where such override is needed to maintain the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system,70 and to apply any existing non-performance penalties to DER Aggregators when they fail to perform as a result of override.71

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68 Order No. 2222 at P 278.

69 *Id.* at P 310.

70 *Id.* at P 312.

71 *Id.*
ii. **PJM Compliance**

In compliance with this directive, PJM has devised an operational framework, in coordination with its stakeholders. This framework is designed to facilitate communication between parties (PJM, DER Aggregators, and distribution utilities), where applicable, and uphold distribution utility operations for safety and reliability. The communication framework is designed to account for day-ahead, real-time, and emergency (override) scenarios. Each of these is described below.

First, with respect to day-ahead, ongoing and initial communication can take place between the distribution utility and the DER Aggregator, prior to the Day-ahead Energy Market submission. Distribution utilities will communicate to DER Aggregators any system constraints to maintain safe distribution operations. An operating range not supported by the utility, for safety and reliability concerns, should not be represented by the DER Aggregator in the market offer or reflected in the economic minimum or economic maximum of the DER Aggregation Resource. In the event that the distribution utility notifies the DER Aggregator of a modified operating range for the DER Aggregation Resource and/or underlying Component DER, the DER Aggregator is required to update its bidding parameters and capability in the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market submission. The graphic below illustrates this communication framework.
Second, with respect to real-time coordination, distribution utilities will communicate with the DER Aggregator and/or the DER Aggregation Resource dispatch agent to inform them of any distribution activities that may require Component DER to have modified operations. While utility activities such as planned maintenance can and should be communicated to impacted parties prior to the Day-ahead Energy Market bid window, more timely activity, such as distribution switching work for a pole hit or tree falling would need to occur in real-time. In the event that the distribution utility notifies the DER Aggregator of a modified operating range for the DER Aggregation Resource and/or underlying Component DER, the DER Aggregator is expected to update its bidding parameters and capability in the PJM Real-time Energy Market. The communication framework below will be used for real-time coordination and emergency (override) actions.
Third, regarding emergency (override) scenarios, in real-time operations, the utility shall take any action they deem necessary for safety and reliability, including overriding DER Aggregation Resources or underlying Component DER operating under PJM dispatch. PJM will not define how a distribution utility will override a DER Aggregation Resource or underlying Component DER, and the distribution utility can use their defined procedures and processes to do so. If a utility determines that overrides are necessary to maintain distribution safety, reliability, and power quality, they should have a documented explanation as to the reason for action for auditing purposes. This will ensure transparency for the DER Aggregator on utility override and operations.

If as a result of distribution utility action, or otherwise, a DER Aggregation Resource’s capability changes, the DER Aggregator should reflect those updates to PJM in its market.
availability and parameters. PJM will then re-dispatch the DER Aggregation Resource based on the updated capabilities and parameters. If a DER Aggregation Resource cannot perform due to a utility override for safety and reliability, PJM will not excuse penalties or deviations for the DER Aggregation Resource for not meeting its market commitment, including, but not limited to, day-ahead energy deviations, performance assessment penalties, and regulation performance scores.

While numerous details of PJM’s operational framework will be memorialized in the PJM Manuals during implementation, PJM has included the core elements in the following language in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(f) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(f).

The electric distribution company should, prior to the deadline for submission of offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, notify the DER Aggregator of any operational limitations for the Operating Day that may impact the bidding parameters of an applicable DER Aggregation Resource. In the event that the electric distribution company identifies additional operational concerns after the deadline described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, the DER Aggregator may utilize the generation rebidding period identified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.9, and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.9, to update its bidding parameters.

During the Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall dispatch DER Aggregation Resources, by communicating with the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the DER Aggregator’s submitted bidding parameters. During the Operating Day, an electric distribution company may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual
Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. Following the exercise of the electric distribution company’s override, the DER Aggregator shall reflect the override by updating the applicable bidding parameters of its DER Aggregation Resource. An electric distribution company’s override shall not excuse a DER Aggregator’s failure to perform any of the obligations established under the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, RAA, or PJM Manuals.

Any disputes regarding an electric distribution company’s exercise of its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be addressed in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In Order No. 2222, the Commission stated that the processes through which a distribution utility may override PJM’s dispatch “must be contained in the tariff and must be non-discriminatory and transparent but still address distribution utility reliability and safety concerns.”72 In light of the fact that (i) local distribution facilities are excluded from the Commission’s general rate and transmission jurisdiction under FPA section 201,73 (ii) the

72 Id. at P 310.
Commission has disclaimed all jurisdiction over the physical interconnection of Component DER to distribution facilities for purposes of participating exclusively in a DER Aggregation Resource, and (iii) the legal means through which an distribution utility will initiate override are subject to state and local jurisdiction, PJM believes that comprehensively listing in the Tariff and Operating Agreement the specific scenarios under which a distribution utility may override PJM’s dispatch is infeasible, and not “realistically susceptible to specification.” Accordingly, PJM proposes to incorporate by reference in its proposed language the numerous non-jurisdictional means through which a distribution utility may initiate override—i.e. “pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.” This approach should also address transparency concerns for DER Aggregators, as each DER Aggregator is required to attest in their DAPSA that they are in compliance with “any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.”

N. Specify how PJM will accommodate and incorporate voluntary relevant electric retail regulatory authority involvement in coordinating the participation of aggregated distributed energy resources in PJM.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to establish market rules that address coordination between PJM, the DER aggregator, the distribution utility, and the

74 City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“As we observed earlier, there is an infinitude of practices affecting rates and service. The statutory directive must reasonably be read to require the recitation of only those practices that affect rates and service significantly, that are realistically susceptible of specification, and that are not so generally understood in any contractual arrangement as to render recitation superfluous.”).
RERRA. As part of this coordination, the Commission required PJM to specify in its tariff how PJM will accommodate and incorporate voluntary RERRA involvement in coordinating the participation of aggregated DERs in PJM markets. The Commission noted that possible roles and responsibilities of RERRAs in coordinating the participation of DER aggregations in PJM markets may include, but are not limited to: developing interconnection agreements and rules; developing local rules to ensure distribution system safety and reliability, data sharing, and/or metering and telemetry requirements; overseeing distribution utility review of DER participation in aggregations; establishing rules for multi-use applications; and resolving disputes between DER aggregators and distribution utilities over issues such as access to individual DER data.

ii. **PJM Compliance**

In compliance with this directive, PJM’s DER Aggregator Participation Model incorporates significant roles for RERRA involvement. First, RERRAs will oversee all physical interconnection of Component DER to distribution facilities for purposes of participating in PJM markets exclusively through a DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the Commission’s explicit disclamoration of jurisdiction over all such interconnections in Order No. 2222. Accordingly, PJM has memorialized this role in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(o) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(o).

Component DER interconnecting to distribution facilities for purposes of participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM exclusively through the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not be subject to the Part IV of the Tariff.

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75 Order No. 2222 at P 278.

76 *Id.* at P 322.

77 *Id.* at 324.
relating to interconnections with the Transmission System, and shall exclusively interconnect to distribution facilities pursuant to applicable state or local law.

Second, RERRAs will play an essential role in overseeing and settling disputes between DER Aggregators and distribution utilities during pre-registration bilateral coordination regarding the locational and data components necessary for the DER Aggregator’s registration with PJM. PJM has memorialized this role in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b).

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

Third, during the distribution utility review process, PJM has explicitly identified RERRAs as an option for parties to settle disputes prior to initiating the PJM dispute resolution process, and will require that parties take disputes to the applicable RERRA when the dispute arises under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of the RERRA. PJM has memorialized this role in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b).

If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution
process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

Fourth, RERRAs will have the option to directly influence and oversee the operational relationship between the distribution utility, the DER Aggregator, and the Component DER, for purposes of physically dispatching DER Aggregation Resources and the Component DER therein. PJM has memorialized this optionality in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b).

During the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource will be assigned to the electric distribution company, the DER Aggregator, or another entity, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

Fifth, the RERRA will have the option to oversee the conditions under which a distribution utility may override PJM’s dispatch for purposes of preserving distribution system reliability, and will have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under that oversight. PJM has memorialized this optionality in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(f) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(f).

During the Operating Day, an electric distribution company may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable
operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

* * *

Any disputes regarding an electric distribution company’s exercise of its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be addressed in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

O. Address modifications to the list of resources in a DER aggregation.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission directed PJM to revise its tariff to specify that DER aggregators must update their lists of DERs in each aggregation (i.e., reflect additions and subtractions from the list) and any associated information and data, but that, when doing so, DER aggregators will not be required to re-register or re-qualify the entire DER aggregation. The Commission noted that any modification triggers the distribution utility review process (described above), and that, to the extent that PJM requires DER aggregators to provide information on the physical or operational characteristics of its DER aggregation, PJM must revise its tariff to ensure

78 Id. at P 336.

79 Id.
that DER aggregators must update such information if any modification to the list of resources participating in the aggregation results in a change to the aggregation’s performance.\textsuperscript{80} The Commission also indicated that participation of the DER aggregation would not need to be paused during the review of modifications or restudy.\textsuperscript{81}

\textit{ii. PJM Compliance}

In compliance with this requirement, PJM proposes to add the following paragraph to new Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b):

A DER Aggregator shall report to the Office of the Interconnection any proposed update to the inventory of the individual Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource, or proposed additional market services provided by the DER Aggregation Resource, identified in the DER Aggregator’s registration to reflect any proposed addition or subtraction of a Component DER or market service, and any applicable information or data associated with the Component DER or market service, in accordance with the specifications described in the PJM Manuals. Any proposed update shall not require a new registration of the existing Component DER within the approved DER Aggregation Resource. Upon notification of any proposed update, the electric distribution company shall have an opportunity to conduct a review, for a period of up to 60 calendar days, in accordance with the provisions of this section related to initial registration, and make a recommendation to the Office of the Interconnection, prior to the Office of the Interconnection approving or denying the proposed update to the DER Aggregation Resource. The DER Aggregator may continue to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using its existing approved DER Aggregation Resource during the course of any such review.

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at P 338.

\textsuperscript{81} Id. at P 337.
conducted by the electric distribution company. An inventory of the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registration that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may not be modified during the course of an applicable Delivery Year.

This proposed language achieves the objectives identified by the Commission above. PJM’s language mandates that a DER Aggregator report to PJM any proposed update to the inventory of the individual Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the DER Aggregator’s registration, to reflect any proposed addition or subtraction of a Component DER, and any applicable information or data associated with the Component DER. In addition, the language provides an opportunity for a distribution utility to review the proposed modification, while simultaneously not inhibiting the participation of the DER Aggregation Resource while that review is pending. In the event that the distribution utility elects to review the modification, PJM anticipates that in many instances the modifications will not require a full 60-day review process. PJM has nonetheless built this 60-day period into the structure of its language, so as to not presume a defined requisite review time. PJM believes this is appropriate, given the diversity of operational configurations and issues that may arise now or in the future, and the breadth of resource types that may be Component DER. Regarding the capacity market, PJM’s language specifies that an inventory of the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registration that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may not be modified during the course of an applicable Delivery Year. This specification is necessary, given the level of certainty that is a requisite component of the capacity market.
P. Address market participation agreements for DER aggregators.

i. Commission Directive

In Order No. 2222, the Commission required PJM to revise its tariff to include a standard market participation agreement that defines the DER aggregator’s role and responsibilities and its relationship with PJM, and that an aggregator is required to execute before it can participate in PJM’s markets.\(^{82}\) The Commission explained that this participation agreement must include an attestation that “the distributed energy resource aggregator’s aggregation is compliant with the tariffs and operating procedures of the distribution utilities and the rules and regulations of any relevant electric retail regulatory authority.”\(^{83}\) The Commission also specified that the participation agreement must not “limit the business models under which distributed energy resource aggregators can operate.”\(^{84}\)

ii. PJM Compliance

In compliance with this directive, PJM proposes to utilize a new form service agreement called the DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement (“DAPSA”), to be located at Tariff, Attachment N-4. The DAPSA is a clear yet concise participation agreement that articulates the relationship and expectations between the DER Aggregator and PJM. Importantly, the DAPSA contains an explicit attestation that the DER Aggregator “is currently, and will remain, in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory

\(^{82}\) *Id.* at P 352.

\(^{83}\) *Id.*

\(^{84}\) *Id.* at P 353.
Authority, during the term of this DAPSA.” The DAPSA also does not limit or restrict in any way the kinds of business models that a DER Aggregator may utilize. Because the DAPSA meets the requirements of 18. C.F.R. 35.10a of the Commission’s regulations relating to form service agreements, PJM anticipates being able to report executed DAPSAEs in its Electric Quarterly Reports (“EQRs”), rather than submitting individual FPA section 205 filings.

Q. **Amend market rules as necessary to effectuate the “opt-in” mechanism for small utilities.**

   i. **Commission Directive**

   In Order No. 2222, the Commission directed PJM to amend its market rules as necessary to (1) accept bids from a DER aggregator if its aggregation includes DERs that are customers of utilities that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, and (2) not accept bids from DER aggregators if its aggregation includes DERs that are customers of utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, unless the RERRA permits such customers to be bid into PJM’s markets by a DER aggregator.85 The Commission further required PJM on compliance “to explain how it will implement this small utility opt-in,” and noted that PJM “may choose to implement this requirement in a similar manner as it currently implements the small utility opt-in provision under Order No. 719-A.”86 Lastly, in Order No. 2222-B, the Commission affirmed that if a RERRA where a demand response resource is located has either

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85 Id. at P 65.

86 Id. at P 66.
chosen to opt out or has not opted in (pursuant to Order Nos. 719 and 719-A), then the demand response resource may not participate in a DER aggregation.\footnote{Order No. 2222-A at P 29.}

\begin{itemize}
\item[ii.] \textbf{PJM Compliance}
\end{itemize}

In compliance with this directive, PJM proposes to add the following to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g). First, this language specifically establishes the prohibition on the participation of DER Aggregators in the event that a DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of a distribution utility that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, absent authorization by the RERRA—\textit{i.e.} the “opt-in.”

The Office of the Interconnection shall not permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the electric distribution company determines that the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permits such end-use customers to participate.

Second, Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g) include language that specifically establishes the process by which evidence of RERRA authorization to participate may be presented to PJM during the registration process.

The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model with a DER Aggregation Resource including Component DER that are
end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, if, during the course of the registration process described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), the electric distribution company presents any of the following evidence to PJM:

i. an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation;

ii. an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority’s legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation; or

iii. an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation.

In accordance with the Commission’s specifications that PJM “may choose to implement this requirement in a similar manner as it currently implements the small utility opt-in provision under Order No. 719-A,” PJM is implementing this directive in accordance with its provisions related to demand response.  

Third, Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g) include language that acknowledges the right of a RERRA to “opt-out” demand responses resources within its jurisdiction from participation in a DER Aggregation Resource.

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88 Order No. 2222 at P 66.

89 See Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A.3; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.5A.3.
The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the DER Aggregation Resource includes one or more Component DER that are demand response and the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has prohibited the participation of demand response in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

**R. Conforming Changes**

In order to ensure that the DER Aggregator Participation Model, and the new resource types (e.g., DER Aggregation Resource and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource), meld within the broader PJM market framework, a number of conforming changes have been made to ensure accurate representation and consistent treatment of all resource types across the PJM governing documents. These includes noting, where applicable, that certain provisions as detailed in the Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA do or do not apply to the new DER resource types or entities (e.g., DER Aggregator). Other conforming changes in this filing, for example, amount to modifying certain existing definitions such that they either include, or do not preclude, new resource types. Conforming changes in this filing are intended to provide clarity and consistency throughout the governing documents.

**IV. EFFECTIVE DATE**

As referenced above, PJM respectfully requests that the Commission grant an effective date of February 2, 2026 for the Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA revisions proposed
herein. With respect to the proposed revisions specific to the DER Aggregator offering a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, PJM respectfully requests an effective date of July 1, 2023. This will allow Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource to participate in the 2026/2027 Delivery Year BRA.

PJM is requesting these specific effective dates for several reasons. First, PJM will need to plan and budget for a number of software and application changes to support the DER Aggregator Participation Model. The software changes that will need to be completed prior to DER Aggregator Participation Model operations include changes to the PJM Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market clearing engines, and PJM’s Market Gateway platform, to support the bidding and operations of DER Aggregation Resources. PJM will also need to stand up a database and system to support the registration process and data management around DER Aggregation Resources.

Second, there is a larger coordination effort remaining for business practice changes before implementation, included but not limited to RERRA readiness, utility readiness, and PJM readiness. There are a number of activities that will need to be reviewed and business process developed or modified in support of DER Aggregation Resource market participation. RERRAs and utilities will have work activities to evaluate for Component DER and support wholesale participation, including by not limited to processes, resources, costs for interconnection, dispute resolution, utility reviews, and metering and settlements. PJM will have a number of implementation activities to complete as well, including but not limited to, locational mapping

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90 See Attachment B.

91 See Attachment A.
processing, planning study processes for DER Aggregation Resources in RTEP, and updated market procedures for the registration and operation of DER Aggregation Resources.

Third, PJM will require coordination of implementation of the DER Aggregator Participation Model with the nGEM software. PJM will implement these changes to support the DER Aggregator Participation Model in the nGEM system. Current timelines for nGEM implementation is 2025. PJM has determined that the best allocation of its resources is to implement the DER Aggregator Participation Model only on the nGEM platform. This will avoid replicating work, since those changes would otherwise need to be developed, tested, and implemented in both legacy Day-ahead and Real-time market systems and nGEM.

V. MOTION FOR EXTENDED COMMENT PERIOD

Given the breadth and scale of this compliance filing, PJM respectfully requests, pursuant to Rule 212 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, an extension of the standard twenty-one day comment period, from February 22, 2022 to April 1, 2022, in order to provide PJM stakeholders with additional time to develop their responsive pleadings in this proceeding.

VI. CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS

Please direct any communications regarding this filing to the following individuals:

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92 18 C.F.R. § 385.212.
VII. DOCUMENTS INCLUDED WITH THIS FILING

In accordance with the requirements of Order No. 714\(^{93}\) and the Commission’s eTariff regulations, PJM hereby submits an eTariff XML filing package consisting of the following materials:

1. This transmittal letter;

2. Attachment A – Revisions to the Tariff and RAA, effective July 1, 2023, in redlined format;

3. Attachment B – Revisions to the Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA, effective February 2, 2026, in redlined format;

4. Attachment C – Revisions to the Tariff and RAA, effective July 1, 2023, in clean format;

5. Attachment D – Revisions to the Tariff, Operating Agreement, and RAA, effective February 2, 2026, in clean format; and

6. Attachment E – Affidavit of Donald Bielak on behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.\(^{94}\)

VIII. SERVICE

PJM has served a copy of this filing on all PJM Members and on all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region by posting this filing electronically. In accordance with the Commission’s regulations,\(^{95}\) PJM will post a copy of this filing to the FERC filings section of its internet site, located at the following link: https://www.pjm.com/library/filing-order.aspx with a

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\(^{94}\) In accordance with the Commission’s December 8, 2021 Order Extending Blanket Waiver of In-Person Meeting and Document Notarization Requirements, PJM has omitted a notarized verification with this affidavit. *See Temporary Action to Facilitate Social Distancing*, 177 FERC ¶ 61,174 (2021).

\(^{95}\) *See* 18 C.F.R §§ 35.2(e) and 385.2010(f)(3).
specific link to the newly-filed document, and will send an e-mail on the same date as this filing to all PJM Members and all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region\(^6\) alerting them that this filing has been made by PJM today and is available by following such link. If the document is not immediately available by using the referenced link, the document will be available through the referenced link within 24 hours of the filing. Also, a copy of this filing will be available on the FERC’s eLibrary website located at the following link: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp in accordance with the Commission’s regulations and Order No. 714. PJM also served this filing on each person designated on the official service list maintained by the Commission for this proceeding.

**IX. CONCLUSION**

In accordance with the foregoing, PJM respectfully requests that the Commission accept this submission and associated tariff records, as discussed herein.

Respectfully submitted,

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February 1, 2022

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\(^6\) PJM already maintains, updates, and regularly uses e-mail lists for all PJM members and affected commissions.
Attachment A

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and
Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective July 1, 2023

(Identified by Additional Cover Pages)

(Marked/Redline Format)
Sections of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

Effective July 1, 2023

(Marked/Redline Format)
ATTACHMENT Q

CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

It is the policy of PJM that prior to an entity participating in any PJM Markets or in order to take Transmission Service, the entity must demonstrate its ability to meet the requirements in this Attachment Q. This Attachment Q also sets forth PJM’s authority to deny, reject, or terminate a Participant’s right to participate in any PJM Markets in order to protect the PJM Markets and PJM Members from unreasonable credit risk from any Participant’s activities. Given the interconnectedness and overlapping of their responsibilities, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and PJM Settlement, Inc. are referred to both individually and collectively herein as “PJM.”

PURPOSE

PJM Settlement is the counterparty to transactions in the PJM Markets. As a consequence, if a Participant defaults on its obligations under this Attachment Q, or PJM determines a Participant represents unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets, and the Participant does not post Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral in response to a Collateral Call, the result is that the Participant represents unsecured credit risk to the PJM Markets. For this reason, PJM must have the authority to monitor and manage credit risk on an ongoing basis, and to act promptly to mitigate or reduce any unsecured credit risk, in order to protect the PJM Markets and PJM Members from losses.

This Attachment Q describes requirements for: (1) eligibility to be a Market Participant, (2) establishment and maintenance of credit by Market Participants, and (3) collateral requirements and forms of credit support that will be deemed as acceptable to mitigate risk to any PJM Markets.

This Attachment Q also sets forth (1) PJM’s authority to monitor and manage credit risk that a Participant may represent to the PJM Markets and/or PJM membership in general, (2) the basis for establishing limits that will be imposed on a Market Participant in order to minimize risk, and (3) various obligations and requirements the violation of which will result in an Event of Default pursuant to this Attachment Q and the Agreements.

Attachment Q describes the types of data and information PJM will review in order to determine whether an Applicant or Market Participant presents an unreasonable risk to any PJM Markets and/or PJM membership in general, and the steps PJM may take in order to address that risk.

APPLICABILITY

This Attachment Q applies to all Applicants and Market Participants who take Transmission Service under this Tariff, or participate in any PJM Markets or market activities under the Agreements. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Attachment Q, simply taking
transmission service or procuring Ancillary Services via market-based rates does not imply market participation for purposes of applicability of this Attachment Q.

II. RISK EVALUATION PROCESS

PJM will conduct a risk evaluation to determine eligibility to become and/or remain a Market Participant or Guarantor that: (1) assesses the entity’s financial strength, risk profile, creditworthiness, and other relevant factors; (2) determines an Unsecured Credit Allowance, if appropriate; (3) determines appropriate levels of Collateral; and (4) evaluates any Credit Support, including Guaranties or Letters of Credit.

A. Initial Risk Evaluation

PJM will perform an initial risk evaluation of each Applicant and/or its Guarantor. As part of the initial risk evaluation, PJM will consider certain Minimum Participation Requirements, assign an Internal Risk Score, establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance if appropriate, and make a determination regarding required levels of Collateral, creditworthiness, credit support, Restricted Collateral and other assurances for participation in certain PJM Markets.

Each Applicant and/or its Guarantor must provide the information set forth below at the time of its initial application pursuant to this Attachment Q and on an ongoing basis in order to remain eligible to participate in any PJM Markets. The same quantitative and qualitative factors will be used to evaluate Participants whether or not they have rated debt.

1. Rating Agency Reports

PJM will review Rating Agency reports from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, Fitch Ratings, or other Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization for each Applicant and/or Guarantor. The review will focus on the Applicant’s or its Guarantor’s senior unsecured debt ratings. If senior unsecured debt ratings are not available, PJM may consider other ratings, including issuer ratings, corporate ratings and/or an implied rating based on an internally derived Internal Credit Score pursuant to section II.A.3 below.

2. Financial Statements and Related Information

Each Applicant and/or its Guarantor must submit, or cause to be submitted, audited financial statements, except as otherwise indicated below, prepared in accordance with United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“US GAAP”) or any other format acceptable to PJM for the three (3) fiscal years most recently ended, or the period of existence of the Applicant and/or its Guarantor, if shorter. Applicants and/or their Guarantors must submit, or cause to be submitted, financial statements, which may be unaudited, for each completed fiscal quarter of the current fiscal year. All audited financial statements provided by the Applicant and/or its Guarantor must be audited by an Independent Auditor.

The information should include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) If the Applicant and/or its Guarantor has publicly traded securities:

(i) Annual reports on Form 10-K, together with any amendments thereto;

(ii) Quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, together with any amendments thereto;

(iii) Form 8-K reports, if any, that have been filed since the most recent Form 10-K;

(iv) A summary provided by the Principal responsible, or to be responsible, for PJM Market activity of: (1) the Participant’s primary purpose(s) of activity or anticipated activity in the PJM Markets (investment, trading or “hedging or mitigating commercial risks,” as such phrase has meaning in the CFTC’s regulations regarding the end-user exception to clearing); (2) the experience of the Participant (and its Principals) in managing risks in similar markets, including other organized RTO/ISO markets or on regulated commodity exchanges; and (3) a high level overview of the Participant’s intended participation in the PJM Markets.

(v) All audited financial statements provided by an Applicant with publicly traded securities and/or its Guarantor with publicly traded securities must be audited by an Independent Auditor that satisfies the requirements set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

(b) If the Applicant and/or its Guarantor does not have publicly-traded securities:

(i) Annual Audited Financial Statements or equivalent independently audited financials, and quarterly financial statements, generally found on:
   - Balance Sheets
   - Income Statements
   - Statements of Cash Flows
   - Statements of Stockholder’s or Member’s Equity or Net Worth;

(ii) Notes to Annual Audited Financial Statements, and notes to quarterly financial statements if any, including disclosures of any material changes from the last report;

(iii) Disclosure equivalent to a Management’s Discussion & Analysis, including an executive overview of operating results and outlook, and compliance with debt covenants and indentures, and off balance sheet arrangements, if any;

(iv) Auditor’s Report with an unqualified opinion or written letter from auditor containing the opinion whether the annual audited financial statements comply with the US GAAP or any other format acceptable to PJM; and
A summary provided by the Principal responsible or to be responsible for
PJM Market activity of: (1) the Participant’s primary purpose(s) of activity
or anticipated activity in the PJM Markets (investment, trading or
“hedging or mitigating commercial risks,” as such phrase has meaning in
the CFTC’s regulations regarding the end-user exception to clearing); (2)
the experience of the Participant (and its Principals) in managing risks in
similar markets, including other organized RTO/ISO markets or on
regulated commodity exchanges; and (3) a high level overview of the
Participant’s intended participation in the PJM Markets.

(c) If Applicant and/or Guarantor is newly formed, does not yet have three (3)
years of audited financials, or does not routinely prepare audited financial statements,
PJM may specify other information to allow it to assess the entity’s
creditworthiness, including but not limited to:

(i) Equivalent financial information traditionally found in:
   - Balance Sheets
   - Income Statements
   - Statements of Cash Flows

(ii) Disclosure equivalent to a Management’s Discussion & Analysis,
    including an executive overview of operating results and outlook, and
    compliance with debt covenants and indentures, and off balance sheet
    arrangements, if any; and

(iii) A summary provided by the Principal responsible or to be responsible for
     PJM Market activity of: (1) the Participant’s primary purpose(s) of activity
     or anticipated activity in the PJM Markets (investment, trading or
     “hedging or mitigating commercial risks,” as such phrase has meaning in
     the CFTC’s regulations regarding the end-user exception to clearing); (2)
     the experience of the Participant (and its Principals) in managing risks in
     similar markets, including other organized RTO/ISO markets or on
     regulated commodity exchanges; and (3) a high level overview of the
     Participant’s intended participation in the PJM Markets.

(d) During a two year transition period from June 1, 2020 to May 31, 2022, the
Applicant or Guarantor may provide a combination of audited financial
statements and/or equivalent financial information.

If any of the above information in this section II.A.2 is available on the internet, the Applicant
and/or its Guarantor may provide a letter stating where such statements can be located and
retrieved by PJM. If an Applicant and/or its Guarantor files Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, or Form 8-
K with the SEC, then the Applicant and/or its Guarantor will be deemed to have satisfied the
requirement by indicating to PJM where the information in this section II.A.2 can be located on
the internet.
If the Applicant and/or its Guarantor fails, for any reason, to provide the information required above in this section II.A.2, PJM has the right to (1) request Collateral and/or Restricted Collateral to cover the amount of risk reasonably associated with the Applicant and/or its Guarantor’s expected activity in any PJM Markets, and/or (2) restrict the Applicant from participating in certain PJM Markets, including but not limited to restricting the positions the Applicant (once it becomes a Market Participant) takes in the market.

For certain Applicants and/or their Guarantors, some of the above submittals may not be applicable and alternate requirements for compliant submittals may be specified by PJM. In the credit evaluation of Municipalities and Cooperatives, PJM may also request additional information as part of the initial and ongoing review process and will consider other qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness.

3. Credit Rating and Internal Credit Score

PJM will use credit risk scoring methodologies as a tool in determining an Unsecured Credit Allowance for each Applicant and/or its Guarantor. As its source for calculating the Unsecured Credit Allowance, PJM will rely on the ratings from a Rating Agency, if any, on the Applicant’s or Guarantor’s senior unsecured debt or their issuer ratings or corporate ratings if senior unsecured debt ratings are not available. If there is a split rating between the Rating Agencies, the lower of the ratings shall apply. If no external credit rating is available PJM will utilize its Internal Credit Score in order to calculate the Unsecured Credit Allowance.

The model used to develop the Internal Credit Score will be quantitative, based on financial data found in the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, and it will be qualitative based on relevant factors that may be internal or external to a particular Applicant and/or its Guarantor.

PJM will employ a framework, as outlined in Tables 1-5 below, based on metrics internal to the Applicant and/or its Guarantor, including capital and leverage, cash flow coverage of fixed obligations, liquidity, profitability, and other qualitative factors. The particular metrics and scoring rules differ according to the Applicant’s or Guarantor’s line of business and the PJM Markets in which it anticipates participating, in order to account for varying sources and degrees of risk to the PJM Markets and PJM members.

The formulation of each metric will be consistently applied to all Applicants and Guarantors across industries with slight variations based on identifiable differences in entity type, anticipated market activity, and risks to the PJM Markets and PJM members. In instances where the external credit rating is used to calculate the unsecured credit allowance, PJM may also use the Internal Credit Score as an input into determining the overall risk profile of an Applicant and/or its Guarantor.
### Table 1.
Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Leverage and Capital Structure

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<td>Debt / Total Capitalization (%)</td>
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<td>FFO / Debt (%)</td>
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<td>Debt / EBITDA (x)</td>
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<td>Debt / Property, Plant &amp; Equipment (%)</td>
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<td>Retained Earnings / Total Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Debt / Avg Daily Production or KwH ($)</td>
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<td>Core Capital / Total Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Risk-Based Capital / RWA (%)</td>
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<td>Tier 1 Capital / RWA (%)</td>
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<td>Equity / Investments (%)</td>
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**primary metric** secondary metric  

*FFO = Funds From Operations  
RWA = Risk-Weighted Assets*  

### Table 2.
Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Fixed Charge Coverage and Funding

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<td>EBIT / Interest Expense (x)</td>
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<td>EBITDA / [Interest Exp + CPLTD] (x)</td>
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<td>[FFO + Interest Exp] / Interest Exp (x)</td>
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<td>Loans / Total Deposits (%)</td>
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<td>NPL / Gross Loans (%)</td>
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<td>NPL / [Net Worth + LLR] (%)</td>
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<td>Market Funding / Tangible Bank Assets (%)</td>
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**primary metric** secondary metric  

*CPLTD = Current Portion of Long-Term Debt  
EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes  
EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization  
LLR = Loan Loss Reserves  
NPL = Non-Performing Loans*
Table 3. 
Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Liquidity

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<td>CFO / Total Debt (x)</td>
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<td>Current Assets / Current Liabilities (x)</td>
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<td>Liquid Assets / Tangible Bank Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Sources / Uses of Funds (x)</td>
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<td>Weighted Avg Maturity of Debt (yrs)</td>
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<td>Floating Rate Debt / Total Debt (%)</td>
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primary metric secondary metric  
CFO = Cash Flow From Operations

Table 4. 
Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Profitability

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<tr>
<td>Return on Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Return on Equity (%)</td>
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<td>Profit Volatility (%)</td>
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<td>Return on Revenue (%)</td>
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<td>Net Income / Tangible Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Net Profit ($)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net Income / Dividends (x)</td>
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primary metric secondary metric

Table 5. 
Qualitative Factors: Industry Level

|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------|---------------|


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need for PJM Markets to Achieve Business Goals</th>
<th>Rating Agency criteria or other industry analysis</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Med</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Med</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Grow/Enter Markets other than PJM</td>
<td>Rating Agency criteria or other industry analysis</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Participants’ Ability to Serve Customers</td>
<td>Rating Agency criteria or other industry analysis</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulation of Participant’s Business</td>
<td>RRA regulator y climate scores, S&amp;P BICRA</td>
<td>PUCS</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>FERC PUCs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Purpose of PJM Activity</td>
<td>Investment (&quot;Inv.&quot;)/ Trading (&quot;Trade&quot;)/ Hedging or Mitigating Commercial Risk of Operations (&quot;CRH&quot;)</td>
<td>CRH</td>
<td>CRH</td>
<td>CRH/Trade</td>
<td>CRH/Trade</td>
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<td>CRH/Trade</td>
<td>CRH/Trade</td>
<td>Inv./Trade</td>
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*RRA = Regulatory Research Associates, a division of S&P Global, Inc.  BICRA = Bank Industry Country Risk Assessment*

The scores developed will range from 1-6, with the following mappings:

1 = Very Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: AAA to AA-; Moody’s: Aaa to Aa3)
2 = Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: A+ to BBB+; Moody’s: A1 to Baa1)
3 = Low to Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB; Moody’s: Baa2)
4 = Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB-; Moody’s: Baa3)
5 = Medium to High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB+ to BB; Moody’s: Ba1 to Ba2)
6 = High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB- and below; Moody’s: Ba3 and below)

4. *Trade References*
If deemed necessary by PJM, whether because the Applicant is newly or recently formed or for any other reason, each Applicant and/or its Guarantor shall provide at least one (1) bank reference and three (3) Trade References to provide PJM with evidence of Applicant’s understanding of the markets in which the Applicant is seeking to participate and the Applicant’s experience and ability to manage risk. PJM may contact the bank references and Trade References provided by the Applicant to verify their business experience with the Applicant.

5. **Litigation and Contingencies**

Unless prohibited by law, each Applicant and Guarantor is also required to disclose and provide information as to the occurrence of, within the five (5) years prior to the submission of the information to PJM (i) any litigation, arbitration, investigation (formal inquiry initiated by a governmental or regulatory entity), or proceeding, pending or, to the knowledge of the involving, Applicant or its Guarantor or any of their Principals that would likely have a material adverse impact on its financial condition and/or would likely materially affect the risk of non-payment by the Applicant or Guarantor, or (ii) any finding of material defalcation, market manipulation or fraud by or involving the Applicant, Guarantor, or any of their Principals, predecessors, subsidiaries, or Credit Affiliates that participate in any United States power markets based upon a final adjudication of regulatory and/or legal proceedings, (iii) any bankruptcy declarations or petitions by or against an Applicant and/or Guarantor, or (iv) any violation by any of the foregoing of any federal or state regulations or laws regarding energy commodities, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) or FERC requirements, the rules of any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, any self-regulatory organization or any other governing, regulatory, or standards body responsible for regulating activity in North American markets for electricity, natural gas or electricity-related commodity products. Each Applicant and Guarantor shall take reasonable measures to obtain permission to disclose information related to a non-public investigation. These disclosures shall be made by Applicant and Guarantor upon application, and within ten (10) Business Days of any material change with respect to any of the above matters.

6. **History of Defaults in Energy Projects**

Each Applicant and Guarantor shall disclose their current default status and default history for any energy related generation or transmission project (e.g. generation, solar, development), and within any wholesale or retail energy market, including but not limited to within PJM, any Independent System Operator or Regional Transmission Organization, and exchange that has not been cured within the past five (5) years. Defaults of a non-recourse project financed entity may not be included in the default history.

7. **Other Disclosures and Additional Information**

Each Applicant and Guarantor is required to disclose any Credit Affiliates that are currently Members of PJM, applying for membership with PJM, Transmission Customers, Participants, applying to become Market Participants, or that participate directly or indirectly in any PJM Markets or any other North American markets for electricity, natural gas or electricity-related commodity products. Each Applicant and Guarantor shall also provide a copy of its limited
liability company agreement or equivalent agreement, certification of formation, articles of incorporation or other similar organization document, offering memo or equivalent, the names of its five (5) most senior Principals, and information pertaining to any non-compliance with debt covenants and indentures.

Applicants shall provide PJM the credit application referenced in section III.A and any other information or documentation reasonably required for PJM to perform the initial risk evaluation of Applicant’s or Guarantor’s creditworthiness and ability to comply with the requirements contained in the Agreements related to settlements, billing, credit requirements, and other financial matters.

B. Supplemental Risk Evaluation Process

As described in section VI below, PJM will conduct a supplemental risk evaluation process for Applicants, Participants, and Guarantors applying to conduct virtual and export transactions or participate in any PJM Markets.

C. Unsecured Credit Allowance

A Market Participant may request that PJM consider it for an Unsecured Credit Allowance pursuant to the provisions herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an FTR Participant shall not be considered for an Unsecured Credit Allowance for participation in the FTR markets.

1. Unsecured Credit Allowance Evaluation

PJM will perform a credit evaluation on each Participant that has requested an Unsecured Credit Allowance, both initially and at least annually thereafter. PJM shall determine the amount of Unsecured Credit Allowance, if any, that can be provided to the Market Participant in accordance with the creditworthiness and other requirements set forth in this Attachment Q. In completing the credit evaluation, PJM will consider:

(a) Rating Agency Reports

PJM will review Rating Agency reports as for each Market Participant on the same basis as described in section II.A.1 above and section II.E.1 below.

(b) Financial Statements and Related Information

All financial statements and related information considered for an Unsecured Credit Allowance must satisfy all of the same requirements described in section II.A.2 above and section II.E.2 below.

2. Material Adverse Changes

Each Market Participant is responsible for informing PJM, in writing, of any Material Adverse Change in its financial condition (or the financial condition of its Guarantor) since the date of the Market Participant or Guarantor’s most recent annual financial statements provided to PJM, pursuant to the requirements reflected in section II.A.2 above and section II.E.3 below.
In the event that PJM determines that a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of a Market Participant warrants a requirement to provide Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral, PJM shall comply with the process and requirements described in section II.A above and section II.E below.

3. **Other Disclosures**

Each Market Participant desiring an Unsecured Credit Allowance is required to make the disclosures and upon the same requirements reflected in section II.A.7 above and section II.E.7 below.

**D. Determination of Unreasonable Credit Risk**

Unreasonable credit risk shall be determined by the likelihood that an Applicant will default on a financial obligation arising from its participation in any PJM Markets. Indicators of potentially unreasonable credit risk include, but are not limited to, a history of market manipulation based upon a final adjudication of regulatory and/or legal proceedings, a history of financial defaults, a history of bankruptcy or insolvency within the past five (5) years, or a combination of current market and financial risk factors such as low capitalization, a reasonably likely future material financial liability, a low Internal Credit Score (derived pursuant to section II.A.3 above) and/or a low externally derived credit score. PJM’s determination will be based on, but not limited to, information and material provided to PJM during its initial risk evaluation process, information and material provided to PJM in the Officer’s Certification, and/or information gleaned by PJM from public and non-public sources.

If PJM determines that an Applicant poses an unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets, PJM may require Collateral, additional Collateral, or Restricted Collateral commensurate with the Applicant’s risk of financial default, reject an application, and/or limit or deny Applicant’s participation in the PJM Markets, to the extent and for the time period it determines is necessary to mitigate the unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets. PJM will reject an application if it determines that Collateral, additional Collateral, or Restricted Collateral cannot address the risk.

PJM will communicate its concerns regarding whether the Applicant presents an unreasonable credit risk, if any, in writing to the Applicant and attempt to better understand the circumstances surrounding that Applicant’s financial and credit position before making its determination. In the event PJM determines that an Applicant presents an unreasonable credit risk that warrants a requirement to provide Collateral of any type, or some action to mitigate risk, PJM shall provide the Applicant with a written explanation of why such determination was made.

**E. Ongoing Risk Evaluation**

In addition to the initial risk evaluation set forth in sections II.A through II.D above and the annual certification requirements set forth in section III.A below, each Market Participant and/or its Guarantor has an ongoing obligation to provide PJM with the information required in section IV.A described in more detail below. PJM may also review public information regarding a
Market Participant and/or its Guarantor as part of its ongoing risk evaluation. If appropriate, PJM will revise the Market Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or change its determination of creditworthiness, credit support, Restricted Collateral, required Collateral or other assurances pursuant to PJM’s ongoing risk evaluation process.

Each Market Participant and/or its Guarantor must provide the information set forth below on an ongoing basis in order to remain eligible to participate in any PJM Markets. The same quantitative and qualitative factors will be used to evaluate Market Participants whether or not they have rated debt.

1. **Rating Agency Reports**

PJM will review Rating Agency reports for each Market Participant and/or Guarantor on the same basis as described in section II.A.1 above.

2. **Financial Statements and Related Information**

On an ongoing basis, Market Participants and/or their Guarantors shall provide the information they are required to provide as described in section II.A.2 above, pursuant to the schedule reflected below, with one exception. With regard to the summary that is required to be provided by the Principal responsible for PJM Market activity, with respect to experience of the Participant or its Principals in managing risks in similar markets, the Principal only needs to provide that information for a new Principal that was not serving in the position when the prior summary was provided. PJM will review financial statements and related information for each Market Participant and/or Guarantor on the same basis as described in section II.A.2 above.

Each Market Participant and/or its Guarantor must submit, or cause to be submitted, annual audited financial statements, except as otherwise indicated below, prepared in accordance with US GAAP or any other format acceptable to PJM for the fiscal year most recently ended within ten (10) calendar days of the financial statements becoming available and no later than one hundred twenty (120) calendar days after its fiscal year end. Market Participants and/or their Guarantors must submit, or cause to be submitted, financial statements, which may be unaudited, for each completed fiscal quarter of the current fiscal year, promptly upon their issuance, but no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the end of each fiscal quarter. All audited financial statements provided by the Market Participant and/or its Guarantor must be audited by an Independent Auditor.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, PJM may upon request, grant a Market Participant or Guarantor an extension of time, if the financials are not available within the time frame stated above.

3. **Material Adverse Changes**

Each Market Participant and each Guarantor is responsible for informing PJM, in writing, of any Material Adverse Change in its or its Guarantor’s financial condition within five (5) Business Days of any Principal becoming aware of the occurrence of a Material Adverse Change since the date of the Market Participant or Guarantor’s most recent annual financial statements provided to
PJM. However, PJM may also independently establish from available information that a Participant and/or its Guarantor has experienced a Material Adverse Change in its financial condition without regard to whether such Market Participant or Guarantor has informed PJM of the same.

For the purposes of this Attachment Q, a Material Adverse Change in financial condition may include, but is not be limited to, any of the following:

(a) a bankruptcy filing;
(b) insolvency;
(c) a significant decrease in market capitalization;
(d) restatement of prior financial statements unless required due to regulatory changes;
(e) the resignation or removal of a Principal unless there is a new Principal appointed or expected to be appointed, a transition plan in place pending the appointment of a new Principal, or a planned restructuring of such roles;
(f) the filing of a lawsuit or initiation of an arbitration, investigation, or other proceeding that would likely have a material adverse effect on any current or future financial results or financial condition or increase the likelihood of non-payment;
(g) a material financial default in any other organized energy, ancillary service, financial transmission rights and/or capacity markets including but not limited to those of another Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator, or on any commodity exchange, futures exchange or clearing house, that has not been cured or remedied after any required notice has been given and any cure period has elapsed;
(h) a revocation of a license or other authority by any Federal or State regulatory agency; where such license or authority is necessary or important to the Participant’s continued business, for example, FERC market-based rate authority, or State license to serve retail load;
(i) a significant change in credit default swap spreads, market capitalization, or other market-based risk measurement criteria, such as a recent increase in Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF™) that is materially greater than the increase in its peers’ EDF™ rates, or a collateral default swap (CDS) premium normally associated with an entity rated lower than investment grade;
(j) a confirmed, undisputed material financial default in a bilateral arrangement with another Participant or counterparty that has not been cured or remedied after any required notice has been given and any cure period has elapsed;
(k) the sale by a Participant of all or substantially all of its bilateral position(s) in the PJM Markets;
(l) any adverse changes in financial condition which, individually, or in the aggregate, are material; and,
(m) any adverse changes, events or occurrences which, individually or in the aggregate, could affect the ability of the entity to pay its debts as they become due or could reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on any current or future financial results or financial condition.
Upon identification of a Material Adverse Change, PJM shall evaluate the financial strength and risk profile of the Market Participant and/or its Guarantor at that time and may do so on a more frequent basis going forward. If the result of such evaluation identifies unreasonable credit risk to any PJM Market as further described in section II.E.8 below, PJM will take steps to mitigate the financial exposure to the PJM Markets. These steps include, but are not limited to requiring the Market Participant and/or each Guarantor to provide Collateral, additional Collateral or additional Restricted Collateral that is commensurate with the amount of risk in which the Market Participant wants to engage, and/or limiting the Market Participant’s ability to participate in any PJM Market to the extent, and for the time-period necessary to mitigate the unreasonable credit risk. In the event PJM determines that a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition or risk profile of a Market Participant and/or Guarantor, warrants a requirement to provide Collateral of any type, or some action to mitigate risk, PJM shall provide the Market Participant and/or Guarantor, a written explanation of why such determination was made. Conversely, in the event PJM determines there has been an improvement in the financial condition or risk profile of a Market Participant and/or Guarantor such that the amount of Collateral needed for that Market Participant and/or Guarantor can be reduced, PJM shall provide a written explanation why such determination was made, including the amount of the Collateral reduction and indicating when and how the reduction will be made.

4. **Litigation and Contingencies**

Each Market Participant and/or Guarantor is required to disclose and provide information regarding litigation and contingencies as outlined in section II.A.5 above.

5. **History of Defaults in Energy Projects**

Each Market Participant and/or Guarantor is required to disclose current default status and default history as outlined in section II.A.6 above.

6. **Internal Credit Score**

As part of its ongoing risk evaluation, PJM will use credit risk scoring methodologies as a tool in determining an Internal Credit Score for each Market Participant and/or Guarantor, utilizing the same model and framework outlined in section II.A.3 above.

7. **Other Disclosures and Additional Information**

Each Market Participant and/or Guarantor is required to make other disclosures and provide additional information outlined in section II.A.7 above.

PJM will monitor each Market Participant’s use of services and associated financial obligations on a regular basis to determine their total potential financial exposure and for credit monitoring purposes, and may require the Market Participant and/or Guarantor to provide additional information, pursuant to the terms and provisions described herein.
Market Participants shall provide PJM, upon request, any information or documentation reasonably required for PJM to monitor and evaluate a Market Participant’s creditworthiness and compliance with the Agreements related to settlements, billing, credit requirements, and other financial matters.

8. **Unreasonable Credit Risk**

If PJM has reasonable grounds to believe that a Market Participant and/or its Guarantor poses an unreasonable credit risk to any PJM Markets, PJM may immediately notify the Market Participant of such unreasonable credit risk and (1) issue a Collateral Call to demand Collateral, additional Collateral, or Restricted Collateral or other assurances commensurate with the Market Participant’s and/or its Guarantor’s risk of financial default or other risk posed by the Market Participant’s or Guarantor’s financial condition or risk profile to the PJM Markets and PJM members, or (2) limit or suspend the Market Participant’s participation in any PJM Markets, to the extent and for such time period PJM determines is necessary to mitigate the unreasonable credit risk to any PJM Markets. PJM will only limit or suspend a Market Participant’s market participation if Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral cannot address the unreasonable credit risk.

PJM’s determination will be based on, but not limited to, information and material provided to PJM during its ongoing risk evaluation process or in the Officer’s Certification, and/or information gleaned by PJM from public and non-public sources. PJM will communicate its concerns, if any, in writing to the Market Participant and attempt to better understand the circumstances surrounding the Market Participant’s financial and credit position before making its determination. At PJM’s request or upon its own initiative, the Market Participant or its Guarantor may provide supplemental information to PJM that would allow PJM to consider reducing the additional Collateral requested or reducing the severity of limitations or other restrictions designed to mitigate the Market Participant’s credit risk. Such information shall include, but not be limited to: (i) the Market Participant’s estimated exposure, (ii) explanations for any recent change in the Market Participant’s market activity, (iii) any relevant new load or unit outage information; or (iv) any default or supply contract expiration, termination or suspension.

The Market Participant shall have five (5) Business Days to respond to PJM’s request for supplemental information. If the requested information is provided in full to PJM’s satisfaction during said period, the additional Collateral requirement shall reflect the Market Participant’s anticipated exposure based on the information provided. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any additional Collateral requested by PJM in a Collateral Call must be provided by the Market Participant within the applicable cure period.

In the event PJM determines that an Market Participant and/or its Guarantor presents an unreasonable credit risk, as described above, that warrants a requirement to provide Collateral of any type, or some action to mitigate risk, PJM shall provide the Market Participant with a written explanation of why such final determination was made.
PJM has the right at any time to modify any Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or require additional Collateral as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support current or anticipated market activity as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q, sections II.A.2 and II.C.1.b. Failure to remit the required amount of additional Collateral within the applicable cure period shall constitute an Event of Default.

F. Collateral and Credit Restrictions

PJM may establish certain restrictions on available credit by requiring that some amounts of credit, i.e. Restricted Collateral, may not be available to satisfy credit requirements. Such designations shall be construed to be applicable to the calculation of credit requirements only, and shall not restrict PJM’s ability to apply such designated credit to any obligation(s) in case of a default. Any such Restricted Collateral will be held by PJM, as applicable. Such Restricted Collateral will not be returned to the Participant until PJM has determined that the risk for which such Restricted Collateral is being held has subsided or been resolved.

PJM may post on PJM’s web site, and may reference on OASIS, a supplementary document which contains additional business practices (such as algorithms for credit scoring) that are not included in this Attachment Q. Changes to the supplementary document will be subject to stakeholder review and comment prior to implementation. PJM may specify a required compliance date, not less than fifteen (15) calendar days from notification, by which time all Participants and their Guarantors must comply with provisions that have been revised in the supplementary document.

PJM will regularly post each Participant’s and/or its Guarantor’s credit requirements and credit provisions on the PJM web site in a secure, password-protected location. Each Participant and/or its Guarantor is responsible for monitoring such information, and maintaining sufficient credit to satisfy the credit requirements described herein. Failure to maintain credit sufficient to satisfy the credit requirements of the Attachment Q shall constitute a Credit Breach, and the Participant will be subject to the remedies established herein and in any of the Agreements.

G. Unsecured Credit Allowance Calculation

The external rating from a Rating Agency will be used as the source for calculating the Unsecured Credit Allowance, unless no external credit rating is available in which case PJM will utilize its Internal Credit Score for such purposes. If there is a split rating between the Rating Agencies, the lower of the ratings shall apply.

Where two or more entities, including Participants, are considered Credit Affiliates, Unsecured Credit Allowances will be established for each individual Participant, subject to an aggregate maximum amount for all Credit Affiliates as provided for in Attachment Q, section II.G.3.

In its credit evaluation of Municipalities and Cooperatives, PJM may request additional information as part of the ongoing risk evaluation process and will also consider qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness.
1. **Credit Rating and Internal Credit Score**

As previously described in section II.A.3 above, PJM will determine the Internal Credit Score for an Applicant, Market Participant and/or its Guarantor using the credit risk scoring methodologies contained therein. Internal Credit Scores, ranging from 1-6, for each Applicant, Market Participant and/or its Guarantor, will be determined with the following mappings:

1 = Very Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: AAA to AA-; Moody’s: Aaa to Aa3)
2 = Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: A+ to BBB+; Moody’s: A1 to Baa1)
3 = Low to Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB; Moody’s: Baa2)
4 = Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB-; Moody’s: Baa3)
5 = Medium to High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB+ to BB; Moody’s: Ba1 to Ba2)
6 = High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB- and below; Moody’s: Ba3 and below)

In instances where the external credit rating is used to calculate the unsecured credit allowance, PJM may also use the Internal Credit Score as an input into its determination of the overall risk profile of an Applicant and/or its Guarantor

2. **Unsecured Credit Allowance**

PJM will determine a Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance based on its external rating or its Internal Credit Score, as applicable, and the parameters in the table below. The maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance is the lower of:

(a) A percentage of the Participant’s Tangible Net Worth, as stated in the table below, with the percentage based on the Participant’s external rating or Internal Credit Score, as applicable; and

(b) A dollar cap based on the external rating or Internal Credit Score, as applicable, as stated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Credit Score</th>
<th>Risk Ranking</th>
<th>Tangible Net Worth Factor</th>
<th>Maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance ($ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00 – 1.99</td>
<td>1 – Very Low (AAA to AA-)</td>
<td>Up to 10.00%</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00 – 2.99</td>
<td>2 – Low (A+ to BBB+)</td>
<td>Up to 8.00%</td>
<td>$42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 – 3.49</td>
<td>3 – Low to Medium (BBB)</td>
<td>Up to 6.00%</td>
<td>$33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.50 – 4.49</td>
<td>4 – Medium (BBB-)</td>
<td>Up to 5.00%</td>
<td>$7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.50 – 5.49</td>
<td>5 – Medium to High (BB+ to BB)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5.49</td>
<td>6 – High (BB- and below)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If a Corporate Guaranty is utilized to establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance for a Participant, the value of a Corporate Guaranty will be the lesser of:

(a) The limit imposed in the Corporate Guaranty;
(b) The Unsecured Credit Allowance calculated for the Guarantor; and
(c) A portion of the Unsecured Credit Allowance calculated for the Guarantor in the case of Credit Affiliates.

PJM has the right at any time to modify any Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or require additional Collateral as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support current market activity. Failure to remit the required amount of additional Collateral within the applicable cure period shall be deemed an Event of Default.

PJM will maintain a posting of each Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance, along with certain other credit related parameters, on the PJM website in a secure, password-protected location. Each Participant will be responsible for monitoring such information and recognizing changes that may occur.

3. Unsecured Credit Limits For Credit Affiliates

If two or more Participants are Credit Affiliates and have requested an Unsecured Credit Allowance, PJM will consider the overall creditworthiness of the Credit Affiliates when determining the Unsecured Credit Allowances in order not to establish more Unsecured Credit for the Credit Affiliates collectively than the overall corporate family could support.

Example: Participants A and B each have a $10.0 million Corporate Guaranty from their common parent, a holding company with an Unsecured Credit Allowance calculation of $12.0 million. PJM may limit the Unsecured Credit Allowance for each Participant to $6.0 million, so the total Unsecured Credit Allowance does not exceed the corporate family total of $12.0 million.

PJM will work with the Credit Affiliates to allocate the total Unsecured Credit Allowance among the Credit Affiliates while assuring that no individual Participant, nor common guarantor, exceeds the Unsecured Credit Allowance appropriate for its credit strength. The aggregate Unsecured Credit for a Participant, including Unsecured Credit Allowance granted based on its own creditworthiness and risk profile, and any Unsecured Credit Allowance conveyed through a Guaranty shall not exceed $50 million. The aggregate Unsecured Credit for a Credit Affiliates corporate family shall not exceed $50 million. A Credit Affiliate corporate family subject to this cap shall request PJM to allocate the maximum Unsecured Credit amongst the corporate family, assuring that no individual Participant or common guarantor, shall exceed the Unsecured Credit level appropriate for its credit strength and activity.

H. Contesting an Unsecured Credit Evaluation
PJM will provide to a Participant, upon request, a written explanation for any determination of or change in Unsecured Credit or credit requirement within ten (10) Business Days of receiving such request.

If a Participant believes that either its level of Unsecured Credit or its credit requirement has been incorrectly determined, according to this Attachment Q, then the Participant may send a request for reconsideration in writing to PJM. Such a request should include:

1. A citation to the applicable section(s) of this Attachment Q along with an explanation of how the respective provisions of this Attachment Q were not carried out in the determination as made; and

2. A calculation of what the Participant believes should be the appropriate Unsecured Credit or Collateral requirement, according to terms of this Attachment Q.

PJM will provide a written response as promptly as practical, but no more than ten (10) Business Days after receipt of the request. If the Participant still feels that the determination is incorrect, then the Participant may contest that determination. Such contest should be in written form, addressed to PJM, and should contain:

1. A complete copy of the Participant’s earlier request for reconsideration, including citations and calculations;

2. A copy of PJM’s written response to its request for reconsideration; and

3. An explanation of why it believes that the determination still does not comply with this Attachment Q.

PJM will investigate and will respond to the Participant with a final determination on the matter as promptly as practical, but no more than twenty (20) Business Days after receipt of the request.

Neither requesting reconsideration nor contesting the determination following such request shall relieve or delay Participant's responsibility to comply with all provisions of this Attachment Q, including without limitation posting Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral in response to a Collateral Call.

If a Corporate Guaranty is being utilized to establish credit for a Participant, the Guarantor will be evaluated and the Unsecured Credit Allowance granted, if any, based on the financial strength and creditworthiness, and risk profile of the Guarantor. Any utilization of a Corporate Guaranty will only be applicable to non-FTR credit requirements, and will not be applicable to cover FTR credit requirements.

PJM will identify any necessary Collateral requirements and establish a Working Credit Limit for each Participant. Any Unsecured Credit Allowance will only be applicable to non-FTR credit requirements, for positions in PJM Markets other than the FTR market, because all FTR credit requirements must be satisfied by posting Collateral.
III. MINIMUM PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS

A Participant seeking to participate in any PJM Markets shall submit to PJM any information or documentation reasonably required for PJM to evaluate its experience and resources. If PJM determines, based on its review of the relevant information and after consultation with the Participant, that the Participant’s participation in any PJM Markets presents an unreasonable credit risk, PJM may reject the Participant’s application to become a Market Participant, notwithstanding applicant’s ability to meet other minimum participation criteria, registration requirements and creditworthiness requirements.

A. Annual Certification

Before they are eligible to transact in any PJM Market, all Applicants shall provide to PJM (i) an executed copy of a credit application and (ii) a copy of the annual certification set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1. As a condition to continued eligibility to transact in any PJM Market, Market Participants shall provide to PJM the annual certification set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1.

After the initial submission, the annual certification must be submitted each calendar year by all Market Participants between January 1 and April 30. PJM will accept such certifications as a matter of course and the Market Participants will not need further notice from PJM before commencing or maintaining their eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets.

A Market Participant that fails to provide its annual certification by April 30 shall be ineligible to transact in any PJM Markets and PJM will disable the Market Participant’s access to any PJM Markets until such time as PJM receives the certification. In addition, failure to provide an executed annual certification in a form acceptable to PJM and by the specified deadlines may result in a default under the Tariff.

Market Participants acknowledge and understand that the annual certification constitutes a representation upon which PJM will rely. Such representation is additionally made under the Tariff, filed with and accepted by FERC, and any false, misleading or incomplete statement knowingly made by the Market Participant and that is material to the Market Participant’s ability to perform may be considered a violation of the Tariff and subject the Market Participant to action by FERC. Failure to comply with any of the criteria or requirements listed herein or in the certification may result in suspension or limitation of a Market Participant’s transaction rights in any PJM Markets.

Applicants and Market Participants shall submit to PJM, upon request, any information or documentation reasonably and/or legally required to confirm Applicant’s or Market Participant’s compliance with the Agreements and the annual certification.

B. PJM Market Participation Eligibility Requirements
PJM may conduct periodic verification to confirm that Applicants and Market Participants can demonstrate that they meet the definition of “appropriate person” to further ensure minimum criteria are in place. Such demonstration will consist of the submission of evidence and an executed Annual Officer Certification form as set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1 in a form acceptable to PJM. If an Applicant or Market Participant does not provide sufficient evidence for verification to PJM within five (5) Business Days of written request, then such Applicant or Market Participant may result in a default under this Tariff. Demonstration of “appropriate person” status and support of other certifications on the annual certification is one part of the Minimum Participation Requirements for any PJM Markets and does not obviate the need to meet the other Minimum Participation Requirements such as those for minimum capitalization and risk profile as set forth in this Attachment Q.

To be eligible to transact in any PJM Markets, an Applicant or Participant must demonstrate in accordance with the Risk Management and Verification processes set forth below that it qualifies in one of the following ways:

1. an “appropriate person,” as that term is defined under Commodity Exchange Act, section 4(c)(3), or successor provision, or;

2. an “eligible contract participant,” as that term is defined in Commodity Exchange Act, section 1a(18), or successor provision, or;

3. a business entity or person who is in the business of: (1) generating, transmitting, or distributing electric energy, or (2) providing electric energy services that are necessary to support the reliable operation of the transmission system, or;

4. an Applicant or Market Participant seeking eligibility as an “appropriate person” providing an unlimited Corporate Guaranty in a form acceptable to PJM as described in section V below from a Guarantor that has demonstrated it is an “appropriate person,” and has at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per Applicant and Market Participant for which the Guarantor has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty, or;

5. an Applicant or Market Participant providing a Letter of Credit of at least $5 million to PJM in a form acceptable to PJM as described in section V below, that the Applicant or Market Participant acknowledges is separate from, and cannot be applied to meet, its credit requirements to PJM, or;

6. an Applicant or Market Participant providing a surety bond of at least $5 million to PJM in a form acceptable to PJM as described in section V below, that the Applicant or Market Participant acknowledges is separate from, and cannot be applied to meet, its credit requirements to PJM.

If, at any time, a Market Participant cannot meet the eligibility requirements set forth above, it shall immediately notify PJM and immediately cease conducting transactions in any PJM Markets. PJM may terminate a Market Participant’s transaction rights in any PJM Markets if, at
any time, it becomes aware that the Market Participant does not meet the minimum eligibility requirements set forth above.

In the event that a Market Participant is no longer able to demonstrate it meets the minimum eligibility requirements set forth above, and possesses, obtains or has rights to possess or obtain, any open or forward positions in any PJM Markets, PJM may take any such action it deems necessary with respect to such open or forward positions, including, but not limited to, liquidation, transfer, assignment or sale; provided, however, that the Market Participant will, notwithstanding its ineligibility to participate in any PJM Markets, be entitled to any positive market value of those positions, net of any obligations due and owing to PJM.

C. Risk Management and Verification

All Market Participants must maintain current written risk management policies, procedures, or controls to address how market and credit risk is managed, and are required to submit to PJM (at the time they make their annual certification) a copy of their current governing risk control policies, procedures and controls applicable to their market activities. PJM will review such documentation to verify that it appears generally to conform to prudent risk management practices for entities participating in any PJM Markets.

All Market Participants subject to this provision shall make a one-time payment of $1,500.00 to PJM to cover administrative costs. Thereafter, if such Participant’s risk policies, procedures and controls applicable to its market activities change substantively, it shall submit such modified documentation, with applicable administrative charge determined by PJM, to PJM for review and verification at the time it makes its annual certification. All Market Participant’s continued eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets is conditioned on PJM notifying a Participant that its annual certification, including the submission of its risk policies, procedures and controls, has been accepted by PJM. PJM may retain outside expertise to perform the review and verification function described in this section, however, in all circumstances, PJM and any third-party it may retain will treat as confidential the documentation provided by a Participant under this section, consistent with the applicable provisions of the Operating Agreement.

Participants must demonstrate that they have implemented prudent risk management policies and procedures in order to be eligible to participate in any PJM Markets. Participants must demonstrate on at least an annual basis that they have implemented and maintained prudent risk management policies and procedures in order to continue to participate in any PJM Markets. Upon written request, the Participant will have fourteen (14) calendar days to provide to PJM current governing risk management policies, procedures, or controls applicable to Participant’s activities in any PJM Markets.

D. Capitalization

In advance of certification, Applicants shall meet the minimum capitalization requirements below. In addition to the annual certification requirements in Attachment Q, Appendix 1, a Market Participant shall satisfy the minimum capitalization requirements on an annual basis thereafter. A Participant must demonstrate that it meets the minimum financial requirements
applicable for the PJM Markets in which it transacts by satisfying either the minimum capitalization or the provision of Collateral requirements listed below:

1. Minimum Capitalization

Minimum capitalization may be met by demonstrating minimum levels of Tangible Net Worth or tangible assets. FTR Participants must demonstrate a Tangible Net Worth in excess of $1 million or tangible assets in excess of $10 million. Other Market Participants must demonstrate a Tangible Net Worth in excess of $500,000 or tangible assets in excess of $5 million.

(a) Consideration of tangible assets and Tangible Net Worth shall exclude assets which PJM reasonably believes to be restricted, highly risky, or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of default. Examples include, but are not limited to, restricted assets, derivative assets, goodwill, and other intangible assets.

(b) Demonstration of “tangible” assets and Tangible Net Worth may be satisfied through presentation of an acceptable Corporate Guaranty, provided that both:

   (i) the Guarantor is a Credit Affiliate company that satisfies the Tangible Net Worth or tangible assets requirements herein, and;

   (ii) the Corporate Guaranty is either unlimited or at least $500,000.

If the Corporate Guaranty presented by the Participant to satisfy these capitalization requirements is limited in value, then the Participant’s resulting Unsecured Credit Allowance shall be the lesser of:

   (1) the applicable Unsecured Credit Allowance available to the Participant by the Corporate Guaranty pursuant to the creditworthiness provisions of this Attachment Q, or,

   (2) the face value of the Corporate Guaranty, reduced by $500,000 and further reduced by 10%. (For example, a $10.5 million Corporate Guaranty would be reduced first by $500,000 to $10 million and then further reduced 10% more to $9 million. The resulting $9 million would be the Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance available through the Corporate Guaranty).

In the event that a Participant provides Collateral in addition to a limited Corporate Guaranty to increase its available credit, the value of such Collateral shall be reduced by 10%. This reduced value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.
(c) Demonstrations of minimum capitalization (minimum Tangible Net Worth or tangible assets) must be presented in the form of audited financial statements for the Participant’s most recent fiscal year during the initial risk evaluation process and ongoing risk evaluation process.

2. Provision of Collateral

If a Participant does not demonstrate compliance with its applicable minimum capitalization requirements above, it may still qualify to participate in any PJM Markets by posting Collateral, additional Collateral, and/or Restricted Collateral, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

Any Collateral provided by a Participant unable to satisfy the minimum capitalization requirements above will also be restricted in the following manner:

(a) Collateral provided by Market Participants that engage in FTR transactions shall be reduced by an amount of the current risk plus any future risk to any PJM Markets and PJM membership in general, and may coincide with limitations on market participation. The amount of this Restricted Collateral shall not be available to cover any credit requirements from market activity. The remaining value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.

(b) Collateral provided by other Participants that engage in Virtual Transactions or Export Transactions shall be reduced by $200,000 and then further reduced by 10%. The amount of this Restricted Collateral shall not be available to cover any credit requirements from market activity. The remaining value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.

(c) Collateral provided by other Participants that do not engage in Virtual Transactions or Export Transactions shall be reduced by 10%. The amount of this Restricted Collateral shall not be available to cover any credit requirements from market activity. The remaining value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.

In the event a Participant that satisfies the minimum capital requirement through provision of Collateral also provides a Corporate Guaranty to increase its available credit, then the Participant’s resulting Unsecured Credit Allowance conveyed through such Corporate Guaranty shall be the lesser of:

(a) the applicable Unsecured Credit Allowance available to the Participant by the Corporate Guaranty pursuant to the creditworthiness provisions of this Attachment Q; or

(b) the face value of the Corporate Guaranty, reduced commensurate with the amount of the current risk plus any anticipated future risk to any PJM Markets and PJM membership in general, and may coincide with limitations on market participation.
IV. ONGOING COVENANTS

A. Ongoing Obligation to Provide Information to PJM

So long as a Participant is eligible to participate, or participates or holds positions, in any PJM Markets, it shall deliver to PJM, in form and detail satisfactory to PJM:

1. All financial statements and other financial disclosures as required by section II.E.2 by the deadline set forth therein;

2. Notice, within five (5) Business Days, of any Principal becoming aware that the Participant does not meet the Minimum Participation Requirements set forth in section III;

3. Notice when any Principal becomes aware of any matter that has resulted or would reasonably be expected to result in a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of the Participant or its Guarantor, if any, a description of such Material Adverse Change in detail reasonable to allow PJM to determine its potential effect on, or any change in, the Participant’s risk profile as a participant in any PJM Markets, by the deadline set forth in section II.E.3 above;

4. Notice, within the deadline set forth therein, of any Principal becoming aware of a litigation or contingency event described in section II.E.4, or of a Material Adverse Change in any such litigation or contingency event previously disclosed to PJM, information in detail reasonable to allow PJM to determine its potential effect on, or any change in, the Market Participant’s risk profile as a participant in any PJM Markets by the deadline set forth therein;

5. Notice, within two (2) Business Days after any Principal becomes aware of a Credit Breach, Financial Default, or Credit Support Default, that includes a description of such default or event and the Participant’s proposals for addressing the default or event;

6. As soon as available but not later than April 30th of any calendar year, the annual Certification described in section III.A in a form set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1;

7. Concurrently with submission of the annual certification, demonstration that the Participant meets the minimum capitalization requirements set forth in section III.D;

8. Concurrently with submission of the annual certification and within the applicable deadline of any substantive change, or within the applicable deadline of a request from PJM, a copy of the Participant’s written risk management policies, procedures or controls addressing how the Participant manages market and credit risk in the PJM Markets in which it participates, as well as a high level summary by the chief risk officer or other Principal regarding any material violations, breaches, or compliance or disciplinary actions related to the risk management policies, by the Participant under the policies, procedures or controls within the prior 12 months, as set forth in section IV.B below;

9. Within five (5) Business Days of request by PJM, evidence demonstrating the Participant meets the definition of “appropriate person” or “eligible contract participant,” as those terms are defined in the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC regulations promulgated thereunder, or of any other certification in the annual Certification; or
Within a reasonable time after PJM requests, any other information or documentation reasonably and/or legally required by PJM to confirm Participant’s compliance with the Tariff and its eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets.

Participants acknowledge and understand that the deliveries constitute representations upon which PJM will rely in allowing the Participant to continue to participate in its markets, with the Internal Credit Score and Unsecured Credit Allowance, if any, previously determined by PJM.

B. Risk Management Review

PJM shall also conduct a periodic compliance verification process to review and verify, as applicable, Participants’ risk management policies, practices, and procedures pertaining to the Participant’s activities in any PJM Markets. PJM shall review such documentation to verify that it appears generally to conform to prudent risk management practices for entities trading in any PJM Markets. Participant shall also provide a high level summary by the chief risk officer or other Principal regarding any material violations, breaches, or compliance or disciplinary actions in connection with such risk management policies, practices and procedures within the prior twelve (12) months.

If a third-party industry association publishes or modifies principles or best practices relating to risk management in North American markets for electricity, natural gas or electricity-related commodity products, PJM may, following stakeholder discussion and with no less than six (6) months prior notice to stakeholders, consider such principles or best practices in evaluating the Participant’s risk controls.

PJM will prioritize the verification of risk management policies based on a number of criteria, including but not limited to how long the entity has been in business, the Participant’s and its Principals’ history of participation in any PJM Markets, and any other information obtained in determining the risk profile of the Participant.

Each Participant’s continued eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets is conditioned upon PJM notifying the Participant of successful completion of PJM’s verification of the Participant’s risk management policies, practices and procedures, as discussed herein. However, if PJM notifies the Participant in writing that it could not successfully complete the verification process, PJM shall allow such Participant fourteen (14) calendar days to provide sufficient evidence for verification prior to declaring the Participant as ineligible to continue to participate in any PJM Markets, which declaration shall be in writing with an explanation of why PJM could not complete the verification. If the Participant does not provide sufficient evidence for verification to PJM within the required cure period, such Participant will be considered in default under this Tariff. PJM may retain outside expertise to perform the review and verification function described in this paragraph. PJM and any third party it may retain will treat as confidential the documentation provided by a Participant under this paragraph, consistent with the applicable provisions of the Agreements. If PJM retains such outside expertise, a Participant may direct in writing that PJM perform the risk management review and verification for such Participant instead of utilizing a third party, provided however, that employees and contract employees of PJM and PJM shall not be considered to be such outside expertise or third parties.

Participants are solely responsible for the positions they take and the obligations they assume in any PJM Markets. PJM hereby disclaims any and all responsibility to any Participant or PJM.
Member associated with Participant’s submitting or failure to submit its annual certification or PJM’s review and verification of a Participant’s risk policies, procedures and controls. Such review and verification is limited to demonstrating basic compliance by a Participant showing the existence of written policies, procedures and controls to limit its risk in any PJM Markets and does not constitute an endorsement of the efficacy of such policies, procedures or controls.

V. FORMS OF CREDIT SUPPORT

In order to satisfy their PJM credit requirements Participants may provide credit support in a PJM-approved form and amount pursuant to the guidelines herein, provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, a Market Participant in PJM’s FTR markets shall meet its credit support requirements related to those FTR markets with either cash or Letters of Credit.

Unless otherwise restricted by PJM, credit support provided may be used by PJM to secure the payment of Participant’s financial obligations under the Agreements.

Collateral which may no longer be required to be maintained under provisions of the Agreements, shall be returned at the request of a Participant, no later than two (2) Business Days following determination by PJM within a commercially reasonable period of time that such Collateral is not required.

Except when an Event of Default has occurred, a Participant may substitute an approved PJM form of Collateral for another PJM approved form of Collateral of equal value.

A. Cash Deposit

Cash provided by a Participant as Collateral will be held in a depository account by PJM. Interest shall accrue to the benefit of the Participant, provided that PJM may require Participants to provide appropriate tax and other information in order to accrue such interest credits.

PJM may establish an array of investment options among which a Participant may choose to invest its cash deposited as Collateral. The depository account shall be held in PJM’s name in a banking or financial institution acceptable to PJM. Where practicable, PJM may establish a means for the Participant to communicate directly with the bank or financial institution to permit the Participant to direct certain activity in the PJM account in which its Collateral is held. PJM will establish and publish procedural rules, identifying the investment options and respective discounts in Collateral value that will be taken to reflect any liquidation, market and/or credit risk presented by such investments.

Cash Collateral may not be pledged or in any way encumbered or restricted from full and timely use by PJM in accordance with terms of the Agreements.

PJM has the right to liquidate all or a portion of the Collateral account balance at its discretion to satisfy a Participant’s Total Net Obligation to PJM in the Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements.
B. Letter of Credit

An unconditional, irrevocable standby Letter of Credit can be utilized to meet the Collateral requirement. As stated below, the form, substance, and provider of the Letter of Credit must all be acceptable to PJM.

1. The Letter of Credit will only be accepted from U.S.-based financial institutions or U.S. branches of foreign financial institutions (“financial institutions”) that have a minimum corporate debt rating of “A” by Standard & Poor’s or Fitch Ratings, or “A2” from Moody’s Investors Service, or an equivalent short term rating from one of these agencies. PJM will consider the lowest applicable rating to be the rating of the financial institution. If the rating of a financial institution providing a Letter of Credit is lowered below A/A2 by any Rating Agency, then PJM may require the Participant to provide a Letter of Credit from another financial institution that is rated A/A2 or better, or to provide a cash deposit. If a Letter of Credit is provided from a U.S. branch of a foreign institution, the U.S. branch must itself comply with the terms of this Attachment Q, including having its own acceptable credit rating.

2. The Letter of Credit shall state that it shall renew automatically for successive one-year periods, until terminated upon at least ninety (90) calendar days prior written notice from the issuing financial institution. If PJM or PJM receives notice from the issuing financial institution that the current Letter of Credit is being cancelled or expiring, the Participant will be required to provide evidence, acceptable to PJM, that such Letter of Credit will be replaced with appropriate Collateral, effective as of the cancellation date of the Letter of Credit, no later than thirty (30) calendar days before the cancellation date of the Letter of Credit, and no later than ninety (90) calendar days after the notice of cancellation. Failure to do so will constitute a default under this Attachment Q and one or more of the Agreements.

3. PJM will post on its web site an acceptable standard form of a Letter of Credit that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to submit a Letter of Credit to establish credit at PJM. If the Letter of Credit varies in any way from the standard format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJM. All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a Letter of Credit and meeting the Attachment Q provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

4. PJM may accept a Letter of Credit from a financial institution that does not meet the credit standards of this Attachment Q provided that the Letter of Credit has third-party support, in a form acceptable to PJM, from a financial institution that does meet the credit standards of this Attachment Q.

C. Corporate Guaranty

An irrevocable and unconditional Corporate Guaranty may be utilized to establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance for a Participant. Such credit will be considered a transfer of Unsecured Credit from the Guarantor to the Participant, and will not be considered a form of Collateral.
PJM will post on its website an acceptable form that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to establish its credit with a Corporate Guaranty. If the Corporate Guaranty varies in any way from the PJM format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJM before it may be applied to satisfy the Participant’s credit requirements. The Corporate Guaranty must be signed by an officer of the Guarantor, and must demonstrate that it is duly authorized in a manner acceptable to PJM. Such demonstration may include either a corporate seal on the Corporate Guaranty itself, or an accompanying executed and sealed secretary’s certificate from the Guarantor’s corporate secretary noting that the Guarantor was duly authorized to provide such Corporate Guaranty and that the person signing the Corporate Guaranty is duly authorized, or other manner acceptable to PJM.

PJM will evaluate the creditworthiness of a Guarantor and will establish any Unsecured Credit granted through a Corporate Guaranty using the methodology and requirements established for Participants requesting an Unsecured Credit Allowance as described herein. Foreign Guaranties and Canadian Guaranties shall be subject to additional requirements as established herein. If PJM determines at any time that a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of the Guarantor has occurred, or if the Corporate Guaranty comes within thirty (30) calendar days of expiring without renewal, PJM may reduce or eliminate any Unsecured Credit afforded to the Participant through the guaranty. Such reduction or elimination may require the Participant to provide Collateral within the applicable cure period. If the Participant fails to provide the required Collateral, the Participant shall be in default under this Attachment Q.

All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a Corporate Guaranty and meeting the Attachment Q provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

1. **Foreign Guaranties**

A Foreign Guaranty is a Corporate Guaranty that is provided by a Credit Affiliate entity that is domiciled in a country other than the United States or Canada. The entity providing a Foreign Guaranty on behalf of a Participant is a Foreign Guarantor. A Participant may provide a Foreign Guaranty in satisfaction of part of its credit obligations or voluntary credit provision at PJM provided that all of the following conditions are met:

PJM reserves the right to deny, reject, or terminate acceptance of any Foreign Guaranty at any time, including for material adverse circumstances or occurrences.

(a) **A Foreign Guaranty:**
   (i) Must contain provisions equivalent to those contained in PJM’s standard form of Foreign Guaranty with any modifications subject to review and approval by PJM counsel.
   (ii) Must be denominated in US currency.
   (iii) Must be written and executed solely in English, including any duplicate originals.
   (iv) Will not be accepted towards a Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance for more than the following limits, depending on the Foreign Guarantor's credit rating:
(v) May not exceed 50% of the Participant’s total credit, if the Foreign Grantor is rated less than BBB+.

(b) A Foreign Guarantor:

(i) Must satisfy all provisions of this Attachment Q applicable to domestic Guarantors.

(ii) Must be a Credit Affiliate of the Participant.

(iii) Must maintain an agent for acceptance of service of process in the United States; such agent shall be situated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, absent legal constraint.

(iv) Must be rated by at least one Rating Agency acceptable to PJM; the credit strength of a Foreign Guarantor may not be determined based on an evaluation of its audited financial statements without an actual credit rating as well.

(v) Must have a senior unsecured (or equivalent, in PJM’s sole discretion) rating of BBB (one notch above BBB-) or greater by any and all agencies that provide rating coverage of the entity.

(vi) Must provide audited financial statements, in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM, with clear representation of net worth, intangible assets, and any other information PJM may require in order to determine the entity’s Unsecured Credit Allowance.

(vii) Must provide a Secretary’s Certificate from the Participant’s corporate secretary certifying the adoption of Corporate Resolutions:

1. Authorizing and approving the Guaranty; and
2. Authorizing the Officers to execute and deliver the Guaranty on behalf of the Guarantor.

(viii) Must be domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign (or equivalent) rating of AA+/Aa1, with the following conditions:

1. Sovereign ratings must be available from at least two rating agencies acceptable to PJM (e.g. S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS).
2. Each agency’s sovereign rating for the domicile will be considered to be the lowest of: country ceiling, senior unsecured government debt, long-term foreign currency sovereign rating, long-term local currency sovereign rating, or other equivalent measures, at PJM’s sole discretion.
3. Whether ratings are available from two or three agencies, the lowest of the two or three will be used.

(ix) Must be domiciled in a country that recognizes and enforces judgments of US courts.

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<tr>
<th>Rating of Foreign Guarantor</th>
<th>Maximum Accepted Guaranty if Country Rating is AAA</th>
<th>Maximum Accepted Guaranty if Country Rating is AA+</th>
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<td>BBB- or below</td>
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(x) Must demonstrate financial commitment to activity in the United States as evidenced by one of the following:
1. American Depository Receipts (ADR) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ.
2. Equity ownership worth over USD 100,000,000 in the wholly-owned or majority owned subsidiaries in the United States.
(xi) Must satisfy all other applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and/or Operating Agreement, including this Attachment Q.
(xii) Must pay for all expenses incurred by PJM related to reviewing and accepting a foreign guaranty beyond nominal in-house credit and legal review.
(xiii) Must, at its own cost, provide PJM with independent legal opinion from an attorney/solicitor of PJM’s choosing and licensed to practice law in the United States and/or Guarantor’s domicile, in form and substance acceptable to PJM in its sole discretion, confirming the enforceability of the Foreign Guaranty, the Guarantor’s legal authorization to grant the Guaranty, the conformance of the Guaranty, Guarantor, and Guarantor's domicile to all of these requirements, and such other matters as PJM may require in its sole discretion.

2. Canadian Guaranties

The entity providing a Canadian Guaranty on behalf of a Participant is a Canadian Guarantor. A Participant may provide a Canadian Guaranty in satisfaction of part of its credit obligations or voluntary credit provision at PJM provided that all of the following conditions are met.

PJM reserves the right to deny, reject, or terminate acceptance of any Canadian Guaranty at any time for reasonable cause, including material adverse circumstances or occurrences.

(a) A Canadian Guaranty:
   (i) Must contain provisions equivalent to those contained in PJM’s standard form of Foreign Guaranty with any modifications subject to review and approval by PJM counsel.
   (ii) Must be denominated in US currency.
   (iii) Must be written and executed solely in English, including any duplicate originals.

(b) A Canadian Guarantor:
   (i) Must be a Credit Affiliate of the Participant.
   (ii) Must satisfy all provisions of this Attachment Q applicable to domestic Guarantors.
   (iii) Must maintain an agent for acceptance of service of process in the United States; such agent shall be situated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, absent legal constraint.
   (iv) Must be rated by at least one Rating Agency acceptable to PJM; the credit strength of a Canadian Guarantor may not be determined based on an evaluation of its audited financial statements without an actual credit rating as well.
   (v) Must provide audited financial statements, in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM with clear representation of net worth, intangible assets,
and any other information PJM may require in order to determine the entity’s Unsecured Credit Allowance.

(vi) Must satisfy all other applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and/or Operating Agreement, including this Attachment Q.

D. Surety Bond

An unconditional, irrevocable surety bond can be utilized to meet the Collateral requirement for Participants. As stated below, the form, substance, and provider of the surety bond must all be acceptable to PJM.

(i) An acceptable surety bond must be payable immediately upon demand without prior demonstration of the validity of the demand. The surety bond will only be accepted from a U.S. Treasury-listed approved surety that has either (i) a minimum corporate debt rating of “A” by Standard & Poor’s or Fitch Ratings, or “A2” from Moody’s Investors Service, or an equivalent short term rating from one of these agencies, or (ii) a minimum insurer rating of “A” by A.M. Best. PJMSettlement will consider the lowest applicable rating to be the rating of the surety. If the rating of a surety providing a surety bond is lowered below A/A2 by any rating agency, then PJMSettlement may require the Participant to provide a surety bond from another surety that is rated A/A2 or better, or to provide another form of Collateral.

(ii) The surety bond shall have an initial period of at least one year, and shall state that it shall renew automatically for successive one-year periods, until terminated upon at least ninety (90) days prior written notice from the issuing surety. If PJM receives notice from the issuing surety that the current surety bond is being cancelled, the Participant will be required to provide evidence, acceptable to PJM, that such surety bond will be replaced with appropriate Collateral, effective as of the cancellation date of the surety bond, no later than thirty (30) days before the cancellation date of the surety bond, and no later than ninety (90) days after the notice of cancellation. Failure to do so will constitute a default under this Attachment Q and one of more of the Agreements enabling PJM to immediately demand payment of the full value of the surety bond.

(iii) PJM will post on its web site an acceptable standard form of a surety bond that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to submit a surety bond to establish credit at PJM. The acceptable standard form of surety bond will include non-negotiable provisions, including but not be limited to, a payment on demand feature, requirement that the bond be construed pursuant to Pennsylvania law, making the surety’s obligation to pay out on the bond absolute and unconditional irrespective of the principal’s (Market Participant’s) bankruptcy, terms of any other agreements, investigation of the Market Participant by any entity or governmental authority, or PJM first attempting to collect payment from the Market Participant, and will require, among other things, that (a) the surety waive all rights that would be available to a principal or surety under the law, including
but not limited to any right to investigate or verify any matter related to a demand for payment, rights to set-off amounts due by PJM to the Market Participant, and all counterclaims, (b) the surety expressly waive all of its and the principal’s defenses, including illegality, fraud in the inducement, reliance on statements or representations of PJM and every other typically available defense; (c) the language of the bond that is determinative of the surety’s obligation, and not the underlying agreement or arrangement between the principal and the obligee; (d) the bond shall not be conditioned on PJM first resorting to any other means of security or collateral, or pursuing any other remedies it may have; and (e) the surety acknowledge the continuing nature of its obligations in the event of termination or nonrenewal of the surety bond to make clear the surety remains liable for any obligations that arose before the effective date of its notice of cancellation of the surety bond. If the surety bond varies in any way from the standard format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJM. PJM shall not accept any surety bond that varies in any material way from the standard format.

(iv) All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a surety bond and meeting the Attachment Q provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

(v) PJM shall not accept surety bonds with an aggregate value greater than $10 million dollars ($10,000,000) issued by any individual surety on behalf of any individual Participant.

(vi) PJM shall not accept surety bonds with an aggregate value greater than $50 million dollars ($50,000,000) issued by any individual surety.

E. PJM Administrative Charges

Collateral or credit support held by PJM shall also secure obligations to PJM for PJM administrative charges, and may be liquidated to satisfy all such obligations in an Event of Default.

F. Collateral and Credit Support Held by PJM

Collateral or credit support submitted by Participants and held by PJM shall be held by PJM for the benefit of PJM.

VI. SUPPLEMENTAL CREDIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SCREENED TRANSACTIONS

A. Virtual and Export Transaction Screening

1. Credit for Virtual and Export Transactions

Export Transactions and Virtual Transactions both utilize Credit Available for Virtual Transactions to support their credit requirements.
PJM does not require a Market Participant to establish separate or additional credit for submitting Virtual or Export Transactions; however, once transactions are submitted and accepted by PJM, PJM may require credit supporting those transactions to be held until the transactions are completed and their financial impact incorporated into the Market Participant’s Obligations. If a Market Participant chooses to establish additional Collateral and/or Unsecured Credit Allowance in order to increase its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions, the Market Participant’s Working Credit Limit for Virtual Transactions shall be increased in accordance with the definition thereof. The Collateral and/or Unsecured Credit Allowance available to increase a Market Participant’s Credit Available for Virtual Transactions shall be the amount of Collateral and/or Unsecured Credit Allowance available after subtracting any credit required for Minimum Participation Requirements, FTR, RPM or other credit requirement determinants defined in this Attachment Q, as applicable.

If a Market Participant chooses to provide additional Collateral in order to increase its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions PJM may establish a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed three months, for which such Collateral must be maintained. PJM will not impose such restriction on a deposit unless a Market Participant is notified prior to making the deposit. Such restriction, if applied, shall be applied to all future deposits by all Market Participants engaging in Virtual Transactions.

A Market Participant may increase its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions by providing additional Collateral to PJM. PJM will make a good faith effort to make new Collateral available as Credit Available for Virtual Transactions as soon as practicable after confirmation of receipt. In any event, however, Collateral received and confirmed by noon on a Business Day will be applied (as provided under this Attachment Q) to Credit Available for Virtual Transactions no later than 10:00 am on the following Business Day. Receipt and acceptance of wired funds for cash deposit shall mean actual receipt by PJM’s bank, deposit into PJM’s customer deposit account, confirmation by PJM that such wire has been received and deposited, and entry into PJM’s credit system. Receipt and acceptance of letters of credit or surety bonds shall mean receipt of the original Letter of Credit or surety bond, or amendment thereto, confirmation from PJM’s credit and legal staffs that such Letter of Credit or surety bond, or amendment thereto conforms to PJM’s requirements, which confirmation shall be made in a reasonable and practicable timeframe, and entry into PJM’s credit system. To facilitate this process, bidders submitting additional Collateral for the purpose of increasing their Credit Available for Virtual Transactions are advised to submit such Collateral well in advance of the desired time, and to specifically notify PJM of such submission.

A Market Participant wishing to submit Virtual or Export Transactions must allocate within PJM’s credit system the appropriate amount of Credit Available for Virtual Transactions to the virtual and export allocation sections within each customer account in which it wishes to submit such transactions.

2. **Virtual Transaction Screening**
All Virtual Transactions submitted to PJM shall be subject to a credit screen prior to acceptance in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The credit screen is applied separately for each of a Market Participant’s customer accounts. The credit screen process will automatically reject Virtual Transactions submitted by the Market Participant in a customer account if the Market Participant’s Credit Available for Virtual Transactions, allocated on a customer account basis, is exceeded by the Virtual Credit Exposure that is calculated based on the Market Participant’s Virtual Transactions submitted, as described below.

A Market Participant’s Virtual Credit Exposure will be calculated separately for each customer account on a daily basis for all Virtual Transactions submitted by the Market Participant for the next Operating Day using the following equation:

Virtual Credit Exposure = INC and DEC Exposure + Up-to Congestion Exposure

Where:

(a) INC and DEC Exposure for each customer account is calculated as:

   (i) ((the total MWh bid or offered, whichever is greater, hourly at each node) x the Nodal Reference Price x 1 day) summed over all nodes and all hours; plus (ii) ((the difference between the total bid MWh cleared and total offered MWh cleared hourly at each node) x Nodal Reference Price) summed over all nodes and all hours for the previous cleared Day-ahead Energy Market.

(b) Up-to Congestion Exposure for each customer account is calculated as:

   (i) Total MWh bid hourly for each Up-to Congestion Transaction x (price bid – Up-to Congestion Reference Price) summed over all Up-to Congestion Transactions and all hours; plus (ii) Total MWh cleared hourly for each Up-to Congestion Transaction x (cleared price – Up-to Congestion Reference Price) summed over all Up-to Congestion Transactions and all hours for the previous cleared Day-ahead Energy Market, provided that hours for which the calculation for an Up-to Congestion Transaction is negative, it shall be deemed to have a zero contribution to the sum.

3. Export Transaction Screening

Export Transactions in the Real-time Energy Market shall be subject to Export Transaction Screening. Export Transaction Screening may be performed either for the duration of the entire Export Transaction, or separately for each time interval comprising an Export Transaction. PJM will deny or curtail all or a portion (based on the relevant time interval) of an Export Transaction if that Export Transaction, or portion thereof, would otherwise cause the Market Participant's Export Credit Exposure to exceed its Credit Available for Export Transactions. Export Transaction Screening shall be applied separately for each Operating Day and shall also be applied to each Export Transaction one or more times prior to the market clearing process for each relevant time interval. Export Transaction Screening shall not apply to transactions established directly by and between PJM and a neighboring Balancing Authority for the purpose of maintaining reliability.
A Market Participant’s credit exposure for an individual Export Transaction shall be the MWh volume of the Export Transaction for each relevant time interval multiplied by each relevant Export Transaction Price Factor and summed over all relevant time intervals of the Export Transaction.

B. **RPM Auction and Price Responsive Demand Credit Requirements**

Settlement during any Delivery Year of cleared positions resulting or expected to result from any RPM Auction shall be included as appropriate in Peak Market Activity, and the provisions of this Attachment Q shall apply to any such activity and obligations arising therefrom. In addition, the provisions of this section shall apply to any entity seeking to participate in any RPM Auction, to address credit risks unique to such auctions. The provisions of this section also shall apply under certain circumstances to PRD Providers that seek to commit Price Responsive Demand pursuant to the provisions of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Credit requirements described herein for RPM Auctions and RPM bilateral transactions are applied separately for each customer account of a Market Participant. Market Participants wishing to participate in an RPM Auction or enter into RPM bilateral transactions must designate the appropriate amount of credit to each account in which their offers are submitted.
1. Applicability

A Market Participant seeking to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction based on any Capacity Resource for which there is a materially increased risk of nonperformance must satisfy the credit requirement specified herein before submitting such Sell Offer. A PRD Provider seeking to commit Price Responsive Demand for which there is a materially increased risk of non-performance must satisfy the credit requirement specified herein before it may commit the Price Responsive Demand. Credit must be maintained until such risk of non-performance is substantially eliminated, but may be reduced commensurate with the reduction in such risk, as set forth in section IV.B.3 below.

For purposes of this provision, a resource for which there is a materially increased risk of nonperformance shall mean: (i) a Planned Generation Capacity Resource; (ii) a Planned Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource; (iii) a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade; (iv) an existing or Planned Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region that at the time it is submitted in a Sell Offer has not secured firm transmission service to the border of the PJM Region sufficient to meet the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement; or (v) Price Responsive Demand to the extent the responsible PRD Provider has not registered PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1; or (vi) a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource.

2. Reliability Pricing Model Auction and Price Responsive Demand Credit Requirement

Except as provided for Credit-Limited Offers below, for any resource specified in section IV.B.1 above, other than Price Responsive Demand, the credit requirement shall be the RPM Auction Credit Rate, as provided in section IV.B.4 below, times the megawatts to be offered for sale from such resource in an RPM Auction. For Qualified Transmission Upgrades, the credit requirements shall be based on the Locational Deliverability Area in which such upgrade was to increase the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit. However, the credit requirement for Planned Financed Generation Capacity Resources and Planned External Financed Generation Capacity Resources shall be one half of the product of the RPM Auction Credit Rate, as provided in section IV.B.4 below, times the megawatts to be offered for sale from such resource in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction. The RPM Auction Credit Requirement for each Market Participant shall be determined on a customer account basis, separately for each customer account of a Market Participant, and shall be the sum of the credit requirements for all such resources to be offered by such Market Participant in the auction or, as applicable, cleared by such Market Participant in the relevant auctions. For Price Responsive Demand, the credit requirement shall be based on the Nominal PRD Value (stated in Unforced Capacity terms) times the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate as set forth in section IV.B.5 below. Except for Credit-Limited Offers, the RPM Auction Credit requirement for a Market Participant will be reduced for any Delivery Year to the extent less than all of such Market Participant’s offers clear in the Base Residual Auction or any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year. Such reduction shall be proportional to the quantity, in megawatts, that failed to clear in such Delivery Year.
A Sell Offer based on a Planned Generation Capacity Resource, Planned Demand Resource, or Energy Efficiency Resource or Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may be submitted as a Credit-Limited Offer. A Market Participant electing this option shall specify a maximum amount of Unforced Capacity, in megawatts, and a maximum credit requirement, in dollars, applicable to the Sell Offer. A Credit-Limited Offer shall clear the RPM Auction in which it is submitted (to the extent it otherwise would clear based on the other offer parameters and the system’s need for the offered capacity) only to the extent of the lesser of: (i) the quantity of Unforced Capacity that is the quotient of the division of the specified maximum credit requirement by the Auction Credit Rate resulting from section IV.B.4.b. below; and (ii) the maximum amount of Unforced Capacity specified in the Sell Offer. For a Market Participant electing this alternative, the RPM Auction Credit requirement applicable prior to the posting of results of the auction shall be the maximum credit requirement specified in its Credit-Limited Offer, and the RPM Auction Credit requirement subsequent to posting of the results will be the Auction Credit Rate, as provided in section IV.B.4.b. c. or d. of this Attachment Q, as applicable, times the amount of Unforced Capacity from such Sell Offer that cleared in the auction. The availability and operational details of Credit-Limited Offers shall be as described in the PJM Manuals.

As set forth in section IV.B.4 below, a Market Participant's Auction Credit requirement shall be determined separately for each Delivery Year.

3. **Reduction in Credit Requirement**

As specified below, the RPM Auction Credit Rate may be reduced under certain circumstances after the auction has closed.

The Price Responsive Demand credit requirement shall be reduced as and to the extent the PRD Provider registers PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1.

In addition, the RPM Auction Credit requirement for a Market Participant for any given Delivery Year shall be reduced periodically, after the Market Participant has provided PJM a written request for each reduction, accompanied by documentation sufficient for PJM to verify attainment of required milestones or satisfaction of other requirements, and PJM has verified that the Market Participant has successfully met progress milestones for its Capacity Resource that reduce the risk of non-performance, as follows:

(a) For Planned Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the RPM Auction Credit requirement will be reduced in direct proportion to the megawatts of such Demand Resource that the Resource Provider qualifies as a Capacity Resource, in accordance with the procedures established under the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(b) For Existing Generation Capacity Resources located outside the PJM Region that have not secured sufficient firm transmission to the border of the PJM Region prior to the auction in which such resource is first offered, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced in direct proportion to the megawatts of firm transmission service secured by the Market Participant.
that qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(c) For Planned Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestones</th>
<th>Increment of reduction from initial RPM Auction Credit requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Date of Interconnection Service Agreement</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Close</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Interconnection Service</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For externally financed projects, the Market Participant must submit with its request for reduction a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized independent engineer for the Financial Close, Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction, and Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered milestones.

For internally financed projects, the Market Participant must submit with its request for reduction a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer of the Market Participant for the Financial Close milestone and either a duly authorized independent engineer or Professional Engineer for the Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction and the Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered milestones.

The required certifications must be in a form acceptable to PJM, certifying that the engineer or officer, as applicable, has personal knowledge, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, that the milestone has been achieved and that, based on its review of the relevant project information, the engineer or officer, as applicable, is not aware of any information that could reasonably cause it to believe that the Capacity Resource will not be in-service by the beginning of the applicable Delivery Year. The Market Participant shall, if requested by PJM, supply to PJM on a confidential basis all records and documents relating to the engineer’s and/or officer’s certifications.

(d) For Planned External Generation Capacity Resources, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that the total percentage reduction in the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be no greater than the quotient of (i) the MWs of firm transmission service that the Market Participant has secured for the complete transmission path divided by (ii) the MWs of firm transmission service required to
qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Reduction Milestones for Planned External Generation Capacity Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Milestones</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Date of the equivalent of an Interconnection Service Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Close</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Interconnection Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To obtain a reduction in its RPM Auction Credit requirement, the Market Participant must demonstrate satisfaction of the applicable milestone in the same manner as set forth for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in subsection (c) above.

(e) For Planned Financed Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Reduction Milestones for Planned Financed Generation Capacity Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Milestones</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Notice to Proceed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Interconnection Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To obtain a reduction in its RPM Auction Credit requirement, the Market Participant must demonstrate satisfaction of the applicable milestone in the same manner as set forth for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in subsection (c) above.

(f) For Planned External Financed Generation Capacity Resources, the RPM Auction Credit Requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that the total percentage reduction in the RPM Auction Credit requirement, including the initial 50% reduction for being a Planned External Financed Generation Capacity Resources, shall be no greater than the quotient of (i) the MWs of firm transmission service that the Market Participant has secured for the complete transmission path divided by (ii) the MWs of firm transmission service required...
to qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

| Credit Reduction Milestones for Planned External Financed Generation Capacity |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| **Milestones**                  | **Increment of reduction from**   |
|                                 | **initial RPM Auction Credit**    |
|                                 | **requirement**                   |
| Full Notice to Proceed          | 50%                               |
| Commencement of Construction    | 15%                               |
| (e.g., footers poured)          |                                   |
| Main Power Generating Equipment | 10%                               |
| Delivered                       |                                   |
| Commencement of Interconnection | 25%                               |
| Service                          |                                   |

To obtain a reduction in its RPM Auction Credit requirement, the Market Participant must demonstrate satisfaction of the applicable milestone in the same manner as set forth for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in subsection (c) above.

(g) For Qualifying Transmission Upgrades, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced to 50% of the amount calculated under section IV.B.2 above beginning as of the effective date of the latest associated Interconnection Service Agreement (or, when a project will have no such agreement, an Upgrade Construction Service Agreement), and shall be reduced to zero on the date the Qualifying Transmission Upgrade is placed in service.

4. RPM Auction Credit Rate

As set forth in the PJM Manuals, a separate Auction Credit Rate shall be calculated for each Delivery Year prior to each RPM Auction for such Delivery Year, as follows:

(a) Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Auction Credit Rate shall be:

(i) For all Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, (the greater of (A) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the greater of ((A) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year.

(iii) For Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the same as the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Performance Resources, but reduced to be proportional to the number of calendar days in the relevant season.
(b) Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Auction Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for supply committed in such auction shall be:

(i) For all Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the (greater of [(A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located] or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located)] times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year).

(iii) For Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the same as the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Performance Resources, but reduced to be proportional to the number of calendar days in the relevant season.

(c) For any resource not previously committed for a Delivery Year that seeks to participate in an Incremental Auction, the Auction Credit Rate shall be:

(i) For all Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, (the greater of (A) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (B) 0.24 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located or (C) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the (greater of (A) 0.5 times Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA or (B) $20/MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year.

(d) Subsequent to the posting of the results of an Incremental Auction, the Auction Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for supply committed in such auction shall be:

(i) For Base Capacity Resources: (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year, but no greater than the Auction Credit Rate previously established for such resource’s participation in such Incremental Auction pursuant to subsection (c) above) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;
(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the greater of [(A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located)] times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year); and

(iii) For Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the same as the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Performance Resources, but reduced to be proportional to the number of calendar days in the relevant season.

(e) For the purposes of this section IV.B.4 and section IV.B.5 below, “Relevant LDA” means the Locational Deliverability Area in which the Capacity Performance Resource is located if a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for that Locational Deliverability Area for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

5. **Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate**

(a) For the 2018/2019 through 2022/2023 Delivery Years:

(i) Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (A) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;

(ii) Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for Price Responsive Demand committed in such auction shall be (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand load is located, in $/MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year times a final price uncertainty factor of 1.05;

(iii) For any additional Price Responsive Demand that seeks to commit in a Third Incremental Auction in response to a qualifying change in the final LDA load forecast, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be the same as the rate for Price Responsive Demand that had cleared in the Base Residual Auction; and

(iv) Subsequent to the posting of the results of the Third Incremental Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for
all Price Responsive Demand, shall be (the greater of (i) $20/MW-day or (ii) 0.2 times the Final Zonal Capacity Price for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year, but no greater than the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate previously established under subsections (a)(i), (a)(ii), or (a)(iii) of this section for such Delivery Year.

(b) For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and Subsequent Delivery Years:

(i) Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (A) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;

(ii) Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for Price Responsive Demand committed in such auction shall be (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located, in $/MW-day or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located)) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;

(iii) For any additional Price Responsive Demand that seeks to commit in a Third Incremental Auction in response to a qualifying change in the final LDA load forecast, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (A) 0.5 times Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (B) $20/MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(iv) Subsequent to the posting of the results of the Third Incremental Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for all Price Responsive Demand committed in such auction shall be the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Performance Resource Clearing Price in such Incremental Auction for the Locational Deliverability Areas within which the Price
Responsive Demand is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year.

6. **RPM Seller Credit - Additional Form of Unsecured Credit for RPM**

In addition to the forms of credit specified elsewhere in this Attachment Q, RPM Seller Credit shall be available to Market Participants, but solely for purposes of satisfying RPM Auction Credit requirements. If a supplier has a history of being a net seller into PJM Markets, on average, over the past 12 months, then PJM will count as available Unsecured Credit twice the average of that Market Participant’s total net monthly PJM bills over the past 12 months. This RPM Seller Credit shall be subject to the cap on available Unsecured Credit as established in section II.G.3 above.

RPM Seller Credit is calculated as a single value for each Market Participant, not separately by account, and must be designated to specific customer accounts in order to be available to satisfy RPM Auction Credit requirements that are calculated in each such customer account.

7. **Credit Responsibility for Traded Planned RPM Capacity Resources**

PJM may require that credit and financial responsibility for planned Capacity Resources that are traded remain with the original party (which for these purposes, means the party bearing credit responsibility for the planned Capacity Resource immediately prior to trade) unless the receiving party independently establishes consistent with this Attachment Q, that it has sufficient credit with PJM and agrees by providing written notice to PJM that it will fully assume the credit responsibility associated with the traded planned Capacity Resource.

C. **Financial Transmission Right Auctions**

Credit requirements described herein for FTR activity are applied separately for each customer account of a Market Participant, unless specified otherwise in this section C. FTR Participants must designate the appropriate amount of credit to each separate customer account in which any activity occurs or will occur.

1. **FTR Credit Limit.**

Participants must maintain their FTR Credit Limit at a level equal to or greater than their FTR Credit Requirement for each applicable account. FTR Credit Limits will be established only by a Participant providing Collateral and designating the available credit to specific accounts.

2. **FTR Credit Requirement.**

For each Market Participant with FTR activity, PJM shall calculate an FTR Credit Requirement. The FTR Credit Requirement shall be based on FTR cost, FTR Historical Value and MWh volume, anticipated FTR activity for new Market Participants, and anticipated change in exposure for existing Market Participants newly participating in the FTR market, and may be
increased to reflect any change in exposure based on the most recent applicable FTR auction prices, as further described below.

FTR Historical Values shall be calculated separately for on-peak, off-peak, and 24-hour FTRs for each month of the year. FTR Historical Values shall be adjusted by plus or minus ten percent for cleared counter flow or prevailing flow FTRs, respectively, in order to mitigate exposure due to uncertainty and fluctuations in actual FTR value. Historical values used in the calculation of FTR Historical Values shall be adjusted when the network simulation model utilized in PJM's economic planning process indicates that transmission congestion will decrease due to certain transmission upgrades that are in effect or planned to go into effect for the following Planning Period. The transmission upgrades to be modeled for this purpose shall only include those upgrades that, individually, or together, have 10% or more impact on the transmission congestion on an individual constraint or constraints with congestion of $5 million or more affecting a common congestion path. The adjustments to historical values shall be the dollar amount of the adjustment shown in the network simulation model.

If FTR cost less the FTR Historical Value, plus any applicable increase related to portfolio diversification as described in section C.6 below, results in a value that is less than ten cents (10¢) per MWh, the FTR Credit Requirement shall be increased to ten cents (10¢) per MWh. When calculating the portfolio MWh for this comparison, for cleared “Sell” FTRs, the MWh shall be subtracted from the portfolio total; prior to clearing, the MWh for “Sell” FTRs shall not be included in the portfolio total. FTR Credit Requirements shall be further adjusted by ARR credits available and by an amount based on portfolio diversification, if applicable. The requirement will be based on individual monthly exposures which are then used to derive a total requirement.

The FTR Credit Requirement shall be calculated by first adding for each month the FTR Monthly Credit Requirement Contribution for each submitted, accepted, and cleared FTR and then subtracting the prorated value of any ARRs held by the Market Participant for that month. The resulting twelve monthly subtotals represent the expected value of net payments between PJM and the Market Participant for FTR activity each month during the Planning Period. Subject to later adjustment by an amount based on portfolio diversification, if applicable, and subject to later adjustment for auction prices, the FTR Credit Requirement shall be the sum of the individual positive monthly subtotals, representing months in which net payments to PJM are expected.

3. Rejection of FTR Bids.

Bids submitted into an auction will be rejected if the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Requirement including such submitted bids would exceed the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Limit, or if the Market Participant fails to provide additional credit support or additional Collateral as required pursuant to provisions related to portfolio diversification and mark-to-auction.
4. **FTR Credit Collateral Returns.**

A Market Participant may request from PJM the return of any Collateral no longer required for the FTR markets. PJM is permitted to limit the frequency of such requested Collateral returns, provided that Collateral returns shall be made by PJM at least once per calendar quarter, if requested by a Market Participant.

5. **Credit Responsibility for Bilateral Transfers of FTRs.**

PJM may require that credit responsibility associated with an FTR bilaterally transferred to a new Market Participant remain with the original party (which for these purposes, means the party bearing credit responsibility for the FTR immediately prior to bilateral transfer) unless and until the receiving party independently establishes, consistent with this Attachment Q, sufficient credit with PJM and agrees through confirmation of the bilateral transfer in PJM’s FTR reporting tool that it will meet in full the credit requirements associated with the transferred FTR.

6. **Portfolio Diversification.**

Portfolio diversification shall be calculated, and the appropriate provisions herein applied, separately for each customer account of a Market Participant, and separately for each month.

Subsequent to calculating a tentative cleared solution for an FTR auction (or auction round), PJM shall determine the FTR Portfolio Auction Value for each customer account of a Market Participant, including the tentative cleared solution. Any customer accounts with such FTR Portfolio Auction Values that are negative in one or more months shall be deemed “FTR Flow Undiversified.”

For customer accounts that are FTR Flow Undiversified in a month, PJM shall increment the FTR Credit Requirement by an amount equal to three times the absolute value of the FTR Portfolio Auction Value in that month, including the tentative cleared solution. For portfolios that are FTR Flow Undiversified in months subsequent to the current planning year, these incremental amounts, calculated on a monthly basis, shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an amount up to 25% of the monthly value of ARR credits that are held by a Market Participant. Subsequent to the ARR allocation process preceding an annual FTR auction, such ARRs credits shall be reduced to zero for months associated with that ARR allocation process. PJM may recalculate such ARR credits at any time, but at a minimum shall do so subsequent to each annual FTR auction. If a reduction in such ARR credits at any time increases an FTR Participant’s FTR Credit Requirements beyond its credit available for FTR activity, the FTR Participant must increase its credit to eliminate the shortfall in the applicable customer account(s).

If the FTR Credit Requirement for any Market Participant’s customer account exceeds its credit available for FTRs as a result of these diversification requirements for the tentatively cleared portfolio of FTRs, PJM shall immediately issue a demand for additional credit, and such demand must be fulfilled before 4:00 p.m. on the Business Day following the demand. If any Market Participant does not timely satisfy such demand, PJM shall cause the removal of that Market
Participant's entire set of bids in that account for that FTR auction (or auction round) and a new cleared solution shall be calculated for the entire auction (or auction round).

If necessary, PJM shall repeat the auction clearing calculation. PJM shall repeat these portfolio diversification calculations subsequent to any secondary clearing calculation, and PJM shall require affected Market Participants to establish additional credit.

7. **FTR Administrative Charge Credit Requirement**

In addition to any other credit requirements, PJM may apply a credit requirement to cover the maximum administrative fees that may be charged to a Market Participant for its bids and offers.

8. **Long-Term FTR Credit Recalculation**

Long-term FTR Credit Requirement calculations shall be updated annually for known history, consistent with updating of historical values used for FTR Credit Requirement calculations in the annual auctions. If the historical value update results in an FTR Credit Requirement for any Market Participant’s customer account that exceeds its credit available for FTR activity, then PJM shall issue a Collateral Call equal to the lesser of the increase in the FTR Credit Requirement from the historical value adjustment and the credit shortfall after the historical value adjustment.

9. **Mark-to-Auction**

A Mark-to-Auction Value shall be calculated separately for each customer account of a Market Participant. For each such customer account, the Mark-to-Auction Value shall be a single number equal to the sum, over all months remaining in the applicable FTR period and for all cleared FTRs in the customer account, of the most recently available cleared auction price applicable to the FTR minus the original transaction price of the FTR, multiplied by the transacted quantity.

The FTR Credit Requirement, as otherwise described above, shall be increased when the Mark-to-Auction Value is negative. The increase shall equal the absolute value of the negative Mark-to-Auction Value less the value of ARR credits that are held in the customer account and have not been used to reduce the FTR Credit Requirement prior to application of the Mark-to-Auction Value. PJM shall recalculate ARR credits held by each Market Participant after each annual FTR auction and may also recalculate such ARR credits at any other additional time intervals it deems appropriate. Application of the Mark-to-Auction Value, including the effect from ARR application, shall not decrease the FTR Credit Requirement.

For Market Participant customer accounts for which FTR bids have been submitted into the current FTR auction, if the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Requirement exceeds its credit available for FTRs as a result of the mark-to-auction requirements for the Market Participant’s portfolio of FTRs in the tentative cleared solution for an FTR auction (or auction round), PJM shall issue a Collateral Call to the Market Participant, and the Market Participant must fulfill such demand before 4:00 p.m. on the following Business Day. If a Market Participant does not
timely satisfy such Collateral Call, PJM shall, in coordination with PJM, cause the removal of all of that Market Participant's bids in that FTR auction (or auction round), submitted from such Market Participant’s customer account, and a new cleared solution shall be calculated for the FTR auction (or auction round).

If necessary, PJM shall repeat the auction clearing calculation. PJM shall repeat these mark-to-auction calculations subsequent to any secondary clearing calculation, and PJM shall require affected Market Participants to establish additional credit.

Subsequent to final clearing of an FTR auction or an annual FTR auction round, PJM shall recalculate the FTR Credit Requirement for all FTR portfolios, and, as applicable, issue to each Market Participant an MTA Collateral Call for the total amount by which the FTR Credit Requirement exceeds the credit allocated in any of the Market Participant's accounts.

If the MTA Collateral Call is not satisfied within the applicable cure period referenced in Operating Agreement, section 15, then such Market Participant shall be restricted in all of its credit-screened transactions. Specifically, such Market Participant may not engage in any Virtual Transactions or Export Transactions, or participate in RPM Auctions or other RPM activity. Such Market Participant may engage only in the selling of open FTR positions, either in FTR auctions or bilaterally, provided such sales would reduce the Market Participant's FTR Credit Requirements. PJM shall not return any Collateral to such Market Participant, and no payment shall be due or payable to such Market Participant, until its credit shortfall is remedied. Market Participant shall allocate any excess or unallocated Collateral to any of its account in which there is a credit shortfall. Market Participants may remedy their credit shortfall at any time through provision of sufficient Collateral.

If a Market Participant fails to satisfy MTA Collateral Calls for two consecutive auctions of overlapping periods, e.g. two balance of Planning Period auctions, an annual FTR auction and a balance of Planning Period auction, or two long term FTR auctions, (for this purpose the four rounds of an annual FTR auction shall be considered a single auction), the Market Participant shall be declared in default of this Attachment Q.

VII. PEAK MARKET ACTIVITY AND WORKING CREDIT LIMIT

A. Peak Market Activity Credit Requirement

PJM shall calculate a Peak Market Activity credit requirement for each Participant. Each Participant must maintain sufficient Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or Collateral, as applicable, and subject to the provisions herein, to satisfy its Peak Market Activity credit requirement.

Peak Market Activity for Participants will be determined semi-annually, utilizing an initial Peak Market Activity, as explained below, calculated after the first complete billing week in the months of April and October. Peak Market Activity shall be the greater of the initial Peak Market Activity, or the greatest amount invoiced for the Participant’s transaction activity for all PJM Markets and services in any rolling one, two, or three week period, ending within a
respective semi-annual period. However, Peak Market Activity shall not exceed the greatest amount invoiced for the Participant’s transaction activity for all PJM Markets and services in any rolling one, two or three week period in the prior 52 weeks. Peak Market Activity shall exclude FTR Net Activity, Virtual Transactions Net Activity, and Export Transactions Net Activity.

When calculating Peak Market Activity, PJM may attribute credits for Regulation service to the days on which they were accrued, rather than including them in the month-end invoice.

The initial Peak Market Activity for Applicants will be determined by PJM based on a review of an estimate of their transactional activity for all PJM Markets and services over the next 52 weeks, which the Applicant shall provide to PJM.

The initial Peak Market Activity for Market Participants and Transmission Customers, calculated at the beginning of each semi-annual period, shall be the three-week average of all non-zero invoice totals over the previous 52 weeks. This calculation shall be performed and applied within three (3) Business Days following the day the invoice is issued for the first full billing week in the current semi-annual period.

Prepayments shall not affect Peak Market Activity unless otherwise agreed to in writing pursuant to this Attachment Q.

Peak Market Activity calculations shall take into account reductions of invoice values effectuated by early payments which are applied to reduce a Participant’s Peak Market Activity as contemplated by other terms of this Attachment Q; provided that the initial Peak Market Activity shall not be less than the average value calculated using the weeks for which no early payment was made.

A Participant may reduce its Collateral requirement by agreeing in writing (in a form acceptable to PJM) to make additional payments, including prepayments, as and when necessary to ensure that such Participant’s Total Net Obligation at no time exceeds such reduced Collateral requirement.

PJM may, at its discretion, adjust a Participant’s Peak Market Activity requirement if PJM determines that the Peak Market Activity is not representative of such Participant’s expected activity, as a consequence of known, measurable, and sustained changes. Such changes may include, but shall not be limited to when a Participant makes PJM aware of federal, state or local law that could affect the allocation of charges or credits from a Participant to another party, the loss (without replacement) of short-term load contracts, when such contracts had terms of three months or more and were acquired through state-sponsored retail load programs, but shall not include short-term buying and selling activities.

PJM may waive the credit requirements for a Participant that has no outstanding transactions and agrees in writing that it shall not, after the date of such agreement, incur obligations under any of the Agreements. Such entity’s access to all electronic transaction systems administered by PJM shall be terminated.
A Participant receiving unsecured credit may make early payments up to ten times in a rolling 52-week period in order to reduce its Peak Market Activity for credit requirement purposes. Imputed Peak Market Activity reductions for credit purposes will be applied to the billing period for which the payment was received. Payments used as the basis for such reductions must be received prior to issuance or posting of the invoice for the relevant billing period. The imputed Peak Market Activity reduction attributed to any payment may not exceed the amount of Unsecured Credit for which the Participant is eligible.

B. Working Credit Limit

PJM will establish a Working Credit Limit for each Participant against which its Total Net Obligation will be monitored. If a Participant’s Total Net Obligation approaches its Working Credit Limit, PJM may require the Participant to make an advance payment or increase its Collateral in order to maintain its Total Net Obligation below its Working Credit Limit. Except as explicitly provided herein, advance payments shall not serve to reduce the Participant’s Peak Market Activity for the purpose of calculating credit requirements.

Example: After ten (10) calendar days, and with five (5) calendar days remaining before the bill is due to be paid, a Participant approaches its $4.0 million Working Credit Limit. PJM may require a prepayment of $2.0 million in order that the Total Net Obligation will not exceed the Working Credit Limit.

If a Participant exceeds its Working Credit Limit or is required to make advance payments more than ten times during a 52-week period, PJM may require Collateral in an amount as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support its Total Net Obligation.

When calculating Total Net Obligation, PJM may attribute credits for Regulation service to the days on which they were accrued, rather than including them in the month-end invoice.

VIII. SUSPENSION OR LIMITATION ON MARKET PARTICIPATION

If PJM determines that a Participant presents an unreasonable credit risk as determined pursuant to initial or ongoing risk evaluations, as described in section II above, or in the case of any other event which, after notice, lapse of time, or both, would result in an Event of Default, PJM will take steps to mitigate the exposure of any PJM Markets, which may include, but is not limited to, requiring Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral or suspending or limiting the Market Participant’s ability to participate in the PJM Markets commensurate to the risk to any PJM Markets.

If a Participant fails to reduce or eliminate any unreasonable credit risks to PJM’s satisfaction within the applicable cure period including without limitation by posting Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral, PJM may treat such failure as an Event of Default.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Participant that transacts in FTRs will be eligible to request that PJM exempt or exclude FTR transactions of such Participant from the effect of any such limitations on market activity established by PJM, and PJM may but shall not be required to so
exempt or exclude, any FTR transactions that the Participant reasonably demonstrates to PJM it has entered into to “hedge or mitigate commercial risk” arising from its transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market that are intended to result in the actual flow of physical energy or ancillary services in the PJM Region, as the phrase “hedge or mitigate commercial risks” is defined under the CFTC’s regulations defining the end-user exception to clearing set forth in 17 C.F.R. §50.50(c).

IX. REMEDIES FOR CREDIT BREACH, FINANCIAL DEFAULT OR CREDIT SUPPORT DEFAULT; REMEDIES FOR EVENTS OF DEFAULT

If PJM determines that a Market Participant is in Credit Breach, or that a Financial Default or Credit Support Default exists, PJM may issue to the Market Participant a breach notice and/or a Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances. At such time, PJM may also suspend payments of any amounts due to the Participant and limit, restrict or rescind the Market Participant’s privileges to participate in any or all PJM Markets under the Agreements during any such cure period. Failure to remedy the Credit Breach, Financial Default or to satisfy a Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances within the applicable cure period described in Operating Agreement, section 15.1.5, shall constitute an Event of Default. If a Participant fails to meet the requirements of this Attachment Q, but then remedies the Credit Breach, Financial Default or Credit Support Default, or satisfies a Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances within the applicable cure period, then the Participant shall be deemed to again be in compliance with this Attachment Q, so long as no other Credit Breach, Financial Default, Credit Support Default or Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances has occurred and is continuing.

Only one cure period shall apply to a single event giving rise to a Credit Breach, Financial Default or Credit Support Default. Application of Collateral towards a Financial Default, Credit Breach or Credit Support Breach shall not be considered a cure of such Credit Breach, Financial Default or Credit Support Default unless the Participant is determined by PJM to be in full compliance with all requirements of this Attachment Q after such application.

When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM may take such actions as may be required or permitted under the Agreements to protect the PJM Markets and the PJM Members, including but not limited to (a) suspension and/or termination of the Participant’s ongoing Transmission Service, (b) limitation, suspension and/or termination of participation in any PJM Markets, (c) close out and liquidation of the Market Participant’s market portfolio, exercising judgment in the manner in which this is achieved in any PJM Markets. When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM also has the immediate right to liquidate all or a portion of a Participant’s Collateral at its discretion to satisfy Total Net Obligations to PJM under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements. No remedy for an Event of Default is or shall be deemed to be exclusive of any other available remedy or remedies by contract or under applicable laws and regulations. Each such remedy shall be distinct, separate and cumulative, shall not be deemed inconsistent with or in exclusion of any other available remedy, and shall be in addition to and separate and distinct from every other remedy.
When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM may continue to retain all payments due to a Participant as a cash security for all such Participant’s obligations under the Agreements (regardless of any restrictions placed on such Participant’s use of Collateral for any account, market activity or capitalization purpose); provided, however, that an Event of Default will not be deemed cured or no longer continuing because PJM is retaining amounts due the Participant, or because PJM has not yet applied Collateral or credit support to any amounts due PJM, unless PJM determines that the Participant has again satisfied all the Collateral requirements and application requirements as a new Applicant for participation in the PJM Markets, and consistent with the requirements and limitations of Operating Agreement, section 15.

In Event of Default by a Participant, PJM may exercise any remedy or action allowed or prescribed by this Attachment Q immediately or following investigation and determination of an orderly exercise of such remedy or action. Delay in exercising any allowed remedy or action shall not preclude PJM from exercising such remedy or action at a later time.

PJM may hold a defaulting Participant’s Collateral for as long as such party’s positions exist and consistent with this Attachment Q, in order to protect the PJM Markets and PJM’s membership, and minimize or mitigate the impacts or potential impacts or risks associated with such Event of Default when an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing.

PJM may apply towards an ongoing Event of Default any amounts that are held or later become available or due to the defaulting Participant through PJM's markets and systems.

In order to cover the Participant’s Obligations, PJM may hold a Participant's Collateral indefinitely and specifically through the end of the billing period which includes the 90th day following the last day a Participant had activity, open positions, or accruing obligations (other than reconciliations and true-ups), until such Participant has satisfactorily paid any obligations invoiced through such period and until PJM determines that the Participant’s positions represent no risk exposure to the PJM Markets or the PJM Members. Obligations incurred or accrued through such period shall survive any withdrawal from PJM. When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM may apply any Collateral to such Participant's Obligations, even if Participant had previously announced and effected its withdrawal from PJM.

X. FTRS UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Under the terms of the Tariff, PJM Settlement is the counterparty to all transactions in PJM Markets, including but not limited to all FTR transactions, other than (i) any bilateral transactions between Participants, or (ii) with respect to self-supplied or self-scheduled transactions reported to the Office of the Interconnection. Pursuant to the “Final Order in Response to a Petition From Certain Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations To Exempt Specified Transactions Authorized by a Tariff or Protocol Approved
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Public Utility Commission of Texas From Certain Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act Pursuant to the Authority Provided in the Act” 78 Fed. Reg. 19880 (April 2, 2013) (the “CFTC RTO/ISO Order”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) exempted transactions offered or entered into in a market administered by PJM pursuant to the Tariff, including but not limited to FTR transactions, from the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC’s rules applicable to “swaps,” with the exception of the CFTC’s general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority and scienter-based prohibitions.

Notwithstanding the CFTC RTO/ISO Order, for purposes of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”), all FTR transactions constitute “swap agreements” and/or “forward contracts,” and PJM and each FTR Participant is a “forward contract merchant” and/or a “swap participant” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of FTR transactions.

Pursuant to this Attachment Q and other provisions of the Agreements, PJM already has, and shall continue to have, the following rights (among other rights) with respect to a Market Participant’s Event of Default: (a) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Market Participant; (b) the right to immediately proceed against any Collateral provided by the Market Participant; (c) the right to set-off any obligations due or owing to that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement, or similar agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement, or similar agreement, such arrangement to constitute a “master netting agreement” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code; and (d) the right to suspend or limit that Market Participant from entering into further FTR transactions.

For the avoidance of doubt, upon the commencement of a voluntary or involuntary proceeding for a Participant under the Bankruptcy Code, and without limiting any other rights of PJM or obligations of any Participant under the Agreements, PJM may exercise any of its rights against such Participant, including, without limitation (1) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Participant, (2) the right to immediately proceed against any Collateral provided by that Participant, (3) the right to set off any obligations due and owing to that Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement and/or master netting agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Participant with respect to an FTR transaction including as a result of the actions taken by PJM pursuant to (a) above, and (4) the right to suspend or limit that Participant from entering into future FTR transactions.

For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, all transactions, including but not limited to FTR transactions, between PJM, on the one hand, and a Market Participant, on the other hand, are intended to be part of a single integrated agreement, and together with the Agreements constitute a “master netting agreement.”
PJM MINIMUM PARTICIPATION CRITERIA
ANNUAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION FORM

Participant Name: ____________________________________________ ("Participant")

I, ______________________________________________, a duly authorized officer of
Participant, understanding that PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and PJMSettlement, Inc.
(“PJMSettlement”) are relying on this certification as evidence that Participant meets the
minimum requirements set forth in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("PJM Tariff"),
Attachment Q hereby certify that I have full authority to represent on behalf of Participant and
further represent as follows, as evidenced by my initialing each representation in the space
provided below:

1. All employees or agents transacting in markets or services provided pursuant to the PJM
Tariff or PJM Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (“PJM Operating
Agreement”) on behalf of the Participant have received appropriate training and are
authorized to transact on behalf of Participant. As used in this representation, the term
“appropriate” as used with respect to training means training that is (i) comparable to
generally accepted practices in the energy trading industry, and (ii) commensurate and
proportional in sophistication, scope and frequency to the volume of transactions and the
nature and extent of the risk taken by the participant.

2. Participant has written risk management policies, procedures, and controls, approved by
Participant’s independent risk management function and applicable to transactions in any
PJM Markets in which it participates and for which employees or agents transacting in
markets or services provided pursuant to the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement
have been trained, that provide an appropriate, comprehensive risk management
framework that, at a minimum, clearly identifies and documents the range of risks to
which Participant is exposed, including, but not limited to credit risks, liquidity risks and
market risks. As used in this representation, a Participant’s “independent risk
management function” can include appropriate corporate persons or bodies that are
independent of the Participant’s trading functions, such as a risk management committee,
a risk officer, a Participant’s board or board committee, or a board or committee of the
Participant’s parent company.

   a. Participant is providing to PJM or PJMSettlement, in accordance with Tariff,
   Attachment Q, section III, with this Annual Officer Certification Form, a copy of its
current governing risk management policies, procedures and controls applicable to its
activities in any PJM Markets pursuant to Attachment Q or because there have been
substantive changes made to such policies, procedures and controls applicable to its
market activities since they were last provided to PJM.

   b. If the risk management policies, procedures and controls applicable to
Participant’s market activities submitted to PJM or PJMSettlement were submitted
prior to the current certification, Participant certifies that no substantive changes have
been made to such policies, procedures and controls applicable to its market activities since such submission.

3. An FTR Participant must make either the following 3.a. or 3.b. additional representations, evidenced by the undersigned officer initialing either the one 3.a. representation or the four 3.b. representations in the spaces provided below:

a. Participant transacts in PJM’s FTR markets with the sole intent to hedge congestion risk in connection with either obligations Participant has to serve load or rights Participant has to generate electricity in the PJM Region (“physical transactions”) and monitors all of the Participant’s FTR market activity to endeavor to ensure that its FTR positions, considering both the size and pathways of the positions, are either generally proportionate to or generally do not exceed the Participant’s physical transactions, and remain generally consistent with the Participant’s intention to hedge its physical transactions.

b. On no less than a weekly basis, Participant values its FTR positions and engages in a probabilistic assessment of the hypothetical risk of such positions using analytically based methodologies, predicated on the use of industry accepted valuation methodologies.

Such valuation and risk assessment functions are performed either by persons within Participant’s organization independent from those trading in PJM’s FTR markets or by an outside firm qualified and with expertise in this area of risk management.

Having valued its FTR positions and quantified their hypothetical risks, Participant applies its written policies, procedures and controls to limit its risks using industry recognized practices, such as value-at-risk limitations, concentration limits, or other controls designed to prevent Participant from purposefully or unintentionally taking on risk that is not commensurate or proportional to Participant’s financial capability to manage such risk.

Exceptions to Participant’s written risk policies, procedures and controls applicable to Participant’s FTR positions are documented and explain a reasoned basis for the granting of any exception.

4. Participant has appropriate personnel resources, operating procedures and technical abilities to promptly and effectively respond to all PJM and PJMSettlement communications and directions.

5. Participant has demonstrated compliance with the Minimum Capitalization criteria set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q that are applicable to any PJM Markets in which Participant transacts, and is not aware of any change having occurred or being imminent that would invalidate such compliance.
6. All Participants must certify and initial in at least one of the four sections below:

a. I certify that Participant qualifies as an “appropriate person” as that term is defined under section 4(c)(3), or successor provision, of the Commodity Exchange Act or an “eligible contract participant” as that term is defined under section 1a(18), or successor provision, of the Commodity Exchange Act. I certify that Participant will cease transacting in any PJM Markets and notify PJM and PJMSettlement immediately if Participant no longer qualifies as an “appropriate person” or “eligible contract participant.”

If providing audited financial statements, which shall be in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM, to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “appropriate person:”

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the audited financial statements provided to PJM and/or PJMSettlement present fairly, pursuant to such disclosures in such audited financial statements, the financial position of Participant as of the date of those audited financial statements. Further, I certify that Participant continues to maintain the minimum $1 million total net worth and/or $5 million total asset levels reflected in these audited financial statements as of the date of this certification. I acknowledge that both PJM and PJMSettlement are relying upon my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

If not providing audited financial statements to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “appropriate person,” Participant certifies that they qualify as an “appropriate person” under one of the entities defined in section 4(c)(3)(A)-(J) of the Commodities Exchange Act.

If providing audited financial statements, which shall be in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM, to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “eligible contract participant:”

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the audited financial statements provided to PJM and/or PJMSettlement present fairly, pursuant to such disclosures in such audited financial statements, the financial position of Participant as of the date of those audited financial statements. Further, I certify that Participant continues to maintain the minimum $1 million total net worth and/or $10 million total asset levels reflected in these audited financial statements as of the date of this certification. I acknowledge that both PJM and PJMSettlement are relying upon my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

If not providing audited financial statements to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “eligible contract participant,” Participant certifies that they
qualify as an “eligible contract participant” under one of the entities defined in
section 1a(18)(A) of the Commodities Exchange Act. 

b. I certify that Participant has provided an unlimited Corporate Guaranty in a form
acceptable to PJM as described in Tariff, Attachment Q, section III.D from an issuer
that has at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per
Participant for which the issuer has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty. I also
certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the audited financial statements
provided to PJM and/or PJMSettlement present fairly, pursuant to such disclosures in
such audited financial statements, the financial position of the issuer as of the date of
those audited financial statements. Further, I certify that Participant will cease
transacting PJM’s Markets and notify PJM and PJMSettlement immediately if issuer
of the unlimited Corporate Guaranty for Participant no longer has at least $1 million
total net worth or $5 million of total assets per Participant for which the issuer has
issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty.

I certify that the issuer of the unlimited Corporate Guaranty to Participant continues
to have at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per
Participant for which the issuer has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty. I
acknowledge that PJM and PJMSettlement are relying upon my certifications to
maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

c. I certify that Participant fulfills the eligibility requirements of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission exemption order (78 F.R. 19880 – April 2, 2013) by being in
the business of at least one of the following in the PJM Region as indicated below
(initial those applicable):

1. Generating electric energy, including Participants that resell physical energy
acquired from an entity generating electric energy:

2. Transmitting electric energy:

3. Distributing electric energy delivered under Point-to-Point or Network
Integration Transmission Service, including scheduled import, export and
wheel through transactions:

4. Other electric energy services that are necessary to support the reliable
operation of the transmission system:

Description only if c(4) is initialed:

Further, I certify that Participant will cease transacting in any PJM Markets and notify
PJM and PJMSettlement immediately if Participant no longer performs at least one of
the functions noted above in the PJM Region. I acknowledge that PJM and
PJMSettlement are relying on my certification to maintain compliance with federal energy regulatory requirements.

d. I certify that Participant has provided a Letter of Credit of $5 million or more to PJM or PJMSettlement in a form acceptable to PJM and/or PJMSettlement as described in Tariff, Attachment Q, section V.B that the Participant acknowledges cannot be utilized to meet its credit requirements to PJM and PJMSettlement. I acknowledge that PJM and PJMSettlement are relying on the provision of this letter of credit and my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

e. I certify that Participant has provided a surety bond of $5 million or more to PJM or PJMSettlement in a form acceptable to PJM and/or PJMSettlement as described in Tariff, Attachment Q, section V.D. that the Participant acknowledges cannot be utilized to meet its credit requirements to PJM and PJMSettlement. I acknowledge that PJM and PJMSettlement are relying on the provision of this surety bond and my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

7. I acknowledge that I have read and understood the provisions of Tariff, Attachment Q applicable to Participant's business in any PJM Markets, including those provisions describing PJM's Minimum Participation Requirements and the enforcement actions available to PJM and PJMSettlement of a Participant not satisfying those requirements. I acknowledge that the information provided herein is true and accurate to the best of my belief and knowledge after due investigation. In addition, by signing this certification, I acknowledge the potential consequences of making incomplete or false statements in this Certification.

Date: ____________________________  Participant (Signature)

Print Name: ____________________________
Title: ____________________________
Sections of the
PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective July 1, 2023

(Marked/Redline Format)
ARTICLE 1 – DEFINITIONS

Unless the context otherwise specifies or requires, capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned herein or in the Schedules hereto, or in the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement if not otherwise defined in this Agreement, for all purposes of this Agreement (such definitions to be equally applicable to both the singular and the plural forms of the terms defined). Unless otherwise specified, all references herein to Articles, Sections or Schedules, are to Articles, Sections or Schedules of this Agreement. As used in this Agreement:

Accredited UCAP:

“Accredited UCAP” shall mean the quantity of Unforced Capacity, as denominated in Effective UCAP, that an ELCC Resource is capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

Agreement:

“Agreement” shall mean this Reliability Assurance Agreement, together with all Schedules hereto, as amended from time to time.

Annual Demand Resource:

“Annual Demand Resource” shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such Delivery Year by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of June through October and the following May, and 6:00AM through 9:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of November through April unless there is an Office of the Interconnection approved maintenance outage during October through April. The Annual Demand Resource must be available in the corresponding Delivery year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Annual Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

Annual Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Annual Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer and winter periods described in such Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

Applicable Regional Entity:
“Applicable Regional Entity” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through September of a Delivery Year, and will be available to the Office of the Interconnection for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Base Capacity Demand Resource must be available June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or self-supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Base Capacity Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Base Capacity Resource:**

“Base Capacity Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Base Residual Auction:**

“Base Residual Auction” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Behind The Meter Generation:**

“Behind The Meter Generation” shall refer to a generating unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection; provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit’s capacity that is designated as a Capacity Resource or (ii) in any hour, any portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
Black Start Capability:

“Black Start Capability” shall mean the ability of a generating unit or station to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition and start delivering power without assistance from the power system.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (CETO):

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall mean the amount of electric energy that a given area must be able to import in order to remain within a loss of load expectation of one event in 25 years when the area is experiencing a localized capacity emergency, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Without limiting the foregoing, CETO shall be calculated based in part on EFORD determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 5, Paragraph C.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL):

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall mean the capability of the transmission system to support deliveries of electric energy to a given area experiencing a localized capacity emergency as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Capacity Import Limit:

For any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, “Capacity Import Limit” shall mean, (a) for the PJM Region, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines for each Delivery Year, through appropriate modeling and the application of engineering judgment, the transmission system can receive, in aggregate at the interface of the PJM Region with all external balancing authority areas and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus (2) the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin; and (b) for certain source zones identified in the PJM manuals as groupings of one or more balancing authority areas, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines the transmission system can receive at the interface of the PJM Region with each such source zone and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin times (2) the ratio of the maximum import quantity from each such source zone divided by the PJM total maximum import quantity. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM shall make such determination based on the latest peak load forecast for the studied period, the same computer simulation model of loads, generation and transmission topography employed in the determination of Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for such Delivery Year, including external facilities from an industry standard model of the loads, generation, and transmission topography of the Eastern Interconnection under peak conditions. PJM shall specify in the PJM Manuals the
areas and minimum distribution factors for identifying monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers on the PJM interface. Employing such tools, PJM shall model increased power transfers from external areas into PJM to determine the transfer level at which one or more reliability criteria is violated on any monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers. For the PJM Region Capacity Import Limit, PJM shall optimize transfers from other source areas not experiencing any reliability criteria violations as appropriate to increase the Capacity Import Limit. The aggregate megawatt quantity of transfers into PJM at the point where any increase in transfers on the interface would violate reliability criteria will establish the Capacity Import Limit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region shall not be subject to the Capacity Import Limit if the Capacity Market Seller seeks an exception thereto by demonstrating to PJM, by no later than five (5) business days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, that such resource meets all of the following requirements:

(i) it has, at the time such exception is requested, met all applicable requirements to be pseudo-tied into the PJM Region, or the Capacity Market Seller has committed in writing that it will meet such requirements, unless prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond the control of the Capacity Market Seller, prior to the relevant Delivery Year;

(ii) at the time such exception is requested, it has long-term firm transmission service confirmed on the complete transmission path from such resource into PJM; and

(iii) it is, by written commitment of the Capacity Market Seller, subject to the same obligations imposed on Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 to offer their capacity into RPM Auctions; provided, however, that (a) the total megawatt quantity of all exceptions granted hereunder for a Delivery Year, plus the Capacity Import Limit for the applicable interface determined for such Delivery Year, may not exceed the total megawatt quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service on such interface that PJM has confirmed for such Delivery Year; and (b) if granting a qualified exception would result in a violation of the rule in clause (a), PJM shall grant the requested exception but reduce the Capacity Import Limit by the quantity necessary to ensure that the total quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service is not exceeded.

**Capacity Only Option:**

“Capacity Only Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

**Capacity Performance Resource:**

“Capacity Performance Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Capacity Resources:**
“Capacity Resources” shall mean megawatts of (i) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources meeting the requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedules 9 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 10 that are or will be owned by or contracted to a Party and that are or will be committed to satisfy that Party's obligations under the Reliability Assurance Agreement, or to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, for a Delivery Year; (ii) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources not owned or contracted for by a Party which are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in such Schedules 9 and 10; or (iii) load reduction capability provided by Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources that are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6; or (iv) generation and load reduction capability provided by a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and the PJM Manuals.

Capacity Storage Resource Class:

“Capacity Storage Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement, each of which is composed of Capacity Storage Resources with the same specified characteristic duration of 4, 6, 8, and 10 hours. The characteristic duration of an Energy Storage Resource Class is the ratio of the modeled MWh energy storage capability of members of the class to the modeled MW power capability of members of the class.

Capacity Transfer Right:

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Combination Resource:

“Combination Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that has a component that has the characteristics of a Limited Duration Resource combined with (i) a component that has the characteristics of an Unlimited Resource or (ii) a component that has the characteristics of a Variable Resource.

Compliance Aggregation Area (CAA):

“Compliance Aggregation Area” or “CAA” shall have the same meaning as in the Tariff.

Complex Hybrid Class:

“Complex Hybrid Class” shall mean an ELCC Class composed of Combination Resources that combine three or more components, whereby one component is a class of Limited Duration Resource, and the other components are different Variable Resource classes, and such Combination Resources cannot be included in any other Combination Resource class. A resource that is a member of a Complex Hybrid Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.
Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, PJM Transmission Owners Agreement or Transmission Owners Agreement:

“Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement,” “PJM Transmission Owners Agreement” or “Transmission Owners Agreement” shall mean that certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on file with the Commission, as amended from time to time.

Control Area:

“Control Area” shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and each Applicable Regional Entity;

(d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

(e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation:

“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8 or, as to an FRR Entity, in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

Delivery Year:

“Delivery Year” shall mean a Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment DD or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan under RAA, Schedule 8.1.
Demand Resource (DR):

“Demand Resource” or “DR” shall mean a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, Annual Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource or Summer-Period Demand Resource with a demonstrated capability to provide a reduction in demand or otherwise control load in accordance with the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 that offers and that clears load reduction capability in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction or that is committed through an FRR Capacity Plan.

Demand Resource Factor or DR Factor:

“Demand Resource Factor” or “DR Factor” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, that factor approved from time to time by the PJM Board used to determine the unforced capacity value of a Demand Resource in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6

Demand Resource Officer Certification Form:

“Demand Resource Officer Certification Form” shall mean a certification as to an intended Demand Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

Demand Resource Registration:

“Demand Resource Registration” shall mean a registration in the Full Program Option or Capacity Only Option of the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Resource Program in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 8.

Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan:

“Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan” shall mean the plan required by Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 in support of an intended offer of Demand Resources in an RPM Auction, or an intended inclusion of Demand Resources in an FRR Capacity Plan.

DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form:

“DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form” shall mean a DER Aggregator’s certification as to an intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan:

“DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan” shall mean the plan required by Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule
8.1 in support of an intended offer of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in an RPM Auction, or an intended inclusion of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan.

**Effective Nameplate Capacity:**

“Effective Nameplate Capacity” shall mean (i) for each Variable Resource and Combination Resource, the resource’s Maximum Facility Output; (ii) for each Limited Duration Resource, the sustained level of output that the unit can provide and maintain over a continuous period, whereby the duration of that continuous period matches the characteristic duration of the corresponding ELCC Class, with consideration given to ambient conditions expected to exist at the time of PJM system peak load, to the extent that such conditions impact such resource’s capability.

**Effective UCAP:**

“Effective UCAP” shall mean a unit of measure that represents the capacity product transacted in the Reliability Pricing Model and included in FRR Capacity Plans. One megawatt of Effective UCAP has the same capacity value of one megawatt of Unforced Capacity.

**ELCC Class:**

“ELCC Class” shall mean a defined group of ELCC Resources that share a common set of operational characteristics and for which effective load carrying capability analysis, as set forth in RAA, Schedule 9.1, will establish a unique ELCC Class UCAP and corresponding ELCC Class Rating(s). ELCC Classes shall be defined in the Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement. Members of an ELCC Class shall share a common method of calculating the ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment, provided that the individual ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment values will generally differ among ELCC Resources.

**ELCC Class Rating:**

“ELCC Class Rating” shall mean the rating factor, based on effective load carrying capability analysis, that applies to ELCC Resources that are members of an ELCC Class as part of the calculation of their Accredited UCAP.

**ELCC Class UCAP:**

“ELCC Class UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP all modeled ELCC Resources in a given ELCC Class are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

**ELCC Portfolio UCAP:**

“ELCC Portfolio UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP that all modeled ELCC Resources are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.
ELCC Resource:

“ELCC Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that is a Variable Resource, a Limited Duration Resource, or a Combination Resource.

ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment:

“ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment” shall mean the performance of a specific ELCC Resource relative to the aggregate performance of the ELCC Class to which it belongs as further described in RAA, Schedule 9.1, section F.

Electric Cooperative:

“Electric Cooperative” shall mean an entity owned in cooperative form by its customers that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

Electric Distributor:

“Electric Distributor” shall mean a Member that 1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership of electric distribution facilities that are used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region; or 2) is a generation and transmission cooperative or a joint municipal agency that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.

Emergency:

“Emergency” shall mean (i) an abnormal system condition requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent loss of firm load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or (ii) a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or (iii) a condition that requires implementation of emergency procedures as defined in the PJM Manuals.

End-Use Customer:

“End-Use Customer” shall mean a Member that is a retail end-user of electricity within the PJM Region. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is a retail end-user that owns generation may qualify as an End-Use customer if: (1) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates in the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average PJM capacity obligation for the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; or (2) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average energy consumed by that Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the same time period. The foregoing notwithstanding, taking retail service may not be sufficient to qualify a Member as an End-Use Customer.
Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the periods described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention. Annual Energy Efficiency Resources, Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resources are types of Energy Efficiency Resources.

Exigent Water Storage:

“Exigent Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is not typically available during normal operating conditions (as those conditions are described in the relevant FERC hydropower license), but which can be drawn upon during emergency conditions (as described in the FERC hydropower license), including in order to avoid a load shed. In an effective load carrying capability analysis, exigent storage capability from an upstream hydro facility can be considered relative to a downstream hydro facility by assessing cascading storage and flows.

Existing Demand Resource:

“Existing Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource for which the Demand Resource Provider has identified existing end-use customer sites that are registered for the current Delivery Year with PJM (even if not registered by such Demand Resource Provider) and that the Demand Resource Provider reasonably expects to have under a contract to reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is offered.

Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:

“Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for which the DER Aggregator has identified existing Component DER that are registered in a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for the current Delivery Year with PJM (even if not registered by such DER Aggregator) and that the DER Aggregator reasonably expects to have under a contract to generate or reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is offered.

Existing Generation Capacity Resource:
“Existing Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean, for purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource that, as of the date on which bidding commences for such auction: (a) is in service; or (b) is not yet in service, but has cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. A Generation Capacity Resource shall be deemed to be in service if interconnection service has ever commenced (for resources located in the PJM Region), or if it is physically and electrically interconnected to an external Control Area and is in full commercial operation (for resources not located in the PJM Region). The additional megawatts of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being, or has been, modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof shall not be deemed to be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource until such time as those megawatts (a) are in service; or (b) are not yet in service, but have cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year.

**Extended Summer Demand Resource:**

“Extended Summer Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through October and the following May, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Extended Summer Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Extended Summer Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Facilities Study Agreement:**

“Facilities Study Agreement” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Part VI, section 206.

**FERC or Commission:**

“FERC” or “Commission” shall mean the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any successor federal agency, commission or department exercising jurisdiction over the Tariff, Operating Agreement and Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:**

“Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service” shall have the meaning specified in the Tariff.

**Firm Service Level:**

“Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when an Emergency Action that triggers a Performance Assessment Interval is declared and the Locational Marginal
Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan. “Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Demand Resource shall mean the pre-determined level for which an end-use customer’s load shall be reduced, upon notification from the Curtailment Service Provider’s market operations center or its agent.

**Firm Transmission Service:**

“Firm Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service that is intended to be available at all times to the maximum extent practicable, subject to an Emergency, an unanticipated failure of a facility, or other event beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility or the Office of the Interconnection.

**Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative or FRR Alternative:**

“Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative” or “FRR Alternative” shall mean an alternative method for a Party to satisfy its obligation to provide Unforced Capacity hereunder, as set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Fixed-Tilt Solar Class:**

“Fixed-Tilt Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted in a fixed orientation.

**Forecast Pool Requirement:**

“Forecast Pool Requirement” or “FPR” shall mean the amount equal to one plus the unforced reserve margin (stated as a decimal number) for the PJM Region required pursuant to this Reliability Assurance Agreement, as approved by the PJM Board pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1.

**FRR Capacity Plan or FRR Plan:**

“FRR Capacity Plan” or “FRR Plan” shall mean a long-term plan for the commitment of Capacity Resources and Price Responsive Demand to satisfy the capacity obligations of a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative, as more fully set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**FRR Entity:**

“FRR Entity” shall mean, for the duration of such election, a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative hereunder.

**FRR Service Area:**

“FRR Service Area” shall mean (a) the service territory of an IOU as recognized by state law, rule or order; (b) the service area of a Public Power Entity or Electric Cooperative as recognized
by franchise or other state law, rule, or order; or (c) a separately identifiable geographic area that is: (i) bounded by wholesale metering, or similar appropriate multi-site aggregate metering, that is visible to, and regularly reported to, the Office of the Interconnection, or that is visible to, and regularly reported to an Electric Distributor and such Electric Distributor agrees to aggregate the load data from such meters for such FRR Service Area and regularly report such aggregated information, by FRR Service Area, to the Office of the Interconnection; and (ii) for which the FRR Entity has or assumes the obligation to provide capacity for all load (including load growth) within such area. In the event that the service obligations of an Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity are not defined by geographic boundaries but by physical connections to a defined set of customers, the FRR Service Area in such circumstances shall be defined as all customers physically connected to transmission or distribution facilities of such Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity within an area bounded by appropriate wholesale aggregate metering as described above.

**Full Program Option:**

“Full Program Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, (i) an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event, and (ii) a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

**Full Requirements Service:**

“Full Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply all of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

**Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generating Facility, or the contractual right to capacity from a specified Generating Facility, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 9 and RAA, Schedule 10, and, for Generating Facilities that are committed to an FRR Capacity Plan, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 8.1. A Generation Capacity Resource may be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource or a Planned Generation Capacity Resource.

**Generation Capacity Resource Provider:**

“Generation Capacity Resource Provider” shall mean a Member that owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output of, a Generation Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity.

**Generation Owner:**

“Generation Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership, or otherwise controls and operates one or more operating generation resources located in the PJM Region. The foregoing notwithstanding, for a planned generation resource to
qualify a Member as a Generation Owner, such resource shall have cleared an RPM auction, and
for Energy Resources, the resource shall have a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement
or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM. Purchasing all or a portion of the
output of a generation resource shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Generation
Owner. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is primarily a
retail end-user of electricity that owns generation may qualify as a Generation Owner if: (1) the
generation resource is the subject of a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or
wholesale market participation agreement within PJM; (2) the average physical unforced
capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates over the five Planning Periods immediately
preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average PJM capacity obligation of the
Member and its affiliates over the same time period; and (3) the average energy produced by the
Member and its affiliates within PJM over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the
relevant Planning Period exceeds the average energy consumed by the Member and its affiliates
within PJM over the same time period.

**Generator Forced Outage:**

“Generator Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal
from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened
Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of
the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or
removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not
constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

**Generator Maintenance Outage:**

“Generator Maintenance Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in
part, of a generating unit in order to perform repairs on specific components of the facility, if
removal of the facility qualifies as a maintenance outage pursuant to the PJM Manuals.

**Generator Planned Outage:**

“Generator Planned Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part,
of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the
Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Good Utility Practice:**

“Good Utility Practice” shall mean any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or
approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period,
or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light
of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish
the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety
and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice,
method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather is intended to include acceptable
practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region; including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Hybrid Resource Class:**

“Hybrid Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 Section B. Each Hybrid Resource Class has a specified combination of two components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in a Capacity Storage Resource Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of a Hybrid Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage:**

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage” shall mean a hydropower facility that can capture and store incoming stream flow, without use of pumps, in pondage or a reservoir, and the Generation Owner has the ability, within the constraints available in the applicable operating license, to exert material control over the quantity of stored water and output of the facility throughout an Operating Day.

**Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class:**

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Combination Resources that are Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage resources.

**Incremental Auction:**

“Incremental Auction” shall mean any of several auctions conducted for a Delivery Year after the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and before the first day of such Delivery Year, including the First Incremental Auction, Second Incremental Auction, Third Incremental Auction, or Conditional Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions (other than the Conditional Incremental Auction), shall be held for the purposes of:

(i) allowing Market Sellers that committed Capacity Resources in the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, which subsequently are determined to be unavailable to deliver the committed Unforced Capacity in such Delivery Year (due to resource retirement, resource cancellation or construction delay, resource derating, EFORd increase, a decrease in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of a Planned Demand Resource, delay or cancellation of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade, or similar occurrences) to submit Buy Bids for replacement Capacity Resources; and

(ii) allowing the Office of the Interconnection to reduce or increase the amount of committed capacity secured in prior auctions for such Delivery Year if, as a result of changed circumstances or expectations since the prior auction(s), there is, respectively, a significant
excess or significant deficit of committed capacity for such Delivery Year, for the PJM Region or for an LDA.

**Intermittent Hydropower Class:**

“Intermittent Hydropower Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are run-of-river hydropower generators that must generally pass incoming water and therefore cannot appreciably store water to later increase the output of the facility. Resources in the Intermittent Hydropower Class are not Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage resources.

**IOU:**

“IOU” shall mean an investor-owned utility with substantial business interest in owning and/or operating electric facilities in any two or more of the following three asset categories: generation, transmission, distribution.

**Landfill Gas Class:**

“Landfill Gas Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources fueled by landfill gas that, because of fuel availability patterns, cannot run consistently at installed capacity levels for 24 or more hours.

**Limited Demand Resource:**

“Limited Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will, at a minimum, be available for interruption for at least 10 Load Management Events during the summer period of June through September in the Delivery Year, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 6-hour duration. At a minimum, the Limited Demand Resource shall be available for such interruptions on weekdays, other than NERC holidays, from 12:00PM (noon) to 8:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Limited Demand Resource must be available during the summer period of June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Limited Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Limited Duration Resource:**

“Limited Duration Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that is not a Variable Resource, that is not a Combination Resource, and that is not capable of running continuously at Maximum Facility Output for 24 hours or longer. A Capacity Storage Resource is a Limited Duration Resource.

**Load Serving Entity or LSE:**
“Load Serving Entity” or “LSE” shall mean any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within the PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located within the PJM Region. Load Serving Entity shall include any end-use customer that qualifies under state rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.

**Locational Reliability Charge:**

“Locational Reliability Charge” shall mean the charge determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 8.

**Markets and Reliability Committee:**

“Markets and Reliability Committee” shall mean the committee established pursuant to the Operating Agreement as a Standing Committee of the Members Committee.

**Maximum Emergency Service Level:**

“Maximum Emergency Service Level” or “MESL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2017/2018 through the 2021/2022 Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when a Maximum Generation Emergency is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan.

**Member:**

“Member” shall have the meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Members Committee:**

“Members Committee” shall mean the committee specified in Operating Agreement, section 8 composed of the representatives of all the Members.

**NERC:**

“NERC” shall mean the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or any successor thereto.

**Network External Designated Transmission Service:**

“Network External Designated Transmission Service” shall mean the quantity of network transmission service confirmed by PJM for use by a market participant to import power and energy from an identified Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region, upon
demonstration by such market participant that it owns such Generation Capacity Resource, has an executed contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource, or has a contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource contingent upon securing firm transmission service from such resource.

**Network Resources:**

“Network Resources” shall have the meaning set forth in the PJM Tariff.

**Network Transmission Service:**

“Network Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Tariff, Part III or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

**Nominal PRD Value:**

“Nominal PRD Value” shall mean, as to any PRD Provider, an adjustment, determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1, to the peak-load forecast used to determine the quantity of capacity sought through an RPM Auction, reflecting the aggregate effect of Price Responsive Demand on peak load resulting from the Price Responsive Demand to be provided by such PRD Provider.

**Nominated Demand Resource Value:**

“Nominated Demand Resource Value” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation:**

“Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation” shall mean Behind the Meter Generation that is used by municipal electric systems, electric cooperatives, and electric distribution companies to serve load.

**Obligation Peak Load:**

“Obligation Peak Load” shall have the meaning specified in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.

**Office of the Interconnection:**

“Office of the Interconnection” shall mean the employees and agents of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., subject to the supervision and oversight of the PJM Board, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement.

**Offshore Wind Class:**
“Offshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with offshore wind turbines located in the ocean.

Onshore Wind Class:

“Onshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy using wind turbines and that are not in the Offshore Wind Class.

Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Operating Agreement or PJM Operating Agreement:

“Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,” “Operating Agreement” or “PJM Operating Agreement” shall mean that agreement, dated as of April 1, 1997 and as amended and restated as of June 2, 1997, including all Schedules, Exhibits, Appendices, addenda or supplements hereto, as amended from time to time thereafter, among the Members of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C, on file with the Commission.

Operating Day:

“Operating Day” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

Operating Reserve:

“Operating Reserve” shall mean the amount of generating capacity scheduled to be available for a specified period of an Operating Day to ensure the reliable operation of the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Ordinary Water Storage:

“Ordinary Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is typically available during normal operating conditions pursuant to the FERC license governing the operation of the hydropower resource.

Other Limited Duration Class:

“Other Limited Duration Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B of this Agreement, each of which has a specified characteristic duration and consists of Limited Duration Resources that are not Capacity Storage Resources. The characteristic duration of an Other Limited Duration Class is the maximum period of time represented in the ELCC model that the resources of the class can run at a stated capability.

Other Limited Duration Combination Class:

“Other Limited Duration Combination Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B. Each Other Limited Duration Class has a specified combination of two
components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in an Other Limited Duration Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of an Other Limited Duration Combination Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Other Supplier:**

“Other Supplier” shall mean a Member that: (i) is engaged in buying, selling or transmitting electric energy, capacity, ancillary services, Financial Transmission Rights or other services available under PJM’s governing documents in or through the Interconnection or has a good faith intent to do so, and (ii) is not a Generation Owner, Electric Distributor, Transmission Owner or End-Use Customer.

**Other Variable Resource Class:**

“Other Variable Resource Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are not in any other Variable Resource class, including Variable Resources that are composed of multiple components, each of which would be a Variable Resource. A resource composed of both fixed-tilt solar panels and tracking solar panels is not in this class. A resource that is a member of a Other Variable Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Partial Requirements Service:**

“Partial Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply a specified portion, but not all, of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

**Party:**

“Party” shall mean an entity bound by the terms of the Operating Agreement.

**Peak Shaving Adjustment:**

“Peak Shaving Adjustment” shall mean a load forecast mechanism that allows load reductions by end-use customers to result in a downward adjustment of the summer load forecast for the associated Zone. Any End-Use Customer identified in an approved peak shaving plan shall not also participate in PJM Markets as Price Responsive Demand, Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource, Capacity Performance Demand Resource, or Economic Load Response Participant.

**Percentage Internal Resources Required:**
“Percentage Internal Resources Required” shall mean, for purposes of an FRR Capacity Plan, the percentage of the LDA Reliability Requirement for an LDA that must be satisfied with Capacity Resources located in such LDA.

Performance Assessment Interval:

“Performance Assessment Interval” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

PJM:

“PJM” shall mean PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., including the Office of the Interconnection as referenced in the PJM Operating Agreement. When such term is being used in the RAA it shall also include the PJM Board.

PJM Board:

“PJM Board” shall mean the Board of Managers of the LLC, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement, except when such term is being used in Tariff, Attachment M, in which case PJM Board shall mean the Board of Managers of PJM or its designated representative, exclusive of any members of PJM Management.

PJM Manuals:

“PJM Manuals” shall mean the instructions, rules, procedures and guidelines established by the Office of the Interconnection for the operation, planning and accounting requirements of the PJM Region.

PJM Region:

“PJM Region” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin:

“PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin” shall mean the percent installed reserve margin for the PJM Region required pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1, as approved by the PJM Board.

PJM Tariff, Tariff, O.A.T.T., OATT or PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff:

“PJM Tariff,” “Tariff,” “O.A.T.T., “OATT” or “PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff” shall mean that certain PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, including any schedules, appendices, or exhibits attached thereto, on file with FERC and as amended from time to time thereafter.

Planned Demand Resource:
“Planned Demand Resource” shall mean any Demand Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide a reduction in demand or to otherwise control load, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such reduction or control on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a Demand Resource Provider submitting a DR Sell Offer Plan shall identify as Planned Demand Resources in such plan all Demand Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing Demand Resources.

**Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:**

A “Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean any DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such generation or reduction in demand on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a DER Aggregator submitting a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall identify in such plan all DER Capacity Aggregation Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources. A Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all provisions of the DER Aggregator Participation Model described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B, prior to the applicable Delivery Year.

**Planned External Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Planned External Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a proposed Generation Capacity Resource, or a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource, that (a) is to be located outside the PJM Region, (b) participates in the generation interconnection process of a Control Area external to PJM, (c) is scheduled to be physically and electrically interconnected to the transmission facilities of such Control Area on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, and (d) is in full commercial operation prior to the first day of such Delivery Year, such that it is sufficient to provide the Installed Capacity set forth in the Sell Offer forming the basis of such resource’s commitment to the PJM Region. Prior to participation in any Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has a fully executed system impact study agreement (or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff) or, for resources which are greater than 20MWs participating in a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, an agreement or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a Facilities Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff, with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. Prior to participating in any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate it has entered into an interconnection agreement, or such other documentation that is functionally equivalent to an Interconnection Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, with the transmission...
owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. A Planned External Generation Capacity Resource must provide evidence to PJM that it has been studied as a Network Resource, or such other similar interconnection product in such external Control Area, must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for or purchased transmission service to be deliverable to the PJM border, and must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for transmission service to be deliverable to the bus at which energy is to delivered, the agreements for which must have been executed prior to participation in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year. Any such resource shall cease to be considered a Planned External Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that interconnection service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Planned Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Planned Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, or additional megawatts to increase the size of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being or has been modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof, participating in the generation interconnection process under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart A, as applicable, for which: (i) Interconnection Service is scheduled to commence on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to RPM or to an FRR Capacity Plan; (ii) for any such resource seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, or for any such resource of 20 MWs or less seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, a System Impact Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a System Impact Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; (iii) for any such resource of more than 20 MWs seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a Facilities Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a Facilities Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a Facility Studies Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; and (iv) an Interconnection Service Agreement has been executed prior to any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year in which such resource plans to participate. For purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource shall cease to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that Interconnection Service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Planning Period:**

“Planning Period” shall mean the 12 months beginning June 1 and extending through May 31 of the following year, or such other period approved by the Members Committee.
PRD Curve:

“PRD Curve” shall mean a price-consumption curve at a PRD Substation level, if available, and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) level, that details the base consumption level of Price Responsive Demand and the decreasing consumption levels at increasing prices.

PRD Provider:

“PRD Provider” shall mean a PJM Member that has entered contractual arrangements with end-use customers that satisfy the eligibility criteria for and provides Price Responsive Demand.

PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD:

“PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD” shall mean the expected contribution to Delivery Year peak load of a PRD Provider’s Price Responsive Demand, were such demand not to be reduced in response to price, based on the contribution of the end-use customers comprising such Price Responsive Demand to the most recent prior Delivery Year’s peak demand, escalated to the Delivery Year in question, as determined in a manner consistent with the Office of the Interconnection’s load forecasts used for purposes of the RPM Auctions.

PRD Reservation Price:

“PRD Reservation Price” shall mean an RPM Auction clearing price identified in a PRD Plan for Price Responsive Demand load below which the PRD Provider desires not to commit the identified load as Price Responsive Demand.

PRD Substation:

“PRD Substation” shall mean an electrical substation that is located in the same Zone or in the same sub-Zonal LDA as the end-use customers identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration and that, in terms of the electrical topography of the Transmission Facilities comprising the PJM Region, is as close as practicable to such loads.

Price Responsive Demand:

“Price Responsive Demand” or “PRD” shall mean end-use customer load registered by a PRD Provider pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 that have, as set forth in more detail in the PJM Manuals, the metering capability to record electricity consumption at an interval of one hour or less, Supervisory Control capable of curtailing such load (consistent with applicable RERRA requirements) at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection (prior to 2022/2023 Delivery Year) or a Performance Assessment Interval that triggers a PRD performance assessment (effective with 2022/2023 Delivery Year), and a retail rate structure, or equivalent contractual arrangement, capable of changing retail rates as frequently as an hourly basis, that is linked to or based upon changes in real-time Locational...
Marginal Prices at a PRD Substation level and that results in a predictable automated response to varying wholesale electricity prices.

**Price Responsive Demand Credit:**

“Price Responsive Demand Credit” shall mean a credit, based on committed Price Responsive Demand, as determined under Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1.

**Price Responsive Demand Plan or PRD Plan:**

“Price Responsive Demand Plan” or “PRD Plan” shall mean a plan, submitted by a PRD Provider and received by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, claiming a peak demand limitation due to Price Responsive Demand to support the determination of such PRD Provider’s Nominal PRD Value.

**Public Power Entity:**

“Public Power Entity” shall mean any agency, authority, or instrumentality of a state or of a political subdivision of a state, or any corporation wholly owned by any one or more of the foregoing, that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Qualifying Transmission Upgrades:**

“Qualifying Transmission Upgrades” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority:**

“Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority” or “RERRA” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Operating Agreement.

**Reliability Principles and Standards:**

“Reliability Principles and Standards” shall mean the principles and standards established by NERC or an Applicable Regional Entity to define, among other things, an acceptable probability of loss of load due to inadequate generation or transmission capability, as amended from time to time.

**Required Approvals:**

“Required Approvals” shall mean all of the approvals required for the Operating Agreement to be modified or to be terminated, in whole or in part, including the acceptance for filing by FERC and every other regulatory authority with jurisdiction over all or any part of the Operating Agreement.

**Self-Supply:**
“Self-Supply” shall have the meaning provided in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Small Commercial Customer:**

“Small Commercial Customer” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**State Consumer Advocate:**

“State Consumer Advocate” shall mean a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of which is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for the purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory commissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.

**State Regulatory Structural Change:**

“State Regulatory Structural Change” shall mean as to any Party, a state law, rule, or order that, after September 30, 2006, initiates a program that allows retail electric consumers served by such Party to choose from among alternative suppliers on a competitive basis, terminates such a program, expands such a program to include classes of customers or localities served by such Party that were not previously permitted to participate in such a program, or that modifies retail electric market structure or market design rules in a manner that materially increases the likelihood that a substantial proportion of the customers of such Party that are eligible for retail choice under such a program (a) that have not exercised such choice will exercise such choice; or (b) that have exercised such choice will no longer exercise such choice, including for example, without limitation, mandating divestiture of utility-owned generation or structural changes to such Party’s default service rules that materially affect whether retail choice is economically viable.

**Summer-Period Demand Resource:**

Summer-Period Demand Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and will be available June through October and the following May of the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Summer-Period Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale in an RPM Auction, or included as a Summer-Period Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource:**

Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements
of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

Supervisory Control:

“Supervisory Control” shall mean the capability to curtail, in accordance with applicable RERRA requirements, load registered as Price Responsive Demand at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection. Except to the extent automation is not required by the provisions of the Operating Agreement, the curtailment shall be automated, meaning that load shall be reduced automatically in response to control signals sent by the PRD Provider or its designated agent directly to the control equipment where the load is located without the requirement for any action by the end-use customer.

Threshold Quantity:

“Threshold Quantity” shall mean, as to any FRR Entity for any Delivery Year, the sum of (a) the Unforced Capacity equivalent (determined using the Pool-Wide Average EFORD) of the Installed Reserve Margin for such Delivery Year multiplied by the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for which such FRR Entity is responsible under its FRR Capacity Plan for such Delivery Year, plus (b) the lesser of (i) 3% of the Unforced Capacity amount determined in (a) above or (ii) 450 MW. If the FRR Entity is not responsible for all load within a Zone, the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for such entity shall be the FRR Entity’s Obligation Peak Load last determined prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, times the Base FRR Scaling Factor (as determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1).

Tracking Solar Class:

“Tracking Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted on trackers that align the panels with incoming sunlight over the course of the day.

Transmission Facilities:

“Transmission Facilities” shall mean facilities that: (i) are within the PJM Region; (ii) meet the definition of transmission facilities pursuant to FERC’s Uniform System of Accounts or have been classified as transmission facilities in a ruling by FERC addressing such facilities; and (iii) have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection to be integrated with the PJM Region transmission system and integrated into the planning and operation of the PJM Region to serve all of the power and transmission customers within the PJM Region.
Transmission Owner:

“Transmission Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities and is a signatory to the PJM Transmission Owners Agreement. Taking transmission service shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Transmission Owner.

Unforced Capacity:

“Unforced Capacity” shall mean installed capacity rated at summer conditions that is not on average experiencing a forced outage or forced derating, calculated for each Capacity Resource on the 12-month period from October to September without regard to the ownership of or the contractual rights to the capacity of the unit.

Unlimited Resource:

“Unlimited Resource” shall mean a generating unit having the ability to maintain output at a stated capability continuously on a daily basis without interruption. An Unlimited Resource is a Generation Capacity Resource that is not an ELCC Resource.

Variable Resource:

“Variable Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource with output that can vary as a function of its energy source, such as wind, solar, run of river hydroelectric power without storage, and landfill gas units without an alternate fuel source. All Intermittent Resources are Variable Resources, with the exception of Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage.

Winter Peak Load (or WPL):

“Winter Peak Load” or “WPL” shall mean the average of the Demand Resource customer’s specific peak hourly load between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on the PJM defined 5 coincident peak days from December through February two Delivery Years prior the Delivery Year for which the registration is submitted. Notwithstanding, if the average use between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on a winter 5 coincident peak day is below 35% of the average hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT over all five of such peak days, then up to two such days and corresponding peak demand values may be excluded from the calculation. Upon approval by the Office of the Interconnection, a Curtailment Service Provider may provide alternative data to calculate Winter Peak Load, as outlined in the PJM Manuals, when there is insufficient hourly load data for the two Delivery Years prior to the relevant Delivery Year or if more than two days meet the exclusion criteria described above.

Zonal Capacity Price:

“Zonal Capacity Price” shall mean the clearing price required in each Zone to meet the demand for Unforced Capacity and satisfy Locational Deliverability Requirements for the LDA or LDAs
associated with such Zone. If the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA.

**Zone or Zonal:**

“Zone” or “Zonal” shall refer to an area within the PJM Region, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment J and RAA, Schedule 15, or as such areas may be (i) combined as a result of mergers or acquisitions or (ii) added as a result of the expansion of the boundaries of the PJM Region. A Zone shall include any Non-Zone Network Load located outside the PJM Region that is served from such Zone under Tariff, Attachment H-A.

**Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor (ZWWAF):**

“Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor” or “ZWWAF” shall mean the PJM zonal winter weather normalized coincident peak divided by PJM zonal average of 5 coincident peak loads in December through February.
SCHEDULE 6.2

DER Capacity Aggregation Resources qualifying under the criteria set forth below may be offered for sale in an RPM auction, or included in an FRR Capacity Plan, for any Delivery Year for which such resource qualifies.

DER Aggregators intending to offer for sale or designate for self-supply, a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any RPM Auction, or intending to include a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any FRR Capacity Plan must demonstrate, to PJM's satisfaction, that such resource shall have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is committed. As part of such demonstration, each such DER Aggregator shall submit a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan in accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in RAA, Schedule 6.2, and the PJM Manuals, no later than 30 days prior to, as applicable, the RPM Auction in which such resource is to be offered, or the deadline for submission of the FRR Capacity Plan in which such resource is to be included.

PJM may verify the DER Aggregator’s adherence to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan at any time. A DER Aggregator with a PJM-approved DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan will be permitted to offer up to the approved megawatt quantity into the subject RPM Auction or include such resource in its FRR Capacity Plan.

A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall consist of a completed template document in the form posted on the PJM website, requiring the information set forth below and in the PJM Manuals, and a DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must provide information that supports the DER Aggregator’s intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offers and demonstrate that the DER Capacity Aggregation Resources are being offered with the intention that the megawatt quantity that clears the auction is reasonably expected to be physically delivered through DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registration for the relevant Delivery Year. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall include all Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources and all Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that the DER Aggregator intends to offer into an RPM Auction or include in an FRR Capacity Plan.

The DER Aggregator shall provide the details of, and key assumptions for underlying Component DER for the Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource contained in the Sell Offer Plan, including but not limited to:

(i) Nominated megawatt quantities and method(s) of achieving generation or load reductions to meet megawatt quantities
(ii) equipment and technology to be installed or controlled
(iii) plan and ability to acquire generating resources or load reductions at customer site(s) and assumptions regarding regulatory approval of program(s), if applicable
(iv) A measurement and verification plan developed in accordance with PJM Manuals, if applicable
(v) Zone and LDA information
(vi) A schedule of an approximate timeline for procuring Component DER

DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form.

Each DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must include a DER Aggregator Officer Certification, signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification, in the form shown in the PJM Manuals, which form shall include the following certifications:

(a) that the signing officer has reviewed the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan and the information supplied to PJM in support of the Plan is true and correct as of the date of the certification; and

(b) that the DER Aggregator is submitting the Plan with the reasonable expectation, based upon its analyses as of the date of the certification, to physically deliver all megawatts that clear the RPM Auction through the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registrations by the specified Delivery Year.

As set forth in the form provided in the PJM Manuals, the certification shall specify that it does not in any way abridge, expand, or otherwise modify the current provisions of the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, and/or RAA.

The Unforced Capacity value of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource will be determined as the sum of the Unforced Capacity value of the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, accounting for any co-located load that is not Station Power, in accordance with the provisions of the PJM Manuals.

The DER Aggregator shall provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource located within the same Zone and LDA as specified in its cleared sell offer, and may be subject to deficiency charges under Tariff, Attachment DD to the extent it fails to provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the applicable DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in such location and quantity consistent with its cleared offer.

A DER Aggregator offering a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all applicable credit requirements, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q.
Attachment B

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff,
Operating Agreement, and
Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective February 2, 2026

(Identified by Additional Cover Pages)

(Marked/Redline Format)
Sections of the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

Effective February 2, 2026

(Marked/Redline Format)
Definitions – A - B

Abnormal Condition:

“Abnormal Condition” shall mean any condition on the Interconnection Facilities which, determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, is: (i) outside normal operating parameters such that facilities are operating outside their normal ratings or that reasonable operating limits have been exceeded; and (ii) could reasonably be expected to materially and adversely affect the safe and reliable operation of the Interconnection Facilities; but which, in any case, could reasonably be expected to result in an Emergency Condition. Any condition or situation that results from lack of sufficient generating capacity to meet load requirements or that results solely from economic conditions shall not, standing alone, constitute an Abnormal Condition.

Acceleration Request:

“Acceleration Request” shall mean a request pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.4A, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.4A, to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.2 or Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.4, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.2 or Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.4.

Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement:

“Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the portion of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement that is required in addition to the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to ensure adequate resources are procured to meet real-time load and operational needs, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Affected System:

“Affected System” shall mean an electric system other than the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System that may be affected by a proposed interconnection or on which a proposed interconnection or addition of facilities or upgrades may require modifications or upgrades to the Transmission System.

Affected System Operator:

“Affected System Operator” shall mean an entity that operates an Affected System or, if the Affected System is under the operational control of an independent system operator or a regional transmission organization, such independent entity.

Affiliate:

“Affiliate” shall mean any two or more entities, one of which Controls the other or that are under common Control. “Control,” as that term is used in this definition, shall mean the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct the management or policies of an entity. Ownership
of publicly-traded equity securities of another entity shall not result in Control or affiliation for purposes of the Tariff or Operating Agreement if the securities are held as an investment, the holder owns (in its name or via intermediaries) less than 10 percent (10%) of the outstanding securities of the entity, the holder does not have representation on the entity’s board of directors (or equivalent managing entity) or vice versa, and the holder does not in fact exercise influence over day-to-day management decisions. Unless the contrary is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Members Committee, Control shall be presumed to arise from the ownership of or the power to vote, directly or indirectly, ten percent or more of the voting securities of such entity.

**Agreements:**

“Agreements” shall mean the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, the Reliability Assurance Agreement, and/or other agreements between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and its Members.

**Ancillary Services:**

“Ancillary Services” shall mean those services that are necessary to support the transmission of capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Annual Demand Resource:**

“Annual Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Annual Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Annual Energy Efficiency Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Annual Resource:**


**Annual Resource Price Adder:**

“Annual Resource Price Adder” shall mean, for Delivery Years starting June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, an addition to the marginal value of Unforced Capacity and the Extended Summer Resource Price Adder as necessary to reflect the price of Annual Resources required to meet the applicable Minimum Annual Resource Requirement.

**Annual Revenue Rate:**

“Annual Revenue Rate” shall mean the rate employed to assess a compliance penalty charge on a
Curtailment Service Provider und Tariff, Attachment DD, section 11.

Annual Transmission Costs:

“Annual Transmission Costs” shall mean the total annual cost of the Transmission System for purposes of Network Integration Transmission Service shall be the amount specified in Attachment H for each Zone until amended by the applicable Transmission Owner or modified by the Commission.

Applicable Laws and Regulations:

“Applicable Laws and Regulations” shall mean all duly promulgated applicable federal, State and local laws, regulations, rules, ordinances, codes, decrees, judgments, directives, or judicial or administrative orders, permits and other duly authorized actions of any Governmental Authority having jurisdiction over the relevant parties, their respective facilities, and/or the respective services they provide.

Applicable Regional Entity:

“Applicable Regional Entity” shall mean the Regional Entity for the region in which a Network Customer, Transmission Customer, New Service Customer, or Transmission Owner operates.

Applicable Standards:

“Applicable Standards” shall mean the requirements and guidelines of NERC, the Applicable Regional Entity, and the Control Area in which the Customer Facility is electrically located; the PJM Manuals; and Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards.

Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards:

“Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards” shall mean those certain technical requirements and standards applicable to interconnections of generation and/or transmission facilities with the facilities of an Interconnected Transmission Owner or, as the case may be and to the extent applicable, of an Electric Distributor, as published by Transmission Provider in a PJM Manual provided, however, that, with respect to any generation facilities with maximum generating capacity of 2 MW or less (synchronous) or 5 MW or less (inverter-based) for which the Interconnection Customer executes a Construction Service Agreement or Interconnection Service Agreement on or after March 19, 2005, “Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards” shall refer to the “PJM Small Generator Interconnection Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards.” All Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards shall be publicly available through postings on Transmission Provider’s internet website.

Applicant:

“Applicant” shall mean an entity desiring to become a PJM Member, become a Market Participant, engage in market activities, or to take Transmission Service that has submitted the
PJMSettlement credit application, PJMSettlement credit agreement and other required submittals as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q.

**Application:**

“Application” shall mean a request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff.

**Attachment Facilities:**

“Attachment Facilities” shall mean the facilities necessary to physically connect a Customer Facility to the Transmission System or interconnected distribution facilities.

**Attachment H:**

“Attachment H” shall refer collectively to the Attachments to the PJM Tariff with the prefix “H” that set forth, among other things, the Annual Transmission Rates for Network Integration Transmission Service in the PJM Zones.

**Auction Revenue Rights:**

“Auction Revenue Rights” or “ARRs” shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4.

**Auction Revenue Rights Credits:**

“Auction Revenue Rights Credits” shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4.3.

**Authorized Government Agency:**

“Authorized Government Agency” means a regulatory body or government agency, with jurisdiction over PJM, the PJM Market, or any entity doing business in the PJM Market, including, but not limited to, the Commission, State Commissions, and state and federal attorneys general.

**Avoidable Cost Rate:**

“Avoidable Cost Rate” shall mean a component of the Market Seller Offer Cap calculated in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.

**Balancing Congestion Charges:**
“Balancing Congestion Charges” shall be equal to the sum of congestion charges collected from Market Participants that are purchasing energy in the Real-time Energy Market minus [the sum of congestion charges paid to Market Participants that are selling energy in the Real-time Energy Market plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement between the Midcontinent Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 38), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to agreements between the Office of the Interconnection and other entities, plus any charges or credits calculated pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.8, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.8, as applicable)].

**Balancing Ratio:**

“Balancing Ratio” shall have the meaning provided in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 10A.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the maximum Unforced Capacity amount, determined by PJM, of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources that is consistent with the maintenance of reliability. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint for the PJM Region or an LDA, by first determining a reference annual loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) assuming no Base Capacity Resources, including no Base Capacity Demand Resources or Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources. The calculation for the PJM Region uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast and iteratively shifting the load distributions to result in the Installed Reserve Margin established for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). The calculation for each relevant LDA uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). For the relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for the Delivery Year in question.

For both the PJM Region and LDA analyses, PJM then models the commitment of varying amounts of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources (displacing otherwise committed generation) as interruptible from June 1 through September 30
and unavailable the rest of the Delivery Year in question and calculates the LOLE at each DR and EE level. The Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint is the combined amount of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources, stated as a percentage of the unrestricted annual peak load, that produces no more than a five percent increase in the LOLE, compared to the reference value. The Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [the Forecast Pool Requirement] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

**Base Capacity Demand Resource Price Decrement:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource Price Decrement” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a difference between the clearing price for Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and the clearing price for Base Capacity Resources and Capacity Performance Resources, representing the cost to procure additional Base Capacity Resources or Capacity Performance Resources out of merit order when the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint is binding.

**Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Base Capacity Resource:**

“Base Capacity Resource” shall mean a Capacity Resource as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(b).

**Base Capacity Resource Constraint:**

“Base Capacity Resource Constraint” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the maximum Unforced Capacity amount, determined by PJM, of Base Capacity Resources, including Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources, that is consistent with the maintenance of reliability. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the above Base Capacity Resource Constraint for the PJM Region or an LDA, by first determining a reference annual loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) assuming no Base Capacity Resources, including no Base Capacity Demand Resources or Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources. The calculation for the PJM Region uses the weekly load distribution from the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question (based on the most recent load forecast and iteratively shifting the load distributions to result in the Installed Reserve Margin established for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). The calculation for each relevant LDA uses a weekly load distribution (based on the Installed Reserve Margin study and the most recent load forecast for the Delivery Year in
question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). For the relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for the Delivery Year in question. Additionally, for the PJM Region and relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect winter ratings.

For both the PJM Region and LDA analyses, PJM models the commitment of an amount of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources equal to the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint (displacing otherwise committed generation). PJM then models the commitment of varying amounts of Base Capacity Resources (displacing otherwise committed generation) as unavailable during the peak week of winter and available the rest of the Delivery Year in question and calculates the LOLE at each Base Capacity Resource level. The Base Capacity Resource Constraint is the combined amount of Base Capacity Demand Resources, Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and Base Capacity Resources, stated as a percentage of the unrestricted annual peak load, that produces no more than a ten percent increase in the LOLE, compared to the reference value. The Base Capacity Resource Constraint shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [one minus the pool-wide average EFORd] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

**Base Capacity Resource Price Decrement:**

“Base Capacity Resource Price Decrement” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a difference between the clearing price for Base Capacity Resources and the clearing price for Capacity Performance Resources, representing the cost to procure additional Capacity Performance Resources out of merit order when the Base Capacity Resource Constraint is binding.

**Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement:**

“Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with the Applicable Standards, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

**Base Load Generation Resource**

“Base Load Generation Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that operates at least 90 percent of the hours that it is available to operate, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Base Offer Segment:**

“Base Offer Segment” shall mean a component of a Sell Offer based on an existing Generation
Capacity Resource, equal to the Unforced Capacity of such resource, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. If the Sell Offers of multiple Market Sellers are based on a single Existing Generation Capacity Resource, the Base Offer Segments of such Market Sellers shall be determined pro rata based on their entitlements to Unforced Capacity from such resource.

**Base Residual Auction:**

“Base Residual Auction” shall mean the auction conducted three years prior to the start of the Delivery Year to secure commitments from Capacity Resources as necessary to satisfy any portion of the Unforced Capacity Obligation of the PJM Region not satisfied through Self-Supply.

**Batch Load Demand Resource:**

“Batch Load Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

**Behind The Meter Generation:**

“Behind The Meter Generation” shall refer to a generation unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities has consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection); provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit’s capacity that is designated as a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource; or (ii) in an hour, any portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**Black Start Service:**

“Black Start Service” shall mean the capability of generating units to start without an outside electrical supply or the demonstrated ability of a generating unit with a high operating factor (subject to Transmission Provider concurrence) to automatically remain operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid.

**Border Yearly Charge:**

“Border Yearly Charge” shall mean the yearly charge determined in accordance with Tariff, Schedule 7.

**Breach:**
“Breach” shall mean the failure of a party to perform or observe any material term or condition of Tariff, Part IV or Tariff, Part VI, or any agreement entered into thereunder as described in the relevant provisions of such agreement.

Breaching Party:

“Breaching Party” shall mean a party that is in Breach of Tariff, Part IV or Tariff, Part VI and/or an agreement entered into thereunder.

Business Day:

“Business Day” shall mean a day in which the Federal Reserve System is open for business and is not a scheduled PJM holiday.

Buy Bid:

“Buy Bid” shall mean a bid to buy Capacity Resources in any Incremental Auction.

Buyer-Side Market Power:

“Buyer-Side Market Power” shall mean the ability of Capacity Market Sellers with a Load Interest to suppress RPM Auction clearing prices for the overall benefit of their (and/or affiliates) portfolio of generation and load.
Definitions – C-D

Canadian Guaranty:

“Canadian Guaranty” shall mean a Corporate Guaranty provided by an Affiliate of a Participant that is domiciled in Canada, and meets all of the provisions of Tariff, Attachment Q.

Cancellation Costs:

“Cancellation Costs” shall mean costs and liabilities incurred in connection with: (a) cancellation of supplier and contractor written orders and agreements entered into to design, construct and install Attachment Facilities, Direct Assignment Facilities and/or Customer-Funded Upgrades, and/or (b) completion of some or all of the required Attachment Facilities, Direct Assignment Facilities and/or Customer-Funded Upgrades, or specific unfinished portions and/or removal of any or all of such facilities which have been installed, to the extent required for the Transmission Provider and/or Transmission Owner(s) to perform their respective obligations under Tariff, Part IV and/or Tariff, Part VI.

Capacity:

“Capacity” shall mean the installed capacity requirement of the Reliability Assurance Agreement or similar such requirements as may be established.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit:

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective:

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Capacity Export Transmission Customer:

“Capacity Export Transmission Customer” shall mean a customer taking point to point transmission service under Tariff, Part II to export capacity from a generation resource located in the PJM Region that has qualified for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(g).

Capacity Import Limit:

“Capacity Import Limit” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Capacity Interconnection Rights:
“Capacity Interconnection Rights” shall mean the rights to input generation as a Generation Capacity Resource into the Transmission System at the Point of Interconnection where the generating facilities connect to the Transmission System.

**Capacity Market Buyer:**

“Capacity Market Buyer” shall mean a Member that submits bids to buy Capacity Resources in any Incremental Auction.

**Capacity Market Seller:**

“Capacity Market Seller” shall mean a Member that owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output or load reduction capability of, a Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity, and that offers such resource in the Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction.

**Capacity Performance Resource:**

“Capacity Performance Resource” shall mean a Capacity Resource as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(a).

**Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction:**

“Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14D.

**Capacity Resource:**

“Capacity Resource” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Capacity Resource with State Subsidy:**

“Capacity Resource with State Subsidy” shall mean (1) a Capacity Resource that is offered into an RPM Auction or otherwise assumes an RPM commitment for which the Capacity Market Seller receives or is entitled to receive one or more State Subsidies for the applicable Delivery Year; (2) a Capacity Resource that has not cleared an RPM Auction for the Delivery Year for which the Capacity Market Seller last received a State Subsidy (or any subsequent Delivery Year) shall still be considered a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy upon the expiration of such State Subsidy until the resource clears an RPM Auction; (3) a Capacity Resource that is the subject of a bilateral transaction (including but not limited to those reported pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 4.6) shall be deemed a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy to the extent an owner of the facility supporting the Capacity Resource is entitled to a State Subsidy associated with such facility even if the Capacity Market Seller is not entitled to a State Subsidy; and (4) any Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resource.
Capacity Resource Clearing Price:

“Capacity Resource Clearing Price” shall mean the price calculated for a Capacity Resource that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.

Capacity Storage Resource:

“Capacity Storage Resource” shall mean any Energy Storage Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan.

Capacity Transfer Right:

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall mean a right, allocated to LSEs serving load in a Locational Deliverability Area, to receive payments, based on the transmission import capability into such Locational Deliverability Area, that offset, in whole or in part, the charges attributable to the Locational Price Adder, if any, included in the Zonal Capacity Price calculated for a Locational Delivery Area.

Capacity Transmission Injection Rights:

“Capacity Transmission Injection Rights” shall mean the rights to schedule energy and capacity deliveries at a Point of Interconnection of a Merchant Transmission Facility with the Transmission System. Capacity Transmission Injection Rights may be awarded only to a Merchant D.C. Transmission Facility and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities that connects the Transmission System to another control area. Deliveries scheduled using Capacity Transmission Injection Rights have rights similar to those under Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service or, if coupled with a generating unit external to the PJM Region that satisfies all applicable criteria specified in the PJM Manuals, similar to Capacity Interconnection Rights.

Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts:

“Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts” shall mean the greatest magnitude of megawatt power consumption available for charging in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Continuous Mode or in Charge Mode. Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts shall be the Economic Minimum for an Energy Storage Resource in Charge Mode or in Continuous Mode.

Charge Economic Minimum Megawatts:

“Charge Economic Minimum Megawatts” shall mean the smallest magnitude of megawatt power consumption available for charging in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Charge Mode. Charge Economic Minimum Megawatts shall be the Economic Maximum for an Energy Storage Resource in Charge Mode.
**Charge Mode:**

“Charge Mode” shall mean the mode of operation of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant that only includes negative megawatt quantities (i.e., the Energy Storage Resource Model Participant is only withdrawing megawatts from the grid).

**Charge Ramp Rate:**

“Charge Ramp Rate” shall mean the Ramping Capability of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Charge Mode.

**Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy:**

“Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy” shall mean a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that has cleared in an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year that is prior to the 2022/2023 Delivery Year or, starting with 2022/2023 Delivery Year, the MWs (in installed capacity) comprising a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that have cleared an RPM Auction pursuant to its Sell Offer at or above its resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price or the applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price and since then, any of those MWs (in installed capacity) comprising a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy have been, the subject of a Sell Offer into the Base Residual Auction or included in an FRR Capacity Plan at the time of the Base Residual Auction for the relevant Delivery Year.

**Cold/Warm/Hot Notification Time:**

“Cold/Warm/Hot Notification Time” shall mean the time interval between PJM notification and the beginning of the start sequence for a generating unit that is currently in its cold/warm/hot temperature state. The start sequence may include steps such as any valve operation, starting feed water pumps, startup of auxiliary equipment, etc.

**Cold/Warm/Hot Start-up Time:**

For all generating units that are not combined cycle units, “Cold/Warm/Hot Start-up Time” shall mean the time interval, measured in hours, from the beginning of the start sequence to the point after generator breaker closure, which is typically indicated by telemetered or aggregated State Estimator megawatts greater than zero for a generating unit in its cold/warm/hot temperature state. For combined cycle units, “Cold/Warm/Hot Start-up Time” shall mean the time interval from the beginning of the start sequence to the point after first combustion turbine generator breaker closure in its cold/warm/hot temperature state, which is typically indicated by telemetered or aggregated State Estimator megawatts greater than zero. For all generating units, the start sequence may include steps such as any valve operation, starting feed water pumps, startup of auxiliary equipment, etc. Other more detailed actions that could signal the beginning of the start sequence could include, but are not limited to, the operation of pumps, condensers, fans, water chemistry evaluations, checklists, valves, fuel systems, combustion turbines, starting
engines or systems, maintaining stable fuel/air ratios, and other auxiliary equipment necessary for startup.

**Cold Weather Alert:**

“Cold Weather Alert” shall mean the notice that PJM provides to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions.

**Collateral:**

“Collateral” shall be a cash deposit, including any interest thereon, or a Letter of Credit issued for the benefit of PJM or PJMSettlement, in an amount and form determined by and acceptable to PJM or PJMSettlement, provided by a Participant to PJM or PJMSettlement as credit support in order to participate in the PJM Markets or take Transmission Service. “Collateral” shall also include surety bonds, except for the purpose of satisfying the FTR Credit Requirement, in which case only a cash deposit or Letter of Credit will be acceptable.

**Collateral Call:**

“Collateral Call” shall mean a notice to a Participant that additional Collateral, or possibly early payment, is required in order to remain in, or to regain, compliance with Tariff, Attachment Q.

**Commencement Date:**

“Commencement Date” shall mean the date on which Interconnection Service commences in accordance with an Interconnection Service Agreement.

**Committed Offer:**

The “Committed Offer” shall mean 1) for pool-scheduled resources, an offer on which a resource was scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection for a particular clock hour for an Operating Day, and 2) for self-scheduled resources, either the offer on which the Market Seller has elected to schedule the resource or the applicable offer for the resource determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4, or Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6, for a particular clock hour for an Operating Day.

**Completed Application:**

“Completed Application” shall mean an application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the Tariff, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Aggregation Area (CAA):**
“Compliance Aggregation Area” or “CAA” shall mean a geographic area of Zones or sub-Zones that are electrically-contiguous and experience for the relevant Delivery Year, based on Resource Clearing Prices of, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, Annual Resources and for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, Capacity Performance Resources, the same locational price separation in the Base Residual Auction, the same locational price separation in the First Incremental Auction, the same locational price separation in the Second Incremental Auction, the same locational price separation in the Third Incremental Auction.

Component DER:

“Component DER” shall mean any resource, within the PJM Region, that is located on a distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter, and is used in a DER Aggregation Resource by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER may not exceed 5 MW.

Composite Energy Offer:

“Composite Energy Offer” for generation resources shall mean the sum (in $/MWh) of the Incremental Energy Offer and amortized Start-Up Costs and amortized No-load Costs, and for Economic Load Response Participant resources the sum (in $/MWh) of the Incremental Energy Offer and amortized shutdown costs, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A and the PJM Manuals.

Conditional Incremental Auction:

“Conditional Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted for a Delivery Year if and when necessary to secure commitments of additional capacity to address reliability criteria violations arising from the delay in a Backbone Transmission upgrade that was modeled in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

Conditioned State Support:

“Conditioned State Support” shall mean any financial benefit required or incentivized by a state, or political subdivision of a state acting in its sovereign capacity, that is provided outside of PJM Markets and in exchange for the sale of a FERC-jurisdictional product conditioned on clearing in any RPM Auction, where “conditioned on clearing in any RPM Auction” refers to specific directives as to the level of the offer that must be entered for the relevant Generation Capacity Resource in the RPM Auction or directives that the Generation Capacity Resource is required to clear in any RPM Auction. Conditioned State Support shall not include any Legacy Policy.

CONE Area:

“CONE Area” shall mean the areas listed in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(A) and any LDAs established as CONE Areas pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(B).
Confidential Information:

“Confidential Information” shall mean any confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information of a plan, specification, pattern, procedure, design, device, list, concept, policy, or compilation relating to the present or planned business of a New Service Customer, Transmission Owner, or other Interconnection Party or Construction Party, which is designated as confidential by the party supplying the information, whether conveyed verbally, electronically, in writing, through inspection, or otherwise, and shall include, without limitation, all information relating to the producing party’s technology, research and development, business affairs and pricing, and any information supplied by any New Service Customer, Transmission Owner, or other Interconnection Party or Construction Party to another such party prior to the execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement or a Construction Service Agreement.

Congestion Price:

“Congestion Price” shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.

Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, PJM Transmission Owners Agreement or Transmission Owners Agreement:

“Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement,” “PJM Transmission Owners Agreement” or “Transmission Owners Agreement” shall mean the certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on file with the Commission, as amended from time to time.

Constraint Relaxation Logic:

“Constraint Relaxation Logic” shall mean the logic applied in the market clearing software where the transmission limit is increased to prevent the Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor from setting the Marginal Value of a transmission constraint.

Constructing Entity:

“Constructing Entity” shall mean either the Transmission Owner or the New Services Customer, depending on which entity has the construction responsibility pursuant to Tariff, Part VI and the applicable Construction Service Agreement; this term shall also be used to refer to an Interconnection Customer with respect to the construction of the Customer Interconnection Facilities.
Construction Party:

“Construction Party” shall mean a party to a Construction Service Agreement. “Construction Parties” shall mean all of the Parties to a Construction Service Agreement.

Construction Service Agreement:

“Construction Service Agreement” shall mean either an Interconnection Construction Service Agreement or an Upgrade Construction Service Agreement.

Contingent Facilities:

“Contingent Facilities” shall mean those unbuilt Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades upon which the Interconnection Request’s costs, timing, and study findings are dependent and, if delayed or not built, could cause a need for restudies of the Interconnection Request or a reassessment of the Interconnection Facilities and/or Network Upgrades and/or costs and timing.

Continuous Mode:

“Continuous Mode” shall mean the mode of operation of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant that includes both negative and positive megawatt quantities (i.e., the Energy Storage Resource Model Participant is capable of continually and immediately transitioning from withdrawing megawatt quantities from the grid to injecting megawatt quantities onto the grid or injecting megawatts to withdrawing megawatts). Energy Storage Resource Model Participants operating in Continuous Mode are considered to have an unlimited ramp rate. Continuous Mode requires Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts to be zero or correspond to an injection, and Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts to be zero or correspond to a withdrawal.

Control Area:

“Control Area” shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(1) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(2) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(3) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice; and
provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Control Zone:

“Control Zone” shall have the meaning given in the Operating Agreement.

Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities:

“Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities” shall mean transmission facilities that (1) employ technology which Transmission Provider reviews and verifies will permit control of the amount and/or direction of power flow on such facilities to such extent as to effectively enable the controllable facilities to be operated as if they were direct current transmission facilities, and (2) that are interconnected with the Transmission System pursuant to Tariff, Part IV and Tariff, Part VI.

Coordinated External Transaction:

“Coordinated External Transaction” shall mean a transaction to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.13, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.13.

Coordinated Transaction Scheduling:

“Coordinated Transaction Scheduling” or “CTS” shall mean the scheduling of Coordinated External Transactions at a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.13, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.13.

Corporate Guaranty:

“Corporate Guaranty” shall mean a legal document, in a form acceptable to PJM and/or PJMSettlement, used by a Credit Affiliate of an entity to guaranty the obligations of another entity.

Cost of New Entry:

“Cost of New Entry” or “CONE” shall mean the nominal levelized cost of a Reference Resource, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.

Costs:

As used in Tariff, Part IV, Tariff, Part VI and related attachments, “Costs” shall mean costs and expenses, as estimated or calculated, as applicable, including, but not limited to, capital
expenditures, if applicable, and overhead, return, and the costs of financing and taxes and any Incidental Expenses.

**Counterparty:**

“Counterparty” shall mean PJMSettlement as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Market Participant or other entities, including the agreements and transactions with customers regarding transmission service and other transactions under the PJM Tariff and the Operating Agreement. PJMSettlement shall not be a counterparty to (i) any bilateral transactions between Members, or (ii) any Member’s self-supply of energy to serve its load, or (iii) any Member’s self-schedule of energy reported to the Office of the Interconnection to the extent that energy serves that Member’s own load.

**Credit Affiliate:**

“Credit Affiliate” shall mean Principals, corporations, partnerships, firms, joint ventures, associations, joint stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations or entities, one of which directly or indirectly controls the other or that are both under common Control. “Control,” as that term is used in this definition, shall mean the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct the management or policies of a person or an entity.

**Credit Available for Export Transactions:**

“Credit Available for Export Transactions” shall mean a designation of credit to be used for Export Transactions that is allocated by each Market Participant from its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions, and which reduces the Market Participant's Credit Available for Virtual Transactions accordingly.

**Credit Available for Virtual Transactions:**

“Credit Available for Virtual Transactions” shall mean the Market Participant’s Working Credit Limit for Virtual Transactions calculated on its credit provided in compliance with its Peak Market Activity requirement plus available credit submitted above that amount, less any unpaid billed and unbilled amounts owed to PJMSettlement, plus any unpaid unbilled amounts owed by PJMSettlement to the Market Participant, less any applicable credit required for Minimum Participation Requirements, FTRs, RPM activity, or other credit requirement determinants as defined in Tariff, Attachment Q.

**Credit Breach:**

“Credit Breach” shall mean (a) the failure of a Participant to perform, observe, meet or comply with any requirements of Tariff, Attachment Q or other provisions of the Agreements, other than a Financial Default, or (b) a determination by PJM and notice to the Participant that a Participant represents an unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets; that, in either event, has not been cured or remedied after any required notice has been given and any cure period has elapsed.
Credit-Limited Offer:

“Credit-Limited Offer” shall mean a Sell Offer that is submitted by a Market Participant in an RPM Auction subject to a maximum credit requirement specified by such Market Participant.

Credit Support Default:

“Credit Support Default,” shall mean (a) the failure of any Guarantor of a Market Participant to make any payment, or to perform, observe, meet or comply with any provisions of the applicable Guaranty or Credit Support Document that has not been cured or remedied, after any required notice has been given and an opportunity to cure (if any) has elapsed, (b) a representation made or deemed made by a Guarantor in any Credit Support Document that proves to be false, incorrect or misleading in any material respect when made or deemed made, (c) the failure of a Guaranty or other Credit Support Document to be in full force and effect prior to the satisfaction of all obligations of such Participant to PJM, without PJM’s consent, or (d) a Guarantor repudiating, disaffirming, disclaiming or rejecting, in whole or in part, its obligations under the Guaranty or challenging the validity of the Guaranty.

Credit Support Document:

“Credit Support Document” shall mean any agreement or instrument in any way guaranteeing or securing any or all of a Participant’s obligations under the Agreements (including, without limitation, the provisions of Tariff, Attachment Q), any agreement entered into under, pursuant to, or in connection with the Agreements or any agreement entered into under, pursuant to, or in connection with the Agreements and/or any other agreement to which PJM, PJMSettlement and the Participant are parties, including, without limitation, any Corporate Guaranty, Letter of Credit, or agreement granting PJM and PJMSettlement a security interest.

CTS Enabled Interface:

“CTS Enabled Interface” shall mean an interface between the PJM Control Area and an adjacent Control Area at which the Office of the Interconnection has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (“CTS”). The CTS Enabled Interfaces between the PJM Control Area and the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. Control Area shall be designated in the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Schedule A (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45). The CTS Enabled Interfaces between the PJM Control Area and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. shall be designated consistent with Attachment 3, section 2 of the Joint Operating Agreement between Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

CTS Interface Bid:

“CTS Interface Bid” shall mean a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Operating

Curtailment:

“Curtailment” shall mean a reduction in firm or non-firm transmission service in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

Curtailment Service Provider:

“Curtailment Service Provider” or “CSP” shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Ancillary Services markets, and/or Reliability Pricing Model by causing a reduction in demand.

Customer Facility:

“Customer Facility” shall mean Generation Facilities or Merchant Transmission Facilities interconnected with or added to the Transmission System pursuant to an Interconnection Request under Tariff, Part IV.

Customer-Funded Upgrade:

“Customer-Funded Upgrade” shall mean any Network Upgrade, Local Upgrade, or Merchant Network Upgrade for which cost responsibility (i) is imposed on an Interconnection Customer or an Eligible Customer pursuant to Tariff, Part VI, section 217, or (ii) is voluntarily undertaken by a New Service Customer in fulfillment of an Upgrade Request. No Network Upgrade, Local Upgrade or Merchant Network Upgrade or other transmission expansion or enhancement shall be a Customer-Funded Upgrade if and to the extent that the costs thereof are included in the rate base of a public utility on which a regulated return is earned.

Customer Interconnection Facilities:

“Customer Interconnection Facilities” shall mean all facilities and equipment owned and/or controlled, operated and maintained by Interconnection Customer on Interconnection Customer’s side of the Point of Interconnection identified in the appropriate appendices to the Interconnection Service Agreement and to the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement, including any modifications, additions, or upgrades made to such facilities and equipment, that are necessary to physically and electrically interconnect the Customer Facility with the Transmission System.

Daily Deficiency Rate:

“Daily Deficiency Rate” shall mean the rate employed to assess certain deficiency charges under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 7, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 9, or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 13.
**Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation:**

“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8, or, as to an FRR entity, in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Day-ahead Congestion Price:**


**Day-ahead Energy Market:**

“Day-ahead Energy Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.

**Day-ahead Energy Market Injection Congestion Credits:**


**Day-ahead Energy Market Transmission Congestion Charges:**

“Day-ahead Energy Market Transmission Congestion Charges” shall be equal to the sum of Day-ahead Energy Market Withdrawal Congestion Charges minus [the sum of Day-ahead Energy Market Injection Congestion Credits plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement between the Midcontinent Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 38), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to agreements between the Office of the Interconnection and other entities, as applicable)].

**Day-ahead Energy Market Withdrawal Congestion Charges:**

Day-ahead Loss Price:


Day-ahead Prices:

“Day-ahead Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction:

“Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction” shall mean a transaction scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to the PJM-MISO interface from a generator within the PJM balancing authority area that Pseudo-Ties into the MISO balancing authority area.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves:

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves” shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the ReliabilityFirst Corporation and SERC.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market:

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement:

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the sum of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement and Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources:

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources” shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

Day-ahead Settlement Interval:

“Day-ahead Settlement Interval” shall mean the interval used by settlements, which shall be every one clock hour.

Day-ahead System Energy Price:

Deactivation:

“Deactivation” shall mean the retirement or mothballing of a generating unit governed by Tariff, Part V.

Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit:

“Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit” shall mean the credit paid to Generation Owners pursuant to Tariff, Part V, section 114.

Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate:

“Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate” shall mean the formula rate established pursuant to Tariff, Part V, section 115.

Deactivation Date:

“Deactivation Date” shall mean the date a generating unit within the PJM Region is either retired or mothballed and ceases to operate.

Decrement Bid:

“Decrement Bid” shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

Default:

As used in the Interconnection Service Agreement and Construction Service Agreement, “Default” shall mean the failure of a Breaching Party to cure its Breach in accordance with the applicable provisions of an Interconnection Service Agreement or Construction Service Agreement.

Delivering Party:

“Delivering Party” shall mean the entity supplying capacity and energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt.

Delivery Year:
“Delivery Year” shall mean the Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan under Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Demand Bid:**

“Demand Bid” shall mean a bid, submitted by a Load Serving Entity in the Day-ahead Energy Market, to purchase energy at its contracted load location, for a specified timeframe and megawatt quantity, that if cleared will result in energy being scheduled at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market and in the physical transfer of energy during the relevant Operating Day.

**Demand Bid Limit:**

“Demand Bid Limit” shall mean the largest MW volume of Demand Bids that may be submitted by a Load Serving Entity for any hour of an Operating Day, as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1B, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1B.

**Demand Bid Screening:**

“Demand Bid Screening” shall mean the process by which Demand Bids are reviewed against the applicable Demand Bid Limit, and rejected if they would exceed that limit, as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1B, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1B.

**Demand Resource:**

“Demand Resource” shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

**Demand Resource Factor or DR Factor:**

“Demand Resource Factor” or (“DR Factor”) shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**DER Aggregation Resource:**

“DER Aggregation Resource” shall be comprised of one or more Component DER. A DER Aggregation Resource is used by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A DER Aggregation Resource is capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW. The market participation eligibility of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.

**DER Aggregator:**
“DER Aggregator” shall mean an entity that is a Market Participant that: (i) uses one or more DER Aggregation Resources to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model; and (ii) has a fully-executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement.

**DER Aggregator Participation Model:**

“DER Aggregator Participation Model” shall mean the participation model described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B.

**DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:**

“DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean one or more DER Aggregation Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model, capable of satisfying a minimum capacity market offer of 100 kW, or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets, such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan, for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year and all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Designated Agent:**

“Designated Agent” shall mean any entity that performs actions or functions on behalf of the Transmission Provider, a Transmission Owner, an Eligible Customer, or the Transmission Customer required under the Tariff.

**Designated Entity:**

“Designated Entity” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Direct Assignment Facilities:**

“Direct Assignment Facilities” shall mean facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the Tariff. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in the Service Agreement that governs service to the Transmission Customer and shall be subject to Commission approval.

**Direct Charging Energy:**

“Direct Charging Energy” shall mean the energy that an Energy Storage Resource purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market and (i) later resells to the PJM Interchange Energy Market; or (ii) is lost to conversion inefficiencies, provided that such inefficiencies are an unavoidable component of the conversion, storage, and discharge process that is used to resell energy back to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**Direct Load Control:**
“Direct Load Control” shall mean load reduction that is controlled directly by the Curtailment Service Provider’s market operations center or its agent, in response to PJM instructions.

**Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts:**

“Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts” shall mean the maximum megawatt power output available for discharge in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Continuous Mode or in Discharge Mode. Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts shall be the Economic Maximum for an Energy Storage Resource in Discharge Mode or in Continuous Mode.

**Discharge Economic Minimum Megawatts:**

“Discharge Economic Minimum Megawatts” shall mean the minimum megawatt power output available for discharge in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Discharge Mode. Discharge Economic Minimum Megawatts shall be the Economic Minimum for an Energy Storage Resource in Discharge Mode.

**Discharge Mode:**

“Discharge Mode” shall mean the mode of operation of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant that only includes positive megawatt quantities (i.e., the Energy Storage Resource Model Participant is only injecting megawatts onto the grid).

**Discharge Ramp Rate:**

“Discharge Ramp Rate” shall mean the Ramping Capability of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Discharge Mode.

**Dispatch Rate:**

“Dispatch Rate” shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

**Dispatched Charging Energy:**

“Dispatched Charging Energy” shall mean Direct Charging Energy that an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant receives from the electric grid pursuant to PJM dispatch while providing one of the following services in the PJM markets: Energy Imbalance Service pursuant to Tariff, Schedule 4; Regulation; Tier 2 Synchronized Reserves; or Reactive Service. Energy Storage Resource Model Participants shall be considered to be providing Energy Imbalance Service when they are dispatchable by PJM in real-time.

**Dynamic Schedule:**
“Dynamic Schedule” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Dynamic Transfer:**

“Dynamic Transfer” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.
1.2 Cost-based Offers.

Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, all cost-based offers for energy or other services to be sold on the PJM Interchange Energy Market from generating resources or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not exceed the variable cost of producing such energy or other service, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 to this Agreement and applicable regulatory standards, requirements and determinations; provided that, a Market Seller may offer to the PJM Interchange Energy Market the right to call on energy from a resource the output of which has been sold on a bilateral basis, with the rate for such energy if called equal to the curtailment rate specified in the bilateral contract.
1.4B DER Aggregator Participation Model

(a) The rules and procedures for the participation of DER Aggregators are established pursuant to this section 1.4B and the PJM Manuals.

(b) In order to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, a DER Aggregator shall register each DER Aggregation Resource and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource with the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with the procedures established under the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the initiation of the registration review process by the Office of the Interconnection, a DER Aggregator shall obtain and verify, through good faith efforts and in coordination with the applicable electric distribution company, and, if necessary, any relevant Transmission Owner, the following location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection:

i. With the express written consent of the applicable Component DER, the electric distribution company customer account number and associated physical and transmission system electrical location information of the applicable Component DER, including compliance with applicable PJM and electric distribution company metering and telemetry requirements;

ii. Evidence of approval to interconnect, including but not limited to a finalized interconnection agreement, with the applicable Component DER, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, to the distribution system for identified megawatts, and identification of participation in an electric distribution company program that recognizes grid withdrawals and/or injections, including but not limited to a net energy metering program.

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

The registration review process shall commence after: (1) the Office of the Interconnection has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) the Office of the Interconnection receives a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) pre-registration activities have been completed, consisting of the DER Aggregator obtaining and verifying the location and data components described above needed for its registration.
The Office of the Interconnection shall review the registration and data submitted therein for completeness, and verify that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as defined under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement and Manuals. The DER Aggregator shall only submit a registration for Component DER that are under contract for the term of the registration, and only one DER Aggregator may operate Component DER at a specific location. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the DER Aggregator’s registration through the appropriate PJM system. A single registration shall only be comprised of individual Component DER in the same state, electric distribution company, Transmission Zone, and pricing point unless otherwise noted below. Upon receipt of notification by the Office of the Interconnection, the electric distribution company may, within 60 calendar days, review and verify, as applicable, the registration and the following information contained therein:

i. Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity;

ii. The specific PJM markets in which the DER Aggregation Resource plans to participate and, if applicable, the effective and termination dates for participation;

iii. The electric distribution company customer account number(s) which represent Component DER location(s) and related information, as defined in the PJM Manuals;

iv. Participation of the Component DER in an electric distribution company’s retail program at the time of registration, and whether such participation precludes participation of the Component DER in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM, and as defined in the PJM Manuals:

a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets the
v. The DER Aggregator’s participation in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets complies with the rules and regulations of any applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority;

vi. The Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority allows the participation of any applicable Component DER that are also end-use customers of an electric distribution company, in accordance with the provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g).

vii. The participation of the Component DER in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets do not pose a threat to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system, the public, or electric distribution company personnel.

If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In the event that the electric distribution company’s concerns are resolved within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may recommend that the Office of the Interconnection approve the registration. In the event that the concerns identified by the electric distribution company are not resolved, the electric distribution company may, within the 60 calendar day review period, recommend that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) reject the registration, (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration, or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.

Within fifteen calendar days, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and shall either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration based on the Office of the Interconnection’s review of the registration and receipt and review of the electric distribution company’s comments and recommendation, with deference given to the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities. To the extent that
no comments or recommendations are provided by the electric distribution company, including after the Office of the Interconnection provides final notice to the electric distribution company prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve the DER Aggregator’s registration.

During the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource will be assigned to the electric distribution company, the DER Aggregator, or another entity, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

All DER Aggregators shall remain in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, in accordance with their executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement, at all times while participating in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. Transmission Owners shall, in coordination with the Office of the Interconnection, provide all data to the Office of the Interconnection reasonably required to accurately represent the DER Aggregation Resource in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 1.5.4 and the PJM Manuals.

A DER Aggregator shall report to the Office of the Interconnection any proposed update to the inventory of the individual Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource, or proposed additional market services provided by the DER Aggregation Resource, identified in the DER Aggregator’s registration to reflect any proposed addition or subtraction of a Component DER or market service, and any applicable information or data associated with the Component DER or market service, in accordance with the specifications described in the PJM Manuals. Any proposed update shall not require a new registration of the existing Component DER within the approved DER Aggregation Resource. Upon notification of any proposed update, the electric distribution company shall have an opportunity to conduct a review, for a period of up to 60 calendar days, in accordance with the provisions of this section related to initial registration, and make a recommendation to the Office of the Interconnection, prior to the Office of the Interconnection approving or denying the proposed update to the DER Aggregation Resource. The DER Aggregator may continue to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using its existing approved DER Aggregation Resource during the course of any such review conducted by the electric distribution company. An inventory of the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registration that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may not be modified during the course of an applicable Delivery Year.

(c) All Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource shall interface with the same primary pricing node, except: (i) in the case of a DER Aggregation Resource that only provides ancillary services and is less than or equal to 5 MW, the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are in the same state and service territory of a single electric distribution
company; and (ii) in the case of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource(s) linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are located within a defined zone or sub-zonal Locational Deliverability Area.

The Office of the Interconnection will establish a periodic review, in coordination with the electric distribution company and DER Aggregator, no less than annually, or more frequently as needed, to identify any permanent electrical location change that would modify the pricing node associated with a DER Aggregation Resource or its underlying Component DER. During this review, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) confirm that applicable data reviewed and verified in the registration process is still complete and accurate, and (ii) request any updates to such data as a condition of continued participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(d) A DER Aggregator shall self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resource into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, as described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall be eligible, at their election, to offer a dispatchable range in submitting bidding parameters into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market.

(e) A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource shall provide telemetry for each DER Aggregation Resource participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, in accordance with the technical specifications described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource may provide telemetry for the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource. This telemetry shall represent one or more values indicative of the total electrical output of the DER Aggregation Resource and inclusive of all underlying Component DER.

A DER Aggregator shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 and the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall retain performance data for individual Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource for auditing purposes, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator is responsible for ensuring that Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. For non-interval metered residential DER Aggregation Resources, the DER Aggregator must ensure that a representative sample of Component DER have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. For DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers, DER Aggregators shall provide aggregated meter data to the Office of the Interconnection for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource. The measurement systems shall comply with the applicable electric distribution company accuracy requirements for meters, and/or as described in
the PJM Manual 01. Additional details for the configuration of such measurement systems under various specific configurations are specified in PJM Manual 14D.

The metering equipment shall meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy, or otherwise have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including potential transformers and current transformers) and the metering equipment and associated data shall meet the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals.

(f) The electric distribution company should, prior to the deadline for submission of offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, notify the DER Aggregator of any operational limitations for the Operating Day that may impact the bidding parameters of an applicable DER Aggregation Resource. In the event that the electric distribution company identifies additional operational concerns after the deadline described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, the DER Aggregator may utilize the generation rebidding period identified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.9, and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.9, to update its bidding parameters.

During the Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall dispatch DER Aggregation Resources, by communicating with the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the DER Aggregator’s submitted bidding parameters. During the Operating Day, an electric distribution company may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. Following the exercise of the electric distribution company’s override, the DER Aggregator shall reflect the override by updating the applicable bidding parameters of its DER Aggregation Resource. An electric distribution company’s override shall not excuse a DER Aggregator’s failure to perform any of the obligations established under the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, RAA, or PJM Manuals.

Any disputes regarding an electric distribution company’s exercise of its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be addressed in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

(g) The Office of the Interconnection shall not permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes
Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the electric distribution company determines that the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permits such end-use customers to participate. The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model with a DER Aggregation Resource including Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, if, during the course of the registration process described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), the electric distribution company presents any of the following evidence to PJM:

i. an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation;

ii. an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority’s legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation; or

iii. an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation.

The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the DER Aggregation Resource includes one or more Component DER that are demand response and the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has prohibited the participation of demand response in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(h) A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources containing one or more Component DER that also participate in one or more retail programs. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of a retail program, including but not limited to a Component DER participating in a retail net energy metering program.

A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources that provide multiple services in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER shall not be registered
with multiple DER Aggregation Resources, or participate as part of another Market Participant outside of the DER Aggregator Participation Model. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of another wholesale sale.

(i) DER Aggregators providing capacity using a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource shall be subject to the Day-ahead Energy Market must-offer requirement described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d), based on the technology of the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

(j) DER Aggregation Resources are subject to offer price cap and associated three pivotal supplier test provisions of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.

(k) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a MOPR Floor Offer Price, in accordance with the provisions applicable to MOPR Floor Offer Price for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2).

If a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-2), the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resources may submit a Sell Offer with a Minimum Floor Offer Price of no lower than the MW-weighted average of the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Prices (zero if not applicable) of the aggregated resources in such Sell Offer.

(l) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a Market Seller Offer Cap, in a manner consistent with the provisions applicable to Market Seller Offer Cap for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6 and Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.

(m) Projected PJM Market Revenues for DER Capacity Aggregation Resources subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price or Market Seller Offer Cap shall be determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8(d-1). The determination of PJM Market Revenues by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize either the hourly output profiles, or the Projected EAS Dispatch, as appropriate.

(n) A DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource that contains Component DER that are also load reduction resources shall be accounted for and settled in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A.
(o) Component DER interconnecting to distribution facilities for purposes of participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM exclusively through the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not be subject to the Part IV of the Tariff relating to interconnections with the Transmission System, and shall exclusively interconnect to distribution facilities pursuant to applicable state or local law.
1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer’s self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer’s Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to-Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to-Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) (i) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(ii) In the Real-time Energy Market, Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(iii) Market Participants that deviate in real-time from the amounts of Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve sales, scheduled day-ahead shall be obligated to purchase Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of
conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.13. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection’s forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers’ offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6.

1.10.1A Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.
(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection:
(i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the
Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-
scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer’s
intend not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection
schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use
of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the
Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any
Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the
Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed $2,000/MWh), if any,
at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed.
The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any
Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in
the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the
transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time
Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Such transactions in the
Real-time Energy Market, other than Coordinated Transaction Schedules and emergency energy
sales and purchases, may specify a price up to $2,000/MWh. Scheduling of such transactions
shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following
requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for
delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM
Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside
the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not Dynamic Transfers
to such entities pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel
through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled
transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the
schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form
of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the
same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum
difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of
Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational
Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual
Transaction of this type is referred to as an “Up-to Congestion Transaction.” Such Up-to
Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference
between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum
difference between the source and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(c–2) A Market Participant may elect to submit an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid form of Virtual Transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall specify the price for such transaction which shall be limited to $2,000/megawatt-hour.

(c-3) Up-to Congestion Transactions may only be submitted at hubs, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b). Increment Offers and Decrement Bids may be only submitted at hubs, nodes at which physical generation or load is settled, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b).

(d) Market Sellers in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy, demand reductions, or other services for the following Operating Day for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires or is required to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection. Offers for the supply of energy may be cost-based, market-based, or both, and may vary hourly. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller’s cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource, or an Intermittent Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources, and Intermittent Resources, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency offers to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on
either a temporary or long-term basis. This includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier’s exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d) and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource, Economic Load Response Participant resource, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each clock hour in the offer period;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) May specify for generation resources offer parameters for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) Minimum Run Time; (2) maximum run time; (3) Start-up Costs; (4) No-load Costs; (5) Incremental Energy Offer; (6) notification time; (7) availability; (8) ramp rate; (9) Economic Minimum; (10) Economic Maximum; (11) emergency minimum MW; (12) emergency maximum MW; (13) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (14) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (15) condense to generation time constraints, and may specify offer parameters for Economic Load Response Participant resources for each
clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) minimum down time; (2) shutdown costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) notification time; (5) Economic Minimum; and (6) Economic Maximum;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with additional schedules applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer for the clock hour, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day, for which the offer is submitted, unless the Market Seller a) submits a Real-time Offer for the applicable clock hour, or b) updates the availability of its offer for that hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day, unless modified after the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market as permitted pursuant to sections 1.10.9A or 1.10.9B below;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all generation resources, except (1) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is above $1,000/megawatt-hour and less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer; and (2) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour; and

ix) Shall not exceed a demand reduction offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, except when an Economic Load Response Participant submits a cost-based offer that includes an incremental cost component that is above $1,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer but in no event greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour; and

x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

  a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,849/megawatt-hour;
b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,425/megawatt hour; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,100/megawatt-hour; and

xi) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $0.00/MWh for pumped storage hydropower units scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to provide Regulation that shall specify the megawatts of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such Regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource’s opportunity costs. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100/megawatt-hour in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $/∆MW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation
Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6.

(g) Each component of an offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource that is constant for the entire Operating Day and does not vary hour to hour shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) (i) Offers to Supply Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Reserves By Generation Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage, shall submit offers or otherwise make their 10-minute reserve
capability available to supply Synchronized Reserve or, as applicable, Non-Synchronized Reserve, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer, in an amount equal to the available 10-minute reserve capability of such Generation Capacity Resource. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources that (A) are capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, (B) are located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region, and (C) have submitted offers for the supply of energy into the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources, and Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve, as applicable.

(3) Offers for the supply of Synchronized Reserve by all generation resources must be cost-based. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. For offers to supply Synchronized Reserve, the offer price shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, where such expected value shall be recalculated annually, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, and posted on PJM’s website. The expected value of the penalty is calculated as the product of: (A) the average penalty, expressed in $/MWh, multiplied by (B) the average rate of non-performance during Synchronized Reserve events multiplied by (C) the probability a Synchronized Reserve event that will qualify for non-performance assessments will occur.

The expected value of the penalty shall be determined by an annual review of the twelve-month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the results of its annual review by no later than December 15, and the revised offer price cap shall be effective as of the following January 1; provided, however, that at the time of implementation of this rule the expected value of the penalty shall be $0.02/MWh,
and for the period from the second month after implementation through the second January 1 following such date of implementation, the expected value of the penalty shall be recalculated on a monthly basis using data from the implementation date of this rule through the 15th day of the current month, and the revised value shall be effective the 1st day of the following month.

(4) All Non-Synchronized Reserve offers shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) of this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by a synchronized resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources, or Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, and Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources may submit offers for their available Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An on-line generation resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) ramp rate; (B) Economic Minimum; and (C) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.
For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (D) ramp rate; (E) condense to generation time constraints; (F) Economic Minimum; and (G) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Determination of Available Non-Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by an off-line generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources. Such hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources may submit offers for their available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Non-Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Non-Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An off-line generation resource’s available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) startup time; (B) notification time; (C) ramp rate; (D) Economic Minimum; and (E) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Non-Synchronized Reserves above its Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iv) Offers to Supply Synchronized Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets
(1) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wish to make their resources available to supply Synchronized Reserve may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All offers to supply Synchronized Reserve offers from Economic Load Response Participant resources shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, as determined in accordance with section 1.10.1A(j)(i)(3) above. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection for each clock hour for which the Economic Load Response Participant desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to reduce demand. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, may vary hourly, and shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shutdown costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Such offers may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs) per hour.

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of an Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Economic Load Response Participant resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Economic Load Response Participant resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. An Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in
the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Economic Load Response Participant resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) (i) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserve By Generation Resources

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, that is available for energy, is capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, or otherwise make their Secondary Reserve capability available. Such offers shall be for an amount equal to the resource’s available energy output achievable within thirty minutes (less its energy output achievable within ten minutes) from a request of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region that submit offers for the supply of energy into the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market and are capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Secondary Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources and Energy Storage Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, as applicable.

(3) Offers for the supply of Secondary Reserve shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) above, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Secondary Reserve Capability of Generation Resources
For each offer to supply Secondary Reserve by a generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources, or Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, or Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources may submit their available Secondary Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Secondary Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(m)(i) above must submit a Secondary Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(A) An on-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability; and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) Economic Minimum; and (iii) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(B) For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) condense to generation time constraints; (iii) Economic Minimum; and (iv) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(C) An off-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, shall be based on the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability and the following offer parameters submitted as part of
the resource’s energy offer: (i) startup time; (ii) notification time; (iii) ramp rate; (iv) Economic Minimum; and (v) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant resources

(1) Each Economic Load Response Participant that submits offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wishes to make their resources available to supply Secondary Reserve shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Secondary Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and include such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All Secondary Reserve offers by Economic Load Response Participant resources shall be for $0.00/MWh. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(n) A Market Participant may submit a Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction for a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that is a Pseudo-Tie into the MISO balancing authority area. Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions combine an offer to sell energy at a source with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink.

Each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction shall: (1) source at a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that Pseudo-Ties into MISO; and (2) sink at the PJM-MISO interface. A Market Participant must reserve transmission service in accordance with the PJM Tariff for each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. Megawatt quantities for Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions shall be greater than zero and less than or equal to the transmission service reserved for the Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. An accepted Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening
(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

\[
\text{Demand Bid Limit} = \text{greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point} \times 1.3), \text{ or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point} + 10\text{MW})
\]

Where:
1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity’s highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM’s highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity’s actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity’s expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead
Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to section 1.10.9 below or Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, Start-up Costs, No-load Costs and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above. Hydropower units can only be pool-scheduled if they are pumped storage units and scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource’s Start-up Costs, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of 0.1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand
in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

- (a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

- (b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

- (c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

- (d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

- (e) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource to supply Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Synchronized Reserve Market that does not deliver the scheduled megawatt quantity in the applicable real-time reserve market, shall replace the Synchronized Reserve not delivered and shall pay for such Synchronized Reserve at the applicable Real-time Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price. Market Participants shall not self-schedule a resource to provide Secondary Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (f) For energy, hydropower units, excluding pumped storage units, may only be self-scheduled.

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

- (a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.
Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for Start-up Costs or No-load Costs.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of Dynamic Transfer shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to Dynamic Transfer by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market.
Buyer’s load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer’s hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection’s forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by PRD Providers; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission
constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) By 1:30 p.m., or as soon as practicable thereafter, of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant’s inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the
real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, or the Real-time Energy Market or Real-time Ancillary Services Markets after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, and Real-time Ancillary Service Markets. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Operating Agreement, section 18.17.1, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants’ non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from the time the Office of the Interconnection posts the results of the Day-ahead Energy Market until 2:15 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for the next
Operating Day. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows and as specified in section 1.10.9A below:

   i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

   ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

   iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

   iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any Start-Up Costs.

(c) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules resulting from the rebidding period by 6:30 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. The Office of the Interconnection may also commit additional resources after such time as system conditions require. For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

1.10.9A Updating Offers in Real-time

(a) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, and such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that
resource for the clock hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals and subject to the following conditions:

(i) A market-based Real-time Offer shall not exceed the applicable energy offer caps specified in this Schedule. Once a Market Seller’s resource is committed for an applicable clock hour, the Market Seller may not increase its Incremental Energy Offer and may only submit a market-based Real-time Offer that is higher than its market-based offer that was in effect at the time of commitment to reflect increases in the resource’s cost-based Start-up Costs and cost-based No-load Costs. The Market Seller may elect not to have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only its lowest cost-based offer considered for the remainder of the Operating Day.

(ii) Cost-based Real-time Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d) and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. If a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for a particular clock hour in accordance with subsection (c) below, or if updates to a cost-based offer are required by the Market Seller’s approved Fuel Cost Policy, the Market Seller shall update its previously submitted cost-based Real-time Offer.

(iii) If a Market Seller’s available cost-based offer is not compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals at the time a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for an applicable clock hour during the Operating Day, the Market Seller must submit an updated cost-based Real-time Offer consisting of an Incremental Energy Offer, Start-up Cost and No-load Cost for that clock hour that is compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource during and through the end of the applicable clock hour to update only the following offer parameters, as further described in the PJM Manuals: (1) Economic Minimum; (2) Economic Maximum; (3) emergency minimum MW; (4) emergency maximum MW; (5) unit availability status; (6) fixed output indicator; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; and (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW. Such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that resource for the clock hour.

1.10.9B Offer Parameter Flexibility

(a) Market Sellers may, in accordance with sections 1.10.1A and 1.10.9A above, this section 1.10.9B, and the PJM Manuals, update offer parameters at any time up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, including prior to the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the close of the rebidding period specified in section 1.10.9, except that Market Sellers may not update their offers for the supply of energy, Secondary Reserve, Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or demand reduction: (1) during the period after the close
the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the posting of the Day-ahead Energy Market results pursuant to section 1.10.8(b); or (2) during the period after close of the rebidding period and prior to PJM announcing the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d).

(b) For generation resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) cost-based Start-up Costs; (2) cost-based No-load Costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) Economic Minimum and Economic Maximum; (5) emergency minimum MW and emergency maximum MW; (6) ramp rate; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (9) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, Minimum Run Time.

(c) For Economic Load Response Participant resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) shutdown costs, (2) Incremental Energy Offer; (3) Economic Minimum; (4) Economic Maximum; and (5) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, minimum down time.

(d) After the announcement of the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d), a Market Seller may submit a Real-time Offer where offer parameters may differ from the offer originally submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, except that a Market Seller may not submit a Real-time Offer that changes, of the offer parameters listed in section 1.10.1A(d), the MW amounts specified in the Incremental Energy Offer, MW amounts specified in the ramp rate, maximum run time, and availability; provided, however, Market Sellers of dual-fueled resources may submit Real-time Offers for such resources that change the availability of a submitted cost-based offer.
3.3A Economic Load Response Participants.

3.3A.1 Compensation.

Economic Load Response Participants shall be compensated pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and/or 3.3A.6 of this Schedule, for demand reduction offers submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test of section 3.3A.4; that are scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection; and that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection. Qualifying demand reductions shall be measured by: 1) comparing actual metered load to an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load or alternative CBL determined in accordance with the provisions of section 3.3A.2 or 3.3A.2.01, respectively; or 2) non-interval metered residential Direct Load Control customers, as metered on a current statistical sample of electric distribution company accounts, as described in the PJM Manuals or 3) by the MWs produced by on-Site Generators pursuant to the provisions of section 3.3A.2.02.

3.3A.2 Customer Baseline Load.

For Economic Load Response Participants that choose to measure demand reductions using an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load (“CBL”), the CBL shall be determined using the following formula for such participant’s Non-Variable Loads. Additionally, the following formula shall be used to determine a Peak Shaving Adjustment End-Use Customer’s demand reductions when determining peak shaving performance rating as described in PJM Manual 19, unless an alternative CBL is approved pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01 of this schedule:

(a) The CBL for weekdays shall be the average of the highest 4 out of the 5 most recent load weekdays in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event.

i. For the purposes of calculating the CBL for weekdays, weekdays shall not include:

1. NERC holidays;
2. Weekend days;
3. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

(i) any weekday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.4 or 3.3A.5, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

(ii) any weekday where the end-use customer location that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer
locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

4. Any weekday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage for the five days.

ii. If a 45-day period does not include 5 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, provided there are 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the CBL shall be based on the average of those 4 weekdays. If there are not 4 eligible weekdays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

iii. Section 3.3A.2(a)(i)(3) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 4 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(b) The CBL for weekend days and NERC holidays shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

i. The CBL for Saturdays and Sundays/NERC holidays shall be the average of the highest 2 load days out of the 3 most recent Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event, provided that the following days shall not be used to calculate a Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday CBL:

1. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

a. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.5 or 3.3A.6, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

b. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday where the end-use customer that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

2. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage level for the three days;
3. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday that corresponds to the beginning or end of daylight savings.

ii. If a 45-day period does not include 3 Saturdays or 3 Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, provided there are 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, the CBL will be based on the average of those 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays. If there are not 2 eligible Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

iii. Section 3.3A.2(b)(i)(1) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 2 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(c) CBLs established pursuant to this section shall represent end-use customers’ actual load patterns. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that a CBL or alternative CBL does not accurately represent a customer’s actual load patterns, the CBL shall be revised accordingly pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01. Consistent with this requirement, if an Economic Load Response Participant chooses to measure load reductions using a Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of a change in its operations or the operations of the end-use customer upon whose behalf it is acting that would result in the adjustment of more than half the hours in the affected party’s Customer Baseline Load by twenty percent or more for more than twenty days.

3.3A.2.01 Alternative Customer Baseline Methodologies.

(a) During the Economic Load Response Participant registration process pursuant to section 1.5A.3 of this Schedule, the relevant Economic Load Response Participant or the Office of the Interconnection (“Interested Parties”) may, in the case of such participant’s Non-Variable Load customers, and shall, in the case of its Variable Load customers, propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2. During the Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registration process pursuant to section 8.4 of this schedule, or as otherwise approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the relevant participant or the Office of the Interconnection may propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2 of this schedule. In support of such proposal, the participant shall demonstrate that the alternative CBL method shall result in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values, as calculated in accordance with the technique specified in the PJM Manuals. Any proposal made pursuant to this section shall be provided to the other Interested Party.

(b) The Interested Parties shall have 30 days to agree on a proposal issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. The 30-day period shall start the day the proposal is provided to
the other Interested Party. If both Interested Parties agree on a proposal issued pursuant to this section, that alternative CBL calculation methodology shall be effective consistent with the date of the relevant Economic Load Response Participant registration.

(c) If agreement is not reached pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a CBL methodology that shall result, as nearly as practicable, in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values within 20 days from the expiration of the 30-day period established by subsection (b). A CBL established by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be binding upon both Interested Parties unless the Interested Parties reach agreement on an alternative CBL methodology prior to the expiration of the 20-day period established by this subsection (c).

(d) Operation of this section 3.3A.2.01 shall not delay Economic Load Response Participant registrations pursuant to Section 1.5A.3, provided that the alternative CBL established pursuant to this section shall be used for all related energy settlements made pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall periodically publish alternative CBL methodologies established pursuant to this section in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registrations will use the CBL defined on the associated economic registration for measuring demand reductions when determining the participant’s compliance with its capacity obligations pursuant to Schedule 6 of the RAA, unless it is the maximum baseload CBL as defined in the PJM Manuals, in which case the participant will use the CBL set forth in the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Response registration.

3.3A.2 On-Site Generators.

On-Site Generators used as the basis for Economic Load Response Participant status pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A shall be subject to the following provisions:

i. The On-Site Generator shall be used solely to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall not otherwise have been operating;

ii. If subsection (i) does not apply, the amount of energy from an On-Site Generator used to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be capable of being quantified in a manner that is acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection.

3.3A.3 Symmetric Additive Adjustment.
(a) Customer Baseline Levels established pursuant to section 3.3A.2 shall be adjusted by the Symmetric Additive Adjustment. Unless an alternative formula is approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the Symmetric Additive Adjustment shall be calculated using the following formula:

Step 1: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period ending 1 hour prior to the start of event.

Step 2: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period in the CBL that corresponds to the 3 hour period described in Step 1.

Step 3: Subtract the results of Step 2 from the results of Step 1 to determine the symmetric additive adjustment (this may be positive or negative).

Step 4: Add the symmetric additive adjustment (i.e. the results of Step 3) to each hour in the CBL that corresponds to each event hour.

(b) Following a Load Reduction Event that is submitted to the Office of the Interconnection for compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Notification window(s), if applicable, directly metered data and Customer Baseline Load and Symmetric Additive Adjustment calculation to the appropriate electric distribution company for optional review. The electric distribution company will have ten Business Days to provide the Office of the Interconnection with notification of any issues related to the metered data or calculations.

3.3A.4 Net Benefits Test.

The Office of the Interconnection shall identify each month the price on a supply curve, representative of conditions expected for that month, at which the benefit of load reductions provided by Economic Load Response Participants exceed the costs of those reductions to other loads. In formulaic terms, the net benefit is deemed to be realized at the price point on the supply curve where \((\Delta LMP \times \text{MWh consumed}) > (LMP_{\text{NEW}} \times \text{DR})\), where \(LMP_{\text{NEW}}\) is the market clearing price after Economic Load Response is dispatched and \(\Delta LMP\) is the price before Economic Load Response is dispatched minus the \(LMP_{\text{NEW}}\).

The Office of the Interconnection shall update and post the Net Benefits Test results and analysis for a calendar month no later than the 15th day of the preceding calendar month. As more fully specified in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the net benefit price level in accordance with the following steps:

Step 1. Retrieve generation offers from the same calendar month (of the prior calendar year) for which the calculation is being performed, employing market-based price offers to the extent available, and cost-based offers to the extent market-based price offers are not available. To the extent that generation offers are unavailable from historical data due to the addition of a Zone to the PJM Region the Office of the Interconnection shall use the most recent generation offers that
best correspond to the characteristics of the calendar month for which the calculation is being performed, provided that at least 30 days of such data is available. If less than 30 days of data is available for a resource or group of resources, such resource[s] shall not be considered in the Net Benefits Test calculation.

Step 2: Adjust a portion of each prior-year offer representing the typical share of fuel costs in energy offers in the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals, for changes in fuel prices based on the ratio of the reference month spot price to the study month forward price. For such purpose, natural gas shall be priced at the Henry Hub price, number 2 fuel oil shall be priced at the New York Harbor price, and coal shall be priced as a blend of coal prices representative of the types of coal typically utilized in the PJM Region.

Step 3. Combine the offers to create daily supply curves for each day in the period.

Step 4. Average the daily curves for each day in the month to form an average supply curve for the study month.

Step 5. Use a non-linear least squares estimation technique to determine an equation that reasonably approximates and smooths the average supply curve.

Step 6. Determine the net benefit level as the point at which the price elasticity of supply is equal to 1 for the estimated supply curve equation established in Step 5.

3.3A.5 Market Settlements in Real-time Energy Market.

(a) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers for load reductions in the Day-ahead Energy Market by no later than 2:15 p.m. on the day prior to the Operating Day that cleared or that otherwise are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the actual kWh relief provided in excess of committed day-ahead load reductions. The offer shall contain the Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k) and shall not thereafter be subject to change; provided, however, the Economic Load Response Participant may update the previously specified minimum or maximum load reduction quantity and associated price by submitting a Real-time Offer for a clock hour by providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals no later than 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may also submit Real-time Offers for a clock hour for an Operating Day containing Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k), and may update such offers up to 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements. An Economic Load Response Participant that curtails or causes the curtailment of demand in real-time in response to PJM dispatch, and for which the applicable real-time LMP is
equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, will be compensated by PJMSettlement at the real-time Locational Marginal Price.

(b) In cases where the demand reduction follows dispatch, as defined in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o-1), as instructed by the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction offer price is equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, and demand reduction is not a Component DER operating as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, payment will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing demand, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the demand reduction must be committed.

Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, real-time operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) For purposes of load reductions qualifying for compensation hereunder, an Economic Load Response Participant shall accumulate credits for energy reductions in those hours when the energy delivered to the end-use customer is less than the end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval. In the event that the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant will accumulate debits at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval for the amount the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load. If the actual load reduction, compared to the desired load reduction is outside the deviation levels specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o), the Economic Load Response Participant shall be assessed balancing operating reserve charges in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions that are compensated at the applicable full LMP, in any Zone for any hour, shall be recovered from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, with the ratio shares determined as follows:

The ratio share for LSE i in zone z shall be \( \frac{RTL_{id}}{RTL + X} \)
and the ratio share for party j shall be \( \frac{X_j}{RTL + X} \).

Where:
RTL is the total real time load in all zones where LMP ≥ Net Benefits Test price;
RTL\textsubscript{iz} is the real-time load for LSE i in zone z;
X is the total export quantity from PJM in that hour; and
X\textsubscript{j} is the export quantity by party j from PJM.


(a) Economic Load Response Participants dispatched as a result of a qualifying demand reduction offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the reductions of kWh committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An Economic Load Response Participant that submits a demand reduction bid day ahead that is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection and for which the applicable day ahead LMP is greater than or equal to the Net Benefits Test shall be compensated by PJM Settlement at the day-ahead Locational Marginal Price.

Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements.

(b) Total payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead demand reduction bids with an offer price equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction is not dispatched as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, day-ahead operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) Economic Load Response Participants that have demand reductions committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market that deviate from the day-ahead schedule in real time shall be charged or credited for such variance at the real time LMP plus or minus an amount equal to the applicable balancing operating reserve charge in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3. Load Serving Entities that otherwise would have load that was reduced shall receive any associated operating reserve credit.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead demand reduction bids that are compensated at the applicable full, day ahead LMP under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions in any Zone for any hour shall be recovered
from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average real-time Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, in accordance with the formula prescribed in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A.5(d).

3.3A.7 Prohibited Economic Load Response Participant Market Settlements.

(a) Settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 shall be limited to demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test and are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) Demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a) shall not be eligible for settlement pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6. Examples of settlements prohibited pursuant to this section 3.3A.7(b) include, but are not limited to, the following:

   i. Settlements based on variable demand where the timing of the demand reduction supporting the settlement did not change in direct response to Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

   ii. Consecutive daily settlements that are the result of a change in normal demand patterns that are submitted to maintain a CBL that no longer reflects the relevant end-use customer’s demand;

   iii. Settlements based on on-site generation data if the On-Site Generator is not supporting demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

   iv. Settlements based on demand reductions that are the result of operational changes between multiple end-use customer sites in the PJM footprint;

   v. Settlements that do not include all hours that the Office of the Interconnection dispatched the load reduction, or for which the load reduction cleared in the Day-ahead Market.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall disallow settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a). If the Economic Load Response Participant continues to submit settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a), then the Office of the Interconnection shall suspend the Economic Load Response Participant’s PJM Interchange Energy Market activity and refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement.

3.3A.8 Economic Load Response Participant Review Process.
The Office of the Interconnection shall review the participation of an Economic Load Response Participant in the PJM Interchange Energy Market under the following circumstances:

i. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registrations submitted pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A.3 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

ii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

iii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are denied by the Office of the Interconnection more than 10% of the time.

iv. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registration will be reviewed when settlements are frequently submitted or if its actual loads frequently deviate from the previously scheduled quantities (as determined for purposes of assessing balancing operating reserves charges). PJM will notify the Participant when their registration is under review. While the Participant’s registration is under review by PJM, the Participant may continue economic load reductions but all settlements will be denied by PJM until the registration review is resolved pursuant to subsection (i) or (ii) below. PJM will require the Participant to provide information within 30 days to support that the settlements were submitted for load reduction activity done in response to price and not submitted based on the End-Use Customer’s normal operations.

i) If the Participant is unable to provide adequate supporting information to substantiate the load reductions submitted for settlement, PJM will terminate the registration and may refer the Participant to either the Market Monitoring Unit or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for further investigation.

ii) If the Participant does provide adequate supporting information, the settlements denied by PJM will be resubmitted by the Participant for review according to existing PJM market rules. Further, PJM may introduce an alternative Customer Baseline Load if the existing Customer Baseline Load does not adequately reflect what the customer load would have been absent a load reduction.

v. The electric distribution company may only deny settlements during the normal settlement review process for inaccurate data including, but not limited to: meter data, line loss factor, Customer Baseline Load calculation, interval meter owner and a known recurring End-Use Customer outage or holiday.

The Office of the Interconnection shall have thirty days to conduct a review pursuant to this section 3.3A.8. The Office of the Interconnection may refer the matter to the
PJM MMU and/or the FERC Office of Enforcement if the review indicates the relevant Economic Load Response Participant and/or relevant electric distribution company or LSE is engaging in activity that is inconsistent with the PJM Interchange Energy Market rules governing Economic Load Response Participants.
6.4 Offer Price Caps.

6.4.1 Applicability.

(a) If, at any time, it is determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Sections 1.10.8 or 6.1 of this Schedule that any generation resource may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, the offer prices for energy from such resource shall be capped as specified below. For such generation resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, if the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped for the entire commitment period, and such offer prices will be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and committed at the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest overall system production cost. For such generation resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market such offer prices shall be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and dispatched on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost in accordance with 6.4.1(g) until the earlier of: (i) the resource is released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection; (ii) the end of the Operating Day; or (iii) the start of the generation resource’s next pre-existing commitment.

The offer on which a resource is committed shall initially be determined at the time of the commitment. If any of the resource’s Incremental Energy Offer, No-load Cost or Start-Up Cost are updated for any portion of the offer capped hours subsequent to commitment, the Office of the Interconnection will redetermine the level of the offer cap using the updated offer values. The Office of the Interconnection will dispatch the resource on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

Resources that are self-scheduled to run in either the Day-ahead Energy Market or in the Real-time Energy Market are subject to the provisions of this section 6.4. The offer on which a resource is dispatched shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the offer price of such resource and as further limited as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A.

In accordance with section 6.4.1(h), a generation resource that is offer capped in the Real-time Energy Market but released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection will be subject to the three pivotal supplier test and further offer capping, as applicable, if the resource is committed for a period later in the same Operating Day.

(b) The energy offer price by any generation resource requested to be dispatched in accordance with Section 6.3 of this Schedule shall be capped at the levels specified in Section 6.4.2 of this Schedule. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the affected resource is so scheduled, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. Energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the price of such resource.

(c) Generation resources subject to an offer price cap shall be paid for energy at the applicable Locational Marginal Price.
(d) [Reserved for Future Use]

(e) Offer price caps under section 6.4 of this Schedule shall be suspended for a generation resource with respect to transmission limit(s) for any period in which a generation resource is committed by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day or any period for which the generation resource has been self-scheduled where (1) there are not three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch under subsection (a) that are jointly pivotal with respect to such transmission limit(s), and (2) the Market Seller of the generation resource, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, is not pivotal ("three pivotal supplier test"). In the event the Office of the Interconnection system is unable to perform the three pivotal supplier test for a Market Seller, generation resources of that Market Seller that are dispatched to control transmission constraints will be dispatched on the resource’s market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

(f) For the purposes of conducting the three pivotal supplier test in subsection (e), the following applies:

(i) All megawatts of available incremental supply, including available self-scheduled supply for which the power distribution factor ("dfax") has an absolute value equal to or greater than the dfax used by the Office of the Interconnection’s system operators when evaluating the impact of generation with respect to the constraint ("effective megawatts") will be included in the available supply analysis at costs equal to the cost-based offers of the available incremental supply adjusted for dfax ("effective costs"). The Office of the Interconnection will post on the PJM website the dfax value used by operators with respect to a constraint when it varies from three percent.

(ii) The three pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of the relevant market incremental supply up to and including all such supply available at an effective cost equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price calculated using effective costs and effective megawatts and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint.

(iii) Offer price caps will apply on a generation supplier basis (i.e. not a generating unit by generating unit basis) and only the generation suppliers that fail the three pivotal supplier test with respect to any hour in the relevant period will have their units that are dispatched with respect to the constraint offer capped. A generation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Supply controlled by a generation supplier or its affiliates by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise will be included as supply of that generation supplier; supply owned by a generation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party by contract or otherwise will be included as supply of that third party.
A generation supplier’s units, including self-scheduled units, are offer capped if, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, the generation supplier is pivotal.

(iv) In the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall include price sensitive demand, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids as demand or supply, as applicable, in the relevant market.

(g) In the Real-time Energy Market, the schedule on which offer capped resources will be placed shall be determined using dispatch cost, where dispatch cost is calculated pursuant to the following formulas:

\[
\text{Dispatch cost for the applicable hour} = ((\text{Incremental Energy Offer} \times \text{Economic Minimum for the hour [\$/MWh]} \times \text{Economic Minimum for the hour [MW]}) + \text{No-load Cost for the hour [\$/H]})
\]

(i) For resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market, the resource is committed on the offer with the lowest Total Dispatch cost at the time of commitment,

where:

Total Dispatch cost = Sum of hourly dispatch cost over a resource’s minimum run time [$] + Start-Up Cost [$]

(ii) For resources operating in real-time pursuant to a day-ahead or real-time commitment, and whose offers are updated after commitment, the resource is dispatched on the offer with the lowest dispatch cost for the each of the updated hours.

(iii) However, once the resource is dispatched on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the determination of the cheapest schedule.

(h) A generation resource that was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, is operating in real time, and may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, will be offer price capped, subject to the outcome of a three pivotal supplier test, for each hour the resource operates beyond its committed hours or Minimum Run Time, whichever is greater, or in the case of resources self-scheduled in the Real-time Energy Market, for each hour the resource operates beyond its first hour of operation, in accordance with the following provisions.

(i) If the resource is operating on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the results of the three pivotal supplier test.
(ii) If the resource is operating on a market-based offer and the Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test then the resource will be dispatched on the cheaper of its market-based offer or the cost-based offer representing the offer cap as determined by section 6.4.2, whichever results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined under section 6.4.1(g).

(iii) If the Market Seller passes the three pivotal supplier test and the resource is currently operating on a market-based offer then the resource will remain on that offer, unless the Market Seller elects to not have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only the cost-based offer that represents the offer cap level as determined under section 6.4.2 considered for dispatch in which case the resource will be dispatched on its cost-based offer for the remainder of the Operating Day.

6.4.2 Level.

(a) The offer price cap shall be one of the amounts specified below, as specified in advance by the Market Seller for the affected unit:

(i) The weighted average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus at which energy from the capped resource was delivered during a specified number of hours during which the resource was dispatched for energy in economic merit order, the specified number of hours to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection and to be a number of hours sufficient to result in an offer price cap that reflects reasonably contemporaneous competitive market conditions for that unit;

(ii) For offers of $2,000/MWh or less, the incremental operating cost of the generation resource or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals (“incremental cost”), plus up to the lesser of 10% of such costs or $100 MWh, the sum of which shall not exceed $2,000/MWh; and, for offers greater than $2,000/MWh, the incremental cost of the generation resource;

(iii) For units that are frequently offer capped (“Frequently Mitigated Unit” or “FMU”), and for which the unit’s market-based offer was greater than its cost based offer, the following shall apply:

(a) For units that are offer capped for 60% or more of their run hours, but less than 70% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10% or (ii) incremental cost plus $20 per megawatt-hour;

(b) For units that are offer capped for 70% or more of their run hours,
but less than 80% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10%, or (ii) incremental cost plus $30 per megawatt-hour;

(c) For units that are offer capped for 80% or more of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental costs plus 10%; or (ii) incremental cost plus $40 per megawatt-hour.

(b) For purposes of section 6.4.2(a)(iii), a generating unit shall qualify for the specified offer cap upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit, pursuant to Section II.A of the Attachment M-Appendix, that it is a “Frequently Mitigated Unit” because it meets all of the following criteria:

(i) The unit was offer capped for the applicable percentage of its run hours, determined on a rolling 12-month basis, effective with a one month lag.

(ii) The unit’s Projected PJM Market Revenues plus the unit’s PJM capacity market revenues on a rolling 12-month basis, divided by the unit’s MW of installed capacity (in $/MW-year) are less than its accepted unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) (excluding APIR and ARPIR), or its default Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) if no unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is accepted for the BRAs for the Delivery Years included in the rolling 12-month period, determined pursuant to Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Attachment DD of the Tariff. (The relevant Avoidable Cost Rate is the weighted average of the Avoidable Cost Rates for each Delivery Year included in the rolling 12-month period, weighted by month.)

(iii) No portion of the unit is included in a FRR Capacity Plan or receiving compensation under Part V of the Tariff.

(iv) The unit is internal to the PJM Region and subject only to PJM dispatch.

(c) Any generating unit, without regard to ownership, located at the same site as a Frequently Mitigated Unit qualifying under Sections 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall become an “Associated Unit” upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Section II.A of Attachment M-Appendix, that it meets all of the following criteria:

1. The unit has the identical electric impact on the transmission system as the FMU;

2. The unit (i) belongs to the same design class (where a design class includes generation that is the same size and utilizes the same technology, without regard to manufacturer) and uses the identical primary fuel as the FMU or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder;
3. The unit (i) has an average daily cost-based offer, as measured over the preceding 12-month period, that is less than or equal to the FMU’s average daily cost-based offer adjusted to include the currently applicable FMU adder or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder.

The offer cap for an associated unit shall be equal to the incremental operating cost of such unit, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, plus the applicable percentage adder or dollar per megawatt-hour adder as specified in Section 6.4.2(a)(iii)(a), (b), or (c) for the unit with which it is associated.

(d) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information and in compliance with the FERC Market Rules, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate or non-compliant information.

6.4.3 Verification of Cost-Based Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based energy offer for a generation resource that includes an Incremental Energy Offer greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the Incremental Energy Offer component of such cost-based offer. For each Incremental Energy Offer segment greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate whether such offer segment exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that generation resource by determining the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost for each segment in accordance with the following formula:

Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost ($/MWh segment in accordance with the following formula: @ MW) =

\[
\text{Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost} = \frac{\left[ ( \text{Maximum Allowable Operating Rate}_i ) - ( \text{Bid Production Cost}_{i-1} ) \right]}{(\text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1})}
\]

where

\[ i = \text{an offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer, which is comprised of a pairing of price ($/MWh) and a megawatt quantity} \]

Maximum Allowable Operating Rate ($/hour @ MW) =

\[
\left[ ( \text{Heat Input}_i @ \text{MW}_i ) \times ( \text{Performance Factor} ) \times ( \text{Fuel Cost} ) \right] \times (1 + A)
\]

where
Heat Input = a point on the heat input curve (in MMBtu/hr), determined in accordance with PJM Manual 15, describing the resource’s operational characteristics for converting the applicable fuel input (MMBtu) into energy (MWh) specified in the Incremental Energy Offer;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent; and

A = Cost adder, in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(ii) of this Schedule.

Bid Production Cost ($/hour @ MW) =
\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1}) \times (\text{P}_i) - \frac{1}{2} \times \text{UBS} \times (\text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1}) \times (\text{P}_i - \text{P}_{i-1}) \] + No-Load Cost

where

\( \text{MW} \) = the MW quantity per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

\( \text{P} \) = the price (in dollars per megawatt-hour) per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

\( \text{UBS} \) = Uses Bid-Slope = 0 for block-offer resources (i.e., a resource with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a step function curve); and 1 for all other resources (i.e., resources with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a sloped offer curve); and

If the price submitted for the offer segment is less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost then that offer segment shall be deemed verified and is eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price. If the price submitted for the offer segment is greater than the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost, then the Market Seller’s cost-based offer for that segment and all segments at an equal or greater price are deemed not verified and are not eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price and such offer shall be price capped at the greater of $1,000/megawatt-hour or the offer price of the most expensive verified segment on the Incremental Energy Offer for the purpose of setting Locational Marginal Prices; provided however, such Market Seller shall be allowed to submit a challenge to a non-verification determination, including supporting documentation, to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. Upon review of such documentation, the Office of the Interconnection may determine that the Market Seller’s cost-
based offer is verified and eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described above.

(i) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is greater than zero, the first segment shall be screened as a block-loaded segment \((UBS=0)\) as if there was a preceding MW\(_{i-1}\) of zero. The Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost calculation for the first incremental would use a preceding Bid Production Cost \(i-1\) (at zero MW) equal to the energy No-Load Cost.

(ii) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and is the only bid-in segment to be verified, then the segment shall be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(iii) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and there are additional segments to be verified, then the first segment shall be deemed verified only if the second segment is deemed verified. If the second segment is deemed not verified, then the first segment shall also be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(b) If an Economic Load Response Participant a cost-based demand reduction offer that includes incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, in order for that offer to be eligible to determine the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate the incremental costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection, and may not include shutdown costs.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the
Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

6.4.3A Verification of Fast-Start Resource Composite Energy Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based offer for a generation resource that is a Fast-Start Resource that results in a Composite Energy Offer that is greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the offer components:

Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost components of each offer segment shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the test described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3.

Start-Up Cost component shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the following formula:

\[
\text{Start-Up Cost ($)} = \left( \text{Performance Factor} \times \text{Start Fuel} \times \text{Fuel Cost} \right) + \text{Start Maintenance Adder} + \text{Additional Start Labor} + \text{Station Service Cost} \times (1 + A)
\]

Where:

Start Fuel = fuel consumed from first fire of start process to breaker closing plus fuel expended from breaker opening of the previous shutdown to initialization of the (hot) unit start-up, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements;

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy under Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Start Maintenance Adder = an adder based on all available maintenance expense history for the defined Maintenance Period regardless of unit
ownership. Only expenses incurred as a result of electric production qualify for inclusion. Only Maintenance Adders specified as $/Start, $/MMBtu, or $/equivalent operating hour can be included in the Start Maintenance Adder;

Start Additional Labor = additional labor costs for startup required above normal station manning levels; and

Station Service Cost = station service usage (MWh) during start-up multiplied by the 12-month rolling average off-peak energy prices as updated quarterly by the Office of the Interconnection.

\[ A = \text{cost adder, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.2(a)(ii)}. \]

(b) Should the submitted Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above for any segment, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices):

(i) the Incremental Energy Offer for each segment shall be capped at the lesser of the cap described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3 or the submitted Incremental Energy Offer; and

(ii) the amortized No-load cost shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(c) Should the submitted Start-Up Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Start-Up Costs shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(d) If an Economic Load Response Participant submits an offer to reduce demand for a Fast-Start Resource where the maximum segment of the resulting Composite Energy Offer exceeds $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate such costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting
documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs and shutdown costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental and shutdown costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental and shutdown costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

Should the submitted shutdown cost exceed the reasonably supported costs for that resource, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the shutdown costs shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).
ATTACHMENT N-4

FORM DER AGGREGATOR PARTICIPATION

SERVICE AGREEMENT
DER AGGREGATOR PARTICIPATION SERVICE AGREEMENT

Among

PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C.

And

[Name of DER Aggregator]
DER AGGREGATOR PARTICIPATION SERVICE AGREEMENT

By and Among

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

And

[Name of DER Aggregator]

1.0 This DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement ("DAPSA"), dated and effective as of ___________, is entered into, by and between, the following entities (hereinafter referred to individually as “Party” or collectively as “the Parties”), for purposes of facilitating the participation of a DER Aggregator in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, and the PJM Manuals ("DER Aggregator Participation Service").

a. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”), the Regional Transmission Organization for the PJM Region, administrator of the DER Aggregator Participation Model, provider of DER Aggregator Participation Service, and a NERC-registered Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, and Transmission Operator; and

b. [Name of DER Aggregator], the DER Aggregator taking DER Aggregator Participation Service from PJM; and

2.0 In consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, together with other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby mutually acknowledged by PJM and the DER Aggregator the Parties agree as follows:

a. PJM shall provide DER Aggregator Participation Service to the DER Aggregator, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, and the PJM Manuals.

b. The DER Aggregator has met all requisite qualification and eligibility criteria for receiving DER Aggregator Participation Service from PJM, shall comply with all operational and safety directives of PJM, and shall comply with all applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, and the PJM Manuals. The DER Aggregator attests that it is currently, and will remain, in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, during the term of this DAPSA.

3.0 Service under this DAPSA shall commence on the later of: (i) the date it is executed and made effective by the Parties, as indicated below in Section 6.0 and above in Section 1.0; or (ii) if this DAPSA is filed with the Commission unexecuted by one
Party, upon the date it is permitted to become effective by the Commission. Service under this DAPSA shall terminate in accordance with the applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement, including, but not limited to, Operating Agreement, section 15.1, on such date as mutually agreed upon by the Parties, or as otherwise established by the Commission.

4.0 All portions of the Tariff and the Operating Agreement pertinent to the subject matter of this DAPSA and not otherwise made a part hereof are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof.

5.0 Any notice or request made to or by any Party regarding this DAPSA shall be made to the representatives of another Party as indicated below.

PJM:

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
2750 Monroe Blvd.
Audubon, PA 19403-2497

DER Aggregator:

6.0 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this DAPSA to be executed by their respective authorized officials.

PJM:  **PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.**

By: ____________________________________________
    ____________________________
    Name                                  Title                         Date

Printed name of signer:
__________________________

DER Aggregator: [Name]

By: ____________________________________________
    ____________________________
    Name                                  Title                         Date

Printed name of signer:
__________________________
5.14 Clearing Prices and Charges

a) Capacity Resource Clearing Prices

For each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a clearing price to be paid for each megawatt-day of Unforced Capacity that clears in such auction. The Capacity Resource Clearing Price for each LDA will be the marginal value of system capacity for the PJM Region, without considering locational constraints, adjusted as necessary by any applicable Locational Price Adders, Annual Resource Price Adders, Extended Summer Resource Price Adders, Limited Resource Price Decrement, Sub-Annual Resource Price Decrement, Base Capacity Demand Resource Price Decrement, and Base Capacity Resource Price Decrement, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection based on the optimization algorithm. If a Capacity Resource is located in more than one Locational Deliverability Area, it shall be paid the highest Locational Price Adder in any applicable LDA in which the Sell Offer for such Capacity Resource cleared. The Annual Resource Price Adder is applicable for Annual Resources only. The Extended Summer Resource Price Adder is applicable for Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources.

The Locational Price Adder applicable to each cleared Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource is determined during the post-processing of the RPM Auction results consistent with the manner in which the auction clearing algorithm recognizes the contribution of Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource Sell Offers in satisfying an LDA’s reliability requirement. For each LDA with a positive Locational Price Adder with respect to the immediate higher level LDA, starting with the lowest level constrained LDAs and moving up, PJM determines the quantity of equally matched Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources and Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources located and cleared within that LDA. Up to this quantity, the cleared Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources and Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources with the lowest Sell Offer prices will be compensated using the highest Locational Price Adder applicable to such LDA; and any remaining Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources cleared within the LDA are effectively moved to the next higher level constrained LDA, where they are considered in a similar manner for compensation.

b) Resource Make-Whole Payments

If a Sell Offer specifies a minimum block, and only a portion of such block is needed to clear the market in a Base Residual or Incremental Auction, the MW portion of such Sell Offer needed to clear the market shall clear, and such Sell Offer shall set the marginal value of system capacity. In addition, the Capacity Market Seller shall receive a Resource Make-Whole Payment equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction times the difference between the Sell Offer's minimum block MW quantity and the Sell Offer’s cleared MW quantity. If the Sell Offer price of a cleared Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource exceeds the applicable Capacity Resource Clearing Price, the Capacity Market Seller shall receive a Resource Make-Whole Payment equal to the difference between the Sell Offer price and Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such RPM Auction. The cost for any such Resource Make-Whole Payments required in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for adjustment of prior capacity commitments shall be collected pro rata from all LSEs in the LDA in which such payments were made, based on their Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations. The cost for any such Resource Make-Whole...
Payments required in an Incremental Auction for capacity replacement shall be collected from all Capacity Market Buyers in the LDA in which such payments were made, on a pro-rata basis based on the MWs purchased in such auction.

c) New Entry Price Adjustment

A Capacity Market Seller that submits a Sell Offer based on a Planned Generation Capacity Resource that clears in the BRA for a Delivery Year may, at its election, submit Sell Offers with a New Entry Price Adjustment in the BRAs for the two immediately succeeding Delivery Years if:

1. Such Capacity Market Seller provides notice of such election at the time it submits its Sell Offer for such resource in the BRA for the first Delivery Year for which such resource is eligible to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. When the Capacity Market Seller provides notice of such election, it must specify whether its Sell Offer is contingent upon qualifying for the New Entry Price Adjustment. The Office of the Interconnection shall not clear such contingent Sell Offer if it does not qualify for the New Entry Price Adjustment.

2. All or any part of a Sell Offer from the Planned Generation Capacity Resource submitted in accordance with section 5.14(c)(1) is the marginal Sell Offer that sets the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for the LDA.

3. Acceptance of all or any part of a Sell Offer that meets the conditions in section 5.14(c)(1)-(2) in the BRA increases the total Unforced Capacity committed in the BRA (including any minimum block quantity) for the LDA in which such Resource will be located from a megawatt quantity below the LDA Reliability Requirement, minus the Short Term Resource Procurement Target, to a megawatt quantity at or above a megawatt quantity at the price-quantity point on the VRR Curve at which the price is 0.40 times the applicable Net CONE divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd).

4. Such Capacity Market Seller submits Sell Offers in the BRA for the two immediately succeeding Delivery Years for the entire Unforced Capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource committed in the first BRA under section 5.14(c)(1)-(2) equal to the lesser of: A) the price in such seller’s Sell Offer for the BRA in which such resource qualified as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource that satisfies the conditions in section 5.14(c)(1)-(3); or B) 0.90 times the Net CONE applicable in the first BRA in which such Planned Generation Capacity Resource meeting the conditions in section 5.14(c)(1)-(3) cleared, on an Unforced Capacity basis, for such LDA.

5. If the Sell Offer is submitted consistent with section 5.14(c)(1)-(4) the foregoing conditions, then:

(i) in the first Delivery Year, the Resource sets the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for the LDA and all cleared resources in the LDA receive the Capacity Resource Clearing Price set by the Sell Offer as the marginal
offer, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.12(a) and
section 5.14(a) above.

(ii) in either of the subsequent two BRAs, if any part of the Sell Offer from
the Resource clears, it shall receive the Capacity Resource Clearing Price
for such LDA for its cleared capacity and for any additional minimum
block quantity pursuant to section 5.14(b) above; or

(iii) if the Resource does not clear, it shall be deemed resubmitted at the
highest price per MW-day at which the megawatt quantity of Unforced
Capacity of such Resource that cleared the first-year BRA will clear the
subsequent-year BRA pursuant to the optimization algorithm described in
Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.12(a), and

(iv) the resource with its Sell Offer submitted shall clear and shall be
committed to the PJM Region in the amount cleared, plus any additional
minimum-block quantity from its Sell Offer for such Delivery Year, but
such additional amount shall be no greater than the portion of a minimum-
block quantity, if any, from its first-year Sell Offer satisfying section
5.14(c)(1)-(3) above that is entitled to compensation pursuant to section
5.14(b) above; and

(v) the Capacity Resource Clearing Price, and the resources cleared, shall be
re-determined to reflect the resubmitted Sell Offer. In such case, the
Resource for which the Sell Offer is submitted pursuant to section
5.14(c)(1)-(4) above shall be paid for the entire committed quantity at the
Sell Offer price that it initially submitted in such subsequent BRA. The
difference between such Sell Offer price and the Capacity Resource
Clearing Price (as well as any difference between the cleared quantity and
the committed quantity), will be treated as a Resource Make-Whole
Payment in accordance with section 5.14(b) above. Other capacity
resources that clear the BRA in such LDA receive the Capacity Resource
Clearing Price as determined in section 5.14(a) above.

6. The failure to submit a Sell Offer consistent with section 5.14(c)(i)-(iii)
above in the BRA for Delivery Year 3 shall not retroactively revoke the New Entry Price
Adjustment for Delivery Year 2. However, the failure to submit a Sell Offer consistent with
section 5.14(c)(4) above in the BRA for Delivery Year 2 shall make the resource ineligible for
the New Entry Pricing Adjustment for Delivery Years 2 and 3.

7. For each Delivery Year that the foregoing conditions are satisfied, the
Office of the Interconnection shall maintain and employ in the auction clearing for such LDA a
separate VRR Curve, notwithstanding the outcome of the test referenced in Tariff, Attachment
DD, section 5.10(a)(ii).

8. On or before August 1, 2012, PJM shall file with FERC under FPA
section 205, as determined necessary by PJM following a stakeholder process, tariff changes to
establish a long-term auction process as a not unduly discriminatory means to provide adequate long-term revenue assurances to support new entry, as a supplement to or replacement of this New Entry Price Adjustment.

d) Qualifying Transmission Upgrade Payments

A Capacity Market Seller that submitted a Sell Offer based on a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade that clears in the Base Residual Auction shall receive a payment equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price, including any Locational Price Adder, of the LDA into which the Qualifying Transmission Upgrade is to increase Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit, less the Capacity Resource Clearing Price, including any Locational Price Adder, of the LDA from which the upgrade was to provide such increased CETL, multiplied by the megawatt quantity of increased CETL cleared from such Sell Offer. Such payments shall be reflected in the Locational Price Adder determined as part of the Final Zonal Capacity Price for the Zone associated with such LDAs, and shall be funded through a reduction in the Capacity Transfer Rights allocated to Load-Serving Entities under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.15, as set forth in that section. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to any cleared capacity transaction resulting from a Sell Offer based on a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade.

e) Locational Reliability Charge

In accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement, each LSE shall incur a Locational Reliability Charge (subject to certain offsets and other adjustments as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14B, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14C, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14D, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14E and Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.15) equal to such LSE’s Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in a Zone during such Delivery Year multiplied by the applicable Final Zonal Capacity Price in such Zone. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the LSEs’ obligations to pay, and payments of, Locational Reliability Charges.

f) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Zonal Capacity Prices in accordance with the following, based on the optimization algorithm:

i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post the Preliminary Zonal Capacity Prices for each Delivery Year following the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The Preliminary Zonal Capacity Price for each Zone shall be the sum of: 1) the marginal value of system capacity for the PJM Region, without considering locational constraints; 2) the Locational Price Adder, if any, for the LDA in which such Zone is located; provided however, that if the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA; 3) an adjustment, if required, to account for adders paid to Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources in the LDA for which the zone is located; 4) an adjustment, if required, to account for Resource Make-Whole Payments; and (5) an adjustment, if required to provide sufficient revenue for payment of any PRD Credits, all as determined in accordance with the optimization algorithm.
ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post the Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price following each Incremental Auction. The Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price for each Zone shall equal the sum of: (1) the average marginal value of system capacity weighted by the Unforced Capacity cleared in all auctions previously conducted for such Delivery Year (excluding any Unforced Capacity cleared as replacement capacity); (2) the average Locational Price Adder weighted by the Unforced Capacity cleared in all auctions previously conducted for such Delivery Year (excluding any Unforced Capacity cleared as replacement capacity); (3) an adjustment, if required, to account for adders paid to Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources for all auctions previously conducted for such Delivery Year (excluding any Unforced Capacity cleared as replacement capacity); (4) an adjustment, if required, to account for Resource Make-Whole Payments for all actions previously conducted (excluding any Resource Make-Whole Payments to be charged to the buyers of replacement capacity); and (5) an adjustment, if required to provide sufficient revenue for payment of any PRD Credits. The Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price may decrease if Unforced Capacity is decommitted or the Resource Clearing Price decreases in an Incremental Auction.

iii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post the Final Zonal Capacity Price for each Delivery Year after the final auction is held for such Delivery Year, as set forth above. The Final Zonal Capacity Price for each Zone shall equal the Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price, as further adjusted to reflect any decreases in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of any existing Demand Resource cleared in the Base Residual Auction and Second Incremental Auction.

g) Resource Substitution Charge

Each Capacity Market Buyer in an Incremental Auction securing replacement capacity shall pay a Resource Substitution Charge equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price resulting from such auction multiplied by the megawatt quantity of Unforced Capacity purchased by such Market Buyer in such auction.

h) Minimum Offer Price Rule for Certain New Generation Capacity Resources that are not Capacity Resources with State Subsidy for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year.

(1) The provisions of this section 5.14(h) shall not be effective after the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. For purposes of this section, the Net Asset Class Costs of New Entry shall be asset-class estimates of competitive, cost-based nominal levelized Cost of New Entry, net of energy and ancillary service revenues. Determination of the gross Cost of New Entry component of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be consistent with the methodology used to determine the Cost of New Entry set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(A) of this Attachment. This section only applies to new Generation Capacity Resources that do not receive or are not entitled to receive a State Subsidy, meaning that such resources are not Capacity Resources with State Subsidy. To the extent a new Generation Capacity Resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy, then the provisions in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h)-1 apply.

The gross Cost of New Entry component of Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be, for purposes of the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the values
indicated in the table below for each CONE Area for a combustion turbine generator ("CT"), and a combined cycle generator ("CC") respectively, and shall be adjusted for subsequent Delivery Years in accordance with subsection (h)(2) below. For purposes of Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the same as that used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The estimated energy and ancillary service revenues for each type of plant shall be determined as described in subsection (h)(3) below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be zero for: (i) Sell Offers based on nuclear, coal or Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle facilities; or (ii) Sell Offers based on hydroelectric, wind, or solar facilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONE Area 1</th>
<th>CONE Area 2</th>
<th>CONE Area 3</th>
<th>CONE Area 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT $/MW-yr</td>
<td>132,200</td>
<td>130,300</td>
<td>128,990</td>
<td>130,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC $/MW-yr</td>
<td>185,700</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>172,600</td>
<td>179,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The gross Cost of New Entry component of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs in the same manner as set forth for the cost of new entry in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(B), provided, however, that the Applicable BLS Composite Index used for CC plants shall be calculated from the three indices referenced in that section but weighted 25% for the wages index, 60% for the construction materials index, and 15% for the turbines index, and provided further that nothing herein shall preclude the Office of the Interconnection from filing to change the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry for any Delivery Year pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act.

(3) For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, for purposes of this provision, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for a combustion turbine generator shall be that determined by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(A), provided that the energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each CONE Area shall be based on the Zone within such CONE Area that has the highest energy revenue estimate calculated under the methodology in that subsection. The net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for a combined cycle generator shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine generator in the previous sentence, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6.501 MMbtu/MWh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource shall be $2.11 per MWh, a 10% adder will not be included in the energy offer, and the reactive service revenues shall be $3,350 per MW-year.

(4) Any Sell Offer that is based on either (i) or (ii), and (iii):

i) a Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region that is submitted in an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year unless a Sell Offer based on that resource has cleared an RPM Auction for that or any prior Delivery Year, or until a Sell Offer based on that resource clears an RPM auction for that or any subsequent Delivery Year; or

ii) a Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region (where such Sell Offer is based solely on such resource) that requires sufficient transmission investment for delivery to the PJM Region to indicate a long-term
commitment to providing capacity to the PJM Region, unless a Sell Offer based on that resource has cleared an RPM Auction for that or any prior Delivery Year, or until a Sell Offer based on that resource clears an RPM Auction for that or any subsequent Delivery Year;

iii) in any LDA for which a separate VRR Curve is established for use in the Base Residual Auction for the Delivery Year relevant to the RPM Auction in which such offer is submitted, and that is less than 90 percent of the applicable Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry or, if there is no applicable Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry, less than 70 percent of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry for a combustion turbine generator as provided in subsection (h)(1) above shall be set to equal 90 percent of the applicable Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry (or set equal to 70 percent of such cost for a combustion turbine, where there is no otherwise applicable net asset class figure), unless the Capacity Market Seller obtains the prior determination from the Office of the Interconnection described in subsection (5) hereof. This provision applies to Sell Offers submitted in Incremental Auctions conducted after December 19, 2011, provided that the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry values for any such Incremental Auctions for the 2012-13 or 2013-14 Delivery Years shall be the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry values posted by the Office of the Interconnection for the Base Residual Auction for the 2014-15 Delivery Year.

(5) Unit-Specific Exception. A Sell Offer meeting the criteria in subsection (4) shall be permitted and shall not be re-set to the price level specified in that subsection if the Capacity Market Seller obtains a determination from the Office of the Interconnection or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer, that such Sell Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry were the resource to rely solely on revenues from PJM-administered markets. The following process and requirements shall apply to requests for such determinations:

i) The Capacity Market Seller may request such a determination by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit its Sell Offer, by submitting simultaneously to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written request with all of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose, the Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the minimum offer level expected to be established under subsection (4). If the minimum offer level subsequently established for the relevant Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall be required.

ii) As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller must include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the planned generation resource, as well as estimates of offsetting net revenues, or, sufficient data for the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit to produce an estimate. Estimates of costs or revenues shall be supported at a level of detail comparable to the cost and revenue estimates used to support the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry established under this section 5.14(h). As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, supporting documentation for project costs may
include, as applicable and available, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction–period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. Such documentation also shall identify and support any sunk costs that the Capacity Market Seller has reflected as a reduction to its Sell Offer. The request shall include a certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for an exception hereunder.

The request also shall identify all revenue sources relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above.

For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, in making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well defined, forward-looking dispatch models, designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services markets. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel prices may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of variable operation and maintenance costs, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors and ancillary service capabilities.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a resource-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices, and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, and plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.
iii) A Sell Offer evaluated hereunder shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer’s competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry is below the minimum offer level prescribed by subsection (4), based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs estimated for subsection (4), including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller’s business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant’s costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than estimated for subsection (4). Capacity Market Sellers shall be asked to demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller’s business are consistent with the standards of this subsection. Failure to adequately support such costs or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in denial of an exception hereunder by the Office of the Interconnection.

iv) The Market Monitoring Unit shall review the information and documentation in support of the request and shall provide its findings whether the proposed Sell Offer is acceptable, in accordance with the standards and criteria hereunder, in writing, to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review all exception requests and documentation and shall provide in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, and the Market Monitoring Unit, its determination whether the requested Sell Offer is acceptable and if not it shall calculate and provide to such Capacity Market Seller, a minimum Sell Offer based on the data and documentation received, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the requested Sell Offer is acceptable, the Capacity Market Seller Shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer to which it agrees to commit by no later than sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction.

h-1) Minimum Offer Price Rule for Capacity Resources with State Subsidy for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year.

(1) **General Rule.** The provisions of this section 5.14(h-1) shall not be effective after the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, any Sell Offer based on either a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or a Cleared Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy submitted in any RPM Auction shall have an offer price no lower than the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless the Capacity Market Seller qualifies for an exemption with respect to such Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy prior to the submission of such offer.

(A) **Effect of Exemption.** To the extent a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction is based on a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that qualifies for any of the exemptions defined in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-1)(4)-(8), the Sell Offer for such resource shall not be limited by the MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless otherwise specified.
(B) Effect of Exception. To the extent a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year is based on a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy for which the Capacity Market Seller obtains, prior to the submission of such offer, a resource-specific exception, such offer may include an offer price below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price applicable to such resource type, but no lower than the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price determined in such exception process.

(C) Process for Establishing a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy.

(i) By no later than one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction conducted for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, each Capacity Market Seller must certify to the Office of Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, whether or not each Capacity Resource (other than Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource) that the Capacity Market Seller intends to offer into the RPM Auction qualifies as a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy (including by way of Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resource) and identify (with specificity) any State Subsidy. Capacity Market Sellers that intend to offer a Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource into the RPM Auction shall certify to the Office of Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, whether or not such Demand Resource or Energy Efficiency Resource qualifies as a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy no later than thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction conducted for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. All Capacity Market Sellers shall be responsible for each certification irrespective of any guidance developed by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit. A Capacity Resource shall be deemed a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy if the Capacity Market Seller fails to timely certify whether or not a Capacity Resource is entitled to a State Subsidy unless the Capacity Market Seller receives a waiver from the Commission. Notwithstanding, if a Capacity Market Seller submits a timely resource-specific exception pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) for the relevant Delivery Year, and PJM approves the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, then the Capacity Market Seller may use such floor price regardless of whether it timely certified whether or not the resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy.

(ii) The requirements in subsection (i) above do not apply to Capacity Resources for which the Market Seller designated whether or not it is subject to a State Subsidy and the associated subsidies to which the Capacity Resource is entitled in a prior Delivery Year, unless there has been a change in the set of those State Subsidy(ies), or for those which are eligible for the Demand Resource or Energy Efficiency exemption, Capacity Storage Resource exemption, Self-Supply Entity exemption, or the Renewable Portfolio Standard exemption.

(iii) Once a Capacity Market Seller has certified a Capacity Resource as a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy, the status of such Capacity Resource will remain unchanged unless and until the Capacity Market Seller (or a subsequent Capacity Market Seller) that owns or controls such Capacity Resource provides a certification of a change in such status, the Office of the Interconnection removes such status, or by FERC order. All Capacity Market Sellers shall have an ongoing obligation to certify to the Office of Interconnection and
the Market Monitoring Unit a Capacity Resource’s material change in status as a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy within 30 days of such material change, unless such material change occurs within 30 days of the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, in which case the Market Seller must notify PJM no later than 5 days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. Nothing in this provision shall supersede the requirement for all Capacity Market Sellers to certify to the Office of Interconnection whether its resource meets the criteria of a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(1)(C)(i).

(2) Minimum Offer Price Rule. Any Sell Offer for a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that does not qualify for any of the exemptions, as defined in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-1)(4)-(8), shall have an offer price no lower than the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price is higher than the applicable Market Seller Offer Cap, in which circumstance the Capacity Resource with State Subsidy must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process to participate in an RPM Auction.

(A) New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. For a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on the net cost of new entry for each resource type, shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (i) the resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below or (ii) if applicable, the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price for the applicable resource based on the gross cost of new entry values shown in the table below, net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type and Zone in which the resource is located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Type</th>
<th>Gross Cost of New Entry (2022/2023 $/ MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Solar PV</td>
<td>$271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking Solar PV</td>
<td>$290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onshore Wind</td>
<td>$420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Wind</td>
<td>$1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Energy Storage</td>
<td>$532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Backed Demand Resource</td>
<td>$254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gross cost of new entry values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the gross cost of new
entry values must be converted to a net cost of new entry by subtracting the estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, as determined below, from the gross cost of new entry. However, the resultant net cost of new entry of the battery energy storage resource type in the table above must be multiplied by 2.5. The net cost of new entry based on nameplate capacity is then converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day. For Delivery Years through the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, to determine the applicable UCAP MW-day value, the net cost of new entry is adjusted as follows: for thermal generation resource types and battery energy storage resource types, the applicable class average EFORd; for wind and solar generation resource types, the applicable class average capacity value factor; or for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the Forecast Pool Requirement, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction. For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, to determine the applicable UCAP MW-day value, the net cost of new entry is adjusted as follows: for thermal generation resource types, the applicable class average EFORd; for battery storage, wind, and solar resource types, the applicable ELCC Class Rating; or for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the Forecast Pool Requirement, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction. The resulting default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of the actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.

The default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price for load-backed Demand Resources (i.e., the MW portion of Demand Resources that is not supported by generation) shall be separately determined for each Locational Deliverability Area as the MW-weighted average offer price of load-backed Demand Resources from the most recent three Base Residual Auctions, where the MW weighting shall be determined based on the portion of each Sell Offer for a load-backed portion of the Demand Resource that is supported by end-use customer locations on the registrations used in the pre-registration process for such Base Residual Auctions, as described in the PJM Manuals.

For generation-backed Demand Resources that are not powered by diesel generators, the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price applicable to their technology type. Generation-backed Demand Resources using a technology type for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below to participate in an RPM Auction.

The default gross cost of new entry for Energy Efficiency Resources shall be $644/ICAP MW-Day, which shall be offset by projected wholesale energy savings, as well as transmission and distribution savings of $95/ICAP MW-Day, to determine the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price (Net Cost of New Entry), where the projected wholesale energy savings are determined utilizing the cost and performance data of relevant programs offered by representative energy efficiency programs with sufficiently detailed publicly available data. The wholesale energy savings, in $/ICAP MW-day, shall be calculated prior to each RPM Auction and be equal to the average annual energy savings of 6,221 MWh/ICAP MW times the weighted average of the annual real-time Forward Hourly LMPs of the Zones of the representative energy
efficiency programs, where the weighting is developed from the annual energy savings in the relevant Zones, divided by 365.

To determine the adjusted applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Prices for all resource types except for load-backed Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the gross costs of new entry utilizing, for combustion turbine and combined cycle resource types, the same Applicable BLS Composite Index applied for such Delivery Year to adjust the CONE value used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv), and for all other resource types, the “BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets” component of the Applicable BLS Composite Index used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be replaced with the “BLS Producer Price Index Final Demand, Goods Less Food & Energy, Private Capital Equipment” when adjusting the gross costs of new entry. The resultant value shall then be then adjusted further by a factor of 1.022 for nuclear, coal, combustion turbine, combine cycle, and generation-backed Demand Resource types or 1.01 for solar, wind, and storage resource types to reflect the annual decline in bonus depreciation scheduled under federal corporate tax law. Updated estimates of the net energy and ancillary service revenues for each default resource type and applicable Zone, which shall include, but are not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 shall then be subtracted from the adjusted gross costs of new entry to determine the adjusted New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. The net energy and ancillary services revenue shall be the average of the net energy and ancillary services revenues that the resource is projected to receive from the PJM energy and ancillary service markets for the applicable Delivery Year from three separate simulations, with each such simulation using forward prices shaped using historical data from one of each of the three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction to take account of year-to-year variability in such hourly shapes. Each net energy and ancillary services revenue simulation shall be conducted in accordance with the following and the PJM Manuals:

(i) for nuclear resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue determined by the product of [average annual day-ahead Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone, times 8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources] minus the total annual cost to produce energy determined by the product of [8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources times $9.02/MWh for a single unit plant or $7.66/MWh for a multi-unit plant] where these hourly cost rates include fuel costs and variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(ii) for coal resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 650 MW coal unit (with heat rate of 8,638 BTU/kWh and variable operations and maintenance variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, of $9.50/MWh) using day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices, and daily forecasted coal prices, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(iii) for combustion turbine resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in a manner consistent with the methodology
described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(B) for the Reference Resource combustion turbine.

(iv) for combined cycle resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine resource type, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6,501 BTU/kwh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, shall be $2.11/MWh, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year.

(v) for solar PV resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a solar resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual net energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the solar output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone and applicable to such hour with this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year. Two separate solar resource models are used, one model for a fixed panel resource and a second model for a tracking panel resource;

(vi) for onshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a wind resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the wind output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone applicable to such hour with this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(vii) for offshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue equal to the product of [the average annual real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone times 8,760 hours times an assumed annual capacity factor of 45%], plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(viii) for Capacity Storage Resource, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate shall be estimated by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 1 MW, 4MWh resource, with an 85% roundtrip efficiency, and assumed to be dispatched between 95% and 5% state of charge against day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year; and

(ix) for generation-backed Demand Resource, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate shall be zero dollars.

New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource for the relevant RPM Auction.

(B) Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Prices.
(i) For a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy, the applicable Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (a) based on the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below, or (b) if available, the default Avoidable Cost Rate for the applicable resource type shown in the table below, net of projected PJM market revenues equal to the resource’s net energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type, as determined in accordance with subsection (ii) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Resource Type</th>
<th>Default Gross ACR (2022/2023) ($/MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - single</td>
<td>$697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - dual</td>
<td>$445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar PV (fixed and tracking)</td>
<td>$40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Onshore</td>
<td>$83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel-backed Demand Response</td>
<td>$3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load-backed Demand Response</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The default gross Avoidable Cost Rate values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the default Avoidable Cost Rate values must be net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, and then the difference is ultimately converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day, where the UCAP MW-day value will be determined based on: for Delivery Years through the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, the resource-specific EFORd for thermal generation resource types, resource-specific capacity value factor for solar and wind generation resource types (based on the ratio of Capacity Interconnection Rights to nameplate capacity, appropriately time-weighted for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights), or the Forecast Pool Requirement for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction, and for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the resource-specific EFORd for thermal generation resource types and on the resource-specific Accredited UCAP value for solar and wind resource types (with appropriate time-weighting for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights), or the Forecast Pool Requirement for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction. The resulting default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.
Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2022, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the default Avoidable Cost Rates for Capacity Resources with State Subsidies that have cleared in an RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses of the avoidable costs of such resource types. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall propose either to modify or retain the default Avoidable Cost Rate values stated in the table above. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the default Avoidable Cost Rate values are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such proposed modifications with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

For generation-backed Demand Resources that are not powered by diesel generators, the default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price applicable to their technology type. Generation-backed Demand Resources using a technology type for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below to participate in an RPM Auction.

Cleared Capacity Resources with State Subsidy for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource.

(ii) The net energy and ancillary services revenue is equal to forecasted net revenues which shall be determined in accordance with the applicable resource type net energy and ancillary services revenue determination methodology set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(2)(A)(i) through (ix) and using the subject resource’s operating parameters as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals based on (a) offers submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market over the calendar year preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction; (b) the resource-specific operating parameters approved, as applicable, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 (including any Fuel Costs, emissions costs, Maintenance Adders, and Operating Costs); (c) the resource’s EFORd; (d) Forward Hourly LMPs at the generation bus as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(C)(6); and (e) the resource’s stated annual revenue requirement for reactive services; plus any unit-specific bilateral contract. In addition, the following resource type-specific parameters shall be considered; (f) for combustion turbine, combined cycle, and coal resource types: the installed capacity rating, ramp rate (which shall be equal to the maximum ramp rate included in the resource’s energy offers over the most recent previous calendar year preceding the determination for the RPM Auction), and the heat rate as determined as the resource’s average heat rate at full load as submitted to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, where for combined cycle resources heat rates will be determined at base load and at peak load (e.g., without duct burners and with duct burners), as applicable; (g) for nuclear resource type: an
average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources to account for refueling outages; (h) for solar and wind resource types: the resource’s output profiles for the most recent three calendar years, as available; and (i) for battery storage resource type: the nameplate capacity rating (on a MW / MWh basis).

To the extent the resource has not achieved commercial operation, the operating parameters used in the simulation of the net energy and ancillary service revenues will be based on the manufacturer’s specifications and/or from parameters used for other existing, comparable resources, as developed by the Market Monitoring Unit and the Capacity Market Seller, and accepted by the Office of the Interconnection.

A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy based on a net energy and ancillary services revenue determination that does not use the foregoing methodology or parameter inputs stated for that resource type shall, at its election, submit a request for a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price for such Capacity Resource pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below.

(3) Resource-Specific Exception. A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy below the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price may, at its election, submit a request for a resource-specific exception for such Capacity Resource. A Sell Offer below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, but no lower than the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, shall be permitted if the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from the Office of the Interconnection or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer. The resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price determined under this provision shall be based on the resource-specific EFORd for thermal generation resource types, on the resource-specific Accredited UCAP value for ELCC Resources (where for solar and wind generation resource types the Accredited UCAP shall be appropriately time-weighted for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights), or the Forecast Pool Requirement for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction and shall be applied to each MW offered by the resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource. Such Sell Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost were the resource to rely solely on revenues exclusive of any State Subsidy. All supporting data must be provided for all requests. The following requirements shall apply to requests for such determinations:

(A) The Capacity Market Seller shall submit a written request with all of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit the resource-specific exception request to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit its Sell Offer. For such purpose, the Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the default Minimum Floor Offer Prices, determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-1)(2)(A) and (B). If the final applicable default Minimum Floor Offer Price subsequently established for the relevant
Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall be required.

(B) For a resource-specific exception for a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy, the Capacity Market Seller must include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the Capacity Resource, as well as estimates of offsetting net revenues.

The financial modeling assumptions for calculating Cost of New Entry for Generation Capacity Resources and generation-backed Demand Resources shall be: (i) nominal levelization of gross costs, (ii) asset life of twenty years, (iii) no residual value, (iv) all project costs included with no sunk costs excluded, (v) use first year revenues (which may include revenues from the sale of renewable energy credits for purposes other than state-mandated or state-sponsored programs), and (vi) weighted average cost of capital based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to build the Capacity Resource. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to utilize an asset life other than twenty years (but no greater than 35 years) shall provide evidence to support the use of a different asset life, including but not limited to, the asset life term for such resource as utilized in the Capacity Market Seller’s financial accounting (e.g., independently audited financial statements), or project financing documents for the resource or evidence of actual costs or financing assumptions of recent comparable projects to the extent the seller has not executed project financing for the resource (e.g., independent project engineer opinion or manufacturer’s performance guarantee), or opinions of third-party experts regarding the reasonableness of the financing assumptions used for the project itself or in comparable projects. Capacity Market Sellers may also rely on evidence presented in federal filings, such as its FERC Form No. 1 or an SEC Form 10-K, to demonstrate an asset life other than 20 years of similar asset projects.

Supporting documentation for project costs may include, as applicable and available, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction-period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. In addition to the certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, the request must include a certification that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for a resource-specific exception hereunder. The request also shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any State Subsidies) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary
services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel prices may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of, variable operation and maintenance expenses, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of net revenues should be consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, including, but not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a resource-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.

The default assumptions for calculating resource-specific Cost of New Entry for Energy Efficiency Resources shall be based on, as supported by documentation provided by the Capacity Market Seller: the nominal-levelized annual cost to implement the Energy Efficiency program or to install the Energy Efficiency measure reflective of the useful life of the implemented Energy Efficiency equipment, and the offsetting savings associated with avoided wholesale energy costs and other claimed savings provided by implementing the Energy Efficiency program or installing the Energy Efficiency measure.

The default assumptions for calculating resource-specific Cost of New Entry for load-backed Demand Resources shall be based on, as supported by documentation provided by the Capacity Market Seller, program costs required for the resource to meet the capacity obligations of a Demand Resource, including all fixed operating and maintenance cost and weighted average cost of capital based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to develop the Demand Resource.

For generation-backed Demand Resources, the determination of a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price shall consider all costs associated with the generation unit supporting the Demand Resource, and demand charge management benefits at the retail level (as supported by documentation at the end-use customer level) may also be considered as an additional offset to
such costs. Supporting documentation (at the end-use customer level) may include, but is not limited to, historic end-use customer bills and associated analysis that identifies the annual retail avoided cost from the operation of such generation unit.

(C) For a Resource-Specific Exception for a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is a generation resource, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit a Sell Offer consistent with the unit-specific Market Seller Offer Cap process pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8; except that the 10% uncertainty adder may not be included in the “Adjustment Factor.” In addition and notwithstanding the requirements of Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8, the Capacity Market Seller shall, at its election, include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support projected energy and ancillary services markets revenues. Such a request shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any State Subsidies) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel sources may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of variable operation and maintenance expenses, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of revenues should include, but would not be not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a resource-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.
The resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price for a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is a generation-backed Demand Resource will be determined based on all costs associated with the generation unit supporting the Demand Resource, and demand charge management benefits at the retail level (as supported by documentation at the end-use customer level) may also be considered as an additional offset to such costs. Supporting documentation (at the end-use customer level) may include but is not limited to, historic end-use customer bills and associated analysis that identifies the annual retail avoided cost from the operation of such generation unit.

(D) A Sell Offer evaluated at the resource-specific exception shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer’s competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry is below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller’s business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant’s costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than those estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price. Capacity Market Sellers shall demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller’s business are consistent with the standards of this subsection. Failure to adequately support such costs or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in denial of a resource-specific exception by the Office of the Interconnection.

(E) The Capacity Market Seller must submit a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer, certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of the resource-specific exception request and that to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (1) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection to support its request for an exception is true and correct; (2) the Capacity Market Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the request for the exception; and (3) the request satisfies the criteria for the exception.

(F) The Market Monitoring Unit shall review, in an open and transparent manner with the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection, the information and documentation in support of the request and shall provide its findings whether the proposed Sell Offer is acceptable, in accordance with the standards and criteria hereunder, in writing, to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review, in an open and transparent manner, all exception requests and documentation and shall provide in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, and the Market Monitoring Unit, its determination whether the requested Sell Offer is acceptable and if not it shall calculate and provide to such Capacity Market Seller, a minimum Sell Offer based on the data and documentation received, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. After the Office of the Interconnection determines with the advice and input of Market Monitor, the acceptable minimum Sell Offer, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer to which it agrees to
commit by no later than sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, and in making such determination, the Capacity Market Seller may consider the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and may select such default value if it is lower than the resource-specific determination. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules based on the lower of the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and the resource-specific determination unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

(4) Competitive Exemption.

(A) A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy may be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule under this subsection 5.14(h-1) in any RPM Auction if the Capacity Market Seller certifies to the Office of Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, that the Capacity Market Seller of such Capacity Resource elects to forego receiving any State Subsidy for the applicable Delivery Year no later than thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the competitive exemption is not available to Capacity Resources with State Subsidy that (A) are owned or offered by Self-Supply Entities unless the Self-Supply Entity certifies, subject to PJM and Market Monitor review, that the Capacity Resource will not accept a State Subsidy, including any financial benefit that is the result of being owned by a regulated utility, such that retail ratepayers are held harmless, (B) are no longer entitled to receive a State Subsidy but are still considered a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy solely because they have not cleared an RPM Auction since last receiving a State Subsidy, or (C) are Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resources or is the subject of a bilateral transaction (including but not limited to those reported pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 4.6) and not all Capacity Market Sellers of the supporting facility unanimously elect the competitive exemption and certify that no State Subsidy will be received associated with supporting the resource (unless the underlying Capacity Resource that is the subject of a bilateral transaction has not received, is not receiving, and is not entitled to receive any State Subsidy except those that are assigned (i.e., renewable energy credits) to the off-takers of a bilateral transaction and the Capacity Market Seller of such Capacity Resource can demonstrate and certify that the Capacity Market Seller’s rights and obligations of its share of the capacity, energy, and assignable State Subsidy associated with the underlying Capacity Resource are in pro rata shares). A new Generation Capacity Resource that is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy may elect the competitive exemption; however, in such instance, the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price will be determined in accordance with the minimum offer price rules for certain new Generation Capacity Resources as provided in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h), which apply the minimum offer price rule to the new Generation Capacity Resources located in an LDA where a separate VRR Curve is established as provided in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h)(4).

(B) The Capacity Market Seller shall not receive a State Subsidy for any part of the relevant Delivery Year in which it elects a competitive exemption or certifies that it is not a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy.

(5) Self-Supply Entity exemption. A Capacity Resource that was owned, or bilaterally contracted, by a Self-Supply Entity on December 19, 2019, shall be exempt from the
Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Resource remains owned or bilaterally contracted by such Self-Supply Entity and satisfies at least one of the criteria specified below:

(A) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019;

(B) is the subject of an interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement executed by the interconnection customer on or before December 19, 2019; or

(C) is the subject of an unexecuted interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement filed by PJM with the Commission on or before December 19, 2019.

(6) Renewable Portfolio Standard Exemption. A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy shall be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Resource (1) receives or is entitled to receive State Subsidies through renewable energy credits or equivalent credits associated with a state-mandated or state-sponsored renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) program or equivalent program as of December 19, 2019 and (2) satisfies at least one of the following criteria:

(A) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019;

(B) is the subject of an interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement executed by the interconnection customer on or before December 19, 2019; or

(C) is the subject of an unexecuted interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement filed by PJM with the Commission on or before December 19, 2019.


(A) A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource shall be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Resource satisfies at least one of the following criteria:

(i) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019. For purposes of this subsection (A), individual customer location registrations that participated as Demand Resource and cleared in an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019, and were submitted to PJM no later than 45 days prior to the BRA for the
2022/2023 Delivery Year shall be deemed eligible for the Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource Exemption; or

(ii) has completed registration on or before December 19, 2019; or

(iii) is supported by a post-installation measurement and verification report for Energy Efficiency Resources approved by PJM on or before December 19, 2019 (calculated for each installation period, Zone and Sub-Zone by using the greater of the latest approved post-installation measurement and verification report prior to December 19, 2019 or the maximum MW cleared for a Delivery Year across all auctions conducted prior to December 19, 2019).

(B) All registered locations that qualify for the Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource exemption shall continue to remain exempt even if the MW of nominated capacity increases between RPM Auctions unless any MW increase in the nominated capacity is due to an investment made for the sole purpose of increasing the curtailment capability of the location in the capacity market. In such case, the MW of increased capability will not be qualified for the Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource exemption.

(8) Capacity Storage Resource Exemption. A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is a Capacity Storage Resource shall be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Storage Resource satisfies at least one of the following criteria:

(A) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019;

(B) is the subject of an interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement executed by the interconnection customer on or before December 19, 2019; or

(C) is the subject of an unexecuted interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement filed by PJM with the Commission on or before December 19, 2019.

(9) Procedures and Remedies in Cases of Suspected Fraud or Material Misrepresentation or Omissions in Connection with a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy. In the event the Office of the Interconnection, with advice and input from the Market Monitoring Unit, reasonably believes that a certification of a Capacity Resource’s status contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations or omissions such that the Capacity Market Seller’s Capacity Resource is a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy (including whether the Capacity Resource is a Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resource) or does not qualify for a competitive exemption or contains information that is inconsistent with the resource-specific exception, then:
(A) A Capacity Market Seller shall, within five (5) business days upon receipt of the request for additional information, provide any supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate whether such Capacity Resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or whether the Capacity Market Seller is eligible for the competitive exemption. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Capacity Resource’s status as a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy is different from that specified by the Capacity Market Seller or is not eligible for a competitive exemption pursuant to subsection (4) above, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify, in writing, the Capacity Market Seller of such determination by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, if the Office of Interconnection determines that the subject resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or is not eligible for a competitive exemption pursuant to subsection (4) above, such Capacity Resource shall be subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule, unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

(B) if the Office of the Interconnection does not provide written notice of suspected fraudulent or material misrepresentation or omission at least sixty-five (65) days before the start of the relevant RPM Auction, then the Office of the Interconnection may file the certification that contains any alleged fraudulent or material misrepresentation or omission with FERC. In such event, if the Office of Interconnection determines that a resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule, the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules on that basis unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC. The Office of the Interconnection shall implement any remedies ordered by FERC; and

(C) prior to applying the Minimum Offer Price Rule, the Office of the Interconnection, with advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, shall notify the affected Capacity Market Seller and, to the extent practicable, provide the Capacity Market Seller an opportunity to explain the alleged fraudulent or material misrepresentation or omission. Any filing to FERC under this provision shall seek fast track treatment and neither the name nor any identifying characteristics of the Capacity Market Seller or the resource shall be publicly revealed, but otherwise the filing shall be public. The Capacity Market Seller may submit a revised certification for that Capacity Resource for subsequent RPM Auctions, including RPM Auctions held during the pendency of the FERC proceeding. In the event that the Capacity Market Seller is cleared by FERC from such allegations of fraudulent or material misrepresentations or omissions then the certification shall be restored to the extent and in the manner permitted by FERC. The remedies required by this subsection to be requested in any filing to FERC shall not be exclusive of any other remedies or penalties that may be pursued against the Capacity Market Seller.

h-2) Minimum Offer Price Rule Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year

(1) Certification Requirement.

(A) By no later than one hundred and fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction conducted for the 2024/2025 Delivery
Year and all subsequent Delivery Years, and by the date posted on the PJM website for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, each Capacity Market Seller must certify to the Office of Interconnection for each Generation Capacity Resource and each applicable DER Capacity Aggregation Resource the Capacity Market Seller intends to offer into the RPM Auction, in accordance with the PJM Manuals:

(i) whether or not the Generation Capacity Resource is receiving or expected to receive Conditioned State Support under any legislative or other governmental policy or program that has been enacted or effective at the time of the certification; and

(ii) whether or not the Capacity Market Seller acknowledges and understands that the Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power is not permitted in RPM Auctions, and does not intend to submit a Sell Offer for their Generation Capacity Resource as an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power.

(B) All Capacity Market Sellers shall be responsible for the accuracy of each certification and its conformance with the Tariff irrespective of any guidance developed by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit.

(C) Once a Capacity Market Seller has certified whether or not a Generation Capacity Resource is receiving or expected to receive Conditioned State Support, the certification requirements in subsection (A)(i) above do not apply and the status of such Generation Capacity Resource will remain unchanged unless and until the Capacity Market Seller (or a subsequent Capacity Market Seller of the underlying resource) that owns or controls such Generation Capacity Resource provides a certification of a change in such status, the Office of the Interconnection removes such status, or by FERC order. All Capacity Market Sellers shall have an ongoing obligation to certify to the Office of Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a Generation Capacity Resource’s material change in status regarding whether such resource is receiving or expected to receive Conditioned State Support within 30 days of such material change. Nothing in this provision shall supersede the requirement for all Capacity Market Sellers to certify to the Office of Interconnection pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(ii).

(2) Determining Generation Capacity Resources Subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule.

(A) Conditioned State Support.

(i) If the Office of the Interconnection reasonably believes a government policy or program would provide Conditioned State Support or a Capacity Market Seller certifies that it is receiving or is expected to receive Conditioned State Support associated with a given Generation Capacity Resource, the Office of Interconnection shall submit, pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, a filing at FERC indicating the Office of the Interconnection’s intent to classify the government policy or program from which that support is derived as Conditioned State Support (and adding such policy or program to the list in Tariff, Attachment DD-3) and apply the Minimum Offer Price Rule to each Generation Capacity Resource reasonably expected to receive such Conditioned State Support. If FERC has already
ruled on whether a specific government program or policy constitutes Conditioned State Support and such policy or program is listed in Tariff, Attachment DD-3, the Office of the Interconnection shall not be required to submit the filing described in the preceding sentence.

(ii) Government policies or programs that do not provide payments or other financial benefit outside of PJM markets and do not provide payment or other financial benefit in exchange for the sale of a FERC-jurisdictional product conditioned on clearing in any RPM Auction do not constitute Conditioned State Support. Examples of such government policies that do not constitute Conditioned State Support may include, but are not limited to: policies designed to procure, incent, or require environmental attributes, whether bundled or unbundled (e.g., Renewable Energy Credits, Zero Emission Credits; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative); economic development programs and policies; tax incentives; state retail default service auctions; policies or programs that provide incentives related to fuel supplies; any contract, legally enforceable obligation, or rate pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act or any other state-administered federal regulatory program (e.g., Cross-State Air Pollution Rule). In addition, Conditioned State Support shall not be determined solely based on the business model of the Capacity Market Seller, such that the fact that a Self-Supply Entity is the Capacity Market Seller, for example, is not a basis for determining Conditioned State Support.

(iii) Upon FERC acceptance (whether by order or operation of law) that a government policy or program or contract with a state entity constitutes Conditioned State Support, a Generation Capacity Resource for which a Capacity Market Seller certifies pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(i) that it is receiving Conditioned State Support or is reasonably expected to receive such Conditioned State Support, as identified by the Office of the Interconnection, with the advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, will be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule.

(B) Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power

(i) If a Capacity Market Seller does not certify that it acknowledges the prohibition of the Exercise of Buyer Side Market Power and the Capacity Market Seller intends to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power for this Generation Capacity Resource, then the underlying Capacity Resource shall be subject to the MOPR pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(i). If the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit reasonably suspects that a certification submitted under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(ii) contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations such that the Capacity Market Seller’s Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power or otherwise reasonably suspects that a Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall initiate a fact-specific review into the facts and circumstances regarding the Generation Capacity Resource and whether the Capacity Market Seller has the ability and incentive to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power with respect to such Generation Capacity Resource. During such fact-specific review, the Capacity Market Seller will have the opportunity to explain and justify why a Sell Offer for the Generation Capacity Resource would not be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power. The Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Capacity Market Seller of the bases for inquiry and
initiation of review at least 135 days in advance of the RPM Auction conducted for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year and all subsequent Delivery Years, and by the date posted on the PJM website for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.

In initiating a review, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall provide the affected Capacity Market Seller, in writing, the basis for its inquiry, including, but not limited to, the Generation Capacity Resource(s), and the purported beneficiary of any price suppression. The Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may request from the Capacity Market Seller additional information and documentation that is reasonably related to the basis for its inquiry, provided that, the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit shall confer with the Capacity Market Seller in advance of any such requests. The Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information and documentation requested by the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit, and any other information and documentation the Capacity Market Seller believes may justify the conduct or action in question as not representing an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, within 15 days or other such timeline as agreed to in writing by the Office of the Interconnection, Market Monitoring Unit and Capacity Market Seller.

The fact-specific review will determine, as necessary, whether a Capacity Market Seller has the ability and incentive to submit a Sell Offer for the Generation Capacity Resource that could be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, as follows:

(a) To determine whether a Capacity Market Seller may have Buyer Side Market Power associated with the Generation Capacity Resource for the applicable RPM Auction, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit will perform ex-ante testing to determine the extent to which a shift in the supply curve by a number of megawatts equal to the size of the Generation Capacity Resource would affect RPM Auction clearing prices, where such analysis would reflect expected supply and demand conditions in the region of the market clearing prices and quantities in recent RPM Auctions, would reflect whether the relevant LDAs have been constrained in recent RPM Auctions, and would reflect reasonably expected material changes in an LDA including the modeling of the LDA and expected changes in supply and demand for the applicable Delivery Year. To the extent the foregoing analyses show that the Generation Capacity Resource would have a material effect on RPM Auction clearing prices, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed to have the ability to exercise Buyer Side Market Power.

(b) To determine whether the Capacity Market Seller’s submission of a Sell Offer at any given price level for such Generation Capacity Resource may constitute an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall perform ex-ante testing to determine whether, given the ability to suppress prices identified in the relevant LDAs and the PJM Region, such price suppression would be economically beneficial to the Capacity Market Seller by comparing its expected cost with its economic benefit, and where the expected cost shall reflect the excess economic costs of the resource above expected market revenues, and the expected benefit shall reflect the expected cost savings to the expected net short position (based on estimated capacity obligations and owned and contracted capacity measured on a three-year average basis for the three years starting with the first day of the Delivery Year associated with the RPM Auction in which the
Generation Capacity Resource is being offered) in the relevant LDAs and RTO multiplied by the price change resulting from offering the resource uneconomically. In this analysis, the Office of Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall consider whether any capacity obligations in which the capacity costs based on RPM Auction clearing prices are directly passed through to load and consider whether the price of any contracted capacity passes through RPM Auction clearing prices. If the expected benefit outweighs the expected cost, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed to have the incentive to exercise Buyer Side Market Power. If a resource offer can be justified, economically or otherwise, without consideration of the benefit to the Capacity Market Seller of the suppressed prices, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed not to have the incentive to exercise Buyer Side Market Power with respect to that resource. Out-of-market compensation (such as from renewable energy credits and zero emission credits) that are not tied to either Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs the submission of an offer to lower market clearing prices may be used to support the economics of the resource under review.

(ii) The following nonexhaustive list of circumstances would preclude an inquiry into or determination regarding an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power in the course of a review initiated pursuant to subsection (i) above: (a) the Generation Capacity Resource is a merchant generation supply resources that is not contracted to an entity with a Load Interest; (b) the Generation Capacity Resource is acquired by or under the contractual control of the Capacity Market Seller through a competitive and non-discriminatory procurement process open to new and existing resources; or (c) the Generation Capacity Resource is owned by or bilaterally contracted to a Self-Supply Seller and such resource is demonstrated as consistent with or included in the Self-Supply Seller’s long-range resource plan (e.g., a long-range hedging plan) that is approved or otherwise reviewed and accepted by the RERRA, provided that any such plan approval or contracts do not direct the submission of an uneconomic offer to deliberately lower market clearing prices or for the Capacity Market Seller to otherwise perform an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power. In addition, to the extent a Generation Capacity Resource may receive compensation in support of characteristics aligned with well-demonstrated customer preferences, such compensation shall not, in and of itself, be a basis for the determination of Buyer-Side Market Power.

(iii) Based on the foregoing tests and fact-specific review, including the facts and circumstances of the Generation Capacity Resource, the Office of the Interconnection, with the advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, shall determine whether a Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power. If the Office of the Interconnection, with the advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, determines that a Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power or the Capacity Market Seller certifies that it intends to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power, then such resource will be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule. If the resource will be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule, the Office of the Interconnection shall include in the notice a written explanation for such determination. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with the Office of the Interconnection’s determination of whether a given Generation Capacity Resource is subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection
will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules based on its determination hereunder unless FERC by order directs otherwise.

(C) Failure to timely submit a certification. Any Generation Capacity Resource for which a Capacity Market Seller has not timely submitted the certifications required under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1) shall be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Capacity Market Seller submits a timely unit-specific exception pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) for the relevant Delivery Year, and PJM approves the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, then the Capacity Market Seller may use such floor price regardless of whether it timely submitted the foregoing certifications.

(3) Minimum Offer Price Rule. Any Sell Offer for a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) shall have an offer price no lower than the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price is higher than the applicable Market Seller Offer Cap, in which circumstance the Capacity Market Seller, to participate in an RPM Auction, must request a unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process, and the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price shall establish the offer level for such resource.

(A) New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. For a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and for which a Sell Offer based on that resource, or any uprate of such Generation Capacity Resource participating in the generation interconnection process under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart A, that has not cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on the net cost of new entry for the resource type, shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (i) the unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) below or (ii) if applicable, the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price for the applicable resource based on the gross cost of new entry values shown in the table below, as adjusted for Delivery Years subsequent to the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type and Zone in which the resource is located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Type</th>
<th>Gross Cost of New Entry (2022/2023 $/ MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$1,068</td>
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<td>Onshore Wind</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Energy Storage</td>
<td>$532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gross cost of new entry values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the gross cost of new entry values must be converted to a net cost of new entry by subtracting the estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, as determined below, from the gross cost of new entry. However, the resultant net cost of new entry of the battery energy storage resource type in the table above must be multiplied by 2.5. The net cost of new entry based on nameplate capacity is then converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day. For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, to determine the applicable UCAP MW-day value, the net cost of new entry is adjusted as follows: for battery storage, wind, and solar resource types, the applicable ELCC Class Rating; or for all other generation resource types, the applicable class average EFORd. The resulting default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of the actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.

Commencing with the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the default gross costs of new entry in the table above and post the preliminary estimates of the adjusted applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Prices on its website, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for each Base Residual Auction. To determine the adjusted applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Prices for all resource types, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the gross costs of new entry utilizing, for combustion turbine and combined cycle resource types, the same Applicable BLS Composite Index applied for such Delivery Year to adjust the CONE value used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv), and for all other resource types, the “BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets” component of the Applicable BLS Composite Index used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be replaced with the “BLS Producer Price Index Final Demand, Goods Less Food & Energy, Private Capital Equipment” when adjusting the gross costs of new entry. The resultant value shall then be then adjusted further by a factor of 1.02 for nuclear, coal, combustion turbine, and combine cycle resource types or 1.01 for solar, wind, and storage resource types to reflect the annual decline in bonus depreciation scheduled under federal corporate tax law. Updated estimates of the net energy and ancillary service revenues for each default resource type and applicable Zone, which shall include, but are not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 shall then be subtracted from the adjusted gross costs of new entry to determine the adjusted New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. The net energy and ancillary services revenue shall be the average of the net energy and ancillary services revenues that the resource is projected to receive from the PJM energy and ancillary service markets for the applicable Delivery Year from three separate simulations, with each such simulation using forward prices shaped using historical data from one of each of the three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction to take account of year-to-year variability in such hourly shapes. Each net energy and ancillary services revenue simulation shall be conducted in accordance with the following and the PJM Manuals:
(i) for nuclear resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue determined by the product of [average annual day-ahead Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone, times 8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources] minus the total annual cost to produce energy determined by the product of [8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources times $9.02/MWh for a single unit plant or $7.66/MWh for a multi-unit plant] where these hourly cost rates include fuel costs and variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(ii) for coal resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 650 MW coal unit (with heat rate of 8,638 BTU/kWh and variable operations and maintenance variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, of $9.50/MWh) using day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices, and daily forecasted coal prices, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(iii) for combustion turbine resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in a manner consistent with the methodology described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(B) for the Reference Resource combustion turbine.

(iv) for combined cycle resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine resource type, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6,501 BTU/kwh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, shall be $2.11/MWh, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year.

(v) for solar PV resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a solar resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual net energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the solar output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone applicable to such hour with this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year. Two separate solar resource models are used, one model for a fixed panel resource and a second model for a tracking panel resource;

(vi) for onshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a wind resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the wind output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone applicable to such hour with
this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(vii) for offshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue equal to the product of [the average annual real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone times 8,760 hours times an assumed annual capacity factor of 45%], plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year; and

(viii) for Capacity Storage Resource, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate shall be estimated by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 1 MW, 4MWh resource, with an 85% roundtrip efficiency, and assumed to be dispatched between 95% and 5% state of charge against day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2022, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the default gross cost of new entry values. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses of the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs for such resource types. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall propose either to modify or retain the default gross cost of new entry values stated in the table above. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the default gross cost of new entry values are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such proposed modifications with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

Any Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has not previously cleared an RPM Auction for that or any prior Delivery Year and for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource for the relevant RPM Auction.

(B) Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Prices.

(i) For a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and for which a Sell Offer based on that resource has previously cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, the applicable Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (a) based on the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) below, or (b) if available, the default Avoidable Cost Rate for the applicable resource type shown in the table below, as adjusted for Delivery Years subsequent for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year to reflect changes in avoidable costs, net of projected PJM market revenues equal to the resource’s net
energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type, as determined in accordance with subsection (ii) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Resource Type</th>
<th>Default Gross ACR (2022/2023 ($/MW-day))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - single</td>
<td>$697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - dual</td>
<td>$445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar PV (fixed and tracking)</td>
<td>$40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Onshore</td>
<td>$83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The default gross Avoidable Cost Rate values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the default Avoidable Cost Rate values must be net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, and then the difference is ultimately converted to Unforced Capacity ("UCAP") MW-day, where the UCAP MW-day value will be determined based on the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the resource-specific Accredited UCAP value for solar and wind resource types (with appropriate time-weighting for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights) or the resource-specific EFORd for all other generation resource types and on. The resulting default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.

Beginning with the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the default Avoidable Cost Rates in the table above, and post the adjusted values on its website, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for each Base Residual Auction. To determine the adjusted Avoidable Cost Rates, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the 10-year average Handy-Whitman Index in order to adjust the Gross ACR values to account for expected inflation. Updated estimates of the net energy and ancillary service revenues shall be determined on a resource-specific basis in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8(d) and the PJM Manuals.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2022, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the default Avoidable Cost Rates for Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) that have cleared in an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses of the avoidable costs of such resource types. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall propose either to modify or retain the default Avoidable Cost Rate values stated in the table above. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment.
regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the default Avoidable Cost Rate values are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such proposed modifications with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

Any Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has previously cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year and for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource.

(ii) The net energy and ancillary services revenue is equal to forecasted net revenues which shall be determined in accordance with the applicable resource type net energy and ancillary services revenue determination methodology set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(3)(A)(i) through (ix) and using the subject resource’s operating parameters as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals based on (a) offers submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market over the calendar year preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction; (b) the resource-specific operating parameters approved, as applicable, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 (including any Fuel Costs, emissions costs, Maintenance Adders, and Operating Costs); (c) the resource’s EFORD; (d) Forward Hourly LMPs at the generation bus as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(C)(6); and (e) the resource’s stated annual revenue requirement for reactive services; plus any unit-specific bilateral contract. In addition, the following resource type-specific parameters shall be considered; (f) for combustion turbine, combined cycle, and coal resource types: the installed capacity rating, ramp rate (which shall be equal to the maximum ramp rate included in the resource’s energy offers over the most recent previous calendar year preceding the determination for the RPM Auction), and the heat rate as determined as the resource’s average heat rate at full load as submitted to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, where for combined cycle resources heat rates will be determined at base load and at peak load (e.g., without duct burners and with duct burners), as applicable; (g) for nuclear resource type: an average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources to account for refueling outages; (h) for solar and wind resource types: the resource’s output profiles for the most recent three calendar years, as available; and (i) for battery storage resource type: the nameplate capacity rating (on a MW / MWh basis).

To the extent the resource has not achieved commercial operation, the operating parameters used in the simulation of the net energy and ancillary service revenues will be based on the manufacturer’s specifications and/or from parameters used for other existing, comparable resources, as developed by the Market Monitoring Unit and the Capacity Market Seller, and accepted by the Office of the Interconnection.

A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a Generation Capacity Resource that has previously cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year and where such Sell Offer is based on a net energy and ancillary services revenue determination that does
not use the foregoing methodology or parameter inputs stated for that resource type shall, at its
election, submit a request for a unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price for such Capacity
Resource pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) below.

(4) **Unit-Specific Exception.** A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a
Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the
provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule below the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer
Price may, at its election, submit a request for a unit-specific exception for such Capacity
Resource. A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a
Generation Capacity Resource that is under a fact-specific review for Buyer-Side Market Power
pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2)(B)(ii), and where the offer is below the
applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price may, at its election, submit a request for a unit-
specific exception for such Generation Capacity Resource. A Sell Offer below the default
MOPR Floor Offer Price, but no lower than the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, shall be
permitted if the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from the Office of the Interconnection
or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer. The
unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price determined under this provision shall be based on the unit-
specific Accredited UCAP value for battery energy storage resource types and for solar and wind
generation resource types (appropriately time-weighted for any winter Capacity Interconnection
Rights) or on the unit-specific EFORd for all other generation resource types, and shall be
applied to each MW offered by the resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and
regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource. Such Sell
Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of
the resource. All supporting data must be provided for all requests. The following requirements
shall apply to requests for such determinations:

(A) The Capacity Market Seller shall submit a written request with all
of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose,
the Capacity Market Seller shall submit the unit-specific exception request to the Office of the
Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit no later than one hundred twenty (120) days
prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit
its Sell Offer. For such purpose, the Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one
hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM
Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the default Minimum Floor
Offer Prices, determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-2)(3)(A) and (B). If
the final applicable default Minimum Floor Offer Price subsequently established for the relevant
Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall
be required.

(B) For a unit-specific exception for a Generation Capacity Resource
that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment
DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has never cleared an RPM Auction, the Capacity Market Seller
must include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support the
fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the Capacity Resource, as
well as estimates of offsetting net revenues.
The financial modeling assumptions for calculating Cost of New Entry for Generation Capacity Resources shall be: (i) nominal levelization of gross costs, (ii) asset life of twenty years, (iii) no residual value, (iv) all project costs included with no sunk costs excluded, (v) use first year revenues (which may include revenues from the sale of renewable energy credits or any other revenues outside of PJM markets that do not constitute Conditioned State Support), and (vi) weighted average cost of capital based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to build the Capacity Resource. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to utilize an asset life other than twenty years (but no greater than 35 years) shall provide evidence to support the use of a different asset life, including but not limited to, the asset life term for such resource as utilized in the Capacity Market Seller’s financial accounting (e.g., independently audited financial statements), or project financing documents for the resource or evidence of actual costs or financing assumptions of recent comparable projects to the extent the seller has not executed project financing for the resource (e.g., independent project engineer opinion or manufacturer’s performance guarantee), or opinions of third-party experts regarding the reasonableness of the financing assumptions used for the project itself or in comparable projects. Capacity Market Sellers may also rely on evidence presented in federal filings, such as its FERC Form No. 1 or an SEC Form 10-K, to demonstrate an asset life other than 20 years of similar asset projects.

Supporting documentation for project costs may include, as applicable and available, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction-period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. In addition to the certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, the request must include a certification that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for a unit-specific exception hereunder. The request also shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any Conditioned State Support or bilateral contracts that direct submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, evidence of compensation outside the PJM market not tied to Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel prices may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of, variable operation and
maintenance expenses, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of net revenues should be consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, including, but not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a unit-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.

(C) For a Unit-Specific Exception for a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has previously cleared an RPM Auction, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit a Sell Offer consistent with the unit-specific Market Seller Offer Cap process pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8; except that the 10% uncertainty adder may not be included in the “Adjustment Factor.” In addition and notwithstanding the requirements of Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8, the Capacity Market Seller shall, at its election, include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support projected energy and ancillary services markets revenues. Such a request shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any Conditioned State Support or bilateral contracts that direct submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, evidence of compensation outside of PJM markets not tied to Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel sources may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of variable operation and maintenance expenses, which may include
Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of revenues should include, but would not be limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a unit-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.

(D) A Sell Offer evaluated at the unit-specific exception shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer’s competitive, fixed, cost-based offer level is below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller’s business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant’s costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than those estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price. Capacity Market Sellers shall demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller’s business are consistent with the standards of this subsection, and that out-of-market compensation is not tied to Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices. Failure to adequately support such claimed cost advantages or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in the elimination of consideration of the unsupported element(s) of a unit-specific exception by the Office of the Interconnection.

(E) The Capacity Market Seller must submit a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer, certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of the unit-specific exception request and that to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (1) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection to support its request for an exception is true and correct; (2) the Capacity Market Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the request for the exception; and (3) the request satisfies the criteria for the exception.
The Market Monitoring Unit shall review, in an open and transparent manner with the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection, the information and documentation in support of the request and shall provide its findings whether the proposed Sell Offer is acceptable, in accordance with the standards and criteria hereunder, in writing, to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review, in an open and transparent manner, all exception requests and documentation and shall provide in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, and the Market Monitoring Unit, its determination whether the requested Sell Offer is acceptable and if not it shall calculate and provide to such Capacity Market Seller, a minimum Sell Offer based on the data and documentation received, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. After the Office of the Interconnection determines with the advice and input of Market Monitor, the acceptable minimum Sell Offer, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer to which it agrees to commit by no later than sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, and in making such determination, the Capacity Market Seller may consider the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and may select such default value if it is lower than the unit-specific determination. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules based on the lower of the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and the unit-specific determination unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

i) Capacity Export Charges and Credits

(1) Charge

Each Capacity Export Transmission Customer shall incur for each day of each Delivery Year a Capacity Export Charge equal to the Reserved Capacity of Long-Term Firm Transmission Service used for such export (“Export Reserved Capacity”) multiplied by (the Final Zonal Capacity Price for such Delivery Year for the Zone encompassing the interface with the Control Area to which such capacity is exported minus the Final Zonal Capacity Price for such Delivery Year for the Zone in which the resources designated for export are located, but not less than zero). If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the amount of Reserved Capacity described above shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in proportion to the flows from such resource through each such Zone directly to such interface under CETO/CETL analysis conditions, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection using procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. The amount of the Reserved Capacity that is associated with a fully controllable facility that crosses such interface shall be completely apportioned to the Zone within which such facility terminates.

(2) Credit

To recognize the value of firm Transmission Service held by any such Capacity Export Transmission Customer, such customer assessed a charge under section 5.14(i)(1) above also shall receive a credit, comparable to the Capacity Transfer Rights provided to Load-Serving
Entities under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.15. Such credit shall be equal to the locational capacity price difference specified in section 5.14(i)(1) above times the Export Customer’s Allocated Share determined as follows:

Export Customer’s Allocated Share equals

\[
\frac{(\text{Export Path Import} \times \text{Export Reserved Capacity})}{(\text{Export Reserved Capacity} + \text{Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations of all LSEs in such Zone})}
\]

Where:

“Export Path Import” means the megawatts of Unforced Capacity imported into the export interface Zone from the Zone in which the resource designated for export is located.

If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the amount of Export Reserved Capacity shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in the same manner as set forth in subsection (i)(1) above.

(3) Distribution of Revenues

Any revenues collected from the Capacity Export Charge with respect to any capacity export for a Delivery Year, less the credit provided in subsection (i)(2) for such Delivery Year, shall be distributed to the Load Serving Entities in the export-interface Zone that were assessed a Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year, pro rata based on the Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations of such Load-serving Entities in such Zone during such Delivery Year. If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the revenues shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in the same manner as set forth in subsection (i)(1) above.

5.14A [Reserved.]


A. This transition provision applies only with respect to Generation Capacity Resources with existing capacity commitments for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years that experience reductions in verified installed capacity available for sale as a direct result of revised generating unit capability verification test procedures effective with the summer 2014 capability tests, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. A Generation Capacity Resource meeting the description of the preceding sentence, and the Capacity Market Seller of such a resource, are hereafter in this section 5.14B referred to as an “Affected Resource” and an “Affected Resource Owner,” respectively.

B. For each of its Affected Resources, an Affected Resource Owner is required to provide documentation to the Office of the Interconnection sufficient to show a reduction in installed
capacity value as a direct result of the revised capability test procedures. Upon acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, the Affected Resource’s installed capacity value will be updated in the eRPM system to reflect the reduction, and the Affected Resource’s Capacity Interconnection Rights value will be updated to reflect the reduction, effective June 1, 2014. The reduction’s impact on the Affected Resource’s existing capacity commitments for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year will be determined in Unforced Capacity terms, using the final EFORd value established by the Office of the Interconnection for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year as applied to the Third Incremental Auction for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year, to convert installed capacity to Unforced Capacity. The reduction’s impact on the Affected Resource’s existing capacity commitments for each of the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 Delivery Years will be determined in Unforced Capacity terms, using the EFORd value from each Sell Offer in each applicable RPM Auction, applied on a pro-rata basis, to convert installed capacity to Unforced Capacity. The Unforced Capacity impact for each Delivery Year represents the Affected Resource’s capacity commitment shortfall, resulting wholly and directly from the revised capability test procedures, for which the Affected Resource Owner is subject to a Capacity Resource Deficiency Charge for the Delivery Year, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8, unless the Affected Resource Owner (i) provides replacement Unforced Capacity, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8.1, prior to the start of the Delivery Year to resolve the Affected Resource’s total capacity commitment shortfall; or (ii) requests relief from Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges that result wholly and directly from the revised capability test procedures by electing the transition mechanism described in this section 5.14B (“Transition Mechanism”).

C. Under the Transition Mechanism, an Affected Resource Owner may elect to have the Unforced Capacity commitments for all of its Affected Resources reduced for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years to eliminate the capacity commitment shortfalls, across all of its Affected Resources, that result wholly and directly from the revised capability test procedures, and for which the Affected Resource Owner otherwise would be subject to Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges for the Delivery Year. In electing this option, the Affected Resource Owner relinquishes RPM Auction Credits associated with the reductions in Unforced Capacity commitments for all of its Affected Resources for the Delivery Year, and Locational Reliability Charges as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(e) of this Attachment DD are adjusted accordingly. Affected Resource Owners wishing to elect the Transition Mechanism for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year must notify the Office of the Interconnection by May 30, 2014. Affected Resource Owners wishing to elect the Transition Mechanism for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year must notify the Office of the Interconnection by July 25, 2014.

D. The Office of the Interconnection will offset the total reduction (across all Affected Resources and Affected Resource Owners) in Unforced Capacity commitments associated with the Transition Mechanism for the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 Delivery Years by applying corresponding adjustments to the quantity of Buy Bid or Sell Offer activity in the upcoming Incremental Auctions for each of those Delivery Years, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.12(b)(ii) and 5.12(b)(iii).

E. By electing the Transition Mechanism, an Affected Resource Owner may receive relief from applicable Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years, and a Locational UCAP Seller that sells Locational UCAP based on an Affected Resource owned by the Affected Resource Owner may receive relief from
applicable Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year, to the extent that the Affected Resource Owner demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection, that an inability to deliver the amount of Unforced Capacity previously committed for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years is due to a reduction in verified installed capacity available for sale as a direct result of revised generating unit capability verification test procedures effective with the summer 2014 capability tests, as set forth in the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that the Affected Resource Owner must provide the Office of the Interconnection with all information deemed necessary by the Office of the Interconnection to assess the merits of the request for relief.

5.14C Demand Response Operational Resource Flexibility Transition Provision for RPM Delivery Years 2015/2016 and 2016/2017

A. This transition provision applies only to Demand Resources for which a Curtailment Service Provider has existing RPM commitments for the 2015/2016 or 2016/2017 Delivery Years (alternatively referred to in this section 5.14C as “Applicable Delivery Years” and each an “Applicable Delivery Year”) that (i) cannot satisfy the 30-minute notification requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; (ii) are not excepted from the 30-minute notification requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; and (iii) cleared in the Base Residual Auction or First Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year, or cleared in the Base Residual Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. A Demand Resource meeting these criteria and the Curtailment Service Provider of such a resource are hereafter in this section 5.14C referred to as an “Affected Demand Resource” and an “Affected Curtailment Service Provider,” respectively.

B. For this section 5.14C to apply to an Affected Demand Resource, the Affected Curtailment Service Provider must notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing, with regard to the following information by the applicable deadline:

i) For each applicable Affected Demand Resource: the number of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year by end-use customer site that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, calculated based on the most current information available to the Affected Curtailment Service Provider; the end-use customer name; electric distribution company’s account number for the end-use customer; address of end-use customer; type of Demand Resource (i.e., Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR); the Zone or sub-Zone in which the end-use customer is located; and, a detailed description of why the end-use customer cannot comply with the 30-minute notification requirement or qualify for one of the exceptions to the 30-minute notification requirement provided in Tariff, Attachment DD-1 section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6.

ii) If applicable, a detailed analysis that quantifies the amount of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year for prospective customer sales that could not be contracted by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider because of the 30-minute notification requirement provided in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and
the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6 that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, by type of Demand Resource (i.e. Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR) and by Zone and sub-Zone, as applicable. The analysis should include the amount of Unforced Capacity expected from prospective customer sales for each Applicable Delivery Year and must include supporting detail to substantiate the difference in reduced sales expectations. The Affected Curtailment Service Provider should maintain records to support its analysis.

1. For the 2015/2016 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Third Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

2. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Second or Third Incremental Auctions for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year.

3. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision must not have sold or offered to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, and may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year.

C. For the Third Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year and the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall publish aggregate information on the undeliverable megawatts declared under this transition provision (hereafter, “non-viable megawatts”), by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, concurrently with its posting of planning parameters for the applicable Scheduled Incremental Auction. Non-viable megawatts for a Scheduled Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year represent those megawatts meeting the criteria of subsection A above and declared in accordance with subsection B above. Prior to each Third Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply adjustments equal to the declared non-viable megawatt quantity to the quantity of Buy Bid or Sell Offer activity in the upcoming Scheduled Incremental Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.12(b)(ii) and 5.12(b)(iii). Prior to the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the recalculated PJM Region Reliability Requirement and recalculated LDA Reliability Requirements, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c), by the applicable quantity of declared non-viable megawatts, and shall update the PJM Region
Reliability Requirement and each LDA Reliability Requirement for such Second Incremental Auction only if the combined change of the applicable adjustment and applicable recalculation is greater than or equal to the lesser of (i) 500 megawatts or (ii) one percent of the prior PJM Region Reliability Requirement or one percent of the prior LDA Reliability Requirement, as applicable.

D. Prior to the start of each Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall reduce, by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, the capacity commitment of each Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year based on the non-viable megawatts declared by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider under this transition provision. If the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cleared megawatts from multiple Affected Demand Resources of the same type and Zone or sub-Zone, or cleared megawatts in multiple RPM Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the reduction in capacity commitment by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone across the applicable Affected Demand Resources and relevant RPM Auctions. Such allocation shall be performed on a pro-rata basis, based on megawatts cleared by the Affected Demand Resources in the relevant RPM Auctions.

E. For each Applicable Delivery Year, an Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year relinquishes an Affected Demand Resource’s RPM Auction Credits for the amount of capacity commitment reduction as determined under subsection D above. Locational Reliability Charges as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(e) are also adjusted accordingly.

5.14D Capacity Performance and Base Capacity Transition Provision for RPM Delivery Years 2016/2017 and 2017/2018

A. This transition provision applies only for procuring Capacity Performance Resources for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years.

B. For both the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, PJM will hold a Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction to procure Capacity Performance Resources.

1. For each Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction, the optimization algorithm shall consider:

   • the target quantities of Capacity Performance Resources specified below;

   • the Sell Offers submitted in such auction.

The Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid based on the quantity of Capacity Performance Resources specified for that Delivery Year. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid, at a price no higher than 0.5 times the Net CONE value for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year, for a quantity of Capacity Performance Resources equal to 60 percent of the updated Reliability Requirement for the PJM Region. For the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid, at a price no higher than 0.6 times the Net CONE value
for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year, for a quantity of Capacity Performance Resources equal to 70 percent of the updated Reliability Requirement for the PJM Region.

2. For each Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a clearing price to be paid for each megawatt-day of Unforced Capacity that clears in such auction. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for any Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction shall not exceed 0.5 times the Net CONE value for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year. For the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for any Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction shall not exceed 0.6 times the Net CONE value for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year.

3. A Capacity Market Seller may offer any Capacity Resource that has not been committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, that qualifies as a Capacity Performance Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(a) and that (i) has not cleared an RPM Auction for that Delivery Year; or (ii) has cleared in an RPM Auction for that Delivery Year. A Capacity Market Seller may offer an external Generation Capacity Resource to the extent that such resource: (i) is reasonably expected, by the relevant Delivery Year, to meet all applicable requirements to be treated as equivalent to PJM Region internal generation that is not subject to NERC tagging as an interchange transaction; (ii) has long-term firm transmission service confirmed on the complete transmission path from such resource into PJM; and (iii) is, by written commitment of the Capacity Market Seller, subject to the same obligations imposed on Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 to offer their capacity into RPM Auctions.

4. Capacity Resources that already cleared an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, retain the capacity obligations for that Delivery Year, and clear in a Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction for the same Delivery Year shall: (i) receive a payment equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price as established in that Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction; and (ii) not be eligible to receive a payment for clearing in any prior RPM Auction for that Delivery Year.

D. All Capacity Performance Resources that clear in a Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction will be subject to the Non-Performance Charge set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 10A.


A. This transition provision applies only to Demand Resources for which a Curtailment Service Provider has existing RPM commitments for the 2016/2017, 2017/2018, or 2018/2019 Delivery Years (alternatively referred to in this section 5.14E as “Applicable Delivery Years” and each an “Applicable Delivery Year”) that (i) qualified as Legacy Direct Load Control before June 1, 2016 as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section G and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; (ii) cannot meet the requirements for using statistical sampling for residential
non-interval metered customers as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section K and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; and (iii) cleared in the Base Residual Auction or First Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, cleared in the Base Residual Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, or cleared in the Base Residual Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year. A Demand Resource meeting these criteria and the Curtailment Service Provider of such a resource are hereafter in this section 5.14E referred to as an “Affected Demand Resource” and an “Affected Curtailment Service Provider,” respectively.

B. For this section 5.14E to apply to an Affected Demand Resource, the Affected Curtailment Service Provider must notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing, with regard to the following information, by the applicable deadline:

i) For each applicable Affected Demand Resource: the number of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year by end-use customer site that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, calculated based on the most current information available to the Affected Curtailment Service Provider; electric distribution company’s account number for the end-use customer; address of end-use customer; type of Demand Resource (i.e., Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR); the Zone or sub-Zone in which the end-use customer is located; and, a detailed description of why the end-use customer cannot comply with statistical sampling for residential non-interval metered customers requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section K and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6.

ii) If applicable, a detailed analysis that quantifies the amount of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year for prospective customer sales that could not be contracted by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider because of the statistical sampling for residential non-interval metered customers requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section K and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6 that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, by type of Demand Resource (i.e., Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR) and by Zone and sub-Zone, as applicable. The analysis should include the amount of Unforced Capacity expected from prospective customer sales for each Applicable Delivery Year and must include supporting detail to substantiate the difference in reduced sales expectations. The Affected Curtailment Service Provider should maintain records to support its analysis.

1. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Second and/or Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the matching LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Second or Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year.

2. For the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters
for the First, Second and/or Third Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the matching LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the First, Second or Third Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year.

3. For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the First, Second and/or Third Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the matching LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the First, Second or Third Incremental Auctions for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year.

C. For the Second and Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, and the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall publish aggregate information on the undeliverable megawatts declared under this transition provision (hereafter, “non-viable megawatts”), by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, concurrently with its posting of planning parameters for the applicable Scheduled Incremental Auction. Non-viable megawatts for a Scheduled Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year represent those megawatts meeting the criteria of subsection A above and declared in accordance with subsection B above. Prior to each Scheduled Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply adjustments equal to the declared non-viable megawatt quantity to the quantity of Buy Bid or Sell Offer activity in the upcoming Scheduled Incremental Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.12(b)(ii) and 5.12(b)(iii). Prior to the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the First and Second Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, and the First and Second Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the recalculated PJM Region Reliability Requirement and recalculated LDA Reliability Requirements, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c), by the applicable quantity of declared non-viable megawatts, and shall update the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and each LDA Reliability Requirement for such Incremental Auction only if the combined change of the applicable adjustment and applicable recalculation is greater than or equal to the lessor of (i) 500 megawatts or (ii) one percent of the prior PJM Region Reliability Requirement or one percent of the prior LDA Reliability Requirement, as applicable.

D. Prior to the start of each Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall reduce, by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, the capacity commitment of each Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year based on the non-viable megawatts declared by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider under this transition provision. If the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cleared megawatts from multiple Affected Demand Resources of the same type and Zone or sub-Zone, or cleared MWs in multiple RPM Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the reduction in capacity commitment by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone across the applicable Affected Demand Resources and relevant RPM Auctions. Such allocation shall be performed on a pro-rata basis, based on megawatts cleared by the Affected Demand Resources in the relevant RPM Auctions.
E. For each Applicable Delivery Year, an Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year relinquishes an Affected Demand Resource’s RPM Auction credits for the amount of capacity commitment reduction as determined under subsection D above. Locational Reliability Charges as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(e) are also adjusted accordingly.
6.6A Offer Requirement for Capacity Performance Resources

(a) For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the installed capacity of every Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region that is capable (or that reasonably can become capable) of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be offered as a Capacity Performance Resource by the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in all RPM Auctions for each such Delivery Year, less any amount determined by the Office of the Interconnection to be eligible for an exception to the Capacity Performance Resource must-offer requirement, where installed capacity is determined as of the date on which bidding commences for each RPM Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6.

(b) Determinations of EFORd and Unforced Capacity made under this section 6.6 as to a Generation Capacity Resource shall govern the offers required under this section as to the same Generation Capacity Resource.

(c) Exceptions to the requirement in subsection (a) shall be permitted only for a resource which the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates is reasonably expected to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Intermittent Resources, Capacity Storage Resources, Demand Resources, and Energy Efficiency Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources shall not be required to offer as a Capacity Performance Resource, but shall not be precluded from being offered as a Capacity Performance Resource at a level that demonstrably satisfies such requirements. Exceptions shall be determined using the same timeline and procedures as specified in section 6.6.

Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, Capacity Market Sellers seeking an exception for a Base Residual Auction on the basis that a resource is incapable of meeting the Capacity Performance Resource requirement shall include a documented plan with the submission of their request showing the steps the Capacity Market Seller intends to pursue for the resource to become physically capable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Such plan shall include (i) a timeline for design, permitting, procurement, and construction milestones, as applicable, where such timeline shall not exceed one Base Residual Auction exception, and (ii) evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment). Periodic updates on the progress, shall be provided by the Capacity Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit for their review by no later than (i) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for subsequent Incremental Auctions for the applicable Delivery Years, and (ii) the December 1 that last precedes subsequent Base Residual Auctions. The Capacity Market Seller shall also immediately notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit of any material changes to the plan that may occur. Upon request by a Capacity Market Seller, a one year extension to the plan timeline shall be permissible only for delays not caused by the Capacity Market Seller, and that could not have been remedied through the exercise of due diligence by the Capacity Market Seller. In no event may an exception be requested by the Capacity Market Seller for more than two Base Residual Auctions.
Failure to submit a documented plan, or lack of good faith effort by a Capacity Market Seller to make an Existing Generation Capacity Resource physically capable of meeting the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource in accordance with a documented plan, shall result in the removal of the resource’s Capacity Resource status effective with the first future Delivery Year for which the resource was granted an exception, no earlier than the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g., FERC Filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement. The required change in Capacity Resource status shall only apply to those Generation Capacity Resources that are shown to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.

(d) A resource not exempted or excepted under subsection (c) hereof that is capable of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource and does not offer into an RPM Auction as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be subject to the same restrictions on subsequent offers, and other possible remedies, as specified in section 6.6.
10A. CHARGES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE AND CREDITS FOR PERFORMANCE

(a) For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and any subsequent Delivery Year (and for certain purposes for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years as provided in subsections (h) and (i) hereof), each Capacity Market Seller that commits a Capacity Resource for a Delivery Year (whether through an RPM Auction, a bilateral transaction, or as Locational UCAP), each Locational UCAP Seller that sells Locational UCAP from a Capacity Resource for a Delivery Year, and for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years each PRD Provider that commits Price Responsive Demand for a Delivery Year, shall be charged to the extent the performance of each of its committed Capacity Resources or Price Responsive Demand during all or any part of a clock-hour when an Emergency Action is in effect falls short of the expected performance of such resources (as determined herein) and the revenue from such charges shall be provided to Market Participants with generation, demand response resources, or Price Responsive Demand that perform during such hour in excess of the level expected based on commitments (if any) of such resources.

(b) Performance shall be measured for purposes of this assessment during each Performance Assessment Interval.

(c) For each Performance Assessment Interval, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether, and the extent to which, the actual performance of each Capacity Resource and Locational UCAP has fallen short of the performance expected of such committed Capacity Resource, and the magnitude of any such shortfall, based on the following formula:

\[
\text{Performance Shortfall} = \text{Expected Performance} - \text{Actual Performance}
\]

Where the result of such formula is a positive number and where:

Expected Performance =

for Generation Capacity Resources (including external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve a declared Emergency Action; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, performance of external Generation Capacity Resources shall be assessed only during Performance Assessment Hours for Emergency Actions declared for the entire PJM Region) and Capacity Storage Resources: [(Resource Committed Capacity \* the Balancing Ratio)];

where

Resource Committed Capacity = the total megawatts of Unforced Capacity of the Capacity Resource committed by such Capacity Market Seller or Locational UCAP Seller; and

The Balancing Ratio = (All Actual Generation Performance, Storage Resource Performance, DER Aggregation Resource Performance, Net Energy Imports,
Price Responsive Demand Bonus Performance effective with the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, and Demand Response Bonus Performance) / (All Committed Generation, and Storage Capacity, and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource); provided, however, that Net Energy Imports shall be included in the calculation of the Balancing Ratio only for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by any external Generation Capacity Resource would have helped resolve the Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; and provided further that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, Net Energy Imports shall be included in the calculation of the Balancing Ratio only for any Performance Assessment Hour for which the Emergency Action was declared for the entire PJM Region; and provided further that the Balancing Ratio shall not exceed a value of 1.0.

for purposes of which

All Committed Generation, and Storage Capacity, and DER Aggregation Capacity = the total megawatts of Unforced Capacity of all Generation Capacity Resources (including external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve the declared Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, performance of external Generation Capacity Resources shall be assessed only during Performance Assessment Hours for Emergency Actions declared for the entire PJM Region) and all Capacity Storage Resources, and all DER Capacity Aggregation Resources, including only unforced capacity of generating resources within the aggregation, and excluding load reduction capacity committed by all Capacity Market Sellers, FRR Entities, Locational UCAP Sellers;

All Actual Generation Performance, and Storage Resource Performance, and DER Aggregation Resource Performance = the total amount of Actual Performance for all generation resources (including external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve the declared Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, performance of external Generation Capacity Resources shall be assessed only during Performance Assessment Hours for Emergency Actions declared for the entire PJM Region) and storage resources and DER Aggregation Resources (calculated as actual performance for all generating Component DER and all bonus performance from demand resource as calculated in (g) below) during the interval;

Net Energy Imports = the sum of interchange transactions importing energy into PJM (not including those associated with external Generation Capacity Resources and therefore included in All Actual Generation Performance) minus the sum of
interchange transactions exporting energy out of PJM, but not less than zero;

Demand Response Bonus Performance = the sum of Bonus performance provided by Demand Response resources as calculated in (g) below;

Price Responsive Demand Bonus Performance = the sum of Bonus performance provided by Price Responsive Demand as calculated in (g) below;

and for Demand Resources, Energy Efficiency Resources, and Qualifying Transmission Upgrades: Resource Committed Capacity;

where

Resource Committed Capacity = the total megawatts of capacity committed from such Capacity Resource committed capacity without making any adjustment for the Forecast Pool Requirement

for DER Aggregation Resource, the sum of generation and storage Component DER calculated as (Resource Committed Capacity * the Balancing Ratio) and the sum of demand resource, and energy efficiency resource calculated as (Resource Committed Capacity).

and for PRD Provider: Price Responsive Demand Committed

where

Price Responsive Demand Committed = the Nominal PRD Value committed by the PRD Provider in the area defined by the Performance Assessment Interval, adjusted to account for any PRD registrations in such area that were not subject to compliance measurement.

and

Actual Performance =

for each generation resource, the metered output of energy delivered to PJM by such resource plus the resource’s real-time reserve or regulation assignment, if any, during the Performance Assessment Interval;

for each storage resource, the metered output of energy delivered to PJM by such resource plus the resource’s real-time reserve or regulation assignment, if any, during the Performance Assessment Interval;

for each Demand Resource, the demand response provided to PJM by such resource, plus such resource’s real-time reserve or regulation assignment, if any, during the Performance Assessment Interval, as established through the PJM
demand response settlement procedure consistent with the standards specified in RAA, Schedule 6;

for each PRD Provider, the actual load reduction provided by the PRD Provider during a Performance Assessment Interval, determined in accordance with RAA, Schedule 6.1.N and the PJM Manuals;

for each Energy Efficiency Resource, the load reduction quantity approved by PJM subsequent to the pre-delivery year submittal of a post-installation measurement and verification report; and

for each Qualified Transmission Upgrade, the megawatt quantity cleared by such Qualified Transmission Upgrade if it is in service during the Performance Assessment Interval, and zero if it is not in service during such Performance Assessment Interval; and

for each DER Aggregation Resource, the sum of Component DER calculated in accordance with the generation resource, storage resource, demand resource, and energy efficiency resource calculations herein.

Such calculation shall encompass all resources and Price Responsive Demand located in the area defined by the Emergency Action; provided, however, that Performance Shortfall shall be calculated for external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve the declared Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, Performance Shortfall shall be calculated for external Generation Capacity Resources only during Performance Assessment Hours which the Emergency Action was declared for the entire PJM Region. At the start of the Delivery Year, PJM will inform the Capacity Market Seller of an external resource as to which Locational Deliverability Area it has been assigned. For purposes of this provision, Qualifying Transmission Upgrades shall be deemed to be located in the Locational Deliverability Area into which such upgrade increased the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit, and a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade shall be included in calculations of Expected Performance and Actual Performance only if, and to the extent that, the declared Emergency Action encompasses the Locational Deliverability Area into which such upgrade increased the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit. The Performance Shortfall shall be calculated for each Performance Assessment Interval, and any committed Capacity Resource for which the above calculation produces a negative number for a Performance Assessment Interval shall not have a Performance Shortfall for such Performance Assessment Interval. For any resource that is partially committed as a Capacity Performance Resource and partially committed as a Base Capacity Resource, the performance of such resource during a Performance Assessment Interval shall first be attributed to the resource’s Capacity Performance Resource obligation; any performance by such resource in excess of the Capacity Performance Resource’s Expected Performance shall be attributed to the resource’s Base Capacity Resource obligation.

(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c) above, a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP
of a Capacity Market Seller or Locational UCAP Seller shall not be considered in the calculation of a Performance Shortfall for a Performance Assessment Interval to the extent such Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP was unavailable during such Performance Assessment Interval solely because the resource on which such Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP is based was on a Generator Planned Outage or Generator Maintenance Outage approved by the Office of the Interconnection, or was not scheduled to operate by the Office of the Interconnection, or was online but was scheduled down, by the Office of the Interconnection, based on a determination by the Office of the Interconnection that such scheduling action was appropriate to the security-constrained economic dispatch of the PJM Region. Such a resource shall be considered in the calculation of a Performance Shortfall if it otherwise was needed and would have been scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection to perform, but was not scheduled to operate, or was scheduled down, solely due to: (i) any operating parameter limitations submitted in the resource’s offer, or (ii) the seller’s submission of a market-based offer higher than its cost-based.

In addition, notwithstanding subsection (c) above, a Price Responsive Demand registration shall not be considered in the calculation of a Performance Shortfall or Bonus Performance for a Performance Assessment Interval when the PRD Curve associated with such registration in the PJM Real-time Energy Market indicates a price point where no demand reduction is expected at the real-time LMP recorded during the Performance Assessment Interval.

(e) Subject to the Non-Performance Charge Limit specified in subsection (f) hereof, each Capacity Market Seller and Locational UCAP Seller shall be assessed a Non-Performance Charge for each of its Capacity Resources or Locational UCAP that has a Performance Shortfall for a Performance Assessment Interval based on the following formula, applied to each such resource:

$$\text{Non-Performance Charge} = \text{Performance Shortfall} \times \text{Non-Performance Charge Rate}$$

Where

For Capacity Performance Resources and Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the Non-Performance Charge Rate = (Net Cost of New Entry (stated in terms of installed capacity) for the LDA and Delivery Year for which such calculation is performed * (the number of days in the Delivery Year / 30) / (the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals in an hour).

and for Base Capacity Resources the Non-Performance Charge Rate = (Weighted Average Resource Clearing Price applicable to the resource * (the number of days in the Delivery Year / 30) (the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals in an hour)

(f) The Non-Performance Charges for each Capacity Performance Resource (including Locational UCAP from such a resource) and each PRD Provider for a Delivery Year shall not exceed a Non-Performance Charge Limit equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource or such PRD Provider times the number of days in the Delivery Year. All references to Net Cost of New Entry in this section 10A shall be to the Net Cost of New Entry for the LDA and Delivery Year for which the calculation is performed. The total Non-Performance Charges for each Base Capacity Resource
(including Locational UCAP from such a resource) for a Delivery Year shall not exceed a Non-Performance Charge Limit equal to the total payments due such Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year. The Non-Performance Charges for each Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource for a Delivery Year shall not exceed a Non-Performance Charge Limit equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource times the number of days in the season applicable to such resource.

(g) Revenues collected from assessment of Non-Performance Charges for a Performance Assessment Interval shall be distributed to each Market Participant, whether or not such Market Participant committed a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP for a Performance Assessment Interval, that provided energy or load reductions above the levels expected for such resource during such interval. For purposes of this provision, the performance expected of a resource, and the revenue distribution payment, if any, for a resource, shall be determined in accordance with the following formulae:

Formula 1: Market Participant Bonus Performance = Actual Performance \(–\) Expected Performance

and

Formula 2: Performance Payment = \(\frac{\text{Market Participant Bonus Performance}}{\text{All Market Participants Bonus Performance}}\) * Non-Performance Charge Revenues.

Where the result of Formula 1 is a positive number and where:

Actual Performance is as defined in subsection (c), provided, however, that Actual Performance for purposes of this calculation shall not exceed the megawatt level at which such resource was scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the Performance Assessment Intervals; and provided further that Actual Performance for a Market Participant that imports energy into the PJM Region during such Performance Assessment Interval shall be the net import, if any, from all interchange transactions scheduled by such Market Participant during such Performance Assessment Interval;

Expected Performance is as defined in subsection (c), provided, however, that for purposes of this calculation, Expected Performance shall be zero for any resource that is not a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP, or that is a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP, but for which the Performance Assessment Interval occurs outside the resource’s capacity obligation period, including, without limitation, a Base Capacity Demand Resource providing demand response during non-summer months; and

All Market Participants Bonus Performance is the sum of the results of calculating Formula 1 of this subsection (g) for all Market Participants that have Bonus Performance during such Performance Assessment Interval.
(h) The provisions of this section 10A shall apply during the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, provided that:

(i) Non-Performance Charges shall be determined solely for and assessed solely on, Capacity Performance Resources committed for such Delivery Year;
(ii) The Non-Performance Charge shall be 0.5 times the Non-Performance Charge calculated under subsection (e) hereof; and
(iii) The Non-Performance Charge Limit for a Delivery Year shall be 0.75 times Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource times 365.

(i) The provisions of this section 10A shall apply during the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, provided that:

(i) Non-Performance Charges shall be determined solely for, and assessed solely on, Capacity Performance Resources committed for such Delivery Year;
(ii) The Non-Performance Charge shall be 0.6 times the Non-Performance Charge calculated under subsection (e) hereof; and
(iii) The Non-Performance Charge Limit for a Delivery Year shall be 0.9 times Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource times 365.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall bill charges and credits for performance during Performance Assessment Intervals within three calendar months after the calendar month that included such Performance Assessment Intervals, provided, for any Non-Performance Charge, the amount shall be divided by the number of months remaining in the Delivery Year for which no invoice has been issued, and the resulting amount shall be invoiced each such remaining month in the Delivery Year or during the first month of the next Delivery Year if three months do not remain in the current Delivery Year.
11B DER CAPACITY AGGREGATION RESOURCE TEST FAILURE CHARGE

Each DER Capacity Aggregation Resource committed in a Delivery Year shall be obligated to simultaneously test all applicable Component DER within the aggregation, on an annual basis, as described in the PJM Manuals. The DER Aggregator may perform an unlimited number of tests during each such period. The Office of Interconnection may, at its discretion, cancel a test and allow a retest, to ensure system reliability. The DER Aggregator shall notify the applicable electric distribution company at least seven business days prior to each such test, and the electric distribution company may cancel the test consistent with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(f). If none of the tests during a testing period certify full delivery of the megawatt amount of nominated capacity the DER Aggregator committed, for such Delivery Year, the DER Aggregator shall be assessed a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charge equal to the net capability testing shortfall, multiplied by the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charge rate.

The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charge rate shall equal such Seller’s Weighted Daily Revenue Rate in such Zone for the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that tested plus the greater of (0.20 times the Weighted Daily Revenue Rate in such Zone for the product(s) tested or $20/MW-day). Such charge shall be assessed daily and charged monthly (or otherwise in accordance with customary PJM billing practices in effect at the time); provided, however, that a lump sum payment may be required to reflect amounts due, as a result of a test failure, from the start of the Delivery Year to the day that charges are reflected in regular billing.

Revenues collected from assessment of DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charges shall be distributed to Load Serving Entities that were charged a Locational Reliability Charge for the Delivery Year for which the DER Aggregation Test Failure Charge was assessed, pro-rata based on such Load Serving Entities' Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations.
Sections of the
PJM Operating Agreement

Effective February 2, 2026

(Marked/Redline Format)
1.2 Cost-based Offers.

Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, all cost-based offers for energy or other services to be sold on the PJM Interchange Energy Market from generating resources or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not exceed the variable cost of producing such energy or other service, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 to this Agreement and applicable regulatory standards, requirements and determinations; provided that, a Market Seller may offer to the PJM Interchange Energy Market the right to call on energy from a resource the output of which has been sold on a bilateral basis, with the rate for such energy if called equal to the curtailment rate specified in the bilateral contract.
1.4B DER Aggregator Participation Model

(a) The rules and procedures for the participation of DER Aggregators are established pursuant to this section 1.4B and the PJM Manuals.

(b) In order to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, a DER Aggregator shall register each DER Aggregation Resource and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource with the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with the procedures established under the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the initiation of the registration review process by the Office of the Interconnection, a DER Aggregator shall obtain and verify, through good faith efforts and in coordination with the applicable electric distribution company, and, if necessary, any relevant Transmission Owner, the following location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection:

i. With the express written consent of the applicable Component DER, the electric distribution company customer account number and associated physical and transmission system electrical location information of the applicable Component DER, including compliance with applicable PJM and electric distribution company metering and telemetry requirements;

ii. Evidence of approval to interconnect, including but not limited to a finalized interconnection agreement, with the applicable Component DER, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, to the distribution system for identified megawatts, and identification of participation in an electric distribution company program that recognizes grid withdrawals and/or injections, including but not limited to a net energy metering program.

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

The registration review process shall commence after: (1) the Office of the Interconnection has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) the Office of the Interconnection receives a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) pre-registration activities have been completed, consisting of the DER Aggregator obtaining and verifying the location and data components described above needed for its registration.
The Office of the Interconnection shall review the registration and data submitted therein for completeness, and verify that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as defined under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement and Manuals. The DER Aggregator shall only submit a registration for Component DER that are under contract for the term of the registration, and only one DER Aggregator may operate Component DER at a specific location. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the DER Aggregator’s registration through the appropriate PJM system. A single registration shall only be comprised of individual Component DER in the same state, electric distribution company, Transmission Zone, and pricing point unless otherwise noted below. Upon receipt of notification by the Office of the Interconnection, the electric distribution company may, within 60 calendar days, review and verify, as applicable, the registration and the following information contained therein:

i. Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity;

ii. The specific PJM markets in which the DER Aggregation Resource plans to participate and, if applicable, the effective and termination dates for participation;

iii. The electric distribution company customer account number(s) which represent Component DER location(s) and related information, as defined in the PJM Manuals;

iv. Participation of the Component DER in an electric distribution company’s retail program at the time of registration, and whether such participation precludes participation of the Component DER in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM, and as defined in the PJM Manuals:

   a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

      1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

      2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets the
applicable requirements for energy market or capacity market participation.

v. The DER Aggregator’s participation in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets complies with the rules and regulations of any applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority;

vi. The Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority allows the participation of any applicable Component DER that are also end-use customers of an electric distribution company, in accordance with the provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g).

vii. The participation of the Component DER in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets do not pose a threat to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system, the public, or electric distribution company personnel.

If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In the event that the electric distribution company’s concerns are resolved within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may recommend that the Office of the Interconnection approve the registration. In the event that the concerns identified by the electric distribution company are not resolved, the electric distribution company may, within the 60 calendar day review period, recommend that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) reject the registration, (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration, or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.

Within fifteen calendar days, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and shall either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration based on the Office of the Interconnection’s review of the registration and receipt and review of the electric distribution company’s comments and recommendation, with deference given to the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities. To the extent that
no comments or recommendations are provided by the electric distribution company, including after the Office of the Interconnection provides final notice to the electric distribution company prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve the DER Aggregator’s registration.

During the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource will be assigned to the electric distribution company, the DER Aggregator, or another entity, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

All DER Aggregators shall remain in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, in accordance with their executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement, at all times while participating in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. Transmission Owners shall, in coordination with the Office of the Interconnection, provide all data to the Office of the Interconnection reasonably required to accurately represent the DER Aggregation Resource in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 1.5.4 and the PJM Manuals.

A DER Aggregator shall report to the Office of the Interconnection any proposed update to the inventory of the individual Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource, or proposed additional market services provided by the DER Aggregation Resource, identified in the DER Aggregator’s registration to reflect any proposed addition or subtraction of a Component DER or market service, and any applicable information or data associated with the Component DER or market service, in accordance with the specifications described in the PJM Manuals. Any proposed update shall not require a new registration of the existing Component DER within the approved DER Aggregation Resource. Upon notification of any proposed update, the electric distribution company shall have an opportunity to conduct a review, for a period of up to 60 calendar days, in accordance with the provisions of this section related to initial registration, and make a recommendation to the Office of the Interconnection, prior to the Office of the Interconnection approving or denying the proposed update to the DER Aggregation Resource. The DER Aggregator may continue to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using its existing approved DER Aggregation Resource during the course of any such review conducted by the electric distribution company. An inventory of the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registration that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may not be modified during the course of an applicable Delivery Year.

(c) All Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource shall interface with the same primary pricing node, except: (i) in the case of a DER Aggregation Resource that only provides ancillary services and is less than or equal to 5 MW, the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are in the same state and service territory of a single electric distribution
company; and (ii) in the case of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource(s) linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are located within a defined zone or sub-zonal Locational Deliverability Area.

The Office of the Interconnection will establish a periodic review, in coordination with the electric distribution company and DER Aggregator, no less than annually, or more frequently as needed, to identify any permanent electrical location change that would modify the pricing node associated with a DER Aggregation Resource or its underlying Component DER. During this review, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) confirm that applicable data reviewed and verified in the registration process is still complete and accurate, and (ii) request any updates to such data as a condition of continued participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(d) A DER Aggregator shall self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resource into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, as described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall be eligible, at their election, to offer a dispatchable range in submitting bidding parameters into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market.

(e) A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource shall provide telemetry for each DER Aggregation Resource participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, in accordance with the technical specifications described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource may provide telemetry for the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource. This telemetry shall represent one or more values indicative of the total electrical output of the DER Aggregation Resource and inclusive of all underlying Component DER.

A DER Aggregator shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 and the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall retain performance data for individual Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource for auditing purposes, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator is responsible for ensuring that Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. For non-interval metered residential DER Aggregation Resources, the DER Aggregator must ensure that a representative sample of Component DER have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. For DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers, DER Aggregators shall provide aggregated meter data to the Office of the Interconnection for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource. The measurement systems shall comply with the applicable electric distribution company accuracy requirements for meters, and/or as described in
the PJM Manual 01. Additional details for the configuration of such measurement systems under various specific configurations are specified in PJM Manual 14D.

The metering equipment shall meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy, or otherwise have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including potential transformers and current transformers) and the metering equipment and associated data shall meet the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals.

(f) The electric distribution company should, prior to the deadline for submission of offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, notify the DER Aggregator of any operational limitations for the Operating Day that may impact the bidding parameters of an applicable DER Aggregation Resource. In the event that the electric distribution company identifies additional operational concerns after the deadline described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, the DER Aggregator may utilize the generation rebidding period identified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.9, and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.9, to update its bidding parameters.

During the Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall dispatch DER Aggregation Resources, by communicating with the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the DER Aggregator’s submitted bidding parameters. During the Operating Day, an electric distribution company may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. Following the exercise of the electric distribution company’s override, the DER Aggregator shall reflect the override by updating the applicable bidding parameters of its DER Aggregation Resource. An electric distribution company’s override shall not excuse a DER Aggregator’s failure to perform any of the obligations established under the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, RAA, or PJM Manuals.

Any disputes regarding an electric distribution company’s exercise of its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be addressed in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

(g) The Office of the Interconnection shall not permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes
Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the electric distribution company determines that the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permits such end-use customers to participate. The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model with a DER Aggregation Resource including Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, if, during the course of the registration process described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), the electric distribution company presents any of the following evidence to PJM:

i. an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation;

ii. an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority’s legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation; or

iii. an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation.

The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the DER Aggregation Resource includes one or more Component DER that are demand response and the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has prohibited the participation of demand response in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(h) A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources containing one or more Component DER that also participate in one or more retail programs. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of a retail program, including but not limited to a Component DER participating in a retail net energy metering program.

A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources that provide multiple services in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER shall not be registered
with multiple DER Aggregation Resources, or participate as part of another Market Participant outside of the DER Aggregator Participation Model. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of another wholesale sale.

(i) DER Aggregators providing capacity using a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource shall be subject to the Day-ahead Energy Market must-offer requirement described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d), based on the technology of the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

(j) DER Aggregation Resources are subject to offer price cap and associated three pivotal supplier test provisions of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.

(k) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a MOPR Floor Offer Price, in accordance with the provisions applicable to MOPR Floor Offer Price for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2).

If a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-2), the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resources may submit a Sell Offer with a Minimum Floor Offer Price of no lower than the MW-weighted average of the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Prices (zero if not applicable) of the aggregated resources in such Sell Offer.

(l) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a Market Seller Offer Cap, in a manner consistent with the provisions applicable to Market Seller Offer Cap for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6 and Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.

(m) Projected PJM Market Revenues for DER Capacity Aggregation Resources subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price or Market Seller Offer Cap shall be determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8(d-1). The determination of PJM Market Revenues by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize either the hourly output profiles, or the Projected EAS Dispatch, as appropriate.

(n) A DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource that contains Component DER that are also load reduction resources shall be accounted for and settled in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A.
Component DER interconnecting to distribution facilities for purposes of participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM exclusively through the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not be subject to the Part IV of the Tariff relating to interconnections with the Transmission System, and shall exclusively interconnect to distribution facilities pursuant to applicable state or local law.
1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer’s self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer’s Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) (i) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(ii) In the Real-time Energy Market, Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(iii) Market Participants that deviate in real-time from the amounts of Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve sales, scheduled day-ahead shall be obligated to purchase Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly
energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.13. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection’s forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers’ offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6.

1.10.1A  Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.
(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection: 
(i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the 
Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such 
self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer’s 
intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for 
any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation 
or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection 
if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant 
that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy 
Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed $2,000/MWh), if any, at which the 
export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing 
price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant 
that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead 
Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are 
not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market 
in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Such transactions in the Real-time Energy 
Market, other than Coordinated Transaction Schedules and emergency energy sales and 
purchases, may specify a price up to $2,000/MWh. Scheduling of such transactions shall be 
conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following 
requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for 
delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside 
the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not 
Dynamic Transfers to such entities pursuant to Operating Agreement, 
Schedule 1, section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel 
through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of 
each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in 
addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of 
Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same 
megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference 
between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection 
will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is 
within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this 
type is referred to as an “Up-to Congestion Transaction.” Such Up-to Congestion Transactions 
may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and 
sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum difference between the source
and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(c–2) A Market Participant may elect to submit an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid form of Virtual Transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall specify the price for such transaction which shall be limited to $2,000/megawatt-hour.

(c–3) Up-to Congestion Transactions may only be submitted at hubs, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b). Increment Offers and Decrement Bids may be only submitted at hubs, nodes at which physical generation or load is settled, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b).

(d) Market Sellers in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy, demand reductions, or other services for the following Operating Day for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires or is required to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection. Offers for the supply of energy may be cost-based, market-based, or both, and may vary hourly. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that is committed as a Capacity Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD or RAA, Schedule 8.1, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller’s cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource, or an Intermittent Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources, and Intermittent Resources, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency offers to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on either a temporary or long-term basis. This
includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier’s exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that are not committed as a Capacity Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD or RAA, Schedule 8.1 shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d), and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that are not committed as a Capacity Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD or RAA, Schedule 8.1 shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource, or Economic Load Response Participant resource, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each clock hour in the offer period;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) May specify for generation resources offer parameters for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) Minimum Run Time; (2) maximum run time; (3) Start-up Costs; (4) No-load Costs; (5) Incremental Energy Offer; (6) notification time; (7) availability; (8) ramp rate; (9) Economic Minimum; (10) Economic Maximum; (11) emergency minimum MW; (12) emergency maximum MW; (13) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (14) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (15) condense to generation time constraints, and may specify offer parameters for
Economic Load Response Participant resources for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) minimum down time; (2) shutdown costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) notification time; (5) Economic Minimum; and (6) Economic Maximum;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with additional schedules applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer for the clock hour, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day, for which the offer is submitted, unless the Market Seller a) submits a Real-time Offer for the applicable clock hour, or b) updates the availability of its offer for that hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day, unless modified after the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market as permitted pursuant to sections 1.10.9A or 1.10.9B below;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all generation resources, except (1) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is above $1,000/megawatt-hour and less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer; and (2) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour;

ix) Shall not exceed a demand reduction offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, except when an Economic Load Response Participant submits a cost-based offer that includes an incremental cost component that is above $1,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer but in no event greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour;
x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2, and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement, minus $1.00;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus [the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement divided by 2]; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,100/megawatt-hour; and

xi) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,849/megawatt-hour;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,425/megawatt-hour; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,100/megawatt-hour; and

xii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $0.00/MWh for pumped storage hydropower units scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to provide Regulation that shall specify the megawatts of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such Regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource’s opportunity costs. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100/megawatt-hour in the case of Regulation
offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $/ΔMW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6.

(g) Each component of an offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource that is constant for the entire Operating Day and does not vary hour to hour shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount,
location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) (i) Offers to Supply Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Reserves By Generation Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage, shall submit offers or otherwise make their 10-minute reserve capability available to supply Synchronized Reserve or, as applicable, Non-Synchronized Reserve, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer, in an amount equal to the available 10-minute reserve capability of such Generation Capacity Resource. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources that (A) are capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, (B) are located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region, and (C) have submitted offers for the supply of energy into the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve, as applicable.
(3) Offers for the supply of Synchronized Reserve by all generation resources must be cost-based. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. For offers to supply Synchronized Reserve, the offer price shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, where such expected value shall be recalculate annually, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, and posted on PJM’s website. The expected value of the penalty is calculated as the product of: (A) the average penalty, expressed in $/MWh, multiplied by (B) the average rate of non-performance during Synchronized Reserve events multiplied by (C) the probability a Synchronized Reserve event that will qualify for non-performance assessments will occur.

The expected value of the penalty shall be determined by an annual review of the twelve-month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the results of its annual review by no later than December 15, and the revised offer price cap shall be effective as of the following January 1; provided, however, that at the time of implementation of this rule the expected value of the penalty shall be $0.02/MWh, and for the period from the second month after implementation through the second January 1 following such date of implementation, the expected value of the penalty shall be recalculated on a monthly basis using data from the implementation date of this rule through the 15th day of the current month, and the revised value shall be effective the 1st day of the following month.

(4) All Non-Synchronized Reserve offers shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) of this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by a synchronized resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation
resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, and Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources may submit offers for their available Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An on-line generation resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) ramp rate; (B) Economic Minimum; and (C) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (D) ramp rate; (E) condense to generation time constraints; (F) Economic Minimum; and (G) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Determination of Available Non-Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by an off-line generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources. Such hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources may submit offers for their available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their
offer into the Non-Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals
or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must
offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Non-
Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Non-
Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such
requirements.

(2) An off-line generation resource’s available Non-Synchronized Reserve
capability shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on
the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer:
(A) startup time; (B) notification time; (C) ramp rate; (D) Economic Minimum;
and (E) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum
MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the
Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of
the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents
it from reliably providing Non-Synchronized Reserves above its Synchronized
Reserve maximum MW.

(iv) Offers to Supply Synchronized Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant
Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets

(1) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers to reduce
demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and
wish to make their resources available to supply Synchronized Reserve may
submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve from such resources, where such
offers shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which
must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and such other information specified by the
Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such
offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before
the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All offers to supply Synchronized Reserve offers from Economic Load
Response Participant resources shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty
for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, as determined in accordance with
section 1.10.1A(j)(i)(3) above. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the
Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and
shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer
Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM
Manuals, as applicable.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead
Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the
Interconnection for each clock hour for which the Economic Load Response Participant desires
to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to reduce demand. The offer
must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, may vary hourly, and shall specify: (i) the amount of the
offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shutdown costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Such offers may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs) per hour.

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of an Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Economic Load Response Participant resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Economic Load Response Participant resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. An Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Economic Load Response Participant resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) (i) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserve By Generation Resources

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, that is available for energy, is capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, or otherwise make their Secondary Reserve capability available. Such offers shall be for an amount equal to the resource’s available energy output achievable within thirty minutes (less its energy output achievable within ten minutes) from a request of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region that submit offers for the supply of energy into the
Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market and are capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Secondary Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources and Energy Storage Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, as applicable.

(3) Offers for the supply of Secondary Reserve shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) above, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Secondary Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply Secondary Reserve by a generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources, or Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, or Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources may submit their available Secondary Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Secondary Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(m)(i) above must submit a Secondary Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) (A) An on-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability; and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) Economic Minimum; and (iii) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification
to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(B) For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) condense to generation time constraints; (iii) Economic Minimum; and (iv) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(C) An off-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, shall be based on the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (i) startup time; (ii) notification time; (iii) ramp rate; (iv) Economic Minimum; and (v) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant resources

(1) Each Economic Load Response Participant that submits offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wishes to make their resources available to supply Secondary Reserve shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Secondary Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and include such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All Secondary Reserve offers by Economic Load Response Participant resources shall be for $0.00/MWh. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and
shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(n) A Market Participant may submit a Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction for a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that is a Pseudo-Tie into the MISO balancing authority area. Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions combine an offer to sell energy at a source with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink.

Each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction shall: (1) source at a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that Pseudo-Ties into MISO; and (2) sink at the PJM-MISO interface. A Market Participant must reserve transmission service in accordance with the PJM Tariff for each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. Megawatt quantities for Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions shall be greater than zero and less than or equal to the transmission service reserved for the Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. An accepted Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

Demand Bid Limit = greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point * 1.3), or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point + 10MW)

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity’s highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM’s highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity’s actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity’s expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to section 1.10.9 below or Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, Start-up Costs, No-load Costs, and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above. Hydropower units can only be pool-scheduled if they are pumped storage units and scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient
to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource’s Start-up Costs, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of 0.1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled and not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not
delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(e) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource to supply Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Synchronized Reserve Market that does not deliver the scheduled megawatt quantity in the applicable real-time reserve market, shall replace the Synchronized Reserve not delivered and shall pay for such Synchronized Reserve at the applicable Real-time Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price. Market Participants shall not self-schedule a resource to provide Secondary Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(f) For energy, hydropower units, excluding pumped storage units, may only be self-scheduled.

(g) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for Start-up Costs or No-load Costs

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall
be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of Dynamic Transfer shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller’s Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to Dynamic Transfer by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer’s load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer’s hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in
the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection’s forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by PRD Providers; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) By 1:30 p.m., or as soon as practicable thereafter, of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant’s inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day
as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, or the Real-time Energy Market or Real-time Ancillary Services Markets after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, and Real-time Ancillary Service Markets. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be
considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Operating Agreement, section 18.17.1, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants’ non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from the time the Office of the Interconnection posts the results of the Day-ahead Energy Market until 2:15 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for the next Operating Day. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 6:30 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows and as specified in section 1.10.9A below:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the
Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any Start-Up Costs.

(c) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules resulting from the rebidding period by 6:30 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. The Office of the Interconnection may also commit additional resources after such time as system conditions require. For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

1.10.9A Updating Offers in Real-time

(a) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, and such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that resource for the clock hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals and subject to the following conditions:

   (i) A market-based Real-time Offer shall not exceed the applicable energy offer caps specified in this Schedule. Once a Market Seller’s resource is committed for an applicable clock hour, the Market Seller may not increase its Incremental Energy Offer and may only submit a market-based Real-time Offer that is higher than its market-based offer that was in effect at the time of commitment to reflect increases in the resource’s cost-based Start-up Costs and cost-based No-load Costs. The Market Seller may elect not to have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only its lowest cost-based offer considered for the remainder of the Operating Day.

   (ii) Cost-based Real-time Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d) and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. If a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for a particular clock hour in accordance with subsection (c) below, or if updates to a cost-based offer are required by the Market Seller’s approved Fuel Cost Policy, the Market Seller shall update its previously submitted cost-based Real-time Offer.
(iii) If a Market Seller’s available cost-based offer is not compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals at the time a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for an applicable clock hour during the Operating Day, the Market Seller must submit an updated cost-based Real-time Offer consisting of an Incremental Energy Offer, Start-up Cost, and No-load Cost for that clock hour that is compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource during and through the end of the applicable clock hour to update only the following offer parameters, as further described in the PJM Manuals: (1) Economic Minimum; (2) Economic Maximum; (3) emergency minimum MW; (4) emergency maximum MW; (5) unit availability status; (6) fixed output indicator; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; and (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW. Such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that resource for the clock hour.

1.10.9B Offer Parameter Flexibility

(a) Market Sellers may, in accordance with sections 1.10.1A and 1.10.9A above, this section 1.10.9B, and the PJM Manuals, update offer parameters at any time up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, including prior to the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the close of the rebidding period specified in section 1.10.9, except that Market Sellers may not update their offers for the supply of energy, Secondary Reserve, Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or demand reduction: (1) during the period after the close the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the posting of the Day-ahead Energy Market results pursuant to section 1.10.8(b); or (2) during the period after close of the rebidding period and prior to PJM announcing the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d).

(b) For generation resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) cost-based Start-up Costs; (2) cost-based No-load Costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) Economic Minimum and Economic Maximum; (5) emergency minimum MW and emergency maximum MW; (6) ramp rate; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (9) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, Minimum Run Time.

(c) For Economic Load Response Participant resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) shutdown costs, (2) Incremental Energy Offer; (3) Economic Minimum; (4) Economic Maximum; and (5) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, minimum down time.

(d) After the announcement of the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d), a Market Seller may submit a Real-time Offer where offer parameters may differ from the offer originally submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, except that a Market Seller may
not submit a Real-time Offer that changes, of the offer parameters listed in section 1.10.1A(d), the MW amounts specified in the Incremental Energy Offer, MW amounts specified in the ramp rate, maximum run time, and availability; provided, however, Market Sellers of dual-fueled resources may submit Real-time Offers for such resources that change the availability of a submitted cost-based offer.
3.3A Economic Load Response Participants.

3.3A.1 Compensation.

Economic Load Response Participants shall be compensated pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and/or 3.3A.6 of this Schedule, for demand reduction offers submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test of section 3.3A.4; that are scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection; and that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection. Qualifying demand reductions shall be measured by: 1) comparing actual metered load to an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load or alternative CBL determined in accordance with the provisions of section 3.3A.2 or 3.3A.2.01, respectively; or 2) non-interval metered residential Direct Load Control customers, as metered on a current statistical sample of electric distribution company accounts, as described in the PJM Manuals or 3) by the MWs produced by on-Site Generators pursuant to the provisions of section 3.3A.2.02.

3.3A.2 Customer Baseline Load.

For Economic Load Response Participants that choose to measure demand reductions using an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load (“CBL”), the CBL shall be determined using the following formula for such participant’s Non-Variable Loads. Additionally, the following formula shall be used to determine a Peak Shaving Adjustment End-Use Customer’s demand reductions when determining peak shaving performance rating as described in PJM Manual 19, unless an alternative CBL is approved pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01 of this schedule:

(a) The CBL for weekdays shall be the average of the highest 4 out of the 5 most recent load weekdays in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event.

(i) For the purposes of calculating the CBL for weekdays, weekdays shall not include:

1. NERC holidays;
2. Weekend days;
3. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

(ii) any weekday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.4 or 3.3A.5, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

(ii) any weekday where the end-use customer location that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer
locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

4. Any weekday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage for the five days.

ii. If a 45-day period does not include 5 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, provided there are 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the CBL shall be based on the average of those 4 weekdays. If there are not 4 eligible weekdays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

iii. Section 3.3A.2(a)(i)(3) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 4 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(b) The CBL for weekend days and NERC holidays shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

i. The CBL for Saturdays and Sundays/NERC holidays shall be the average of the highest 2 load days out of the 3 most recent Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event, provided that the following days shall not be used to calculate a Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday CBL:

1. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:
   a. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.5 or 3.3A.6, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or
   b. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday where the end-use customer that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

2. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage level for the three days;
3. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday that corresponds to the beginning or end of daylight savings.

   ii. If a 45-day period does not include 3 Saturdays or 3 Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, provided there are 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, the CBL will be based on the average of those 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays. If there are not 2 eligible Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

   iii. Section 3.3A.2(b)(i)(1) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 2 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(c) CBLs established pursuant to this section shall represent end-use customers’ actual load patterns. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that a CBL or alternative CBL does not accurately represent a customer’s actual load patterns, the CBL shall be revised accordingly pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01. Consistent with this requirement, if an Economic Load Response Participant chooses to measure load reductions using a Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of a change in its operations or the operations of the end-use customer upon whose behalf it is acting that would result in the adjustment of more than half the hours in the affected party’s Customer Baseline Load by twenty percent or more for more than twenty days.

3.3A.2.01 Alternative Customer Baseline Methodologies.

   (a) During the Economic Load Response Participant registration process pursuant to section 1.5A.3 of this Schedule, the relevant Economic Load Response Participant or the Office of the Interconnection (“Interested Parties”) may, in the case of such participant’s Non-Variable Load customers, and shall, in the case of its Variable Load customers, propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2. During the Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registration process pursuant to section 8.4 of this schedule, or as otherwise approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the relevant participant or the Office of the Interconnection may propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2 of this schedule. In support of such proposal, the participant shall demonstrate that the alternative CBL method shall result in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values, as calculated in accordance with the technique specified in the PJM Manuals. Any proposal made pursuant to this section shall be provided to the other Interested Party.

   (b) The Interested Parties shall have 30 days to agree on a proposal issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. The 30-day period shall start the day the proposal is provided to
the other Interested Party. If both Interested Parties agree on a proposal issued pursuant to this 
section, that alternative CBL calculation methodology shall be effective consistent with the date 
of the relevant Economic Load Response Participant registration.

(c) If agreement is not reached pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Office of 
the Interconnection shall determine a CBL methodology that shall result, as nearly as practicable, 
in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly 
values within 20 days from the expiration of the 30-day period established by subsection (b). A 
CBL established by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be 
bounding upon both Interested Parties unless the Interested Parties reach agreement on an 
alternative CBL methodology prior to the expiration of the 20-day period established by this 
subsection (c).

(d) Operation of this section 3.3A.2.01 shall not delay Economic Load Response 
Participant registrations pursuant to Section 1.5A.3, provided that the alternative CBL 
established pursuant to this section shall be used for all related energy settlements made pursuant 
to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall periodically publish alternative CBL 
methodologies established pursuant to this section in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registrations will use the CBL 
defined on the associated economic registration for measuring demand reductions when 
determining the participant’s compliance with its capacity obligations pursuant to Schedule 6 of 
the RAA, unless it is the maximum baseload CBL as defined in the PJM Manuals, in which case 
the participant will use the CBL set forth in the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Response 
registration.

3.3A.2.02 On-Site Generators.

On-Site Generators used as the basis for Economic Load Response Participant status 
pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A shall be subject to the following 
provisions:

i. The On-Site Generator shall be used solely to enable an Economic Load Response 
Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the 
Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall not otherwise have 
been operating;

ii. If subsection (i) does not apply, the amount of energy from an On-Site Generator 
used to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in 
response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead 
Energy Market shall be capable of being quantified in a manner that is acceptable to the Office 
of the Interconnection.

3.3A.3 Symmetric Additive Adjustment.
(a) Customer Baseline Levels established pursuant to section 3.3A.2 shall be adjusted by the Symmetric Additive Adjustment. Unless an alternative formula is approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the Symmetric Additive Adjustment shall be calculated using the following formula:

Step 1: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period ending 1 hour prior to the start of event.

Step 2: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period in the CBL that corresponds to the 3 hour period described in Step 1.

Step 3: Subtract the results of Step 2 from the results of Step 1 to determine the symmetric additive adjustment (this may be positive or negative).

Step 4: Add the symmetric additive adjustment (i.e. the results of Step 3) to each hour in the CBL that corresponds to each event hour.

(b) Following a Load Reduction Event that is submitted to the Office of the Interconnection for compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Notification window(s), if applicable, directly metered data and Customer Baseline Load and Symmetric Additive Adjustment calculation to the appropriate electric distribution company for optional review. The electric distribution company will have ten Business Days to provide the Office of the Interconnection with notification of any issues related to the metered data or calculations.

3.3A.4 Net Benefits Test.

The Office of the Interconnection shall identify each month the price on a supply curve, representative of conditions expected for that month, at which the benefit of load reductions provided by Economic Load Response Participants exceed the costs of those reductions to other loads. In formulaic terms, the net benefit is deemed to be realized at the price point on the supply curve where \((\Delta \text{LMP} \times \text{MWh consumed}) > (\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}} \times \text{DR})\), where \(\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}}\) is the market clearing price after Economic Load Response is dispatched and \(\Delta \text{LMP}\) is the price before Economic Load Response is dispatched minus the \(\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}}\).

The Office of the Interconnection shall update and post the Net Benefits Test results and analysis for a calendar month no later than the 15th day of the preceding calendar month. As more fully specified in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the net benefit price level in accordance with the following steps:

Step 1. Retrieve generation offers from the same calendar month (of the prior calendar year) for which the calculation is being performed, employing market-based price offers to the extent available, and cost-based offers to the extent market-based price offers are not available. To the extent that generation offers are unavailable from historical data due to the addition of a Zone to the PJM Region the Office of the Interconnection shall use the most recent generation offers that
best correspond to the characteristics of the calendar month for which the calculation is being performed, provided that at least 30 days of such data is available. If less than 30 days of data is available for a resource or group of resources, such resource[s] shall not be considered in the Net Benefits Test calculation.

Step 2: Adjust a portion of each prior-year offer representing the typical share of fuel costs in energy offers in the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals, for changes in fuel prices based on the ratio of the reference month spot price to the study month forward price. For such purpose, natural gas shall be priced at the Henry Hub price, number 2 fuel oil shall be priced at the New York Harbor price, and coal shall be priced as a blend of coal prices representative of the types of coal typically utilized in the PJM Region.

Step 3. Combine the offers to create daily supply curves for each day in the period.

Step 4. Average the daily curves for each day in the month to form an average supply curve for the study month.

Step 5. Use a non-linear least squares estimation technique to determine an equation that reasonably approximates and smooths the average supply curve.

Step 6. Determine the net benefit level as the point at which the price elasticity of supply is equal to 1 for the estimated supply curve equation established in Step 5.

3.3A.5 Market Settlements in Real-time Energy Market.

(a) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers for load reductions in the Day-ahead Energy Market by no later than 2:15 p.m. on the day prior to the Operating Day that cleared or that otherwise are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the actual kWh relief provided in excess of committed day-ahead load reductions. The offer shall contain the Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k) and shall not thereafter be subject to change; provided, however, the Economic Load Response Participant may update the previously specified minimum or maximum load reduction quantity and associated price by submitting a Real-time Offer for a clock hour by providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals no later than 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may also submit Real-time Offers for a clock hour for an Operating Day containing Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k), and may update such offers up to 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements. An Economic Load Response Participant that curtails or causes the curtailment of demand in real-time in response to PJM dispatch, and for which the applicable real-time LMP is
equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, will be compensated by PJMSettlement at the real-time Locational Marginal Price.

(b) In cases where the demand reduction follows dispatch, as defined in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o-1), as instructed by the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction offer price is equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, and demand reduction is not a Component DER operating as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, payment will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing demand, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the demand reduction must be committed.

Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, real-time operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) For purposes of load reductions qualifying for compensation hereunder, an Economic Load Response Participant shall accumulate credits for energy reductions in those hours when the energy delivered to the end-use customer is less than the end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval. In the event that the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant will accumulate debits at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval for the amount the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load. If the actual load reduction, compared to the desired load reduction is outside the deviation levels specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o), the Economic Load Response Participant shall be assessed balancing operating reserve charges in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions that are compensated at the applicable full LMP, in any Zone for any hour, shall be recovered from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, with the ratio shares determined as follows:

The ratio share for LSE \( i \) in zone \( z \) shall be \( \frac{\text{RTL}_{zd}}{\text{RTL} + X} \)
and the ratio share for party \( j \) shall be \( \frac{X_j}{\text{RTL} + X} \).

Where:
RTL is the total real time load in all zones where LMP ≥ Net Benefits Test price;
RTL_{iz} is the real-time load for LSE i in zone z;
X is the total export quantity from PJM in that hour; and
X_{ij} is the export quantity by party j from PJM.


(a) Economic Load Response Participants dispatched as a result of a qualifying
demand reduction offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be compensated for reducing
demand based on the reductions of kWh committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An
Economic Load Response Participant that submits a demand reduction bid day ahead that is
accepted by the Office of the Interconnection and for which the applicable day ahead LMP is
greater than or equal to the Net Benefits Test shall be compensated by PJMSettlement at the day-
ahead Locational Marginal Price.

Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads
that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching
their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be
measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio
level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements.

(b) Total payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead
demand reduction bids with an offer price equal to or greater than the threshold price established
under the Net Benefits Test that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection
and the demand reduction is not dispatched as part of a DER Aggregation
Resource, will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of
this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up
costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity
costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load
reduction must be committed. Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price
and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, day-ahead
operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate
(including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-
use customer.

(c) Economic Load Response Participants that have demand reductions committed in
the Day-ahead Energy Market that deviate from the day-ahead schedule in real time shall be
charged or credited for such variance at the real time LMP plus or minus an amount equal to the
applicable balancing operating reserve charge in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-
Appendix, section 3.2.3. Load Serving Entities that otherwise would have load that was reduced
shall receive any associated operating reserve credit.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-
ahead demand reduction bids that are compensated at the applicable full, day ahead LMP under
this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions in any Zone for any hour shall be recovered
from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average real-time Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, in accordance with the formula prescribed in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A.5(d).

3.3A.7 Prohibited Economic Load Response Participant Market Settlements.

(a) Settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 shall be limited to demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test and are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) Demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a) shall not be eligible for settlement pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6. Examples of settlements prohibited pursuant to this section 3.3A.7(b) include, but are not limited to, the following:

i. Settlements based on variable demand where the timing of the demand reduction supporting the settlement did not change in direct response to Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii. Consecutive daily settlements that are the result of a change in normal demand patterns that are submitted to maintain a CBL that no longer reflects the relevant end-use customer’s demand;

iii. Settlements based on on-site generation data if the On-Site Generator is not supporting demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

iv. Settlements based on demand reductions that are the result of operational changes between multiple end-use customer sites in the PJM footprint;

v. Settlements that do not include all hours that the Office of the Interconnection dispatched the load reduction, or for which the load reduction cleared in the Day-ahead Market.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall disallow settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a). If the Economic Load Response Participant continues to submit settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a), then the Office of the Interconnection shall suspend the Economic Load Response Participant’s PJM Interchange Energy Market activity and refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement.

3.3A.8 Economic Load Response Participant Review Process.
(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall review the participation of an Economic Load Response Participant in the PJM Interchange Energy Market under the following circumstances:

i. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registrations submitted pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A.3 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

ii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

iii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are denied by the Office of the Interconnection more than 10% of the time.

iv. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registration will be reviewed when settlements are frequently submitted or if its actual loads frequently deviate from the previously scheduled quantities (as determined for purposes of assessing balancing operating reserves charges). PJM will notify the Participant when their registration is under review. While the Participant’s registration is under review by PJM, the Participant may continue economic load reductions but all settlements will be denied by PJM until the registration review is resolved pursuant to subsection (i) or (ii) below. PJM will require the Participant to provide information within 30 days to support that the settlements were submitted for load reduction activity done in response to price and not submitted based on the End-Use Customer’s normal operations.

i) If the Participant is unable to provide adequate supporting information to substantiate the load reductions submitted for settlement, PJM will terminate the registration and may refer the Participant to either the Market Monitoring Unit or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for further investigation.

ii) If the Participant does provide adequate supporting information, the settlements denied by PJM will be resubmitted by the Participant for review according to existing PJM market rules. Further, PJM may introduce an alternative Customer Baseline Load if the existing Customer Baseline Load does not adequately reflect what the customer load would have been absent a load reduction.

v. The electric distribution company may only deny settlements during the normal settlement review process for inaccurate data including, but not limited to: meter data, line loss factor, Customer Baseline Load calculation, interval meter owner and a known recurring End-Use Customer outage or holiday.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall have thirty days to conduct a review pursuant to this section 3.3A.8. The Office of the Interconnection may refer the matter to the
PJM MMU and/or the FERC Office of Enforcement if the review indicates the relevant Economic Load Response Participant and/or relevant electric distribution company or LSE is engaging in activity that is inconsistent with the PJM Interchange Energy Market rules governing Economic Load Response Participants.
6.4 Offer Price Caps.

6.4.1 Applicability.

(a) If, at any time, it is determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Sections 1.10.8 or 6.1 of this Schedule that any generation resource may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, the offer prices for energy from such resource shall be capped as specified below. For such generation resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, if the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped for the entire commitment period, and such offer prices will be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and committed at the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest overall system production cost. For such generation resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market such offer prices shall be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and dispatched on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost in accordance with 6.4.1(g) until the earlier of: (i) the resource is released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection; (ii) the end of the Operating Day; or (iii) the start of the generation resource’s next pre-existing commitment.

The offer on which a resource is committed shall initially be determined at the time of the commitment. If any of the resource’s Incremental Energy Offer, No-load Cost or Start-Up Cost are updated for any portion of the offer capped hours subsequent to commitment, the Office of the Interconnection will redetermine the level of the offer cap using the updated offer values. The Office of the Interconnection will dispatch the resource on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

Resources that are self-scheduled to run in either the Day-ahead Energy Market or in the Real-time Energy Market are subject to the provisions of this section 6.4. The offer on which a resource is dispatched shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the offer price of such resource and as further limited as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A.

In accordance with section 6.4.1(h), a generation resource that is offer capped in the Real-time Energy Market but released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection will be subject to the three pivotal supplier test and further offer capping, as applicable, if the resource is committed for a period later in the same Operating Day.

(b) The energy offer price by any generation resource requested to be dispatched in accordance with Section 6.3 of this Schedule shall be capped at the levels specified in Section 6.4.2 of this Schedule. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the affected resource is so scheduled, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. Energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the price of such resource.

(c) Generation resources subject to an offer price cap shall be paid for energy at the applicable Locational Marginal Price.
(d) [Reserved for Future Use]

(e) Offer price caps under section 6.4 of this Schedule shall be suspended for a generation resource with respect to transmission limit(s) for any period in which a generation resource is committed by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day or any period for which the generation resource has been self-scheduled where (1) there are not three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch under subsection (a) that are jointly pivotal with respect to such transmission limit(s), and (2) the Market Seller of the generation resource, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, is not pivotal (“three pivotal supplier test”). In the event the Office of the Interconnection system is unable to perform the three pivotal supplier test for a Market Seller, generation resources of that Market Seller that are dispatched to control transmission constraints will be dispatched on the resource’s market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

(f) For the purposes of conducting the three pivotal supplier test in subsection (e), the following applies:

(i) All megawatts of available incremental supply, including available self-scheduled supply for which the power distribution factor (“dfax”) has an absolute value equal to or greater than the dfax used by the Office of the Interconnection’s system operators when evaluating the impact of generation with respect to the constraint (“effective megawatts”) will be included in the available supply analysis at costs equal to the cost-based offers of the available incremental supply adjusted for dfax (“effective costs”). The Office of the Interconnection will post on the PJM website the dfax value used by operators with respect to a constraint when it varies from three percent.

(ii) The three pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of the relevant market incremental supply up to and including all such supply available at an effective cost equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price calculated using effective costs and effective megawatts and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint.

(iii) Offer price caps will apply on a generation supplier basis (i.e. not a generating unit by generating unit basis) and only the generation suppliers that fail the three pivotal supplier test with respect to any hour in the relevant period will have their units that are dispatched with respect to the constraint offer capped. A generation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Supply controlled by a generation supplier or its affiliates by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise will be included as supply of that generation supplier; supply owned by a generation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party by contract or otherwise will be included as supply of that third party.
A generation supplier’s units, including self-scheduled units, are offer capped if, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, the generation supplier is pivotal.

(iv) In the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall include price sensitive demand, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids as demand or supply, as applicable, in the relevant market.

(g) In the Real-time Energy Market, the schedule on which offer capped resources will be placed shall be determined using dispatch cost, where dispatch cost is calculated pursuant to the following formulas:

\[
\text{Dispatch cost for the applicable hour} = (\text{Incremental Energy Offer @ Economic Minimum for the hour} \times \text{Economic Minimum for the hour}) + \text{No-load Cost for the hour}
\]

(i) For resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market, the resource is committed on the offer with the lowest Total Dispatch cost at the time of commitment,

where:

\[
\text{Total Dispatch cost} = \text{Sum of hourly dispatch cost over a resource’s minimum run time} + \text{Start-Up Cost}
\]

(ii) For resources operating in real-time pursuant to a day-ahead or real-time commitment, and whose offers are updated after commitment, the resource is dispatched on the offer with the lowest dispatch cost for the each of the updated hours.

(iii) However, once the resource is dispatched on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the determination of the cheapest schedule.

(h) A generation resource that was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, is operating in real time, and may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, will be offer price capped, subject to the outcome of a three pivotal supplier test, for each hour the resource operates beyond its committed hours or Minimum Run Time, whichever is greater, or in the case of resources self-scheduled in the Real-time Energy Market, for each hour the resource operates beyond its first hour of operation, in accordance with the following provisions.

(i) If the resource is operating on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the results of the three pivotal supplier test.
(ii) If the resource is operating on a market-based offer and the Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test then the resource will be dispatched on the cheaper of its market-based offer or the cost-based offer representing the offer cap as determined by section 6.4.2, whichever results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined under section 6.4.1(g).

(iii) If the Market Seller passes the three pivotal supplier test and the resource is currently operating on a market-based offer then the resource will remain on that offer, unless the Market Seller elects to not have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only the cost-based offer that represents the offer cap level as determined under section 6.4.2 considered for dispatch in which case the resource will be dispatched on its cost-based offer for the remainder of the Operating Day.

### 6.4.2 Level.

(a) The offer price cap shall be one of the amounts specified below, as specified in advance by the Market Seller for the affected unit:

(i) The weighted average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus at which energy from the capped resource was delivered during a specified number of hours during which the resource was dispatched for energy in economic merit order, the specified number of hours to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection and to be a number of hours sufficient to result in an offer price cap that reflects reasonably contemporaneous competitive market conditions for that unit;

(ii) For offers of $2,000/MWh or less, the incremental operating cost of the generation resource or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals (“incremental cost”), plus up to the lesser of 10% of such costs or $100 MWh, the sum of which shall not exceed $2,000/MWh; and, for offers greater than $2,000/MWh, the incremental cost of the generation resource;

(iii) For units that are frequently offer capped (“Frequently Mitigated Unit” or “FMU”), and for which the unit’s market-based offer was greater than its cost based offer, the following shall apply:

(a) For units that are offer capped for 60% or more of their run hours, but less than 70% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10% or (ii) incremental cost plus $20 per megawatt-hour;

(b) For units that are offer capped for 70% or more of their run hours, but less than 80% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater
of either (i) incremental cost plus 10%, or (ii) incremental cost plus $30 per megawatt-hour;

(c) For units that are offer capped for 80% or more of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental costs plus 10%; or (ii) incremental cost plus $40 per megawatt-hour.

(b) For purposes of section 6.4.2(a)(iii), a generating unit shall qualify for the specified offer cap upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit, pursuant to Section II.A of the Attachment M-Appendix, that it is a “Frequently Mitigated Unit” because it meets all of the following criteria:

(i) The unit was offer capped for the applicable percentage of its run hours, determined on a rolling 12-month basis, effective with a one month lag.

(ii) The unit’s Projected PJM Market Revenues plus the unit’s PJM capacity market revenues on a rolling 12-month basis, divided by the unit’s MW of installed capacity (in $/MW-year) are less than its accepted unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) (excluding APIR and ARPIR), or its default Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) if no unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is accepted for the BRAs for the Delivery Years included in the rolling 12-month period, determined pursuant to Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Attachment DD of the Tariff. (The relevant Avoidable Cost Rate is the weighted average of the Avoidable Cost Rates for each Delivery Year included in the rolling 12-month period, weighted by month.)

(iii) No portion of the unit is included in a FRR Capacity Plan or receiving compensation under Part V of the Tariff.

(iv) The unit is internal to the PJM Region and subject only to PJM dispatch.

(c) Any generating unit, without regard to ownership, located at the same site as a Frequently Mitigated Unit qualifying under Sections 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall become an “Associated Unit” upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Section II.A of Attachment M-Appendix, that it meets all of the following criteria:

1. The unit has the identical electric impact on the transmission system as the FMU;

2. The unit (i) belongs to the same design class (where a design class includes generation that is the same size and utilizes the same technology, without regard to manufacturer) and uses the identical primary fuel as the FMU or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder;

3. The unit (i) has an average daily cost-based offer, as measured over the
preceding 12-month period, that is less than or equal to the FMU’s average daily cost-based offer adjusted to include the currently applicable FMU adder or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder.

The offer cap for an associated unit shall be equal to the incremental operating cost of such unit, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, plus the applicable percentage adder or dollar per megawatt-hour adder as specified in Section 6.4.2(a)(iii)(a), (b), or (c) for the unit with which it is associated.

(d) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information and in compliance with the FERC Market Rules, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate or non-compliant information.

6.4.3 Verification of Cost-Based Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based energy offer for a generation resource that includes an Incremental Energy Offer greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the Incremental Energy Offer component of such cost-based offer. For each Incremental Energy Offer segment greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate whether such offer segment exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that generation resource by determining the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost for each segment in accordance with the following formula:

Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost ($/MWh segment in accordance with the following formula: @ MW) =

\[
\frac{[ ( \text{Maximum Allowable Operating Rate}_i ) - ( \text{Bid Production Cost }_{i-1} ) ]}{(\text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1})}
\]

where

\[i = \text{an offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer, which is comprised of a pairing of price ($/MWh) and a megawatt quantity}\]

Maximum Allowable Operating Rate ($/hour @ MW) =

\[
[ ( \text{Heat Input}_i @ \text{MW}_i ) \times ( \text{Performance Factor} ) \times ( \text{Fuel Cost} ) ] \times (1 + A)
\]

where

Heat Input = a point on the heat input curve (in MMBtu/hr), determined in accordance with PJM Manual 15, describing the resource’s operational
characteristics for converting the applicable fuel input (MMBtu) into energy (MWh) specified in the Incremental Energy Offer;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent; and

A = Cost adder, in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(ii) of this Schedule.

Bid Production Cost ($/hour @ MW) =  
\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i) - \frac{1}{2} \times UBS \times (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i - P_{i-1}) \] + No-Load Cost

where

MW = the MW quantity per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

P = the price (in dollars per megawatt-hour) per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

UBS = Uses Bid-Slope = 0 for block-offer resources (i.e., a resource with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a step function curve); and 1 for all other resources (i.e., resources with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a sloped offer curve); and

If the price submitted for the offer segment is less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost then that offer segment shall be deemed verified and is eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price. If the price submitted for the offer segment is greater than the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost, then the Market Seller’s cost-based offer for that segment and all segments at an equal or greater price are deemed not verified and are not eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price and such offer shall be price capped at the greater of $1,000/megawatt-hour or the offer price of the most expensive verified segment on the Incremental Energy Offer for the purpose of setting Locational Marginal Prices; provided however, such Market Seller shall be allowed to submit a challenge to a non-verification determination, including supporting documentation, to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. Upon review of such documentation, the Office of the Interconnection may determine that the Market Seller’s cost-based offer is verified and eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described above.
(i) For the first incremental segment (i=1), when the MW in the segment is greater than zero, the first segment shall be screened as a block-loaded segment (UBS=0) as if there was a preceding MW\textsubscript{i-1} of zero. The Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost calculation for the first incremental would use a preceding Bid Production Cost \textsubscript{i-1} (at zero MW) equal to the energy No-Load Cost.

(ii) For the first incremental segment (i=1), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and is the only bid-in segment to be verified, then the segment shall be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(iii) For the first incremental segment (i=1), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and there are additional segments to be verified, then the first segment shall be deemed verified only if the second segment is deemed verified. If the second segment is deemed not verified, then the first segment shall also be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(b) If an Economic Load Response Participant a cost-based demand reduction offer that includes incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, in order for that offer to be eligible to determine the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate the incremental costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection, and may not include shutdown costs.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.
6.4.3A Verification of Fast-Start Resource Composite Energy Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based offer for a generation resource that is a Fast-Start Resource that results in a Composite Energy Offer that is greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the offer components:

Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost components of each offer segment shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the test described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3.

Start-Up Cost component shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the following formula:

\[
\text{Start-Up Cost} ($) = \left[ \left( \text{Performance Factor} \times (\text{Start Fuel}) \times (\text{Fuel Cost}) \right) + \text{Start Maintenance Adder} + \text{Additional Start Labor} + \text{Station Service Cost} \right] \times (1 + A)
\]

Where:

Start Fuel = fuel consumed from first fire of start process to breaker closing plus fuel expended from breaker opening of the previous shutdown to initialization of the (hot) unit start-up, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements;

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy under Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Start Maintenance Adder = an adder based on all available maintenance expense history for the defined Maintenance Period regardless of unit ownership. Only expenses incurred as a result of electric production qualify for inclusion. Only Maintenance Adders specified as $/Start,
$/MMBtu, or $/equivalent operating hour can be included in the Start Maintenance Adder;

Start Additional Labor = additional labor costs for startup required above normal station manning levels; and

Station Service Cost = station service usage (MWh) during start-up multiplied by the 12-month rolling average off-peak energy prices as updated quarterly by the Office of the Interconnection.

A = cost adder, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.2(a)(ii).

(b) Should the submitted Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above for any segment, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices):

(i) the Incremental Energy Offer for each segment shall be capped at the lesser of the cap described above in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3 or the submitted Incremental Energy Offer; and

(ii) the amortized No-load cost shall be adjusted as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(c) Should the submitted Start-Up Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Start-Up Costs shall be adjusted as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(d) If an Economic Load Response Participant submits an offer to reduce demand for a Fast-Start Resource where the maximum segment of the resulting Composite Energy Offer exceeds $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate such costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such
demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs and shutdown costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental and shutdown costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental and shutdown costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

Should the submitted shutdown cost exceed the reasonably supported costs for that resource, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the shutdown costs shall be adjusted as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).
Sections of the
PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective February 2, 2026

(Marked/Redline Format)
ARTICLE 1 – DEFINITIONS

Unless the context otherwise specifies or requires, capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned herein or in the Schedules hereto, or in the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement if not otherwise defined in this Agreement, for all purposes of this Agreement (such definitions to be equally applicable to both the singular and the plural forms of the terms defined). Unless otherwise specified, all references herein to Articles, Sections or Schedules, are to Articles, Sections or Schedules of this Agreement. As used in this Agreement:

Accredited UCAP:

“Accredited UCAP” shall mean the quantity of Unforced Capacity, as denominated in Effective UCAP, that an ELCC Resource is capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

Agreement:

“Agreement” shall mean this Reliability Assurance Agreement, together with all Schedules hereto, as amended from time to time.

Annual Demand Resource:

“Annual Demand Resource” shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such Delivery Year by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of June through October and the following May, and 6:00AM through 9:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of November through April unless there is an Office of the Interconnection approved maintenance outage during October through April. The Annual Demand Resource must be available in the corresponding Delivery year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Annual Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

Annual Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Annual Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer and winter periods described in such Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

Applicable Regional Entity:
“Applicable Regional Entity” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through September of a Delivery Year, and will be available to the Office of the Interconnection for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Base Capacity Demand Resource must be available June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or self-supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Base Capacity Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Base Capacity Resource:**

“Base Capacity Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Base Residual Auction:**

“Base Residual Auction” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Behind The Meter Generation:**

“Behind The Meter Generation” shall refer to a generating unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection; provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit’s capacity that is designated as a *Generation* Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource or (ii) in any hour, any portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
**Black Start Capability:**

“Black Start Capability” shall mean the ability of a generating unit or station to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition and start delivering power without assistance from the power system.

**Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (CETO):**

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall mean the amount of electric energy that a given area must be able to import in order to remain within a loss of load expectation of one event in 25 years when the area is experiencing a localized capacity emergency, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Without limiting the foregoing, CETO shall be calculated based in part on EFORD determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 5, Paragraph C.

**Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL):**

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall mean the capability of the transmission system to support deliveries of electric energy to a given area experiencing a localized capacity emergency as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Capacity Import Limit:**

For any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, “Capacity Import Limit” shall mean, (a) for the PJM Region, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines for each Delivery Year, through appropriate modeling and the application of engineering judgment, the transmission system can receive, in aggregate at the interface of the PJM Region with all external balancing authority areas and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus (2) the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin; and (b) for certain source zones identified in the PJM manuals as groupings of one or more balancing authority areas, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines the transmission system can receive at the interface of the PJM Region with each such source zone and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin times (2) the ratio of the maximum import quantity from each such source zone divided by the PJM total maximum import quantity. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM shall make such determination based on the latest peak load forecast for the studied period, the same computer simulation model of loads, generation and transmission topography employed in the determination of Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for such Delivery Year, including external facilities from an industry standard model of the loads, generation, and transmission topography.
of the Eastern Interconnection under peak conditions. PJM shall specify in the PJM Manuals the areas and minimum distribution factors for identifying monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers on the PJM interface. Employing such tools, PJM shall model increased power transfers from external areas into PJM to determine the transfer level at which one or more reliability criteria is violated on any monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers. For the PJM Region Capacity Import Limit, PJM shall optimize transfers from other source areas not experiencing any reliability criteria violations as appropriate to increase the Capacity Import Limit. The aggregate megawatt quantity of transfers into PJM at the point where any increase in transfers on the interface would violate reliability criteria will establish the Capacity Import Limit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region shall not be subject to the Capacity Import Limit if the Capacity Market Seller seeks an exception thereto by demonstrating to PJM, by no later than five (5) business days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, that such resource meets all of the following requirements:

(i) it has, at the time such exception is requested, met all applicable requirements to be pseudo-tied into the PJM Region, or the Capacity Market Seller has committed in writing that it will meet such requirements, unless prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond the control of the Capacity Market Seller, prior to the relevant Delivery Year;

(ii) at the time such exception is requested, it has long-term firm transmission service confirmed on the complete transmission path from such resource into PJM; and

(iii) it is, by written commitment of the Capacity Market Seller, subject to the same obligations imposed on Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 to offer their capacity into RPM Auctions; provided, however, that (a) the total megawatt quantity of all exceptions granted hereunder for a Delivery Year, plus the Capacity Import Limit for the applicable interface determined for such Delivery Year, may not exceed the total megawatt quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service on such interface that PJM has confirmed for such Delivery Year; and (b) if granting a qualified exception would result in a violation of the rule in clause (a), PJM shall grant the requested exception but reduce the Capacity Import Limit by the quantity necessary to ensure that the total quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service is not exceeded.

Capacity Only Option:

“Capacity Only Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

Capacity Performance Resource:

“Capacity Performance Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Capacity Resources:
“Capacity Resources” shall mean megawatts of (i) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources meeting the requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedules 9 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 10 that are or will be owned by or contracted to a Party and that are or will be committed to satisfy that Party's obligations under the Reliability Assurance Agreement, or to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, for a Delivery Year; (ii) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources not owned or contracted for by a Party which are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in Schedules 9 and 10; or (iii) load reduction capability provided by Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources that are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6; or (iv) generation and load reduction capability provided by a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and the PJM Manuals.

**Capacity Resource Provider:**

“Capacity Resource Provider” shall mean a Member that (1) owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output of, a Generation Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity; (2) or a DER Aggregator that has a contractual relationship to use a Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource.

**Capacity Storage Resource Class:**

“Capacity Storage Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement, each of which is composed of (1) Capacity Storage Resources with the same specified characteristic duration of 4, 6, 8, and 10 hours or; (2) storage device Component DER. The characteristic duration of an Energy Storage Resource Class is the ratio of the modeled MWh energy storage capability of members of the class to the modeled MW power capability of members of the class.

**Capacity Transfer Right:**

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Combination Resource:**

“Combination Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, or a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, that has a component that has the characteristics of a Limited Duration Resource combined with (i) a component that has the characteristics of an Unlimited Resource or (ii) a component that has the characteristics of a Variable Resource.

**Compliance Aggregation Area (CAA):**

“Compliance Aggregation Area” or “CAA” shall have the same meaning as in the Tariff.
Complex Hybrid Class:

“Complex Hybrid Class” shall mean an ELCC Class composed of Combination Resources that combine three or more components, whereby one component is a class of Limited Duration Resource, and the other components are different Variable Resource classes, and such Combination Resources cannot be included in any other Combination Resource class. A resource that is a member of a Complex Hybrid Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, PJM Transmission Owners Agreement or Transmission Owners Agreement:

“Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement,” “PJM Transmission Owners Agreement” or “Transmission Owners Agreement” shall mean that certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on file with the Commission, as amended from time to time.

Control Area:

“Control Area” shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and each Applicable Regional Entity;

(d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

(e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation:
“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8 or, as to an FRR Entity, in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

Delivery Year:

“Delivery Year” shall mean a Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment DD or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan under RAA, Schedule 8.1.

Demand Resource (DR):

“Demand Resource” or “DR” shall mean a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, Annual Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource or Summer-Period Demand Resource with a demonstrated capability to provide a reduction in demand or otherwise control load in accordance with the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 that offers and that clears load reduction capability in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction or that is committed through an FRR Capacity Plan.

Demand Resource Factor or DR Factor:

“Demand Resource Factor” or “DR Factor” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, that factor approved from time to time by the PJM Board used to determine the unforced capacity value of a Demand Resource in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6

Demand Resource Officer Certification Form:

“Demand Resource Officer Certification Form” shall mean a certification as to an intended Demand Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

Demand Resource Registration:

“Demand Resource Registration” shall mean a registration in the Full Program Option or Capacity Only Option of the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Resource Program in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 8.

Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan:

“Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan” shall mean the plan required by Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 in support of an intended offer of Demand Resources in an RPM Auction, or an intended inclusion of Demand Resources in an FRR Capacity Plan.
**DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form:**

“**DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form**” shall mean a DER Aggregator’s certification as to an intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

**DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan:**


**Effective Nameplate Capacity:**

“**Effective Nameplate Capacity**” shall mean (i) for each Variable Resource and Combination Resource, the resource’s Maximum Facility Output; (ii) for each Variable Resource and Combination Resource, that is an individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the device’s maximum energy production capability, as defined by the resource’s state interconnection agreement; or (iii) for each Limited Duration Resource, the sustained level of output that the unit-device can provide and maintain over a continuous period, whereby the duration of that continuous period matches the characteristic duration of the corresponding ELCC Class, with consideration given to ambient conditions expected to exist at the time of PJM system peak load, to the extent that such conditions impact such resource’s capability.

**Effective UCAP:**

“**Effective UCAP**” shall mean a unit of measure that represents the capacity product transacted in the Reliability Pricing Model and included in FRR Capacity Plans. One megawatt of Effective UCAP has the same capacity value of one megawatt of Unforced Capacity.

**ELCC Class:**

“**ELCC Class**” shall mean a defined group of ELCC Resources that share a common set of operational characteristics and for which effective load carrying capability analysis, as set forth in RAA, Schedule 9.1, will establish a unique ELCC Class UCAP and corresponding ELCC Class Rating(s). ELCC Classes shall be defined in the Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement. Members of an ELCC Class shall share a common method of calculating the ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment, provided that the individual ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment values will generally differ among ELCC Resources.

**ELCC Class Rating:**
“ELCC Class Rating” shall mean the rating factor, based on effective load carrying capability analysis, that applies to ELCC Resources that are members of an ELCC Class as part of the calculation of their Accredited UCAP.

**ELCC Class UCAP:**

“ELCC Class UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP all modeled ELCC Resources in a given ELCC Class are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

**ELCC Portfolio UCAP:**

“ELCC Portfolio UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP that all modeled ELCC Resources are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

**ELCC Resource:**

“ELCC Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that is a Variable Resource, a Limited Duration Resource, or a Combination Resource that also is either (a) a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, or (b) a Generation Capacity Resource.

**ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment:**

“ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment” shall mean the performance of a specific ELCC Resource relative to the aggregate performance of the ELCC Class to which it belongs as further described in RAA, Schedule 9.1, section F.

**Electric Cooperative:**

“Electric Cooperative” shall mean an entity owned in cooperative form by its customers that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Electric Distributor:**

“Electric Distributor” shall mean a Member that 1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership of electric distribution facilities that are used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region; or 2) is a generation and transmission cooperative or a joint municipal agency that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.

**Emergency:**

“Emergency” shall mean (i) an abnormal system condition requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent loss of firm load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or (ii) a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures
in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or (iii) a condition that requires implementation of emergency procedures as defined in the PJM Manuals.

**End-Use Customer:**

“End-Use Customer” shall mean a Member that is a retail end-user of electricity within the PJM Region. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is a retail end-user that owns generation may qualify as an End-Use customer if: (1) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates in the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average PJM capacity obligation for the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; or (2) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average energy consumed by that Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the same time period. The foregoing notwithstanding, taking retail service may not be sufficient to qualify a Member as an End-Use Customer.

**Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the periods described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention. Annual Energy Efficiency Resources, Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resources are types of Energy Efficiency Resources.

**Existent Water Storage:**

“Existent Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is not typically available during normal operating conditions (as those conditions are described in the relevant FERC hydropower license), but which can be drawn upon during emergency conditions (as described in the FERC hydropower license), including in order to avoid a load shed. In an effective load carrying capability analysis, exigent storage capability from an upstream hydro facility can be considered relative to a downstream hydro facility by assessing cascading storage and flows.

**Existing Demand Resource:**

“Existing Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource for which the Demand Resource Provider has identified existing end-use customer sites that are registered for the current Delivery
Year with PJM (even if not registered by such Demand Resource Provider) and that the Demand Resource Provider reasonably expects to have under a contract to reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is offered.

**Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:**

“Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for which the DER Aggregator has identified existing Component DER that are registered in a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for the current Delivery Year with PJM (even if not registered by such DER Aggregator) and that the DER Aggregator reasonably expects to have under a contract to generate or reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is offered.

**Existing Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Existing Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean, for purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource that, as of the date on which bidding commences for such auction: (a) is in service; or (b) is not yet in service, but has cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. A Generation Capacity Resource shall be deemed to be in service if interconnection service has ever commenced (for resources located in the PJM Region), or if it is physically and electrically interconnected to an external Control Area and is in full commercial operation (for resources not located in the PJM Region). The additional megawatts of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being, or has been, modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof shall not be deemed to be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource until such time as those megawatts (a) are in service; or (b) are not yet in service, but have cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year.

**Extended Summer Demand Resource:**

“Extended Summer Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through October and the following May, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Extended Summer Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Extended Summer Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Facilities Study Agreement:**

“Facilities Study Agreement” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Part VI, section 206.

**FERC or Commission:**
“FERC” or “Commission” shall mean the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any successor federal agency, commission or department exercising jurisdiction over the Tariff, Operating Agreement and Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:**

“Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service” shall have the meaning specified in the Tariff.

**Firm Service Level:**

“Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when an Emergency Action that triggers a Performance Assessment Interval is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan. “Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Demand Resource shall mean the pre-determined level for which an end-use customer’s load shall be reduced, upon notification from the Curtailment Service Provider’s market operations center or its agent.

**Firm Transmission Service:**

“Firm Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service that is intended to be available at all times to the maximum extent practicable, subject to an Emergency, an unanticipated failure of a facility, or other event beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility or the Office of the Interconnection.

**Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative or FRR Alternative:**

“Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative” or “FRR Alternative” shall mean an alternative method for a Party to satisfy its obligation to provide Unforced Capacity hereunder, as set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Fixed-Tilt Solar Class:**

“Fixed-Tilt Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted in a fixed orientation.

**Forecast Pool Requirement:**

“Forecast Pool Requirement” or “FPR” shall mean the amount equal to one plus the unforced reserve margin (stated as a decimal number) for the PJM Region required pursuant to this Reliability Assurance Agreement, as approved by the PJM Board pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1.

**FRR Capacity Plan or FRR Plan:**
“FRR Capacity Plan” or “FRR Plan” shall mean a long-term plan for the commitment of Capacity Resources and Price Responsive Demand to satisfy the capacity obligations of a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative, as more fully set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**FRR Entity:**

“FRR Entity” shall mean, for the duration of such election, a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative hereunder.

**FRR Service Area:**

“FRR Service Area” shall mean (a) the service territory of an IOU as recognized by state law, rule or order; (b) the service area of a Public Power Entity or Electric Cooperative as recognized by franchise or other state law, rule, or order; or (c) a separately identifiable geographic area that is: (i) bounded by wholesale metering, or similar appropriate multi-site aggregate metering, that is visible to, and regularly reported to, the Office of the Interconnection, or that is visible to, and regularly reported to an Electric Distributor and such Electric Distributor agrees to aggregate the load data from such meters for such FRR Service Area and regularly report such aggregated information, by FRR Service Area, to the Office of the Interconnection; and (ii) for which the FRR Entity has or assumes the obligation to provide capacity for all load (including load growth) within such area. In the event that the service obligations of an Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity are not defined by geographic boundaries but by physical connections to a defined set of customers, the FRR Service Area in such circumstances shall be defined as all customers physically connected to transmission or distribution facilities of such Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity within an area bounded by appropriate wholesale aggregate metering as described above.

**Full Program Option:**

“Full Program Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, (i) an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event, and (ii) a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

**Full Requirements Service:**

“Full Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply all of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

**Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generating Facility, or the contractual right to capacity from a specified Generating Facility, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 9
and RAA, Schedule 10, and, for Generating Facilities that are committed to an FRR Capacity Plan, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 8.1. A Generation Capacity Resource may be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource or a Planned Generation Capacity Resource.

**Generation Capacity Resource Provider:**

“Generation Capacity Resource Provider” shall mean a Member that owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output of, a Generation Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity.

**Generation Owner:**

“Generation Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership, or otherwise controls and operates one or more operating generation resources located in the PJM Region. The foregoing notwithstanding, for a planned generation resource to qualify a Member as a Generation Owner, such resource shall have cleared an RPM auction, and for Energy Resources, the resource shall have a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM. Purchasing all or a portion of the output of a generation resource shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Generation Owner. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is primarily a retail end-user of electricity that owns generation may qualify as a Generation Owner if: (1) the generation resource is the subject of a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM; (2) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average PJM capacity obligation of the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; and (3) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within PJM over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average energy consumed by the Member and its affiliates within PJM over the same time period.

**Generator Forced Outage:**

“Generator Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

**Generator Maintenance Outage:**

“Generator Maintenance Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility qualifies as a maintenance outage pursuant to the PJM Manuals.

**Generator Planned Outage:**
“Generator Planned Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Good Utility Practice:**

“Good Utility Practice” shall mean any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather is intended to include acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region; including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Hybrid Resource Class:**

“Hybrid Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 Section B. Each Hybrid Resource Class has a specified combination of two components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in a Capacity Storage Resource Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of a Hybrid Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage:**

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage” shall mean a hydropower facility that can capture and store incoming stream flow, without use of pumps, in pondage or a reservoir, and the Generation Owner has the ability, within the constraints available in the applicable operating license, to exert material control over the quantity of stored water and output of the facility throughout an Operating Day.

**Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class:**

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Combination Resources that are Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage resources.

**Incremental Auction:**

“Incremental Auction” shall mean any of several auctions conducted for a Delivery Year after the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and before the first day of such Delivery Year, including the First Incremental Auction, Second Incremental Auction, Third Incremental
Auction, or Conditional Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions (other than the Conditional Incremental Auction), shall be held for the purposes of:

(i) allowing Market Sellers that committed Capacity Resources in the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, which subsequently are determined to be unavailable to deliver the committed Unforced Capacity in such Delivery Year (due to resource retirement, resource cancellation or construction delay, resource derating, EFORD increase, a decrease in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of a Planned Demand Resource, delay or cancellation of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade, or similar occurrences) to submit Buy Bids for replacement Capacity Resources; and

(ii) allowing the Office of the Interconnection to reduce or increase the amount of committed capacity secured in prior auctions for such Delivery Year if, as a result of changed circumstances or expectations since the prior auction(s), there is, respectively, a significant excess or significant deficit of committed capacity for such Delivery Year, for the PJM Region or for an LDA.

Intermittent Hydropower Class:

“Intermittent Hydropower Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are run-of-river hydropower generators that must generally pass incoming water and therefore cannot appreciably store water to later increase the output of the facility. Resources in the Intermittent Hydropower Class are not Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage resources.

IOU:

“IOU” shall mean an investor-owned utility with substantial business interest in owning and/or operating electric facilities in any two or more of the following three asset categories: generation, transmission, distribution.

Landfill Gas Class:

“Landfill Gas Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources fueled by landfill gas that, because of fuel availability patterns, cannot run consistently at installed capacity levels for 24 or more hours.

Limited Demand Resource:

“Limited Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will, at a minimum, be available for interruption for at least 10 Load Management Events during the summer period of June through September in the Delivery Year, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 6-hour duration. At a minimum, the Limited Demand Resource shall be available for such interruptions on weekdays, other than NERC holidays, from 12:00PM (noon) to 8:00PM
Eastern Prevailing Time. The Limited Demand Resource must be available during the summer period of June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Limited Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Limited Duration Resource:**

“Limited Duration Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource or a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, that is not a Variable Resource, that is not a Combination Resource, and that is not capable of running continuously at Maximum Facility Output for 24 hours or longer. A Capacity Storage Resource is a Limited Duration Resource.

**Load Serving Entity or LSE:**

“Load Serving Entity” or “LSE” shall mean any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within the PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located within the PJM Region. Load Serving Entity shall include any end-use customer that qualifies under state rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.

**Locational Reliability Charge:**

“Locational Reliability Charge” shall mean the charge determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 8.

**Markets and Reliability Committee:**

“Markets and Reliability Committee” shall mean the committee established pursuant to the Operating Agreement as a Standing Committee of the Members Committee.

**Maximum Emergency Service Level:**

“Maximum Emergency Service Level” or “MESL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2017/2018 through the 2021/2022 Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when a Maximum Generation Emergency is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan.

**Member:**

“Member” shall have the meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.
Members Committee:

“Members Committee” shall mean the committee specified in Operating Agreement, section 8 composed of the representatives of all the Members.

NERC:

“NERC” shall mean the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or any successor thereto.

Network External Designated Transmission Service:

“Network External Designated Transmission Service” shall mean the quantity of network transmission service confirmed by PJM for use by a market participant to import power and energy from an identified Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region, upon demonstration by such market participant that it owns such Generation Capacity Resource, has an executed contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource, or has a contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource contingent upon securing firm transmission service from such resource.

Network Resources:

“Network Resources” shall have the meaning set forth in the PJM Tariff.

Network Transmission Service:

“Network Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Tariff, Part III or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

Nominal PRD Value:

“Nominal PRD Value” shall mean, as to any PRD Provider, an adjustment, determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1, to the peak-load forecast used to determine the quantity of capacity sought through an RPM Auction, reflecting the aggregate effect of Price Responsive Demand on peak load resulting from the Price Responsive Demand to be provided by such PRD Provider.

Nominated Demand Resource Value:

“Nominated Demand Resource Value” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation:
“Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation” shall mean Behind the Meter Generation that is used by municipal electric systems, electric cooperatives, and electric distribution companies to serve load.

**Obligation Peak Load:**

“Obligation Peak Load” shall have the meaning specified in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.

**Office of the Interconnection:**

“Office of the Interconnection” shall mean the employees and agents of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., subject to the supervision and oversight of the PJM Board, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement.

**Offshore Wind Class:**

“Offshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with offshore wind turbines located in the ocean.

**Onshore Wind Class:**

“Onshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy using wind turbines and that are not in the Offshore Wind Class.

**Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Operating Agreement or PJM Operating Agreement:**

“Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,” “Operating Agreement” or “PJM Operating Agreement” shall mean that agreement, dated as of April 1, 1997 and as amended and restated as of June 2, 1997, including all Schedules, Exhibits, Appendices, addenda or supplements hereto, as amended from time to time thereafter, among the Members of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C, on file with the Commission.

**Operating Day:**

“Operating Day” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Operating Reserve:**

“Operating Reserve” shall mean the amount of generating capacity scheduled to be available for a specified period of an Operating Day to ensure the reliable operation of the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

**Ordinary Water Storage:**
“Ordinary Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is typically available during normal operating conditions pursuant to the FERC license governing the operation of the hydropower resource.

**Other Limited Duration Class:**

“Other Limited Duration Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B of this Agreement, each of which has a specified characteristic duration and consists of Limited Duration Resources that are not Capacity Storage Resources. The characteristic duration of an Other Limited Duration Class is the maximum period of time represented in the ELCC model that the resources of the class can run at a stated capability.

**Other Limited Duration Combination Class:**

“Other Limited Duration Combination Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B. Each Other Limited Duration Class has a specified combination of two components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in an Other Limited Duration Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of an Other Limited Duration Combination Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Other Supplier:**

“Other Supplier” shall mean a Member that: (i) is engaged in buying, selling or transmitting electric energy, capacity, ancillary services, Financial Transmission Rights or other services available under PJM’s governing documents in or through the Interconnection or has a good faith intent to do so, and (ii) is not a Generation Owner, Electric Distributor, Transmission Owner or End-Use Customer.

**Other Variable Resource Class:**

“Other Variable Resource Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are not in any other Variable Resource class, including Variable Resources that are composed of multiple components, each of which would be a Variable Resource. A resource composed of both fixed-tilt solar panels and tracking solar panels is not in this class. A resource that is a member of a Other Variable Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Partial Requirements Service:**

“Partial Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply a specified portion, but not all, of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.
Party:

“Party” shall mean an entity bound by the terms of the Operating Agreement.

Peak Shaving Adjustment:

“Peak Shaving Adjustment” shall mean a load forecast mechanism that allows load reductions by end-use customers to result in a downward adjustment of the summer load forecast for the associated Zone. Any End-Use Customer identified in an approved peak shaving plan shall not also participate in PJM Markets as Price Responsive Demand, Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource, Capacity Performance Demand Resource, or Economic Load Response Participant.

Percentage Internal Resources Required:

“Percentage Internal Resources Required” shall mean, for purposes of an FRR Capacity Plan, the percentage of the LDA Reliability Requirement for an LDA that must be satisfied with Capacity Resources located in such LDA.

Performance Assessment Interval:

“Performance Assessment Interval” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

PJM:

“PJM” shall mean PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., including the Office of the Interconnection as referenced in the PJM Operating Agreement. When such term is being used in the RAA it shall also include the PJM Board.

PJM Board:

“PJM Board” shall mean the Board of Managers of the LLC, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement, except when such term is being used in Tariff, Attachment M, in which case PJM Board shall mean the Board of Managers of PJM or its designated representative, exclusive of any members of PJM Management.

PJM Manuals:

“PJM Manuals” shall mean the instructions, rules, procedures and guidelines established by the Office of the Interconnection for the operation, planning and accounting requirements of the PJM Region.

PJM Region:

“PJM Region” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.
PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin:

“PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin” shall mean the percent installed reserve margin for the PJM Region required pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1, as approved by the PJM Board.

PJM Tariff, Tariff, O.A.T.T., OATT or PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff:

“PJM Tariff,” “Tariff,” “O.A.T.T., “OATT” or “PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff” shall mean that certain PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, including any schedules, appendices, or exhibits attached thereto, on file with FERC and as amended from time to time thereafter.

Planned Demand Resource:

“Planned Demand Resource” shall mean any Demand Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide a reduction in demand or to otherwise control load, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such reduction or control on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a Demand Resource Provider submitting a DR Sell Offer Plan shall identify as Planned Demand Resources in such plan all Demand Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing Demand Resources.

Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:

A “Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean any DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a DER Aggregator submitting a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall identify in such plan all DER Capacity Aggregation Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources. A Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all provisions of the DER Aggregator Participation Model described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B, prior to the applicable Delivery Year.

Planned External Generation Capacity Resource:

“Planned External Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a proposed Generation Capacity Resource, or a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource, that (a) is to be located outside the PJM Region, (b) participates in the generation interconnection process of a Control Area external to PJM, (c) is scheduled to be physically and electrically interconnected to the transmission facilities of such Control Area on or before the first day of the
Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, and (d) is in full commercial operation prior to the first day of such Delivery Year, such that it is sufficient to provide the Installed Capacity set forth in the Sell Offer forming the basis of such resource’s commitment to the PJM Region. Prior to participation in any Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has a fully executed system impact study agreement (or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff) or, for resources which are greater than 20MWs participating in a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, an agreement or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a Facilities Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff), with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. Prior to participating in any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate it has entered into an interconnection agreement, or such other documentation that is functionally equivalent to an Interconnection Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. A Planned External Generation Capacity Resource must provide evidence to PJM that it has been studied as a Network Resource, or such other similar interconnection product in such external Control Area, must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for or purchased transmission service to be deliverable to the PJM border, and must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for transmission service to be deliverable to the bus at which energy is to delivered, the agreements for which must have been executed prior to participation in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year. Any such resource shall cease to be considered a Planned External Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that interconnection service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Planned Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Planned Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, or additional megawatts to increase the size of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being or has been modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof, participating in the generation interconnection process under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart A, as applicable, for which: (i) Interconnection Service is scheduled to commence on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to RPM or to an FRR Capacity Plan; (ii) for any such resource seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, or for any such resource of 20 MWs or less seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, a System Impact Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a System Impact Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; (iii) for any such resource of more than 20 MWs seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a Facilities Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a Facilities Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a Facility Studies
Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; and (iv) an Interconnection Service Agreement has been executed prior to any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year in which such resource plans to participate. For purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource shall cease to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that Interconnection Service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Planning Period:**

“Planning Period” shall mean the 12 months beginning June 1 and extending through May 31 of the following year, or such other period approved by the Members Committee.

**PRD Curve:**

“PRD Curve” shall mean a price-consumption curve at a PRD Substation level, if available, and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) level, that details the base consumption level of Price Responsive Demand and the decreasing consumption levels at increasing prices.

**PRD Provider:**

“PRD Provider” shall mean a PJM Member that has entered contractual arrangements with end-use customers that satisfy the eligibility criteria for and provides Price Responsive Demand.

**PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD:**

“PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD” shall mean the expected contribution to Delivery Year peak load of a PRD Provider’s Price Responsive Demand, were such demand not to be reduced in response to price, based on the contribution of the end-use customers comprising such Price Responsive Demand to the most recent prior Delivery Year’s peak demand, escalated to the Delivery Year in question, as determined in a manner consistent with the Office of the Interconnection’s load forecasts used for purposes of the RPM Auctions.

**PRD Reservation Price:**

“PRD Reservation Price” shall mean an RPM Auction clearing price identified in a PRD Plan for Price Responsive Demand load below which the PRD Provider desires not to commit the identified load as Price Responsive Demand.

**PRD Substation:**

“PRD Substation” shall mean an electrical substation that is located in the same Zone or in the same sub-Zonal LDA as the end-use customers identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration and
that, in terms of the electrical topography of the Transmission Facilities comprising the PJM Region, is as close as practicable to such loads.

**Price Responsive Demand:**

“Price Responsive Demand” or “PRD” shall mean end-use customer load registered by a PRD Provider pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 that have, as set forth in more detail in the PJM Manuals, the metering capability to record electricity consumption at an interval of one hour or less, Supervisory Control capable of curtailing such load (consistent with applicable RERRA requirements) at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection (prior to 2022/2023 Delivery Year) or a Performance Assessment Interval that triggers a PRD performance assessment (effective with 2022/2023 Delivery Year), and a retail rate structure, or equivalent contractual arrangement, capable of changing retail rates as frequently as an hourly basis, that is linked to or based upon changes in real-time Locational Marginal Prices at a PRD Substation level and that results in a predictable automated response to varying wholesale electricity prices.

**Price Responsive Demand Credit:**

“Price Responsive Demand Credit” shall mean a credit, based on committed Price Responsive Demand, as determined under Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1.

**Price Responsive Demand Plan or PRD Plan:**

“Price Responsive Demand Plan” or “PRD Plan” shall mean a plan, submitted by a PRD Provider and received by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, claiming a peak demand limitation due to Price Responsive Demand to support the determination of such PRD Provider’s Nominal PRD Value.

**Public Power Entity:**

“Public Power Entity” shall mean any agency, authority, or instrumentality of a state or of a political subdivision of a state, or any corporation wholly owned by any one or more of the foregoing, that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Qualifying Transmission Upgrades:**

“Qualifying Transmission Upgrades” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority:**

“Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority” or “RERRA” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Operating Agreement.
Reliability Principles and Standards:

“Reliability Principles and Standards” shall mean the principles and standards established by NERC or an Applicable Regional Entity to define, among other things, an acceptable probability of loss of load due to inadequate generation or transmission capability, as amended from time to time.

Required Approvals:

“Required Approvals” shall mean all of the approvals required for the Operating Agreement to be modified or to be terminated, in whole or in part, including the acceptance for filing by FERC and every other regulatory authority with jurisdiction over all or any part of the Operating Agreement.

Self-Supply:

“Self-Supply” shall have the meaning provided in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Small Commercial Customer:

“Small Commercial Customer” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

State Consumer Advocate:

“State Consumer Advocate” shall mean a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of which is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for the purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory commissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.

State Regulatory Structural Change:

“State Regulatory Structural Change” shall mean as to any Party, a state law, rule, or order that, after September 30, 2006, initiates a program that allows retail electric consumers served by such Party to choose from among alternative suppliers on a competitive basis, terminates such a program, expands such a program to include classes of customers or localities served by such Party that were not previously permitted to participate in such a program, or that modifies retail electric market structure or market design rules in a manner that materially increases the likelihood that a substantial proportion of the customers of such Party that are eligible for retail choice under such a program (a) that have not exercised such choice will exercise such choice; or (b) that have exercised such choice will no longer exercise such choice, including for example, without limitation, mandating divestiture of utility-owned generation or structural changes to such Party’s default service rules that materially affect whether retail choice is economically viable.

Summer-Period Demand Resource:
Summer-Period Demand Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and will be available June through October and the following May of the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Summer-Period Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale in an RPM Auction, or included as a Summer-Period Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource:**

Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Supervisory Control:**

“Supervisory Control” shall mean the capability to curtail, in accordance with applicable RERRA requirements, load registered as Price Responsive Demand at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection. Except to the extent automation is not required by the provisions of the Operating Agreement, the curtailment shall be automated, meaning that load shall be reduced automatically in response to control signals sent by the PRD Provider or its designated agent directly to the control equipment where the load is located without the requirement for any action by the end-use customer.

**Threshold Quantity:**

“Threshold Quantity” shall mean, as to any FRR Entity for any Delivery Year, the sum of (a) the Unforced Capacity equivalent (determined using the Pool-Wide Average EFORD) of the Installed Reserve Margin for such Delivery Year multiplied by the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for which such FRR Entity is responsible under its FRR Capacity Plan for such Delivery Year, plus (b) the lesser of (i) 3% of the Unforced Capacity amount determined in (a) above or (ii) 450 MW. If the FRR Entity is not responsible for all load within a Zone, the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for such entity shall be the FRR Entity’s Obligation Peak Load last determined prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, times the Base FRR Scaling Factor (as determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1).
Tracking Solar Class:

“Tracking Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted on trackers that align the panels with incoming sunlight over the course of the day.

Transmission Facilities:

“Transmission Facilities” shall mean facilities that: (i) are within the PJM Region; (ii) meet the definition of transmission facilities pursuant to FERC’s Uniform System of Accounts or have been classified as transmission facilities in a ruling by FERC addressing such facilities; and (iii) have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection to be integrated with the PJM Region transmission system and integrated into the planning and operation of the PJM Region to serve all of the power and transmission customers within the PJM Region.

Transmission Owner:

“Transmission Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities and is a signatory to the PJM Transmission Owners Agreement. Taking transmission service shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Transmission Owner.

Unforced Capacity:

“Unforced Capacity” shall mean installed capacity rated at summer conditions that is not on average experiencing a forced outage or forced derating, calculated for each Capacity Resource on the 12-month period from October to September without regard to the ownership of or the contractual rights to the capacity of the unit.

Unlimited Resource:

“Unlimited Resource” shall mean a generating unit having the ability to maintain output at a stated capability continuously on a daily basis without interruption. An Unlimited Resource is a Generation Capacity Resource that is not an ELCC Resource.

Variable Resource:

“Variable Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource or a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, with output that can vary as a function of its energy source, such as wind, solar, run of river hydroelectric power without storage, and landfill gas units without an alternate fuel source. All Intermittent Resources are Variable Resources, with the exception of Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage.

Winter Peak Load (or WPL):
“Winter Peak Load” or “WPL” shall mean the average of the Demand Resource customer’s specific peak hourly load between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on the PJM defined 5 coincident peak days from December through February two Delivery Years prior the Delivery Year for which the registration is submitted. Notwithstanding, if the average use between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on a winter 5 coincident peak day is below 35% of the average hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT over all five of such peak days, then up to two such days and corresponding peak demand values may be excluded from the calculation. Upon approval by the Office of the Interconnection, a Curtailment Service Provider may provide alternative data to calculate Winter Peak Load, as outlined in the PJM Manuals, when there is insufficient hourly load data for the two Delivery Years prior to the relevant Delivery Year or if more than two days meet the exclusion criteria described above.

Zonal Capacity Price:

“Zonal Capacity Price” shall mean the clearing price required in each Zone to meet the demand for Unforced Capacity and satisfy Locational Deliverability Requirements for the LDA or LDAs associated with such Zone. If the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA.

Zone or Zonal:

“Zone” or “Zonal” shall refer to an area within the PJM Region, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment J and RAA, Schedule 15, or as such areas may be (i) combined as a result of mergers or acquisitions or (ii) added as a result of the expansion of the boundaries of the PJM Region. A Zone shall include any Non-Zone Network Load located outside the PJM Region that is served from such Zone under Tariff, Attachment H-A.

Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor (ZWWAF):

“Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor” or “ZWWAF” shall mean the PJM zonal winter weather normalized coincident peak divided by PJM zonal average of 5 coincident peak loads in December through February.
**SCHEDULE 6.2**

DER Capacity Aggregation Resources qualifying under the criteria set forth below may be offered for sale in an RPM auction, or included in an FRR Capacity Plan, for any Delivery Year for which such resource qualifies.

DER Aggregators intending to offer for sale or designate for self-supply, a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any RPM Auction, or intending to include a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any FRR Capacity Plan must demonstrate, to PJM's satisfaction, that such resource shall have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is committed. As part of such demonstration, each such DER Aggregator shall submit a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan in accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in RAA, Schedule 6.2, and the PJM Manuals, no later than 30 days prior to, as applicable, the RPM Auction in which such resource is to be offered, or the deadline for submission of the FRR Capacity Plan in which such resource is to be included.

PJM may verify the DER Aggregator's adherence to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan at any time. A DER Aggregator with a PJM-approved DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan will be permitted to offer up to the approved megawatt quantity into the subject RPM Auction or include such resource in its FRR Capacity Plan.

A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall consist of a completed template document in the form posted on the PJM website, requiring the information set forth below and in the PJM Manuals, and a DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must provide information that supports the DER Aggregator's intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offers and demonstrate that the DER Capacity Aggregation Resources are being offered with the intention that the megawatt quantity that clears the auction is reasonably expected to be physically delivered through DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registration for the relevant Delivery Year. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall include all Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources and all Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that the DER Aggregator intends to offer into an RPM Auction or include in an FRR Capacity Plan.

The DER Aggregator shall provide the details of, and key assumptions for underlying Component DER for the Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource contained in the Sell Offer Plan, including but not limited to:

(i) Nominated megawatt quantities and method(s) of achieving generation or load reductions to meet megawatt quantities
(ii) equipment and technology to be installed or controlled
(iii) plan and ability to acquire generating resources or load reductions at customer site(s) and assumptions regarding regulatory approval of program(s), if applicable
(iv) A measurement and verification plan developed in accordance with PJM Manuals, if applicable
(v) Zone and LDA information
(vi) A schedule of an approximate timeline for procuring Component DER

DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form.
Each DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must include a DER Aggregator Officer Certification, signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification, in the form shown in the PJM Manuals, which form shall include the following certifications:

(a) that the signing officer has reviewed the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan and the information supplied to PJM in support of the Plan is true and correct as of the date of the certification; and
(b) that the DER Aggregator is submitting the Plan with the reasonable expectation, based upon its analyses as of the date of the certification, to physically deliver all megawatts that clear the RPM Auction through the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registrations by the specified Delivery Year.

As set forth in the form provided in the PJM Manuals, the certification shall specify that it does not in any way abridge, expand, or otherwise modify the current provisions of the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, and/or RAA.

The Unforced Capacity value of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource will be determined as the sum of the Unforced Capacity value of the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, accounting for any co-located load that is not Station Power, in accordance with the provisions of the PJM Manuals.

The DER Aggregator shall provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource located within the same Zone and LDA as specified in its cleared sell offer, and may be subject to deficiency charges under Tariff, Attachment DD to the extent it fails to provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the applicable DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in such location and quantity consistent with its cleared offer.

A DER Aggregator offering a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all applicable credit requirements, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q.
Attachment C

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and
Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective July 1, 2023

(Identified by Additional Cover Pages)

(Clean Format)
Sections of the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

Effective July 1, 2023

(Clean Format)
ATTACHMENT Q

CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

It is the policy of PJM that prior to an entity participating in any PJM Markets or in order to take Transmission Service, the entity must demonstrate its ability to meet the requirements in this Attachment Q. This Attachment Q also sets forth PJM’s authority to deny, reject, or terminate a Participant’s right to participate in any PJM Markets in order to protect the PJM Markets and PJM Members from unreasonable credit risk from any Participant’s activities. Given the interconnectedness and overlapping of their responsibilities, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and PJM Settlement, Inc. are referred to both individually and collectively herein as “PJM.”

PURPOSE

PJM Settlement is the counterparty to transactions in the PJM Markets. As a consequence, if a Participant defaults on its obligations under this Attachment Q, or PJM determines a Participant represents unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets, and the Participant does not post Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral in response to a Collateral Call, the result is that the Participant represents unsecured credit risk to the PJM Markets. For this reason, PJM must have the authority to monitor and manage credit risk on an ongoing basis, and to act promptly to mitigate or reduce any unsecured credit risk, in order to protect the PJM Markets and PJM Members from losses.

This Attachment Q describes requirements for: (1) eligibility to be a Market Participant, (2) establishment and maintenance of credit by Market Participants, and (3) collateral requirements and forms of credit support that will be deemed as acceptable to mitigate risk to any PJM Markets.

This Attachment Q also sets forth (1) PJM’s authority to monitor and manage credit risk that a Participant may represent to the PJM Markets and/or PJM membership in general, (2) the basis for establishing limits that will be imposed on a Market Participant in order to minimize risk, and (3) various obligations and requirements the violation of which will result in an Event of Default pursuant to this Attachment Q and the Agreements.

Attachment Q describes the types of data and information PJM will review in order to determine whether an Applicant or Market Participant presents an unreasonable risk to any PJM Markets and/or PJM membership in general, and the steps PJM may take in order to address that risk.

APPLICABILITY

This Attachment Q applies to all Applicants and Market Participants who take Transmission Service under this Tariff, or participate in any PJM Markets or market activities under the Agreements. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Attachment Q, simply taking
transmission service or procuring Ancillary Services via market-based rates does not imply market participation for purposes of applicability of this Attachment Q.

II. RISK EVALUATION PROCESS

PJM will conduct a risk evaluation to determine eligibility to become and/or remain a Market Participant or Guarantor that: (1) assesses the entity’s financial strength, risk profile, creditworthiness, and other relevant factors; (2) determines an Unsecured Credit Allowance, if appropriate; (3) determines appropriate levels of Collateral; and (4) evaluates any Credit Support, including Guaranties or Letters of Credit.

A. Initial Risk Evaluation

PJM will perform an initial risk evaluation of each Applicant and/or its Guarantor. As part of the initial risk evaluation, PJM will consider certain Minimum Participation Requirements, assign an Internal Risk Score, establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance if appropriate, and make a determination regarding required levels of Collateral, creditworthiness, credit support, Restricted Collateral and other assurances for participation in certain PJM Markets.

Each Applicant and/or its Guarantor must provide the information set forth below at the time of its initial application pursuant to this Attachment Q and on an ongoing basis in order to remain eligible to participate in any PJM Markets. The same quantitative and qualitative factors will be used to evaluate Participants whether or not they have rated debt.

1. Rating Agency Reports

PJM will review Rating Agency reports from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, Fitch Ratings, or other Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization for each Applicant and/or Guarantor. The review will focus on the Applicant’s or its Guarantor’s senior unsecured debt ratings. If senior unsecured debt ratings are not available, PJM may consider other ratings, including issuer ratings, corporate ratings and/or an implied rating based on an internally derived Internal Credit Score pursuant to section II.A.3 below.

2. Financial Statements and Related Information

Each Applicant and/or its Guarantor must submit, or cause to be submitted, audited financial statements, except as otherwise indicated below, prepared in accordance with United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“US GAAP“) or any other format acceptable to PJM for the three (3) fiscal years most recently ended, or the period of existence of the Applicant and/or its Guarantor, if shorter. Applicants and/or their Guarantors must submit, or cause to be submitted, financial statements, which may be unaudited, for each completed fiscal quarter of the current fiscal year. All audited financial statements provided by the Applicant and/or its Guarantor must be audited by an Independent Auditor.

The information should include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) If the Applicant and/or its Guarantor has publicly traded securities:

(i) Annual reports on Form 10-K, together with any amendments thereto;

(ii) Quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, together with any amendments thereto;

(iii) Form 8-K reports, if any, that have been filed since the most recent Form 10-K;

(iv) A summary provided by the Principal responsible, or to be responsible, for PJM Market activity of: (1) the Participant’s primary purpose(s) of activity or anticipated activity in the PJM Markets (investment, trading or “hedging or mitigating commercial risks,” as such phrase has meaning in the CFTC’s regulations regarding the end-user exception to clearing); (2) the experience of the Participant (and its Principals) in managing risks in similar markets, including other organized RTO/ISO markets or on regulated commodity exchanges; and (3) a high level overview of the Participant’s intended participation in the PJM Markets.

(v) All audited financial statements provided by an Applicant with publicly traded securities and/or its Guarantor with publicly traded securities must be audited by an Independent Auditor that satisfies the requirements set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

(b) If the Applicant and/or its Guarantor does not have publicly-traded securities:

(i) Annual Audited Financial Statements or equivalent independently audited financials, and quarterly financial statements, generally found on:
   - Balance Sheets
   - Income Statements
   - Statements of Cash Flows
   - Statements of Stockholder’s or Member’s Equity or Net Worth;

(ii) Notes to Annual Audited Financial Statements, and notes to quarterly financial statements if any, including disclosures of any material changes from the last report;

(iii) Disclosure equivalent to a Management’s Discussion & Analysis, including an executive overview of operating results and outlook, and compliance with debt covenants and indentures, and off balance sheet arrangements, if any;

(iv) Auditor’s Report with an unqualified opinion or written letter from auditor containing the opinion whether the annual audited financial statements comply with the US GAAP or any other format acceptable to PJM; and
(v) A summary provided by the Principal responsible or to be responsible for PJM Market activity of: (1) the Participant’s primary purpose(s) of activity or anticipated activity in the PJM Markets (investment, trading or “hedging or mitigating commercial risks,” as such phrase has meaning in the CFTC’s regulations regarding the end-user exception to clearing); (2) the experience of the Participant (and its Principals) in managing risks in similar markets, including other organized RTO/ISO markets or on regulated commodity exchanges; and (3) a high level overview of the Participant’s intended participation in the PJM Markets.

(c) If Applicant and/or Guarantor is newly formed, does not yet have three (3) years of audited financials, or does not routinely prepare audited financial statements, PJM may specify other information to allow it to assess the entity’s creditworthiness, including but not limited to:

(i) Equivalent financial information traditionally found in:
- Balance Sheets
- Income Statements
- Statements of Cash Flows

(ii) Disclosure equivalent to a Management’s Discussion & Analysis, including an executive overview of operating results and outlook, and compliance with debt covenants and indentures, and off balance sheet arrangements, if any; and

(iii) A summary provided by the Principal responsible or to be responsible for PJM Market activity of: (1) the Participant’s primary purpose(s) of activity or anticipated activity in the PJM Markets (investment, trading or “hedging or mitigating commercial risks,” as such phrase has meaning in the CFTC’s regulations regarding the end-user exception to clearing); (2) the experience of the Participant (and its Principals) in managing risks in similar markets, including other organized RTO/ISO markets or on regulated commodity exchanges; and (3) a high level overview of the Participant’s intended participation in the PJM Markets.

(d) During a two year transition period from June 1, 2020 to May 31, 2022, the Applicant or Guarantor may provide a combination of audited financial statements and/or equivalent financial information.

If any of the above information in this section II.A.2 is available on the internet, the Applicant and/or its Guarantor may provide a letter stating where such statements can be located and retrieved by PJM. If an Applicant and/or its Guarantor files Form 10-K, Form 10-Q, or Form 8-K with the SEC, then the Applicant and/or its Guarantor will be deemed to have satisfied the requirement by indicating to PJM where the information in this section II.A.2 can be located on the internet.
If the Applicant and/or its Guarantor fails, for any reason, to provide the information required above in this section II.A.2, PJM has the right to (1) request Collateral and/or Restricted Collateral to cover the amount of risk reasonably associated with the Applicant and/or its Guarantor’s expected activity in any PJM Markets, and/or (2) restrict the Applicant from participating in certain PJM Markets, including but not limited to restricting the positions the Applicant (once it becomes a Market Participant) takes in the market.

For certain Applicants and/or their Guarantors, some of the above submittals may not be applicable and alternate requirements for compliant submittals may be specified by PJM. In the credit evaluation of Municipalities and Cooperatives, PJM may also request additional information as part of the initial and ongoing review process and will consider other qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness.

3. **Credit Rating and Internal Credit Score**

PJM will use credit risk scoring methodologies as a tool in determining an Unsecured Credit Allowance for each Applicant and/or its Guarantor. As its source for calculating the Unsecured Credit Allowance, PJM will rely on the ratings from a Rating Agency, if any, on the Applicant’s or Guarantor’s senior unsecured debt or their issuer ratings or corporate ratings if senior unsecured debt ratings are not available. If there is a split rating between the Rating Agencies, the lower of the ratings shall apply. If no external credit rating is available PJM will utilize its Internal Credit Score in order to calculate the Unsecured Credit Allowance.

The model used to develop the Internal Credit Score will be quantitative, based on financial data found in the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement, and it will be qualitative based on relevant factors that may be internal or external to a particular Applicant and/or its Guarantor.

PJM will employ a framework, as outlined in Tables 1-5 below, based on metrics internal to the Applicant and/or its Guarantor, including capital and leverage, cash flow coverage of fixed obligations, liquidity, profitability, and other qualitative factors. The particular metrics and scoring rules differ according to the Applicant’s or Guarantor’s line of business and the PJM Markets in which it anticipates participating, in order to account for varying sources and degrees of risk to the PJM Markets and PJM members.

The formulation of each metric will be consistently applied to all Applicants and Guarantors across industries with slight variations based on identifiable differences in entity type, anticipated market activity, and risks to the PJM Markets and PJM members. In instances where the external credit rating is used to calculate the unsecured credit allowance, PJM may also use the Internal Credit Score as an input into determining the overall risk profile of an Applicant and/or its Guarantor.
### Table 1. Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Leverage and Capital Structure

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<td>Debt / Total Capitalization (%)</td>
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<td>FFO / Debt (%)</td>
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<td>Debt / EBITDA (x)</td>
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<td>Debt / Property, Plant &amp; Equipment (%)</td>
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<td>Retained Earnings / Total Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Debt / Avg Daily Production or KwH ($)</td>
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<td>Core Capital / Total Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Risk-Based Capital / RWA (%)</td>
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<td>Tier 1 Capital / RWA (%)</td>
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<td>Equity / Investments (%)</td>
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**primary metric** | **secondary metric**

*FFO = Funds From Operations* *RWA = Risk-Weighted Assets*

### Table 2. Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Fixed Charge Coverage and Funding

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<tr>
<td>EBIT / Interest Expense (x)</td>
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<td>EBITDA / [Interest Exp + CPLTD] (x)</td>
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<td>[FFO + Interest Exp] / Interest Exp (x)</td>
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<td>Loans / Total Deposits (%)</td>
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<td>NPL / Gross Loans (%)</td>
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<td>NPL / [Net Worth + LLR] (%)</td>
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<td>Market Funding / Tangible Bank Assets (%)</td>
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**primary metric** | **secondary metric**

*CPLTD = Current Portion of Long-Term Debt* *EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes* *EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization* *LLR = Loan Loss Reserves* *NPL = Non-Performing Loans*
### Table 3. Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Liquidity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Investor-Owned</th>
<th>Municipal Utilities</th>
<th>Co-Operative</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Transmission</th>
<th>Merchant Power</th>
<th>Project Developers</th>
<th>Financial Institutions</th>
<th>Commodity Trading</th>
<th>Private Equity</th>
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<tr>
<td>CFFO / Total Debt (x)</td>
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<td>Current Assets / Current Liabilities (x)</td>
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<td>Liquid Assets / Tangible Bank Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Sources / Uses of Funds (x)</td>
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<td>Weighted Avg Maturity of Debt (yrs)</td>
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<td>Floating Rate Debt / Total Debt (%)</td>
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*primary metric*  
*secondary metric*  
*CFFO = Cash Flow From Operations*

### Table 4. Quantitative Metrics by Line of Business: Profitability

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<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Investor-Owned</th>
<th>Municipal Utilities</th>
<th>Co-Operative</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Transmission</th>
<th>Merchant Power</th>
<th>Project Developers</th>
<th>Financial Institutions</th>
<th>Commodity Trading</th>
<th>Private Equity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Return on Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Return on Equity (%)</td>
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<td>Profit Volatility (%)</td>
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<td>Return on Revenue (%)</td>
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<td>Net Income / Tangible Assets (%)</td>
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<td>Net Income / Dividends (x)</td>
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*primary metric*  
*secondary metric*

### Table 5. Qualitative Factors: Industry Level

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<tr>
<td>Need for PJM Markets to Achieve Business Goals</td>
<td>Rating Agency criteria or other industry analysis</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ability to Grow/Enter Markets other than PJM</td>
<td>Rating Agency criteria or other industry analysis</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Participants’ Ability to Serve Customers</td>
<td>Rating Agency criteria or other industry analysis</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulation of Participant’s Business</td>
<td>RRA regulator y climate scores, S&amp;P BICRA</td>
<td>PUCS</td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>FERC PUCs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Purpose of PJM Activity</td>
<td>Investment (&quot;Inv.&quot;)/Trading (&quot;Trade&quot;)/Hedging or Mitigating Commercial Risk of Operations (&quot;CRH&quot;)</td>
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<td>CRH</td>
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<td>Inv./Trade</td>
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**RRA** = Regulatory Research Associates, a division of S&P Global, Inc.  
**BICRA** = Bank Industry Country Risk Assessment

The scores developed will range from 1-6, with the following mappings:

1 = Very Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: AAA to AA-; Moody’s: Aaa to Aa3)
2 = Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: A+ to BBB+; Moody’s: A1 to Baa1)
3 = Low to Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB; Moody’s: Baa2)
4 = Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB-; Moody’s: Baa3)
5 = Medium to High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB+ to BB; Moody’s: Baa1 to Baa2)
6 = High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB- and below; Moody’s: Ba3 and below)

4. Trade References
If deemed necessary by PJM, whether because the Applicant is newly or recently formed or for any other reason, each Applicant and/or its Guarantor shall provide at least one (1) bank reference and three (3) Trade References to provide PJM with evidence of Applicant’s understanding of the markets in which the Applicant is seeking to participate and the Applicant’s experience and ability to manage risk. PJM may contact the bank references and Trade References provided by the Applicant to verify their business experience with the Applicant.

5. **Litigation and Contingencies**

Unless prohibited by law, each Applicant and Guarantor is also required to disclose and provide information as to the occurrence of, within the five (5) years prior to the submission of the information to PJM (i) any litigation, arbitration, investigation (formal inquiry initiated by a governmental or regulatory entity), or proceeding, pending or, to the knowledge of the involving, Applicant or its Guarantor or any of their Principals that would likely have a material adverse impact on its financial condition and/or would likely materially affect the risk of non-payment by the Applicant or Guarantor, or (ii) any finding of material defalcation, market manipulation or fraud by or involving the Applicant, Guarantor, or any of their Principals, predecessors, subsidiaries, or Credit Affiliates that participate in any United States power markets based upon a final adjudication of regulatory and/or legal proceedings, (iii) any bankruptcy declarations or petitions by or against an Applicant and/or Guarantor, or (iv) any violation by any of the foregoing of any federal or state regulations or laws regarding energy commodities, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) or FERC requirements, the rules of any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, any self-regulatory organization or any other governing, regulatory, or standards body responsible for regulating activity in North American markets for electricity, natural gas or electricity-related commodity products. Each Applicant and Guarantor shall take reasonable measures to obtain permission to disclose information related to a non-public investigation. These disclosures shall be made by Applicant and Guarantor upon application, and within ten (10) Business Days of any material change with respect to any of the above matters.

6. **History of Defaults in Energy Projects**

Each Applicant and Guarantor shall disclose their current default status and default history for any energy related generation or transmission project (e.g. generation, solar, development), and within any wholesale or retail energy market, including but not limited to within PJM, any Independent System Operator or Regional Transmission Organization, and exchange that has not been cured within the past five (5) years. Defaults of a non-recourse project financed entity may not be included in the default history.

7. **Other Disclosures and Additional Information**

Each Applicant and Guarantor is required to disclose any Credit Affiliates that are currently Members of PJM, applying for membership with PJM, Transmission Customers, Participants, applying to become Market Participants, or that participate directly or indirectly in any PJM Markets or any other North American markets for electricity, natural gas or electricity-related commodity products. Each Applicant and Guarantor shall also provide a copy of its limited
liability company agreement or equivalent agreement, certification of formation, articles of incorporation or other similar organization document, offering memo or equivalent, the names of its five (5) most senior Principals, and information pertaining to any non-compliance with debt covenants and indentures.

Applicants shall provide PJM the credit application referenced in section III.A and any other information or documentation reasonably required for PJM to perform the initial risk evaluation of Applicant’s or Guarantor’s creditworthiness and ability to comply with the requirements contained in the Agreements related to settlements, billing, credit requirements, and other financial matters.

B. Supplemental Risk Evaluation Process

As described in section VI below, PJM will conduct a supplemental risk evaluation process for Applicants, Participants, and Guarantors applying to conduct virtual and export transactions or participate in any PJM Markets.

C. Unsecured Credit Allowance

A Market Participant may request that PJM consider it for an Unsecured Credit Allowance pursuant to the provisions herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an FTR Participant shall not be considered for an Unsecured Credit Allowance for participation in the FTR markets.

1. Unsecured Credit Allowance Evaluation

PJM will perform a credit evaluation on each Participant that has requested an Unsecured Credit Allowance, both initially and at least annually thereafter. PJM shall determine the amount of Unsecured Credit Allowance, if any, that can be provided to the Market Participant in accordance with the creditworthiness and other requirements set forth in this Attachment Q. In completing the credit evaluation, PJM will consider:

(a) Rating Agency Reports

PJM will review Rating Agency reports as for each Market Participant on the same basis as described in section II.A.1 above and section II.E.1 below.

(b) Financial Statements and Related Information

All financial statements and related information considered for an Unsecured Credit Allowance must satisfy all of the same requirements described in section II.A.2 above and section II.E.2 below.

2. Material Adverse Changes

Each Market Participant is responsible for informing PJM, in writing, of any Material Adverse Change in its financial condition (or the financial condition of its Guarantor) since the date of the Market Participant or Guarantor’s most recent annual financial statements provided to PJM, pursuant to the requirements reflected in section II.A.2 above and section II.E.3 below.
In the event that PJM determines that a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of a Market Participant warrants a requirement to provide Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral, PJM shall comply with the process and requirements described in section II.A above and section II.E below.

3. **Other Disclosures**

Each Market Participant desiring an Unsecured Credit Allowance is required to make the disclosures and upon the same requirements reflected in section II.A.7 above and section II.E.7 below.

D. **Determination of Unreasonable Credit Risk**

Unreasonable credit risk shall be determined by the likelihood that an Applicant will default on a financial obligation arising from its participation in any PJM Markets. Indicators of potentially unreasonable credit risk include, but are not limited to, a history of market manipulation based upon a final adjudication of regulatory and/or legal proceedings, a history of financial defaults, a history of bankruptcy or insolvency within the past five (5) years, or a combination of current market and financial risk factors such as low capitalization, a reasonably likely future material financial liability, a low Internal Credit Score (derived pursuant to section II.A.3 above) and/or a low externally derived credit score. PJM’s determination will be based on, but not limited to, information and material provided to PJM during its initial risk evaluation process, information and material provided to PJM in the Officer’s Certification, and/or information gleaned by PJM from public and non-public sources.

If PJM determines that an Applicant poses an unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets, PJM may require Collateral, additional Collateral, or Restricted Collateral commensurate with the Applicant’s risk of financial default, reject an application, and/or limit or deny Applicant’s participation in the PJM Markets, to the extent and for the time period it determines is necessary to mitigate the unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets. PJM will reject an application if it determines that Collateral, additional Collateral, or Restricted Collateral cannot address the risk.

PJM will communicate its concerns regarding whether the Applicant presents an unreasonable credit risk, if any, in writing to the Applicant and attempt to better understand the circumstances surrounding that Applicant’s financial and credit position before making its determination. In the event PJM determines that an Applicant presents an unreasonable credit risk that warrants a requirement to provide Collateral of any type, or some action to mitigate risk, PJM shall provide the Applicant with a written explanation of why such determination was made.

E. **Ongoing Risk Evaluation**

In addition to the initial risk evaluation set forth in sections II.A through II.D above and the annual certification requirements set forth in section III.A below, each Market Participant and/or its Guarantor has an ongoing obligation to provide PJM with the information required in section IV.A described in more detail below. PJM may also review public information regarding a
Market Participant and/or its Guarantor as part of its ongoing risk evaluation. If appropriate, PJM will revise the Market Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or change its determination of creditworthiness, credit support, Restricted Collateral, required Collateral or other assurances pursuant to PJM’s ongoing risk evaluation process.

Each Market Participant and/or its Guarantor must provide the information set forth below on an ongoing basis in order to remain eligible to participate in any PJM Markets. The same quantitative and qualitative factors will be used to evaluate Market Participants whether or not they have rated debt.

1. **Rating Agency Reports**

PJM will review Rating Agency reports for each Market Participant and/or Guarantor on the same basis as described in section II.A.1 above.

2. **Financial Statements and Related Information**

On an ongoing basis, Market Participants and/or their Guarantors shall provide the information they are required to provide as described in section II.A.2 above, pursuant to the schedule reflected below, with one exception. With regard to the summary that is required to be provided by the Principal responsible for PJM Market activity, with respect to experience of the Participant or its Principals in managing risks in similar markets, the Principal only needs to provide that information for a new Principal that was not serving in the position when the prior summary was provided. PJM will review financial statements and related information for each Market Participant and/or Guarantor on the same basis as described in section II.A.2 above.

Each Market Participant and/or its Guarantor must submit, or cause to be submitted, annual audited financial statements, except as otherwise indicated below, prepared in accordance with US GAAP or any other format acceptable to PJM for the fiscal year most recently ended within ten (10) calendar days of the financial statements becoming available and no later than one hundred twenty (120) calendar days after its fiscal year end. Market Participants and/or their Guarantors must submit, or cause to be submitted, financial statements, which may be unaudited, for each completed fiscal quarter of the current fiscal year, promptly upon their issuance, but no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the end of each fiscal quarter. All audited financial statements provided by the Market Participant and/or its Guarantor must be audited by an Independent Auditor.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, PJM may upon request, grant a Market Participant or Guarantor an extension of time, if the financials are not available within the time frame stated above.

3. **Material Adverse Changes**

Each Market Participant and each Guarantor is responsible for informing PJM, in writing, of any Material Adverse Change in its or its Guarantor’s financial condition within five (5) Business Days of any Principal becoming aware of the occurrence of a Material Adverse Change since the date of the Market Participant or Guarantor’s most recent annual financial statements provided to
PJM. However, PJM may also independently establish from available information that a Participant and/or its Guarantor has experienced a Material Adverse Change in its financial condition without regard to whether such Market Participant or Guarantor has informed PJM of the same.

For the purposes of this Attachment Q, a Material Adverse Change in financial condition may include, but is not be limited to, any of the following:

(a) a bankruptcy filing;
(b) insolvency;
(c) a significant decrease in market capitalization;
(d) restatement of prior financial statements unless required due to regulatory changes;
(e) the resignation or removal of a Principal unless there is a new Principal appointed or expected to be appointed, a transition plan in place pending the appointment of a new Principal, or a planned restructuring of such roles;
(f) the filing of a lawsuit or initiation of an arbitration, investigation, or other proceeding that would likely have a material adverse effect on any current or future financial results or financial condition or increase the likelihood of non-payment;
(g) a material financial default in any other organized energy, ancillary service, financial transmission rights and/or capacity markets including but not limited to those of another Regional Transmission Organization or Independent System Operator, or on any commodity exchange, futures exchange or clearing house, that has not been cured or remedied after any required notice has been given and any cure period has elapsed;
(h) a revocation of a license or other authority by any Federal or State regulatory agency; where such license or authority is necessary or important to the Participant’s continued business, for example, FERC market-based rate authority, or State license to serve retail load;
(i) a significant change in credit default swap spreads, market capitalization, or other market-based risk measurement criteria, such as a recent increase in Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF™) that is materially greater than the increase in its peers’ EDF™ rates, or a collateral default swap (CDS) premium normally associated with an entity rated lower than investment grade;
(j) a confirmed, undisputed material financial default in a bilateral arrangement with another Participant or counterparty that has not been cured or remedied after any required notice has been given and any cure period has elapsed;
(k) the sale by a Participant of all or substantially all of its bilateral position(s) in the PJM Markets;
(l) any adverse changes in financial condition which, individually, or in the aggregate, are material; and,
(m) any adverse changes, events or occurrences which, individually or in the aggregate, could affect the ability of the entity to pay its debts as they become due or could reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on any current or future financial results or financial condition.
Upon identification of a Material Adverse Change, PJM shall evaluate the financial strength and risk profile of the Market Participant and/or its Guarantor at that time and may do so on a more frequent basis going forward. If the result of such evaluation identifies unreasonable credit risk to any PJM Market as further described in section II.E.8 below, PJM will take steps to mitigate the financial exposure to the PJM Markets. These steps include, but are not limited to requiring the Market Participant and/or each Guarantor to provide Collateral, additional Collateral or additional Restricted Collateral that is commensurate with the amount of risk in which the Market Participant wants to engage, and/or limiting the Market Participant’s ability to participate in any PJM Market to the extent, and for the time-period necessary to mitigate the unreasonable credit risk. In the event PJM determines that a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition or risk profile of a Market Participant and/or Guarantor, warrants a requirement to provide Collateral of any type, or some action to mitigate risk, PJM shall provide the Market Participant and/or Guarantor, a written explanation of why such determination was made. Conversely, in the event PJM determines there has been an improvement in the financial condition or risk profile of a Market Participant and/or Guarantor such that the amount of Collateral needed for that Market Participant and/or Guarantor can be reduced, PJM shall provide a written explanation why such determination was made, including the amount of the Collateral reduction and indicating when and how the reduction will be made.

4. **Litigation and Contingencies**

Each Market Participant and/or Guarantor is required to disclose and provide information regarding litigation and contingencies as outlined in section II.A.5 above.

5. **History of Defaults in Energy Projects**

Each Market Participant and/or Guarantor is required to disclose current default status and default history as outlined in section II.A.6 above.

6. **Internal Credit Score**

As part of its ongoing risk evaluation, PJM will use credit risk scoring methodologies as a tool in determining an Internal Credit Score for each Market Participant and/or Guarantor, utilizing the same model and framework outlined in section II.A.3 above.

7. **Other Disclosures and Additional Information**

Each Market Participant and/or Guarantor is required to make other disclosures and provide additional information outlined in section II.A.7 above.

PJM will monitor each Market Participant’s use of services and associated financial obligations on a regular basis to determine their total potential financial exposure and for credit monitoring purposes, and may require the Market Participant and/or Guarantor to provide additional information, pursuant to the terms and provisions described herein.
Market Participants shall provide PJM, upon request, any information or documentation reasonably required for PJM to monitor and evaluate a Market Participant’s creditworthiness and compliance with the Agreements related to settlements, billing, credit requirements, and other financial matters.

8. Unreasonable Credit Risk

If PJM has reasonable grounds to believe that a Market Participant and/or its Guarantor poses an unreasonable credit risk to any PJM Markets, PJM may immediately notify the Market Participant of such unreasonable credit risk and (1) issue a Collateral Call to demand Collateral, additional Collateral, or Restricted Collateral or other assurances commensurate with the Market Participant’s and/or its Guarantor’s risk of financial default or other risk posed by the Market Participant’s or Guarantor’s financial condition or risk profile to the PJM Markets and PJM members, or (2) limit or suspend the Market Participant’s participation in any PJM Markets, to the extent and for such time period PJM determines is necessary to mitigate the unreasonable credit risk to any PJM Markets. PJM will only limit or suspend a Market Participant’s market participation if Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral cannot address the unreasonable credit risk.

PJM’s determination will be based on, but not limited to, information and material provided to PJM during its ongoing risk evaluation process or in the Officer’s Certification, and/or information gleaned by PJM from public and non-public sources. PJM will communicate its concerns, if any, in writing to the Market Participant and attempt to better understand the circumstances surrounding the Market Participant’s financial and credit position before making its determination. At PJM’s request or upon its own initiative, the Market Participant or its Guarantor may provide supplemental information to PJM that would allow PJM to consider reducing the additional Collateral requested or reducing the severity of limitations or other restrictions designed to mitigate the Market Participant’s credit risk. Such information shall include, but not be limited to: (i) the Market Participant’s estimated exposure, (ii) explanations for any recent change in the Market Participant’s market activity, (iii) any relevant new load or unit outage information; or (iv) any default or supply contract expiration, termination or suspension.

The Market Participant shall have five (5) Business Days to respond to PJM’s request for supplemental information. If the requested information is provided in full to PJM’s satisfaction during said period, the additional Collateral requirement shall reflect the Market Participant’s anticipated exposure based on the information provided. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any additional Collateral requested by PJM in a Collateral Call must be provided by the Market Participant within the applicable cure period.

In the event PJM determines that an Market Participant and/or its Guarantor presents an unreasonable credit risk, as described above, that warrants a requirement to provide Collateral of any type, or some action to mitigate risk, PJM shall provide the Market Participant with a written explanation of why such final determination was made.
PJM has the right at any time to modify any Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or require additional Collateral as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support current or anticipated market activity as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q, sections II.A.2 and II.C.1.b. Failure to remit the required amount of additional Collateral within the applicable cure period shall constitute an Event of Default.

F. Collateral and Credit Restrictions

PJM may establish certain restrictions on available credit by requiring that some amounts of credit, i.e. Restricted Collateral, may not be available to satisfy credit requirements. Such designations shall be construed to be applicable to the calculation of credit requirements only, and shall not restrict PJM’s ability to apply such designated credit to any obligation(s) in case of a default. Any such Restricted Collateral will be held by PJM, as applicable. Such Restricted Collateral will not be returned to the Participant until PJM has determined that the risk for which such Restricted Collateral is being held has subsided or been resolved.

PJM may post on PJM's web site, and may reference on OASIS, a supplementary document which contains additional business practices (such as algorithms for credit scoring) that are not included in this Attachment Q. Changes to the supplementary document will be subject to stakeholder review and comment prior to implementation. PJM may specify a required compliance date, not less than fifteen (15) calendar days from notification, by which time all Participants and their Guarantors must comply with provisions that have been revised in the supplementary document.

PJM will regularly post each Participant’s and/or its Guarantor’s credit requirements and credit provisions on the PJM web site in a secure, password-protected location. Each Participant and/or its Guarantor is responsible for monitoring such information, and maintaining sufficient credit to satisfy the credit requirements described herein. Failure to maintain credit sufficient to satisfy the credit requirements of the Attachment Q shall constitute a Credit Breach, and the Participant will be subject to the remedies established herein and in any of the Agreements.

G. Unsecured Credit Allowance Calculation

The external rating from a Rating Agency will be used as the source for calculating the Unsecured Credit Allowance, unless no external credit rating is available in which case PJM will utilize its Internal Credit Score for such purposes. If there is a split rating between the Rating Agencies, the lower of the ratings shall apply.

Where two or more entities, including Participants, are considered Credit Affiliates, Unsecured Credit Allowances will be established for each individual Participant, subject to an aggregate maximum amount for all Credit Affiliates as provided for in Attachment Q, section II.G.3.

In its credit evaluation of Municipalities and Cooperatives, PJM may request additional information as part of the ongoing risk evaluation process and will also consider qualitative factors in determining financial strength and creditworthiness.
1. Credit Rating and Internal Credit Score

As previously described in section II.A.3 above, PJM will determine the Internal Credit Score for an Applicant, Market Participant and/or its Guarantor using the credit risk scoring methodologies contained therein. Internal Credit Scores, ranging from 1-6, for each Applicant, Market Participant and/or its Guarantor, will be determined with the following mappings:

1 = Very Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: AAA to AA-; Moody’s: Aaa to Aa3)
2 = Low Risk (S&P/Fitch: A+ to BBB+; Moody’s: A1 to Baa1)
3 = Low to Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB; Moody’s: Baa2)
4 = Medium Risk (S&P/Fitch: BBB-; Moody’s: Baa3)
5 = Medium to High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB+ to BB; Moody’s Ba1 to Ba2)
6 = High Risk (S&P/Fitch: BB- and below; Moody’s: Ba3 and below)

In instances where the external credit rating is used to calculate the unsecured credit allowance, PJM may also use the Internal Credit Score as an input into its determination of the overall risk profile of an Applicant and/or its Guarantor

2. Unsecured Credit Allowance

PJM will determine a Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance based on its external rating or its Internal Credit Score, as applicable, and the parameters in the table below. The maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance is the lower of:

(a) A percentage of the Participant’s Tangible Net Worth, as stated in the table below, with the percentage based on the Participant’s external rating or Internal Credit Score, as applicable; and

(b) A dollar cap based on the external rating or Internal Credit Score, as applicable, as stated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Credit Score</th>
<th>Risk Ranking</th>
<th>Tangible Net Worth Factor</th>
<th>Maximum Unsecured Credit Allowance ($ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00 – 1.99</td>
<td>1 – Very Low (AAA to AA-)</td>
<td>Up to 10.00%</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00 – 2.99</td>
<td>2 – Low (A+ to BBB+)</td>
<td>Up to 8.00%</td>
<td>$42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 – 3.49</td>
<td>3 – Low to Medium (BBB)</td>
<td>Up to 6.00%</td>
<td>$33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.50 – 4.49</td>
<td>4 – Medium (BBB-)</td>
<td>Up to 5.00%</td>
<td>$7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.50 – 5.49</td>
<td>5 – Medium to High (BB+ to BB)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5.49</td>
<td>6 – High (BB- and below)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If a Corporate Guaranty is utilized to establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance for a Participant, the value of a Corporate Guaranty will be the lesser of:

(a) The limit imposed in the Corporate Guaranty;

(b) The Unsecured Credit Allowance calculated for the Guarantor; and

(c) A portion of the Unsecured Credit Allowance calculated for the Guarantor in the case of Credit Affiliates.

PJM has the right at any time to modify any Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or require additional Collateral as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support current market activity. Failure to remit the required amount of additional Collateral within the applicable cure period shall be deemed an Event of Default.

PJM will maintain a posting of each Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance, along with certain other credit related parameters, on the PJM website in a secure, password-protected location. Each Participant will be responsible for monitoring such information and recognizing changes that may occur.

3. **Unsecured Credit Limits For Credit Affiliates**

If two or more Participants are Credit Affiliates and have requested an Unsecured Credit Allowance, PJM will consider the overall creditworthiness of the Credit Affiliates when determining the Unsecured Credit Allowances in order not to establish more Unsecured Credit for the Credit Affiliates collectively than the overall corporate family could support.

**Example:** Participants A and B each have a $10.0 million Corporate Guaranty from their common parent, a holding company with an Unsecured Credit Allowance calculation of $12.0 million. PJM may limit the Unsecured Credit Allowance for each Participant to $6.0 million, so the total Unsecured Credit Allowance does not exceed the corporate family total of $12.0 million.

PJM will work with the Credit Affiliates to allocate the total Unsecured Credit Allowance among the Credit Affiliates while assuring that no individual Participant, nor common guarantor, exceeds the Unsecured Credit Allowance appropriate for its credit strength. The aggregate Unsecured Credit for a Participant, including Unsecured Credit Allowance granted based on its own creditworthiness and risk profile, and any Unsecured Credit Allowance conveyed through a Guaranty shall not exceed $50 million. The aggregate Unsecured Credit for a Credit Affiliates corporate family shall not exceed $50 million. A Credit Affiliate corporate family subject to this cap shall request PJM to allocate the maximum Unsecured Credit amongst the corporate family, assuring that no individual Participant or common guarantor, shall exceed the Unsecured Credit level appropriate for its credit strength and activity.

H. **Contesting an Unsecured Credit Evaluation**
PJM will provide to a Participant, upon request, a written explanation for any determination of or change in Unsecured Credit or credit requirement within ten (10) Business Days of receiving such request.

If a Participant believes that either its level of Unsecured Credit or its credit requirement has been incorrectly determined, according to this Attachment Q, then the Participant may send a request for reconsideration in writing to PJM. Such a request should include:

(1) A citation to the applicable section(s) of this Attachment Q along with an explanation of how the respective provisions of this Attachment Q were not carried out in the determination as made; and

(2) A calculation of what the Participant believes should be the appropriate Unsecured Credit or Collateral requirement, according to terms of this Attachment Q.

PJM will provide a written response as promptly as practical, but no more than ten (10) Business Days after receipt of the request. If the Participant still feels that the determination is incorrect, then the Participant may contest that determination. Such contest should be in written form, addressed to PJM, and should contain:

(1) A complete copy of the Participant’s earlier request for reconsideration, including citations and calculations;

(2) A copy of PJM’s written response to its request for reconsideration; and

(3) An explanation of why it believes that the determination still does not comply with this Attachment Q.

PJM will investigate and will respond to the Participant with a final determination on the matter as promptly as practical, but no more than twenty (20) Business Days after receipt of the request.

Neither requesting reconsideration nor contesting the determination following such request shall relieve or delay Participant's responsibility to comply with all provisions of this Attachment Q, including without limitation posting Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral in response to a Collateral Call.

If a Corporate Guaranty is being utilized to establish credit for a Participant, the Guarantor will be evaluated and the Unsecured Credit Allowance granted, if any, based on the financial strength and creditworthiness, and risk profile of the Guarantor. Any utilization of a Corporate Guaranty will only be applicable to non-FTR credit requirements, and will not be applicable to cover FTR credit requirements.

PJM will identify any necessary Collateral requirements and establish a Working Credit Limit for each Participant. Any Unsecured Credit Allowance will only be applicable to non-FTR credit requirements, for positions in PJM Markets other than the FTR market, because all FTR credit requirements must be satisfied by posting Collateral.
III. MINIMUM PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS

A Participant seeking to participate in any PJM Markets shall submit to PJM any information or documentation reasonably required for PJM to evaluate its experience and resources. If PJM determines, based on its review of the relevant information and after consultation with the Participant, that the Participant’s participation in any PJM Markets presents an unreasonable credit risk, PJM may reject the Participant’s application to become a Market Participant, notwithstanding applicant’s ability to meet other minimum participation criteria, registration requirements and creditworthiness requirements.

A. Annual Certification

Before they are eligible to transact in any PJM Market, all Applicants shall provide to PJM (i) an executed copy of a credit application and (ii) a copy of the annual certification set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1. As a condition to continued eligibility to transact in any PJM Market, Market Participants shall provide to PJM the annual certification set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1.

After the initial submission, the annual certification must be submitted each calendar year by all Market Participants between January 1 and April 30. PJM will accept such certifications as a matter of course and the Market Participants will not need further notice from PJM before commencing or maintaining their eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets.

A Market Participant that fails to provide its annual certification by April 30 shall be ineligible to transact in any PJM Markets and PJM will disable the Market Participant’s access to any PJM Markets until such time as PJM receives the certification. In addition, failure to provide an executed annual certification in a form acceptable to PJM and by the specified deadlines may result in a default under the Tariff.

Market Participants acknowledge and understand that the annual certification constitutes a representation upon which PJM will rely. Such representation is additionally made under the Tariff, filed with and accepted by FERC, and any false, misleading or incomplete statement knowingly made by the Market Participant and that is material to the Market Participant’s ability to perform may be considered a violation of the Tariff and subject the Market Participant to action by FERC. Failure to comply with any of the criteria or requirements listed herein or in the certification may result in suspension or limitation of a Market Participant’s transaction rights in any PJM Markets.

Applicants and Market Participants shall submit to PJM, upon request, any information or documentation reasonably and/or legally required to confirm Applicant’s or Market Participant’s compliance with the Agreements and the annual certification.

B. PJM Market Participation Eligibility Requirements
PJM may conduct periodic verification to confirm that Applicants and Market Participants can demonstrate that they meet the definition of “appropriate person” to further ensure minimum criteria are in place. Such demonstration will consist of the submission of evidence and an executed Annual Officer Certification form as set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1 in a form acceptable to PJM. If an Applicant or Market Participant does not provide sufficient evidence for verification to PJM within five (5) Business Days of written request, then such Applicant or Market Participant may result in a default under this Tariff. Demonstration of “appropriate person” status and support of other certifications on the annual certification is one part of the Minimum Participation Requirements for any PJM Markets and does not obviate the need to meet the other Minimum Participation Requirements such as those for minimum capitalization and risk profile as set forth in this Attachment Q.

To be eligible to transact in any PJM Markets, an Applicant or Participant must demonstrate in accordance with the Risk Management and Verification processes set forth below that it qualifies in one of the following ways:

1. an “appropriate person,” as that term is defined under Commodity Exchange Act, section 4(c)(3), or successor provision, or;

2. an “eligible contract participant,” as that term is defined in Commodity Exchange Act, section 1a(18), or successor provision, or;

3. a business entity or person who is in the business of: (1) generating, transmitting, or distributing electric energy, or (2) providing electric energy services that are necessary to support the reliable operation of the transmission system, or;

4. an Applicant or Market Participant seeking eligibility as an “appropriate person” providing an unlimited Corporate Guaranty in a form acceptable to PJM as described in section V below from a Guarantor that has demonstrated it is an “appropriate person,” and has at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per Applicant and Market Participant for which the Guarantor has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty, or;

5. an Applicant or Market Participant providing a Letter of Credit of at least $5 million to PJM in a form acceptable to PJM as described in section V below, that the Applicant or Market Participant acknowledges is separate from, and cannot be applied to meet, its credit requirements to PJM, or;

6. an Applicant or Market Participant providing a surety bond of at least $5 million to PJM in a form acceptable to PJM as described in section V below, that the Applicant or Market Participant acknowledges is separate from, and cannot be applied to meet, its credit requirements to PJM.

If, at any time, a Market Participant cannot meet the eligibility requirements set forth above, it shall immediately notify PJM and immediately cease conducting transactions in any PJM Markets. PJM may terminate a Market Participant’s transaction rights in any PJM Markets if, at
any time, it becomes aware that the Market Participant does not meet the minimum eligibility requirements set forth above.

In the event that a Market Participant is no longer able to demonstrate it meets the minimum eligibility requirements set forth above, and possesses, obtains or has rights to possess or obtain, any open or forward positions in any PJM Markets, PJM may take any such action it deems necessary with respect to such open or forward positions, including, but not limited to, liquidation, transfer, assignment or sale; provided, however, that the Market Participant will, notwithstanding its ineligibility to participate in any PJM Markets, be entitled to any positive market value of those positions, net of any obligations due and owing to PJM.

C. Risk Management and Verification

All Market Participants must maintain current written risk management policies, procedures, or controls to address how market and credit risk is managed, and are required to submit to PJM (at the time they make their annual certification) a copy of their current governing risk control policies, procedures and controls applicable to their market activities. PJM will review such documentation to verify that it appears generally to conform to prudent risk management practices for entities participating in any PJM Markets.

All Market Participants subject to this provision shall make a one-time payment of $1,500.00 to PJM to cover administrative costs. Thereafter, if such Participant’s risk policies, procedures and controls applicable to its market activities change substantively, it shall submit such modified documentation, with applicable administrative charge determined by PJM, to PJM for review and verification at the time it makes its annual certification. All Market Participant’s continued eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets is conditioned on PJM notifying a Participant that its annual certification, including the submission of its risk policies, procedures and controls, has been accepted by PJM. PJM may retain outside expertise to perform the review and verification function described in this section, however, in all circumstances, PJM and any third-party it may retain will treat as confidential the documentation provided by a Participant under this section, consistent with the applicable provisions of the Operating Agreement.

Participants must demonstrate that they have implemented prudent risk management policies and procedures in order to be eligible to participate in any PJM Markets. Participants must demonstrate on at least an annual basis that they have implemented and maintained prudent risk management policies and procedures in order to continue to participate in any PJM Markets. Upon written request, the Participant will have fourteen (14) calendar days to provide to PJM current governing risk management policies, procedures, or controls applicable to Participant’s activities in any PJM Markets.

D. Capitalization

In advance of certification, Applicants shall meet the minimum capitalization requirements below. In addition to the annual certification requirements in Attachment Q, Appendix 1, a Market Participant shall satisfy the minimum capitalization requirements on an annual basis thereafter. A Participant must demonstrate that it meets the minimum financial requirements
appropriate for the PJM Markets in which it transacts by satisfying either the minimum capitalization or the provision of Collateral requirements listed below:

1. **Minimum Capitalization**

Minimum capitalization may be met by demonstrating minimum levels of Tangible Net Worth or tangible assets. FTR Participants must demonstrate a Tangible Net Worth in excess of $1 million or tangible assets in excess of $10 million. Other Market Participants must demonstrate a Tangible Net Worth in excess of $500,000 or tangible assets in excess of $5 million.

(a) Consideration of tangible assets and Tangible Net Worth shall exclude assets which PJM reasonably believes to be restricted, highly risky, or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of default. Examples include, but are not limited to, restricted assets, derivative assets, goodwill, and other intangible assets.

(b) Demonstration of “tangible” assets and Tangible Net Worth may be satisfied through presentation of an acceptable Corporate Guaranty, provided that both:

   (i) the Guarantor is a Credit Affiliate company that satisfies the Tangible Net Worth or tangible assets requirements herein, and;

   (ii) the Corporate Guaranty is either unlimited or at least $500,000.

If the Corporate Guaranty presented by the Participant to satisfy these capitalization requirements is limited in value, then the Participant’s resulting Unsecured Credit Allowance shall be the lesser of:

(1) the applicable Unsecured Credit Allowance available to the Participant by the Corporate Guaranty pursuant to the creditworthiness provisions of this Attachment Q, or,

(2) the face value of the Corporate Guaranty, reduced by $500,000 and further reduced by 10%. (For example, a $10.5 million Corporate Guaranty would be reduced first by $500,000 to $10 million and then further reduced 10% more to $9 million. The resulting $9 million would be the Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance available through the Corporate Guaranty).

In the event that a Participant provides Collateral in addition to a limited Corporate Guaranty to increase its available credit, the value of such Collateral shall be reduced by 10%. This reduced value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.
Demonstrations of minimum capitalization (minimum Tangible Net Worth or tangible assets) must be presented in the form of audited financial statements for the Participant’s most recent fiscal year during the initial risk evaluation process and ongoing risk evaluation process.

2. **Provision of Collateral**

If a Participant does not demonstrate compliance with its applicable minimum capitalization requirements above, it may still qualify to participate in any PJM Markets by posting Collateral, additional Collateral, and/or Restricted Collateral, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

Any Collateral provided by a Participant unable to satisfy the minimum capitalization requirements above will also be restricted in the following manner:

(a) Collateral provided by Market Participants that engage in FTR transactions shall be reduced by an amount of the current risk plus any future risk to any PJM Markets and PJM membership in general, and may coincide with limitations on market participation. The amount of this Restricted Collateral shall not be available to cover any credit requirements from market activity. The remaining value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.

(b) Collateral provided by other Participants that engage in Virtual Transactions or Export Transactions shall be reduced by $200,000 and then further reduced by 10%. The amount of this Restricted Collateral shall not be available to cover any credit requirements from market activity. The remaining value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.

(c) Collateral provided by other Participants that do not engage in Virtual Transactions or Export Transactions shall be reduced by 10%. The amount of this Restricted Collateral shall not be available to cover any credit requirements from market activity. The remaining value shall be considered the amount available to satisfy requirements of this Attachment Q.

In the event a Participant that satisfies the minimum capital requirement through provision of Collateral also provides a Corporate Guaranty to increase its available credit, then the Participant’s resulting Unsecured Credit Allowance conveyed through such Corporate Guaranty shall be the lesser of:

(a) the applicable Unsecured Credit Allowance available to the Participant by the Corporate Guaranty pursuant to the creditworthiness provisions of this Attachment Q; or

(b) the face value of the Corporate Guaranty, reduced commensurate with the amount of the current risk plus any anticipated future risk to any PJM Markets and PJM membership in general, and may coincide with limitations on market participation.
IV. ONGOING COVENANTS

A. Ongoing Obligation to Provide Information to PJM

So long as a Participant is eligible to participate, or participates or holds positions, in any PJM Markets, it shall deliver to PJM, in form and detail satisfactory to PJM:

(1) All financial statements and other financial disclosures as required by section II.E.2 by the deadline set forth therein;

(2) Notice, within five (5) Business Days, of any Principal becoming aware that the Participant does not meet the Minimum Participation Requirements set forth in section III;

(3) Notice when any Principal becomes aware of any matter that has resulted or would reasonably be expected to result in a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of the Participant or its Guarantor, if any, a description of such Material Adverse Change in detail reasonable to allow PJM to determine its potential effect on, or any change in, the Participant’s risk profile as a participant in any PJM Markets, by the deadline set forth in section II.E.3 above;

(4) Notice, within the deadline set forth therein, of any Principal becoming aware of a litigation or contingency event described in section II.E.4, or of a Material Adverse Change in any such litigation or contingency event previously disclosed to PJM, information in detail reasonable to allow PJM to determine its potential effect on, or any change in, the Market Participant’s risk profile as a participant in any PJM Markets by the deadline set forth therein;

(5) Notice, within two (2) Business Days after any Principal becomes aware of a Credit Breach, Financial Default, or Credit Support Default, that includes a description of such default or event and the Participant’s proposals for addressing the default or event;

(6) As soon as available but not later than April 30th of any calendar year, the annual Certification described in section II.E.4 in a form set forth in Attachment Q, Appendix 1;

(7) Concurrently with submission of the annual certification, demonstration that the Participant meets the minimum capitalization requirements set forth in section III.D;

(8) Concurrently with submission of the annual certification and within the applicable deadline of any substantive change, or within the applicable deadline of a request from PJM, a copy of the Participant’s written risk management policies, procedures or controls addressing how the Participant manages market and credit risk in the PJM Markets in which it participates, as well as a high level summary by the chief risk officer or other Principal regarding any material violations, breaches, or compliance or disciplinary actions related to the risk management policies, by the Participant under the policies, procedures or controls within the prior 12 months, as set forth in section IV.B below;

(9) Within five (5) Business Days of request by PJM, evidence demonstrating the Participant meets the definition of “appropriate person” or “eligible contract participant,” as those terms are defined in the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC regulations promulgated thereunder, or of any other certification in the annual Certification; or
Within a reasonable time after PJM requests, any other information or documentation reasonably and/or legally required by PJM to confirm Participant’s compliance with the Tariff and its eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets.

Participants acknowledge and understand that the deliveries constitute representations upon which PJM will rely in allowing the Participant to continue to participate in its markets, with the Internal Credit Score and Unsecured Credit Allowance, if any, previously determined by PJM.

B. Risk Management Review

PJM shall also conduct a periodic compliance verification process to review and verify, as applicable, Participants’ risk management policies, practices, and procedures pertaining to the Participant’s activities in any PJM Markets. PJM shall review such documentation to verify that it appears generally to conform to prudent risk management practices for entities trading in any PJM Markets. Participant shall also provide a high level summary by the chief risk officer or other Principal regarding any material violations, breaches, or compliance or disciplinary actions in connection with such risk management policies, practices and procedures within the prior twelve (12) months.

If a third-party industry association publishes or modifies principles or best practices relating to risk management in North American markets for electricity, natural gas or electricity-related commodity products, PJM may, following stakeholder discussion and with no less than six (6) months prior notice to stakeholders, consider such principles or best practices in evaluating the Participant’s risk controls.

PJM will prioritize the verification of risk management policies based on a number of criteria, including but not limited to how long the entity has been in business, the Participant’s and its Principals’ history of participation in any PJM Markets, and any other information obtained in determining the risk profile of the Participant.

Each Participant’s continued eligibility to participate in any PJM Markets is conditioned upon PJM notifying the Participant of successful completion of PJM’s verification of the Participant’s risk management policies, practices and procedures, as discussed herein. However, if PJM notifies the Participant in writing that it could not successfully complete the verification process, PJM shall allow such Participant fourteen (14) calendar days to provide sufficient evidence for verification prior to declaring the Participant as ineligible to continue to participate in any PJM Markets, which declaration shall be in writing with an explanation of why PJM could not complete the verification. If the Participant does not provide sufficient evidence for verification to PJM within the required cure period, such Participant will be considered in default under this Tariff. PJM may retain outside expertise to perform the review and verification function described in this paragraph. PJM and any third party it may retain will treat as confidential the documentation provided by a Participant under this paragraph, consistent with the applicable provisions of the Agreements. If PJM retains such outside expertise, a Participant may direct in writing that PJM perform the risk management review and verification for such Participant instead of utilizing a third party, provided however, that employees and contract employees of PJM and PJM shall not be considered to be such outside expertise or third parties.

Participants are solely responsible for the positions they take and the obligations they assume in any PJM Markets. PJM hereby disclaims any and all responsibility to any Participant or PJM
Member associated with Participant’s submitting or failure to submit its annual certification or PJM’s review and verification of a Participant’s risk policies, procedures and controls. Such review and verification is limited to demonstrating basic compliance by a Participant showing the existence of written policies, procedures and controls to limit its risk in any PJM Markets and does not constitute an endorsement of the efficacy of such policies, procedures or controls.

V. FORMS OF CREDIT SUPPORT

In order to satisfy their PJM credit requirements Participants may provide credit support in a PJM-approved form and amount pursuant to the guidelines herein, provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, a Market Participant in PJM’s FTR markets shall meet its credit support requirements related to those FTR markets with either cash or Letters of Credit.

Unless otherwise restricted by PJM, credit support provided may be used by PJM to secure the payment of Participant’s financial obligations under the Agreements.

Collateral which may no longer be required to be maintained under provisions of the Agreements, shall be returned at the request of a Participant, no later than two (2) Business Days following determination by PJM within a commercially reasonable period of time that such Collateral is not required.

Except when an Event of Default has occurred, a Participant may substitute an approved PJM form of Collateral for another PJM approved form of Collateral of equal value.

A. Cash Deposit

Cash provided by a Participant as Collateral will be held in a depository account by PJM. Interest shall accrue to the benefit of the Participant, provided that PJM may require Participants to provide appropriate tax and other information in order to accrue such interest credits.

PJM may establish an array of investment options among which a Participant may choose to invest its cash deposited as Collateral. The depository account shall be held in PJM’s name in a banking or financial institution acceptable to PJM. Where practicable, PJM may establish a means for the Participant to communicate directly with the bank or financial institution to permit the Participant to direct certain activity in the PJM account in which its Collateral is held. PJM will establish and publish procedural rules, identifying the investment options and respective discounts in Collateral value that will be taken to reflect any liquidation, market and/or credit risk presented by such investments.

Cash Collateral may not be pledged or in any way encumbered or restricted from full and timely use by PJM in accordance with terms of the Agreements.

PJM has the right to liquidate all or a portion of the Collateral account balance at its discretion to satisfy a Participant’s Total Net Obligation to PJM in the Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements.
B. Letter of Credit

An unconditional, irrevocable standby Letter of Credit can be utilized to meet the Collateral requirement. As stated below, the form, substance, and provider of the Letter of Credit must all be acceptable to PJM.

1. The Letter of Credit will only be accepted from U.S.-based financial institutions or U.S. branches of foreign financial institutions (“financial institutions”) that have a minimum corporate debt rating of “A” by Standard & Poor’s or Fitch Ratings, or “A2” from Moody’s Investors Service, or an equivalent short term rating from one of these agencies. PJM will consider the lowest applicable rating to be the rating of the financial institution. If the rating of a financial institution providing a Letter of Credit is lowered below A/A2 by any Rating Agency, then PJM may require the Participant to provide a Letter of Credit from another financial institution that is rated A/A2 or better, or to provide a cash deposit. If a Letter of Credit is provided from a U.S. branch of a foreign institution, the U.S. branch must itself comply with the terms of this Attachment Q, including having its own acceptable credit rating.

2. The Letter of Credit shall state that it shall renew automatically for successive one-year periods, until terminated upon at least ninety (90) calendar days prior written notice from the issuing financial institution. If PJM or PJM receives notice from the issuing financial institution that the current Letter of Credit is being cancelled or expiring, the Participant will be required to provide evidence, acceptable to PJM, that such Letter of Credit will be replaced with appropriate Collateral, effective as of the cancellation date of the Letter of Credit, no later than thirty (30) calendar days before the cancellation date of the Letter of Credit, and no later than ninety (90) calendar days after the notice of cancellation. Failure to do so will constitute a default under this Attachment Q and one or more of the Agreements.

3. PJM will post on its web site an acceptable standard form of a Letter of Credit that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to submit a Letter of Credit to establish credit at PJM. If the Letter of Credit varies in any way from the standard format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJM. All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a Letter of Credit and meeting the Attachment Q provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

4. PJM may accept a Letter of Credit from a financial institution that does not meet the credit standards of this Attachment Q provided that the Letter of Credit has third-party support, in a form acceptable to PJM, from a financial institution that does meet the credit standards of this Attachment Q.

C. Corporate Guaranty

An irrevocable and unconditional Corporate Guaranty may be utilized to establish an Unsecured Credit Allowance for a Participant. Such credit will be considered a transfer of Unsecured Credit from the Guarantor to the Participant, and will not be considered a form of Collateral.
PJM will post on its web site an acceptable form that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to establish its credit with a Corporate Guaranty. If the Corporate Guaranty varies in any way from the PJM format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJM before it may be applied to satisfy the Participant’s credit requirements. The Corporate Guaranty must be signed by an officer of the Guarantor, and must demonstrate that it is duly authorized in a manner acceptable to PJM. Such demonstration may include either a corporate seal on the Corporate Guaranty itself, or an accompanying executed and sealed secretary’s certificate from the Guarantor’s corporate secretary noting that the Guarantor was duly authorized to provide such Corporate Guaranty and that the person signing the Corporate Guaranty is duly authorized, or other manner acceptable to PJM. PJM will evaluate the creditworthiness of a Guarantor and will establish any Unsecured Credit granted through a Corporate Guaranty using the methodology and requirements established for Participants requesting an Unsecured Credit Allowance as described herein. Foreign Guaranties and Canadian Guaranties shall be subject to additional requirements as established herein. If PJM determines at any time that a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of the Guarantor has occurred, or if the Corporate Guaranty comes within thirty (30) calendar days of expiring without renewal, PJM may reduce or eliminate any Unsecured Credit afforded to the Participant through the guaranty. Such reduction or elimination may require the Participant to provide Collateral within the applicable cure period. If the Participant fails to provide the required Collateral, the Participant shall be in default under this Attachment Q.

All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a Corporate Guaranty and meeting the Attachment Q provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

1. **Foreign Guaranties**

A Foreign Guaranty is a Corporate Guaranty that is provided by a Credit Affiliate entity that is domiciled in a country other than the United States or Canada. The entity providing a Foreign Guaranty on behalf of a Participant is a Foreign Guarantor. A Participant may provide a Foreign Guaranty in satisfaction of part of its credit obligations or voluntary credit provision at PJM provided that all of the following conditions are met:

PJM reserves the right to deny, reject, or terminate acceptance of any Foreign Guaranty at any time, including for material adverse circumstances or occurrences.

(a) A Foreign Guaranty:
   (i) Must contain provisions equivalent to those contained in PJM’s standard form of Foreign Guaranty with any modifications subject to review and approval by PJM counsel.
   (ii) Must be denominated in US currency.
   (iii) Must be written and executed solely in English, including any duplicate originals.
   (iv) Will not be accepted towards a Participant’s Unsecured Credit Allowance for more than the following limits, depending on the Foreign Guarantor’s credit rating:
(v) May not exceed 50% of the Participant’s total credit, if the Foreign Grantor is rated less than BBB+.

(b) A Foreign Guarantor:
   (i) Must satisfy all provisions of this Attachment Q applicable to domestic Guarantors.
   (ii) Must be a Credit Affiliate of the Participant.
   (iii) Must maintain an agent for acceptance of service of process in the United States; such agent shall be situated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, absent legal constraint.
   (iv) Must be rated by at least one Rating Agency acceptable to PJM; the credit strength of a Foreign Guarantor may not be determined based on an evaluation of its audited financial statements without an actual credit rating as well.
   (v) Must have a senior unsecured (or equivalent, in PJM’s sole discretion) rating of BBB (one notch above BBB-) or greater by any and all agencies that provide rating coverage of the entity.
   (vi) Must provide audited financial statements, in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM, with clear representation of net worth, intangible assets, and any other information PJM may require in order to determine the entity’s Unsecured Credit Allowance.
   (vii) Must provide a Secretary’s Certificate from the Participant’s corporate secretary certifying the adoption of Corporate Resolutions:
         1. Authorizing and approving the Guaranty; and
         2. Authorizing the Officers to execute and deliver the Guaranty on behalf of the Guarantor.
   (viii) Must be domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign (or equivalent) rating of AA+/Aa1, with the following conditions:
         1. Sovereign ratings must be available from at least two rating agencies acceptable to PJM (e.g. S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS).
         2. Each agency’s sovereign rating for the domicile will be considered to be the lowest of: country ceiling, senior unsecured government debt, long-term foreign currency sovereign rating, long-term local currency sovereign rating, or other equivalent measures, at PJM’s sole discretion.
         3. Whether ratings are available from two or three agencies, the lowest of the two or three will be used.
   (ix) Must be domiciled in a country that recognizes and enforces judgments of US courts.

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<th>Rating of Foreign Guarantor</th>
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<th>Maximum Accepted Guaranty if Country Rating is AA+</th>
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(x) Must demonstrate financial commitment to activity in the United States as evidenced by one of the following:

1. American Depository Receipts (ADR) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ.
2. Equity ownership worth over USD 100,000,000 in the wholly-owned or majority owned subsidiaries in the United States.

(xi) Must satisfy all other applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and/or Operating Agreement, including this Attachment Q.

(xii) Must pay for all expenses incurred by PJM related to reviewing and accepting a foreign guaranty beyond nominal in-house credit and legal review.

(xiii) Must, at its own cost, provide PJM with independent legal opinion from an attorney/solicitor of PJM’s choosing and licensed to practice law in the United States and/or Guarantor’s domicile, in form and substance acceptable to PJM in its sole discretion, confirming the enforceability of the Foreign Guaranty, the Guarantor’s legal authorization to grant the Guaranty, the conformance of the Guaranty, Guarantor, and Guarantor's domicile to all of these requirements, and such other matters as PJM may require in its sole discretion.

2. Canadian Guaranties

The entity providing a Canadian Guaranty on behalf of a Participant is a Canadian Guarantor. A Participant may provide a Canadian Guaranty in satisfaction of part of its credit obligations or voluntary credit provision at PJM provided that all of the following conditions are met.

PJM reserves the right to deny, reject, or terminate acceptance of any Canadian Guaranty at any time for reasonable cause, including material adverse circumstances or occurrences.

(a) A Canadian Guaranty:

(i) Must contain provisions equivalent to those contained in PJM’s standard form of Foreign Guaranty with any modifications subject to review and approval by PJM counsel.

(ii) Must be denominated in US currency.

(iii) Must be written and executed solely in English, including any duplicate originals.

(b) A Canadian Guarantor:

(i) Must be a Credit Affiliate of the Participant.

(ii) Must satisfy all provisions of this Attachment Q applicable to domestic Guarantors.

(iii) Must maintain an agent for acceptance of service of process in the United States; such agent shall be situated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, absent legal constraint.

(iv) Must be rated by at least one Rating Agency acceptable to PJM; the credit strength of a Canadian Guarantor may not be determined based on an evaluation of its audited financial statements without an actual credit rating as well.

(v) Must provide audited financial statements, in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM with clear representation of net worth, intangible assets,
and any other information PJM may require in order to determine the entity’s Unsecured Credit Allowance.

(vi) Must satisfy all other applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and/or Operating Agreement, including this Attachment Q.

D. Surety Bond

An unconditional, irrevocable surety bond can be utilized to meet the Collateral requirement for Participants. As stated below, the form, substance, and provider of the surety bond must all be acceptable to PJM.

(i) An acceptable surety bond must be payable immediately upon demand without prior demonstration of the validity of the demand. The surety bond will only be accepted from a U.S. Treasury-listed approved surety that has either (i) a minimum corporate debt rating of “A” by Standard & Poor’s or Fitch Ratings, or “A2” from Moody’s Investors Service, or an equivalent short term rating from one of these agencies, or (ii) a minimum insurer rating of “A” by A.M. Best. PJMSettlement will consider the lowest applicable rating to be the rating of the surety. If the rating of a surety providing a surety bond is lowered below A/A2 by any rating agency, then PJMSettlement may require the Participant to provide a surety bond from another surety that is rated A/A2 or better, or to provide another form of Collateral.

(ii) The surety bond shall have an initial period of at least one year, and shall state that it shall renew automatically for successive one-year periods, until terminated upon at least ninety (90) days prior written notice from the issuing surety. If PJM receives notice from the issuing surety that the current surety bond is being cancelled, the Participant will be required to provide evidence, acceptable to PJM, that such surety bond will be replaced with appropriate Collateral, effective as of the cancellation date of the surety bond, no later than thirty (30) days before the cancellation date of the surety bond, and no later than ninety (90) days after the notice of cancellation. Failure to do so will constitute a default under this Attachment Q and one of more of the Agreements enabling PJM to immediately demand payment of the full value of the surety bond.

(iii) PJM will post on its web site an acceptable standard form of a surety bond that should be utilized by a Participant choosing to submit a surety bond to establish credit at PJM. The acceptable standard form of surety bond will include non-negotiable provisions, including but not be limited to, a payment on demand feature, requirement that the bond be construed pursuant to Pennsylvania law, making the surety’s obligation to pay out on the bond absolute and unconditional irrespective of the principal’s (Market Participant’s) bankruptcy, terms of any other agreements, investigation of the Market Participant by any entity or governmental authority, or PJM first attempting to collect payment from the Market Participant, and will require, among other things, that (a) the surety waive all rights that would be available to a principal or surety under the law, including
but not limited to any right to investigate or verify any matter related to a demand for payment, rights to set-off amounts due by PJM to the Market Participant, and all counterclaims, (b) the surety expressly waive all of its and the principal’s defenses, including illegality, fraud in the inducement, reliance on statements or representations of PJM and every other typically available defense; (c) the language of the bond that is determinative of the surety’s obligation, and not the underlying agreement or arrangement between the principal and the obligee; (d) the bond shall not be conditioned on PJM first resorting to any other means of security or collateral, or pursuing any other remedies it may have; and (e) the surety acknowledge the continuing nature of its obligations in the event of termination or nonrenewal of the surety bond to make clear the surety remains liable for any obligations that arose before the effective date of its notice of cancellation of the surety bond. If the surety bond varies in any way from the standard format, it must first be reviewed and approved by PJM. PJM shall not accept any surety bond that varies in any material way from the standard format.

(iv) All costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a surety bond and meeting the Attachment Q provisions are the responsibility of the Participant.

(v) PJM shall not accept surety bonds with an aggregate value greater than $10 million dollars ($10,000,000) issued by any individual surety on behalf of any individual Participant.

(vi) PJM shall not accept surety bonds with an aggregate value greater than $50 million dollars ($50,000,000) issued by any individual surety.

E.  PJM Administrative Charges

Collateral or credit support held by PJM shall also secure obligations to PJM for PJM administrative charges, and may be liquidated to satisfy all such obligations in an Event of Default.

F.  Collateral and Credit Support Held by PJM

Collateral or credit support submitted by Participants and held by PJM shall be held by PJM for the benefit of PJM.

VI.  SUPPLEMENTAL CREDIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SCREENED TRANSACTIONS

A.  Virtual and Export Transaction Screening

1.  Credit for Virtual and Export Transactions

Export Transactions and Virtual Transactions both utilize Credit Available for Virtual Transactions to support their credit requirements.
PJM does not require a Market Participant to establish separate or additional credit for submitting Virtual or Export Transactions; however, once transactions are submitted and accepted by PJM, PJM may require credit supporting those transactions to be held until the transactions are completed and their financial impact incorporated into the Market Participant’s Obligations. If a Market Participant chooses to establish additional Collateral and/or Unsecured Credit Allowance in order to increase its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions, the Market Participant’s Working Credit Limit for Virtual Transactions shall be increased in accordance with the definition thereof. The Collateral and/or Unsecured Credit Allowance available to increase a Market Participant’s Credit Available for Virtual Transactions shall be the amount of Collateral and/or Unsecured Credit Allowance available after subtracting any credit required for Minimum Participation Requirements, FTR, RPM or other credit requirement determinants defined in this Attachment Q, as applicable.

If a Market Participant chooses to provide additional Collateral in order to increase its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions PJM may establish a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed three months, for which such Collateral must be maintained. PJM will not impose such restriction on a deposit unless a Market Participant is notified prior to making the deposit. Such restriction, if applied, shall be applied to all future deposits by all Market Participants engaging in Virtual Transactions.

A Market Participant may increase its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions by providing additional Collateral to PJM. PJM will make a good faith effort to make new Collateral available as Credit Available for Virtual Transactions as soon as practicable after confirmation of receipt. In any event, however, Collateral received and confirmed by noon on a Business Day will be applied (as provided under this Attachment Q) to Credit Available for Virtual Transactions no later than 10:00 am on the following Business Day. Receipt and acceptance of wired funds for cash deposit shall mean actual receipt by PJM’s bank, deposit into PJM’s customer deposit account, confirmation by PJM that such wire has been received and deposited, and entry into PJM’s credit system. Receipt and acceptance of letters of credit or surety bonds shall mean receipt of the original Letter of Credit or surety bond, or amendment thereto, confirmation from PJM’s credit and legal staffs that such Letter of Credit or surety bond, or amendment thereto conforms to PJM’s requirements, which confirmation shall be made in a reasonable and practicable timeframe, and entry into PJM’s credit system. To facilitate this process, bidders submitting additional Collateral for the purpose of increasing their Credit Available for Virtual Transactions are advised to submit such Collateral well in advance of the desired time, and to specifically notify PJM of such submission.

A Market Participant wishing to submit Virtual or Export Transactions must allocate within PJM’s credit system the appropriate amount of Credit Available for Virtual Transactions to the virtual and export allocation sections within each customer account in which it wishes to submit such transactions.

2. Virtual Transaction Screening
All Virtual Transactions submitted to PJM shall be subject to a credit screen prior to acceptance in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The credit screen is applied separately for each of a Market Participant’s customer accounts. The credit screen process will automatically reject Virtual Transactions submitted by the Market Participant in a customer account if the Market Participant’s Credit Available for Virtual Transactions, allocated on a customer account basis, is exceeded by the Virtual Credit Exposure that is calculated based on the Market Participant’s Virtual Transactions submitted, as described below.

A Market Participant’s Virtual Credit Exposure will be calculated separately for each customer account on a daily basis for all Virtual Transactions submitted by the Market Participant for the next Operating Day using the following equation:

Virtual Credit Exposure = INC and DEC Exposure + Up-to Congestion Exposure

Where:

(a) INC and DEC Exposure for each customer account is calculated as:

(i) ((the total MWh bid or offered, whichever is greater, hourly at each node) x the Nodal Reference Price x 1 day) summed over all nodes and all hours; plus (ii) ((the difference between the total bid MWh cleared and total offered MWh cleared hourly at each node) x Nodal Reference Price) summed over all nodes and all hours for the previous cleared Day-ahead Energy Market.

(b) Up-to Congestion Exposure for each customer account is calculated as:

(i) Total MWh bid hourly for each Up-to Congestion Transaction x (price bid – Up-to Congestion Reference Price) summed over all Up-to Congestion Transactions and all hours; plus (ii) Total MWh cleared hourly for each Up-to Congestion Transaction x (cleared price – Up-to Congestion Reference Price) summed over all Up-to Congestion Transactions and all hours for the previous cleared Day-ahead Energy Market, provided that hours for which the calculation for an Up-to Congestion Transaction is negative, it shall be deemed to have a zero contribution to the sum.

3. Export Transaction Screening

Export Transactions in the Real-time Energy Market shall be subject to Export Transaction Screening. Export Transaction Screening may be performed either for the duration of the entire Export Transaction, or separately for each time interval comprising an Export Transaction. PJM will deny or curtail all or a portion (based on the relevant time interval) of an Export Transaction if that Export Transaction, or portion thereof, would otherwise cause the Market Participant's Export Credit Exposure to exceed its Credit Available for Export Transactions. Export Transaction Screening shall be applied separately for each Operating Day and shall also be applied to each Export Transaction one or more times prior to the market clearing process for each relevant time interval. Export Transaction Screening shall not apply to transactions established directly by and between PJM and a neighboring Balancing Authority for the purpose of maintaining reliability.
A Market Participant’s credit exposure for an individual Export Transaction shall be the MWh volume of the Export Transaction for each relevant time interval multiplied by each relevant Export Transaction Price Factor and summed over all relevant time intervals of the Export Transaction.

B. RPM Auction and Price Responsive Demand Credit Requirements

Settlement during any Delivery Year of cleared positions resulting or expected to result from any RPM Auction shall be included as appropriate in Peak Market Activity, and the provisions of this Attachment Q shall apply to any such activity and obligations arising therefrom. In addition, the provisions of this section shall apply to any entity seeking to participate in any RPM Auction, to address credit risks unique to such auctions. The provisions of this section also shall apply under certain circumstances to PRD Providers that seek to commit Price Responsive Demand pursuant to the provisions of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Credit requirements described herein for RPM Auctions and RPM bilateral transactions are applied separately for each customer account of a Market Participant. Market Participants wishing to participate in an RPM Auction or enter into RPM bilateral transactions must designate the appropriate amount of credit to each account in which their offers are submitted.
1. **Applicability**

A Market Participant seeking to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction based on any Capacity Resource for which there is a materially increased risk of nonperformance must satisfy the credit requirement specified herein before submitting such Sell Offer. A PRD Provider seeking to commit Price Responsive Demand for which there is a materially increased risk of non-performance must satisfy the credit requirement specified herein before it may commit the Price Responsive Demand. Credit must be maintained until such risk of non-performance is substantially eliminated, but may be reduced commensurate with the reduction in such risk, as set forth in section IV.B.3 below.

For purposes of this provision, a resource for which there is a materially increased risk of nonperformance shall mean: (i) a Planned Generation Capacity Resource; (ii) a Planned Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource; (iii) a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade; (iv) an existing or Planned Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region that at the time it is submitted in a Sell Offer has not secured firm transmission service to the border of the PJM Region sufficient to satisfy the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement; (v) Price Responsive Demand to the extent the responsible PRD Provider has not registered PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1; or (vi) a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource.

2. **Reliability Pricing Model Auction and Price Responsive Demand Credit Requirement**

Except as provided for Credit-Limited Offers below, for any resource specified in section IV.B.1 above, other than Price Responsive Demand, the credit requirement shall be the RPM Auction Credit Rate, as provided in section IV.B.4 below, times the megawatts to be offered for sale from such resource in an RPM Auction. For Qualified Transmission Upgrades, the credit requirements shall be based on the Locational Deliverability Area in which such upgrade was to increase the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit. However, the credit requirement for Planned Financed Generation Capacity Resources and Planned External Financed Generation Capacity Resources shall be one half of the product of the RPM Auction Credit Rate, as provided in section IV.B.4 below, times the megawatts to be offered for sale from such resource in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction. The RPM Auction Credit Requirement for each Market Participant shall be determined on a customer account basis, separately for each customer account of a Market Participant, and shall be the sum of the credit requirements for all such resources to be offered by such Market Participant in the auction or, as applicable, cleared by such Market Participant in the relevant auctions. For Price Responsive Demand, the credit requirement shall be based on the Nominal PRD Value (stated in Unforced Capacity terms) times the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate as set forth in section IV.B.5 below. Except for Credit-Limited Offers, the RPM Auction Credit requirement for a Market Participant will be reduced for any Delivery Year to the extent less than all of such Market Participant’s offers clear in the Base Residual Auction or any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year. Such reduction shall be proportional to the quantity, in megawatts, that failed to clear in such Delivery Year.
A Sell Offer based on a Planned Generation Capacity Resource, Planned Demand Resource, Energy Efficiency Resource or Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may be submitted as a Credit-Limited Offer. A Market Participant electing this option shall specify a maximum amount of Unforced Capacity, in megawatts, and a maximum credit requirement, in dollars, applicable to the Sell Offer. A Credit-Limited Offer shall clear the RPM Auction in which it is submitted (to the extent it otherwise would clear based on the other offer parameters and the system’s need for the offered capacity) only to the extent of the lesser of: (i) the quantity of Unforced Capacity that is the quotient of the division of the specified maximum credit requirement by the Auction Credit Rate resulting from section IV.B.4.b. below; and (ii) the maximum amount of Unforced Capacity specified in the Sell Offer. For a Market Participant electing this alternative, the RPM Auction Credit requirement applicable prior to the posting of results of the auction shall be the maximum credit requirement specified in its Credit-Limited Offer, and the RPM Auction Credit requirement subsequent to posting of the results will be the Auction Credit Rate, as provided in section IV.B.4.b. c. or d. of this Attachment Q, as applicable, times the amount of Unforced Capacity from such Sell Offer that cleared in the auction. The availability and operational details of Credit-Limited Offers shall be as described in the PJM Manuals.

As set forth in section IV.B.4 below, a Market Participant’s Auction Credit requirement shall be determined separately for each Delivery Year.

3. Reduction in Credit Requirement

As specified below, the RPM Auction Credit Rate may be reduced under certain circumstances after the auction has closed.

The Price Responsive Demand credit requirement shall be reduced as and to the extent the PRD Provider registers PRD-eligible load at a PRD Substation level to satisfy its Nominal PRD Value commitment, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1.

In addition, the RPM Auction Credit requirement for a Market Participant for any given Delivery Year shall be reduced periodically, after the Market Participant has provided PJM a written request for each reduction, accompanied by documentation sufficient for PJM to verify attainment of required milestones or satisfaction of other requirements, and PJM has verified that the Market Participant has successfully met progress milestones for its Capacity Resource that reduce the risk of non-performance, as follows:

(a) For Planned Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the RPM Auction Credit requirement will be reduced in direct proportion to the megawatts of such Demand Resource that the Resource Provider qualifies as a Capacity Resource, in accordance with the procedures established under the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(b) For Existing Generation Capacity Resources located outside the PJM Region that have not secured sufficient firm transmission to the border of the PJM Region prior to the auction in which such resource is first offered, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced in direct proportion to the megawatts of firm transmission service secured by the Market Participant.
that qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(c) For Planned Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestones</th>
<th>Increment of reduction from initial RPM Auction Credit requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Date of Interconnection Service Agreement</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Close</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Interconnection Service</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For externally financed projects, the Market Participant must submit with its request for reduction a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized independent engineer for the Financial Close, Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction, and Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered milestones.

For internally financed projects, the Market Participant must submit with its request for reduction a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer of the Market Participant for the Financial Close milestone and either a duly authorized independent engineer or Professional Engineer for the Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction and the Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered milestones.

The required certifications must be in a form acceptable to PJM, certifying that the engineer or officer, as applicable, has personal knowledge, or has engaged in a diligent inquiry to determine, that the milestone has been achieved and that, based on its review of the relevant project information, the engineer or officer, as applicable, is not aware of any information that could reasonably cause it to believe that the Capacity Resource will not be in-service by the beginning of the applicable Delivery Year. The Market Participant shall, if requested by PJM, supply to PJM on a confidential basis all records and documents relating to the engineer’s and/or officer’s certifications.

(d) For Planned External Generation Capacity Resources, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that the total percentage reduction in the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be no greater than the quotient of (i) the MWs of firm transmission service that the Market Participant has secured for the complete transmission path divided by (ii) the MWs of firm transmission service required to
qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Reduction Milestones for Planned External Generation Capacity Resources</th>
<th>Increment of reduction from initial RPM Auction Credit requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Date of the equivalent of an Interconnection Service Agreement</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Close</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Notice to Proceed and Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Interconnection Service</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To obtain a reduction in its RPM Auction Credit requirement, the Market Participant must demonstrate satisfaction of the applicable milestone in the same manner as set forth for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in subsection (c) above.

(e) For Planned Financed Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit Reduction Milestones for Planned Financed Generation Capacity Resources</th>
<th>Increment of reduction from initial RPM Auction Credit requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Notice to Proceed</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commencement of Interconnection Service</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To obtain a reduction in its RPM Auction Credit requirement, the Market Participant must demonstrate satisfaction of the applicable milestone in the same manner as set forth for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in subsection (c) above.

(f) For Planned External Financed Generation Capacity Resources, the RPM Auction Credit Requirement shall be reduced as the Capacity Resource attains the milestones stated in the following table and as further described in the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that the total percentage reduction in the RPM Auction Credit requirement, including the initial 50% reduction for being a Planned External Financed Generation Capacity Resources, shall be no greater than the quotient of (i) the MWs of firm transmission service that the Market Participant has secured for the complete transmission path divided by (ii) the MWs of firm transmission service required.
to qualify such resource under the deliverability requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

| Credit Reduction Milestones for Planned External Financed Generation Capacity |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Milestones**                  | **Increment of reduction from initial RPM Auction Credit requirement** |
| Full Notice to Proceed          | 50%                             |
| Commencement of Construction (e.g., footers poured) | 15%                             |
| Main Power Generating Equipment Delivered | 10%                             |
| Commencement of Interconnection Service | 25%                             |

To obtain a reduction in its RPM Auction Credit requirement, the Market Participant must demonstrate satisfaction of the applicable milestone in the same manner as set forth for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in subsection (c) above.

(g) For Qualifying Transmission Upgrades, the RPM Auction Credit requirement shall be reduced to 50% of the amount calculated under section IV.B.2 above beginning as of the effective date of the latest associated Interconnection Service Agreement (or, when a project will have no such agreement, an Upgrade Construction Service Agreement), and shall be reduced to zero on the date the Qualifying Transmission Upgrade is placed in service.

4. RPM Auction Credit Rate

As set forth in the PJM Manuals, a separate Auction Credit Rate shall be calculated for each Delivery Year prior to each RPM Auction for such Delivery Year, as follows:

(a) Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Auction Credit Rate shall be:

   (i) For all Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, (the greater of (A) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

   (ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the greater of ((A) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year.

   (iii) For Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the same as the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Performance Resources, but reduced to be proportional to the number of calendar days in the relevant season.
(b) Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Auction Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for supply committed in such auction shall be:

(i) For all Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the (greater of [(A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located] or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located)] times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year).

(iii) For Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the same as the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Performance Resources, but reduced to be proportional to the number of calendar days in the relevant season.

(c) For any resource not previously committed for a Delivery Year that seeks to participate in an Incremental Auction, the Auction Credit Rate shall be:

(i) For all Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, (the greater of (A) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (B) 0.24 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located or (C) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the (greater of (A) 0.5 times Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA or (B) $20/MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year.

(d) Subsequent to the posting of the results of an Incremental Auction, the Auction Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for supply committed in such auction shall be:

(i) For Base Capacity Resources: (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year, but no greater than the Auction Credit Rate previously established for such resource’s participation in such Incremental Auction pursuant to subsection (c) above) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;
(ii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the greater of [(A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the resource is located)] times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(iii) For Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the same as the Auction Credit Rate for Capacity Performance Resources, but reduced to be proportional to the number of calendar days in the relevant season.

(e) For the purposes of this section IV.B.4 and section IV.B.5 below, “Relevant LDA” means the Locational Deliverability Area in which the Capacity Performance Resource is located if a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for that Locational Deliverability Area for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

5. **Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate**

(a) For the 2018/2019 through 2022/2023 Delivery Years:

(i) Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (A) 0.3 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year, in MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;

(ii) Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for Price Responsive Demand committed in such auction shall be (the greater of (A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand load is located, in $/MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year times a final price uncertainty factor of 1.05;

(iii) For any additional Price Responsive Demand that seeks to commit in a Third Incremental Auction in response to a qualifying change in the final LDA load forecast, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be the same as the rate for Price Responsive Demand that had cleared in the Base Residual Auction; and

(iv) Subsequent to the posting of the results of the Third Incremental Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for
all Price Responsive Demand, shall be (the greater of (i) $20/MW-day or (ii) 0.2 times the Final Zonal Capacity Price for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year, but no greater than the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate previously established under subsections (a)(i), (a)(ii), or (a)(iii) of this section for such Delivery Year.

(b) For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and Subsequent Delivery Years:

(i) Prior to the posting of the results of a Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (A) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (B) $20 per MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;

(ii) Subsequent to the posting of the results from a Base Residual Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for Price Responsive Demand committed in such auction shall be (the greater of [(A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located, in $/MW-day or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located)] times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year;

(iii) For any additional Price Responsive Demand that seeks to commit in a Third Incremental Auction in response to a qualifying change in the final LDA load forecast, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate shall be (the greater of (A) 0.5 times Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (B) $20/MW-day) times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year; and

(iv) Subsequent to the posting of the results of the Third Incremental Auction, the Price Responsive Demand Credit Rate used for ongoing credit requirements for all Price Responsive Demand committed in such auction shall be the greater of [(A) $20/MW-day or (B) 0.2 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction for the Locational Deliverability Area within which the Price Responsive Demand is located or (C) the lesser of (1) 0.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day or (2) 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry (stated on an installed capacity basis) for the PJM Region for such Delivery Year or for the Relevant LDA, in $/MW-day minus (the Capacity Performance Resource Clearing Price in such Incremental Auction for the Locational Deliverability Areas within which the Price
Responsive Demand is located)] times the number of calendar days in such Delivery Year.

6. **RPM Seller Credit - Additional Form of Unsecured Credit for RPM**

In addition to the forms of credit specified elsewhere in this Attachment Q, RPM Seller Credit shall be available to Market Participants, but solely for purposes of satisfying RPM Auction Credit requirements. If a supplier has a history of being a net seller into PJM Markets, on average, over the past 12 months, then PJM will count as available Unsecured Credit twice the average of that Market Participant’s total net monthly PJM bills over the past 12 months. This RPM Seller Credit shall be subject to the cap on available Unsecured Credit as established in section II.G.3 above.

RPM Seller Credit is calculated as a single value for each Market Participant, not separately by account, and must be designated to specific customer accounts in order to be available to satisfy RPM Auction Credit requirements that are calculated in each such customer account.

7. **Credit Responsibility for Traded Planned RPM Capacity Resources**

PJM may require that credit and financial responsibility for planned Capacity Resources that are traded remain with the original party (which for these purposes, means the party bearing credit responsibility for the planned Capacity Resource immediately prior to trade) unless the receiving party independently establishes consistent with this Attachment Q, that it has sufficient credit with PJM and agrees by providing written notice to PJM that it will fully assume the credit responsibility associated with the traded planned Capacity Resource.

C. **Financial Transmission Right Auctions**

Credit requirements described herein for FTR activity are applied separately for each customer account of a Market Participant, unless specified otherwise in this section C. FTR Participants must designate the appropriate amount of credit to each separate customer account in which any activity occurs or will occur.

1. **FTR Credit Limit.**

Participants must maintain their FTR Credit Limit at a level equal to or greater than their FTR Credit Requirement for each applicable account. FTR Credit Limits will be established only by a Participant providing Collateral and designating the available credit to specific accounts.

2. **FTR Credit Requirement.**

For each Market Participant with FTR activity, PJM shall calculate an FTR Credit Requirement. The FTR Credit Requirement shall be based on FTR cost, FTR Historical Value and MWh volume, anticipated FTR activity for new Market Participants, and anticipated change in exposure for existing Market Participants newly participating in the FTR market, and may be
increased to reflect any change in exposure based on the most recent applicable FTR auction prices, as further described below.

FTR Historical Values shall be calculated separately for on-peak, off-peak, and 24-hour FTRs for each month of the year. FTR Historical Values shall be adjusted by plus or minus ten percent for cleared counter flow or prevailing flow FTRs, respectively, in order to mitigate exposure due to uncertainty and fluctuations in actual FTR value. Historical values used in the calculation of FTR Historical Values shall be adjusted when the network simulation model utilized in PJM’s economic planning process indicates that transmission congestion will decrease due to certain transmission upgrades that are in effect or planned to go into effect for the following Planning Period. The transmission upgrades to be modeled for this purpose shall only include those upgrades that, individually, or together, have 10% or more impact on the transmission congestion on an individual constraint or constraints with congestion of $5 million or more affecting a common congestion path. The adjustments to historical values shall be the dollar amount of the adjustment shown in the network simulation model.

If FTR cost less the FTR Historical Value, plus any applicable increase related to portfolio diversification as described in section C.6 below, results in a value that is less than ten cents (10¢) per MWh, the FTR Credit Requirement shall be increased to ten cents (10¢) per MWh. When calculating the portfolio MWh for this comparison, for cleared “Sell” FTRs, the MWh shall be subtracted from the portfolio total; prior to clearing, the MWh for “Sell” FTRs shall not be included in the portfolio total. FTR Credit Requirements shall be further adjusted by ARR credits available and by an amount based on portfolio diversification, if applicable. The requirement will be based on individual monthly exposures which are then used to derive a total requirement.

The FTR Credit Requirement shall be calculated by first adding for each month the FTR Monthly Credit Requirement Contribution for each submitted, accepted, and cleared FTR and then subtracting the prorated value of any ARRs held by the Market Participant for that month. The resulting twelve monthly subtotals represent the expected value of net payments between PJM and the Market Participant for FTR activity each month during the Planning Period. Subject to later adjustment by an amount based on portfolio diversification, if applicable, and subject to later adjustment for auction prices, the FTR Credit Requirement shall be the sum of the individual positive monthly subtotals, representing months in which net payments to PJM are expected.

3. **Rejection of FTR Bids.**

Bids submitted into an auction will be rejected if the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Requirement including such submitted bids would exceed the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Limit, or if the Market Participant fails to provide additional credit support or additional Collateral as required pursuant to provisions related to portfolio diversification and mark-to-auction.
4. **FTR Credit Collateral Returns.**

A Market Participant may request from PJM the return of any Collateral no longer required for the FTR markets. PJM is permitted to limit the frequency of such requested Collateral returns, provided that Collateral returns shall be made by PJM at least once per calendar quarter, if requested by a Market Participant.

5. **Credit Responsibility for Bilateral Transfers of FTRs.**

PJM may require that credit responsibility associated with an FTR bilaterally transferred to a new Market Participant remain with the original party (which for these purposes, means the party bearing credit responsibility for the FTR immediately prior to bilateral transfer) unless and until the receiving party independently establishes, consistent with this Attachment Q, sufficient credit with PJM and agrees through confirmation of the bilateral transfer in PJM’s FTR reporting tool that it will meet in full the credit requirements associated with the transferred FTR.

6. **Portfolio Diversification.**

Portfolio diversification shall be calculated, and the appropriate provisions herein applied, separately for each customer account of a Market Participant, and separately for each month.

Subsequent to calculating a tentative cleared solution for an FTR auction (or auction round), PJM shall determine the FTR Portfolio Auction Value for each customer account of a Market Participant, including the tentative cleared solution. Any customer accounts with such FTR Portfolio Auction Values that are negative in one or more months shall be deemed “FTR Flow Undiversified.”

For customer accounts that are FTR Flow Undiversified in a month, PJM shall increment the FTR Credit Requirement by an amount equal to three times the absolute value of the FTR Portfolio Auction Value in that month, including the tentative cleared solution. For portfolios that are FTR Flow Undiversified in months subsequent to the current planning year, these incremental amounts, calculated on a monthly basis, shall be reduced (but not below zero) by an amount up to 25% of the monthly value of ARR credits that are held by a Market Participant. Subsequent to the ARR allocation process preceding an annual FTR auction, such ARRs credits shall be reduced to zero for months associated with the ARR allocation process. PJM may recalculate such ARR credits at any time, but at a minimum shall do so subsequent to each annual FTR auction. If a reduction in such ARR credits at any time increases an FTR Participant’s FTR Credit Requirements beyond its credit available for FTR activity, the FTR Participant must increase its credit to eliminate the shortfall in the applicable customer account(s).

If the FTR Credit Requirement for any Market Participant’s customer account exceeds its credit available for FTRs as a result of these diversification requirements for the tentatively cleared portfolio of FTRs, PJM shall immediately issue a demand for additional credit, and such demand must be fulfilled before 4:00 p.m. on the Business Day following the demand. If any Market Participant does not timely satisfy such demand, PJM shall cause the removal of that Market
Participant's entire set of bids in that account for that FTR auction (or auction round) and a new cleared solution shall be calculated for the entire auction (or auction round).

If necessary, PJM shall repeat the auction clearing calculation. PJM shall repeat these portfolio diversification calculations subsequent to any secondary clearing calculation, and PJM shall require affected Market Participants to establish additional credit.

7.  FTR Administrative Charge Credit Requirement

In addition to any other credit requirements, PJM may apply a credit requirement to cover the maximum administrative fees that may be charged to a Market Participant for its bids and offers.

8.  Long-Term FTR Credit Recalculation

Long-term FTR Credit Requirement calculations shall be updated annually for known history, consistent with updating of historical values used for FTR Credit Requirement calculations in the annual auctions. If the historical value update results in an FTR Credit Requirement for any Market Participant’s customer account that exceeds its credit available for FTR activity, then PJM shall issue a Collateral Call equal to the lesser of the increase in the FTR Credit Requirement from the historical value adjustment and the credit shortfall after the historical value adjustment.

9.  Mark-to-Auction

A Mark-to-Auction Value shall be calculated separately for each customer account of a Market Participant. For each such customer account, the Mark-to-Auction Value shall be a single number equal to the sum, over all months remaining in the applicable FTR period and for all cleared FTRs in the customer account, of the most recently available cleared auction price applicable to the FTR minus the original transaction price of the FTR, multiplied by the transacted quantity.

The FTR Credit Requirement, as otherwise described above, shall be increased when the Mark-to-Auction Value is negative. The increase shall equal the absolute value of the negative Mark-to-Auction Value less the value of ARR credits that are held in the customer account and have not been used to reduce the FTR Credit Requirement prior to application of the Mark-to-Auction Value. PJM shall recalculate ARR credits held by each Market Participant after each annual FTR auction and may also recalculate such ARR credits at any other additional time intervals it deems appropriate. Application of the Mark-to-Auction Value, including the effect from ARR application, shall not decrease the FTR Credit Requirement.

For Market Participant customer accounts for which FTR bids have been submitted into the current FTR auction, if the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Requirement exceeds its credit available for FTRs as a result of the mark-to-auction requirements for the Market Participant’s portfolio of FTRs in the tentative cleared solution for an FTR auction (or auction round), PJM shall issue a Collateral Call to the Market Participant, and the Market Participant must fulfill such demand before 4:00 p.m. on the following Business Day. If a Market Participant does not
timely satisfy such Collateral Call, PJM shall, in coordination with PJM, cause the removal of all of that Market Participant’s bids in that FTR auction (or auction round), submitted from such Market Participant’s customer account, and a new cleared solution shall be calculated for the FTR auction (or auction round).

If necessary, PJM shall repeat the auction clearing calculation. PJM shall repeat these mark-to-auction calculations subsequent to any secondary clearing calculation, and PJM shall require affected Market Participants to establish additional credit.

Subsequent to final clearing of an FTR auction or an annual FTR auction round, PJM shall recalculate the FTR Credit Requirement for all FTR portfolios, and, as applicable, issue to each Market Participant an MTA Collateral Call for the total amount by which the FTR Credit Requirement exceeds the credit allocated in any of the Market Participant's accounts.

If the MTA Collateral Call is not satisfied within the applicable cure period referenced in Operating Agreement, section 15, then such Market Participant shall be restricted in all of its credit-screened transactions. Specifically, such Market Participant may not engage in any Virtual Transactions or Export Transactions, or participate in RPM Auctions or other RPM activity. Such Market Participant may engage only in the selling of open FTR positions, either in FTR auctions or bilaterally, provided such sales would reduce the Market Participant's FTR Credit Requirements. PJM shall not return any Collateral to such Market Participant, and no payment shall be due or payable to such Market Participant, until its credit shortfall is remedied. Market Participant shall allocate any excess or unallocated Collateral to any of its account in which there is a credit shortfall. Market Participants may remedy their credit shortfall at any time through provision of sufficient Collateral.

If a Market Participant fails to satisfy MTA Collateral Calls for two consecutive auctions of overlapping periods, e.g. two balance of Planning Period auctions, an annual FTR auction and a balance of Planning Period auction, or two long term FTR auctions, (for this purpose the four rounds of an annual FTR auction shall be considered a single auction), the Market Participant shall be declared in default of this Attachment Q.

VII. PEAK MARKET ACTIVITY AND WORKING CREDIT LIMIT

A. Peak Market Activity Credit Requirement

PJM shall calculate a Peak Market Activity credit requirement for each Participant. Each Participant must maintain sufficient Unsecured Credit Allowance and/or Collateral, as applicable, and subject to the provisions herein, to satisfy its Peak Market Activity credit requirement.

Peak Market Activity for Participants will be determined semi-annually, utilizing an initial Peak Market Activity, as explained below, calculated after the first complete billing week in the months of April and October. Peak Market Activity shall be the greater of the initial Peak Market Activity, or the greatest amount invoiced for the Participant’s transaction activity for all PJM Markets and services in any rolling one, two, or three week period, ending within a
respective semi-annual period. However, Peak Market Activity shall not exceed the greatest amount invoiced for the Participant’s transaction activity for all PJM Markets and services in any rolling one, two or three week period in the prior 52 weeks. Peak Market Activity shall exclude FTR Net Activity, Virtual Transactions Net Activity, and Export Transactions Net Activity.

When calculating Peak Market Activity, PJM may attribute credits for Regulation service to the days on which they were accrued, rather than including them in the month-end invoice.

The initial Peak Market Activity for Applicants will be determined by PJM based on a review of an estimate of their transactional activity for all PJM Markets and services over the next 52 weeks, which the Applicant shall provide to PJM.

The initial Peak Market Activity for Market Participants and Transmission Customers, calculated at the beginning of each semi-annual period, shall be the three-week average of all non-zero invoice totals over the previous 52 weeks. This calculation shall be performed and applied within three (3) Business Days following the day the invoice is issued for the first full billing week in the current semi-annual period.

Prepayments shall not affect Peak Market Activity unless otherwise agreed to in writing pursuant to this Attachment Q.

Peak Market Activity calculations shall take into account reductions of invoice values effectuated by early payments which are applied to reduce a Participant’s Peak Market Activity as contemplated by other terms of this Attachment Q; provided that the initial Peak Market Activity shall not be less than the average value calculated using the weeks for which no early payment was made.

A Participant may reduce its Collateral requirement by agreeing in writing (in a form acceptable to PJM) to make additional payments, including prepayments, as and when necessary to ensure that such Participant’s Total Net Obligation at no time exceeds such reduced Collateral requirement.

PJM may, at its discretion, adjust a Participant’s Peak Market Activity requirement if PJM determines that the Peak Market Activity is not representative of such Participant’s expected activity, as a consequence of known, measurable, and sustained changes. Such changes may include, but shall not be limited to when a Participant makes PJM aware of federal, state or local law that could affect the allocation of charges or credits from a Participant to another party, the loss (without replacement) of short-term load contracts, when such contracts had terms of three months or more and were acquired through state-sponsored retail load programs, but shall not include short-term buying and selling activities.

PJM may waive the credit requirements for a Participant that has no outstanding transactions and agrees in writing that it shall not, after the date of such agreement, incur obligations under any of the Agreements. Such entity’s access to all electronic transaction systems administered by PJM shall be terminated.
A Participant receiving unsecured credit may make early payments up to ten times in a rolling 52-week period in order to reduce its Peak Market Activity for credit requirement purposes. Imputed Peak Market Activity reductions for credit purposes will be applied to the billing period for which the payment was received. Payments used as the basis for such reductions must be received prior to issuance or posting of the invoice for the relevant billing period. The imputed Peak Market Activity reduction attributed to any payment may not exceed the amount of Unsecured Credit for which the Participant is eligible.

B. Working Credit Limit

PJM will establish a Working Credit Limit for each Participant against which its Total Net Obligation will be monitored. If a Participant’s Total Net Obligation approaches its Working Credit Limit, PJM may require the Participant to make an advance payment or increase its Collateral in order to maintain its Total Net Obligation below its Working Credit Limit. Except as explicitly provided herein, advance payments shall not serve to reduce the Participant’s Peak Market Activity for the purpose of calculating credit requirements.

Example: After ten (10) calendar days, and with five (5) calendar days remaining before the bill is due to be paid, a Participant approaches its $4.0 million Working Credit Limit. PJM may require a prepayment of $2.0 million in order that the Total Net Obligation will not exceed the Working Credit Limit.

If a Participant exceeds its Working Credit Limit or is required to make advance payments more than ten times during a 52-week period, PJM may require Collateral in an amount as may be deemed reasonably necessary to support its Total Net Obligation.

When calculating Total Net Obligation, PJM may attribute credits for Regulation service to the days on which they were accrued, rather than including them in the month-end invoice.

VIII. SUSPENSION OR LIMITATION ON MARKET PARTICIPATION

If PJM determines that a Participant presents an unreasonable credit risk as determined pursuant to initial or ongoing risk evaluations, as described in section II above, or in the case of any other event which, after notice, lapse of time, or both, would result in an Event of Default, PJM will take steps to mitigate the exposure of any PJM Markets, which may include, but is not limited to, requiring Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral or suspending or limiting the Market Participant’s ability to participate in the PJM Markets commensurate to the risk to any PJM Markets.

If a Participant fails to reduce or eliminate any unreasonable credit risks to PJM’s satisfaction within the applicable cure period including without limitation by posting Collateral, additional Collateral or Restricted Collateral, PJM may treat such failure as an Event of Default.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Participant that transacts in FTRs will be eligible to request that PJM exempt or exclude FTR transactions of such Participant from the effect of any such limitations on market activity established by PJM, and PJM may but shall not be required to so
exempt or exclude, any FTR transactions that the Participant reasonably demonstrates to PJM it has entered into to “hedge or mitigate commercial risk” arising from its transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market that are intended to result in the actual flow of physical energy or ancillary services in the PJM Region, as the phrase “hedge or mitigate commercial risks” is defined under the CFTC’s regulations defining the end-user exception to clearing set forth in 17 C.F.R. §50.50(c).

IX. REMEDIES FOR CREDIT BREACH, FINANCIAL DEFAULT OR CREDIT SUPPORT DEFAULT; REMEDIES FOR EVENTS OF DEFAULT

If PJM determines that a Market Participant is in Credit Breach, or that a Financial Default or Credit Support Default exists, PJM may issue to the Market Participant a breach notice and/or a Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances. At such time, PJM may also suspend payments of any amounts due to the Participant and limit, restrict or rescind the Market Participant’s privileges to participate in any or all PJM Markets under the Agreements during any such cure period. Failure to remedy the Credit Breach, Financial Default or to satisfy a Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances within the applicable cure period described in Operating Agreement, section 15.1.5, shall constitute an Event of Default. If a Participant fails to meet the requirements of this Attachment Q, but then remedies the Credit Breach, Financial Default or Credit Support Default, or satisfies a Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances within the applicable cure period, then the Participant shall be deemed to again be in compliance with this Attachment Q, so long as no other Credit Breach, Financial Default, Credit Support Default or Collateral Call or demand for additional documentation or assurances has occurred and is continuing.

Only one cure period shall apply to a single event giving rise to a Credit Breach, Financial Default or Credit Support Default. Application of Collateral towards a Financial Default, Credit Breach or Credit Support Breach shall not be considered a cure of such Credit Breach, Financial Default or Credit Support Default unless the Participant is determined by PJM to be in full compliance with all requirements of this Attachment Q after such application.

When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM may take such actions as may be required or permitted under the Agreements to protect the PJM Markets and the PJM Members, including but not limited to (a) suspension and/or termination of the Participant’s ongoing Transmission Service, (b) limitation, suspension and/or termination of participation in any PJM Markets, (c) close out and liquidation of the Market Participant’s market portfolio, exercising judgment in the manner in which this is achieved in any PJM Markets. When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM also has the immediate right to liquidate all or a portion of a Participant’s Collateral at its discretion to satisfy Total Net Obligations to PJM under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements. No remedy for an Event of Default is or shall be deemed to be exclusive of any other available remedy or remedies by contract or under applicable laws and regulations. Each such remedy shall be distinct, separate and cumulative, shall not be deemed inconsistent with or in exclusion of any other available remedy, and shall be in addition to and separate and distinct from every other remedy.
When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM may continue to retain all payments due to a Participant as a cash security for all such Participant’s obligations under the Agreements (regardless of any restrictions placed on such Participant’s use of Collateral for any account, market activity or capitalization purpose); provided, however, that an Event of Default will not be deemed cured or no longer continuing because PJM is retaining amounts due the Participant, or because PJM has not yet applied Collateral or credit support to any amounts due PJM, unless PJM determines that the Participant has again satisfied all the Collateral requirements and application requirements as a new Applicant for participation in the PJM Markets, and consistent with the requirements and limitations of Operating Agreement, section 15.

In Event of Default by a Participant, PJM may exercise any remedy or action allowed or prescribed by this Attachment Q immediately or following investigation and determination of an orderly exercise of such remedy or action. Delay in exercising any allowed remedy or action shall not preclude PJM from exercising such remedy or action at a later time.

PJM may hold a defaulting Participant’s Collateral for as long as such party’s positions exist and consistent with this Attachment Q, in order to protect the PJM Markets and PJM’s membership, and minimize or mitigate the impacts or potential impacts or risks associated with such Event of Default when an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing.

PJM may apply towards an ongoing Event of Default any amounts that are held or later become available or due to the defaulting Participant through PJM's markets and systems.

In order to cover the Participant’s Obligations, PJM may hold a Participant's Collateral indefinitely and specifically through the end of the billing period which includes the 90th day following the last day a Participant had activity, open positions, or accruing obligations (other than reconciliations and true-ups), until such Participant has satisfactorily paid any obligations invoiced through such period and until PJM determines that the Participant’s positions represent no risk exposure to the PJM Markets or the PJM Members. Obligations incurred or accrued through such period shall survive any withdrawal from PJM. When an Event of Default under this Attachment Q or one or more of the Agreements has occurred and is continuing, PJM may apply any Collateral to such Participant's Obligations, even if Participant had previously announced and effected its withdrawal from PJM.

X. FTRS UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Under the terms of the Tariff, PJM Settlement is the counterparty to all transactions in PJM Markets, including but not limited to all FTR transactions, other than (i) any bilateral transactions between Participants, or (ii) with respect to self-supplied or self-scheduled transactions reported to the Office of the Interconnection. Pursuant to the “Final Order in Response to a Petition From Certain Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations To Exempt Specified Transactions Authorized by a Tariff or Protocol Approved
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Public Utility Commission of Texas From Certain Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act Pursuant to the Authority Provided in the Act” 78 Fed. Reg. 19880 (April 2, 2013) (the “CFTC RTO/ISO Order”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) exempts transactions offered or entered into in a market administered by PJM pursuant to the Tariff, including but not limited to FTR transactions, from the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC’s rules applicable to “swaps,” with the exception of the CFTC’s general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority and scienter-based prohibitions.

Notwithstanding the CFTC RTO/ISO Order, for purposes of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”), all FTR transactions constitute “swap agreements” and/or “forward contracts,” and PJM and each FTR Participant is a “forward contract merchant” and/or a “swap participant” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of FTR transactions.

Pursuant to this Attachment Q and other provisions of the Agreements, PJM already has, and shall continue to have, the following rights (among other rights) with respect to a Market Participant’s Event of Default: (a) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Market Participant; (b) the right to immediately proceed against any Collateral provided by the Market Participant; (c) the right to set-off any obligations due or owing to that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement, or similar agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement, or similar agreement, such arrangement to constitute a “master netting agreement” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code; and (d) the right to suspend or limit that Market Participant from entering into further FTR transactions.

For the avoidance of doubt, upon the commencement of a voluntary or involuntary proceeding for a Participant under the Bankruptcy Code, and without limiting any other rights of PJM or obligations of any Participant under the Agreements, PJM may exercise any of its rights against such Participant, including, without limitation (1) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Participant, (2) the right to immediately proceed against any Collateral provided by that Participant, (3) the right to set off any obligations due and owing to that Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement and/or master netting agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Participant with respect to an FTR transaction including as a result of the actions taken by PJM pursuant to (a) above, and 4) the right to suspend or limit that Participant from entering into future FTR transactions.

For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, all transactions, including but not limited to FTR transactions, between PJM, on the one hand, and a Market Participant, on the other hand, are intended to be part of a single integrated agreement, and together with the Agreements constitute a “master netting agreement.”
Attachment Q
Appendix 1
I, ______________________________________________, a duly authorized officer of Participant, understanding that PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and PJM Settlement, Inc. ("PJM Settlement") are relying on this certification as evidence that Participant meets the minimum requirements set forth in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("PJM Tariff"), Attachment Q hereby certify that I have full authority to represent on behalf of Participant and further represent as follows, as evidenced by my initialing each representation in the space provided below:

1. All employees or agents transacting in markets or services provided pursuant to the PJM Tariff or PJM Amended and Restated Operating Agreement ("PJM Operating Agreement") on behalf of the Participant have received appropriate training and are authorized to transact on behalf of Participant. As used in this representation, the term “appropriate” as used with respect to training means training that is (i) comparable to generally accepted practices in the energy trading industry, and (ii) commensurate and proportional in sophistication, scope and frequency to the volume of transactions and the nature and extent of the risk taken by the participant.

2. Participant has written risk management policies, procedures, and controls, approved by Participant’s independent risk management function and applicable to transactions in any PJM Markets in which it participates and for which employees or agents transacting in markets or services provided pursuant to the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement have been trained, that provide an appropriate, comprehensive risk management framework that, at a minimum, clearly identifies and documents the range of risks to which Participant is exposed, including, but not limited to credit risks, liquidity risks and market risks. As used in this representation, a Participant’s “independent risk management function” can include appropriate corporate persons or bodies that are independent of the Participant’s trading functions, such as a risk management committee, a risk officer, a Participant’s board or board committee, or a board or committee of the Participant’s parent company.

   a. Participant is providing to PJM or PJM Settlement, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment Q, section III, with this Annual Officer Certification Form, a copy of its current governing risk management policies, procedures and controls applicable to its activities in any PJM Markets pursuant to Attachment Q or because there have been substantive changes made to such policies, procedures and controls applicable to its market activities since they were last provided to PJM.

   b. If the risk management policies, procedures and controls applicable to Participant’s market activities submitted to PJM or PJM Settlement were submitted prior to the current certification, Participant certifies that no substantive changes have
been made to such policies, procedures and controls applicable to its market activities
since such submission.__________

3. An FTR Participant must make either the following 3.a. or 3.b. additional representations,
evidenced by the undersigned officer initialing either the one 3.a. representation or the
four 3.b. representations in the spaces provided below:

a. Participant transacts in PJM’s FTR markets with the sole intent to hedge
congestion risk in connection with either obligations Participant has to serve load
or rights Participant has to generate electricity in the PJM Region (“physical
transactions”) and monitors all of the Participant’s FTR market activity to
endeavor to ensure that its FTR positions, considering both the size and pathways
of the positions, are either generally proportionate to or generally do not exceed
the Participant’s physical transactions, and remain generally consistent with the
Participant’s intention to hedge its physical transactions.__________

b. On no less than a weekly basis, Participant values its FTR positions and
engages in a probabilistic assessment of the hypothetical risk of such positions
using analytically based methodologies, predicated on the use of industry
accepted valuation methodologies.__________

Such valuation and risk assessment functions are performed either by persons
within Participant’s organization independent from those trading in PJM’s FTR
markets or by an outside firm qualified and with expertise in this area of risk
management.__________

Having valued its FTR positions and quantified their hypothetical risks,
Participant applies its written policies, procedures and controls to limit its risks
using industry recognized practices, such as value-at-risk limitations,
concentration limits, or other controls designed to prevent Participant from
purposefully or unintentionally taking on risk that is not commensurate or
proportional to Participant’s financial capability to manage such risk.__________

Exceptions to Participant’s written risk policies, procedures and controls
applicable to Participant’s FTR positions are documented and explain a reasoned
basis for the granting of any exception.__________

4. Participant has appropriate personnel resources, operating procedures and technical
abilities to promptly and effectively respond to all PJM and PJMSettlement
communications and directions.__________

5. Participant has demonstrated compliance with the Minimum Capitalization criteria set
forth in Tariff, Attachment Q that are applicable to any PJM Markets in which Participant
transacts, and is not aware of any change having occurred or being imminent that would
invalidate such compliance.__________
6. All Participants must certify and initial in at least one of the four sections below:

a. I certify that Participant qualifies as an “appropriate person” as that term is defined under section 4(c)(3), or successor provision, of the Commodity Exchange Act or an “eligible contract participant” as that term is defined under section 1a(18), or successor provision, of the Commodity Exchange Act. I certify that Participant will cease transacting in any PJM Markets and notify PJM and PJM Settlement immediately if Participant no longer qualifies as an “appropriate person” or “eligible contract participant.”

If providing audited financial statements, which shall be in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM, to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “appropriate person:”

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the audited financial statements provided to PJM and/or PJM Settlement present fairly, pursuant to such disclosures in such audited financial statements, the financial position of Participant as of the date of those audited financial statements. Further, I certify that Participant continues to maintain the minimum $1 million total net worth and/or $5 million total asset levels reflected in these audited financial statements as of the date of this certification. I acknowledge that both PJM and PJM Settlement are relying upon my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

If not providing audited financial statements to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “appropriate person,” Participant certifies that they qualify as an “appropriate person” under one of the entities defined in section 4(c)(3)(A)-(J) of the Commodities Exchange Act.

If providing audited financial statements, which shall be in US GAAP format or any other format acceptable to PJM, to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “eligible contract participant:”

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the audited financial statements provided to PJM and/or PJM Settlement present fairly, pursuant to such disclosures in such audited financial statements, the financial position of Participant as of the date of those audited financial statements. Further, I certify that Participant continues to maintain the minimum $1 million total net worth and/or $10 million total asset levels reflected in these audited financial statements as of the date of this certification. I acknowledge that both PJM and PJM Settlement are relying upon my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.

If not providing audited financial statements to support Participant’s certification of qualification as an “eligible contract participant,” Participant certifies that they
qualify as an “eligible contract participant” under one of the entities defined in section 1a(18)(A) of the Commodities Exchange Act. __________

b. I certify that Participant has provided an unlimited Corporate Guaranty in a form acceptable to PJM as described in Tariff, Attachment Q, section III D from an issuer that has at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per Participant for which the issuer has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty. I also certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the audited financial statements provided to PJM and/or PJMSettlement present fairly, pursuant to such disclosures in such audited financial statements, the financial position of the issuer as of the date of those audited financial statements. Further, I certify that Participant will cease transacting PJM’s Markets and notify PJM and PJMSettlement immediately if issuer of the unlimited Corporate Guaranty for Participant no longer has at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per Participant for which the issuer has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty. __________

I certify that the issuer of the unlimited Corporate Guaranty to Participant continues to have at least $1 million of total net worth or $5 million of total assets per Participant for which the issuer has issued an unlimited Corporate Guaranty. I acknowledge that PJM and PJMSettlement are relying upon my certifications to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements. __________

c. I certify that Participant fulfills the eligibility requirements of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission exemption order (78 F.R. 19880 – April 2, 2013) by being in the business of at least one of the following in the PJM Region as indicated below (initial those applicable):

1. Generating electric energy, including Participants that resell physical energy acquired from an entity generating electric energy: __________

2. Transmitting electric energy: __________

3. Distributing electric energy delivered under Point-to-Point or Network Integration Transmission Service, including scheduled import, export and wheel through transactions: __________

4. Other electric energy services that are necessary to support the reliable operation of the transmission system: __________

Description only if c(4) is initialed:
__________________________________________________________________________

Further, I certify that Participant will cease transacting in any PJM Markets and notify PJM and PJMSettlement immediately if Participant no longer performs at least one of the functions noted above in the PJM Region. I acknowledge that PJM and
PJMSettlement are relying on my certification to maintain compliance with federal energy regulatory requirements.__________

d. I certify that Participant has provided a Letter of Credit of $5 million or more to PJM or PJMSettlement in a form acceptable to PJM and/or PJMSettlement as described in Tariff, Attachment Q, section V.B that the Participant acknowledges cannot be utilized to meet its credit requirements to PJM and PJMSettlement. I acknowledge that PJM and PJMSettlement are relying on the provision of this letter of credit and my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements.__________

e. I certify that Participant has provided a surety bond of $5 million or more to PJM or PJMSettlement in a form acceptable to PJM and/or PJMSettlement as described in Tariff, Attachment Q, section V.D. that the Participant acknowledges cannot be utilized to meet its credit requirements to PJM and PJMSettlement. I acknowledge that PJM and PJMSettlement are relying on the provision of this surety bond and my certification to maintain compliance with federal regulatory requirements. __________

7. I acknowledge that I have read and understood the provisions of Tariff, Attachment Q applicable to Participant's business in any PJM Markets, including those provisions describing PJM's Minimum Participation Requirements and the enforcement actions available to PJM and PJMSettlement of a Participant not satisfying those requirements. I acknowledge that the information provided herein is true and accurate to the best of my belief and knowledge after due investigation. In addition, by signing this certification, I acknowledge the potential consequences of making incomplete or false statements in this Certification.__________

Date: _______________________________ Participant (Signature)
Print Name: _______________________________  
Title: _______________________________
Sections of the
PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective July 1, 2023

(Clean Format)
ARTICLE 1 – DEFINITIONS

Unless the context otherwise specifies or requires, capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned herein or in the Schedules hereto, or in the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement if not otherwise defined in this Agreement, for all purposes of this Agreement (such definitions to be equally applicable to both the singular and the plural forms of the terms defined). Unless otherwise specified, all references herein to Articles, Sections or Schedules, are to Articles, Sections or Schedules of this Agreement. As used in this Agreement:

Accredited UCAP:

“Accredited UCAP” shall mean the quantity of Unforced Capacity, as denominated in Effective UCAP, that an ELCC Resource is capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

Agreement:

“Agreement” shall mean this Reliability Assurance Agreement, together with all Schedules hereto, as amended from time to time.

Annual Demand Resource:

“Annual Demand Resource” shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such Delivery Year by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of June through October and the following May, and 6:00AM through 9:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of November through April unless there is an Office of the Interconnection approved maintenance outage during October through April. The Annual Demand Resource must be available in the corresponding Delivery year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Annual Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

Annual Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Annual Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer and winter periods described in such Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

Applicable Regional Entity:
“Applicable Regional Entity” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through September of a Delivery Year, and will be available to the Office of the Interconnection for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Base Capacity Demand Resource must be available June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or self-supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Base Capacity Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Base Capacity Resource:**

“Base Capacity Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Base Residual Auction:**

“Base Residual Auction” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Behind The Meter Generation:**

“Behind The Meter Generation” shall refer to a generating unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection; provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit’s capacity that is designated as a Capacity Resource or (ii) in any hour, any portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
**Black Start Capability:**

“Black Start Capability” shall mean the ability of a generating unit or station to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition and start delivering power without assistance from the power system.

**Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (CETO):**

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall mean the amount of electric energy that a given area must be able to import in order to remain within a loss of load expectation of one event in 25 years when the area is experiencing a localized capacity emergency, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Without limiting the foregoing, CETO shall be calculated based in part on EFORD determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 5, Paragraph C.

**Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL):**

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall mean the capability of the transmission system to support deliveries of electric energy to a given area experiencing a localized capacity emergency as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Capacity Import Limit:**

For any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, “Capacity Import Limit” shall mean, (a) for the PJM Region, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines for each Delivery Year, through appropriate modeling and the application of engineering judgment, the transmission system can receive, in aggregate at the interface of the PJM Region with all external balancing authority areas and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus (2) the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin; and (b) for certain source zones identified in the PJM manuals as groupings of one or more balancing authority areas, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines the transmission system can receive at the interface of the PJM Region with each such source zone and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin times (2) the ratio of the maximum import quantity from each such source zone divided by the PJM total maximum import quantity. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM shall make such determination based on the latest peak load forecast for the studied period, the same computer simulation model of loads, generation and transmission topography employed in the determination of Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for such Delivery Year, including external facilities from an industry standard model of the loads, generation, and transmission topography of the Eastern Interconnection under peak conditions. PJM shall specify in the PJM Manuals the
areas and minimum distribution factors for identifying monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers on the PJM interface. Employing such tools, PJM shall model increased power transfers from external areas into PJM to determine the transfer level at which one or more reliability criteria is violated on any monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers. For the PJM Region Capacity Import Limit, PJM shall optimize transfers from other source areas not experiencing any reliability criteria violations as appropriate to increase the Capacity Import Limit. The aggregate megawatt quantity of transfers into PJM at the point where any increase in transfers on the interface would violate reliability criteria will establish the Capacity Import Limit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region shall not be subject to the Capacity Import Limit if the Capacity Market Seller seeks an exception thereto by demonstrating to PJM, by no later than five (5) business days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, that such resource meets all of the following requirements:

(i) it has, at the time such exception is requested, met all applicable requirements to be pseudo-tied into the PJM Region, or the Capacity Market Seller has committed in writing that it will meet such requirements, unless prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond the control of the Capacity Market Seller, prior to the relevant Delivery Year;

(ii) at the time such exception is requested, it has long-term firm transmission service confirmed on the complete transmission path from such resource into PJM; and

(iii) it is, by written commitment of the Capacity Market Seller, subject to the same obligations imposed on Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 to offer their capacity into RPM Auctions; provided, however, that (a) the total megawatt quantity of all exceptions granted hereunder for a Delivery Year, plus the Capacity Import Limit for the applicable interface determined for such Delivery Year, may not exceed the total megawatt quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service on such interface that PJM has confirmed for such Delivery Year; and (b) if granting a qualified exception would result in a violation of the rule in clause (a), PJM shall grant the requested exception but reduce the Capacity Import Limit by the quantity necessary to ensure that the total quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service is not exceeded.

**Capacity Only Option:**

“Capacity Only Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

**Capacity Performance Resource:**

“Capacity Performance Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Capacity Resources:**
“Capacity Resources” shall mean megawatts of (i) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources meeting the requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedules 9 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 10 that are or will be owned by or contracted to a Party and that are or will be committed to satisfy that Party's obligations under the Reliability Assurance Agreement, or to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, for a Delivery Year; (ii) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources not owned or contracted for by a Party which are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in such Schedules 9 and 10; or (iii) load reduction capability provided by Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources that are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6; or (iv) generation and load reduction capability provided by a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and the PJM Manuals.

Capacity Storage Resource Class:

“Capacity Storage Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement, each of which is composed of Capacity Storage Resources with the same specified characteristic duration of 4, 6, 8, and 10 hours. The characteristic duration of an Energy Storage Resource Class is the ratio of the modeled MWh energy storage capability of members of the class to the modeled MW power capability of members of the class.

Capacity Transfer Right:

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Combination Resource:

“Combination Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that has a component that has the characteristics of a Limited Duration Resource combined with (i) a component that has the characteristics of an Unlimited Resource or (ii) a component that has the characteristics of a Variable Resource.

Compliance Aggregation Area (CAA):

“Compliance Aggregation Area” or “CAA” shall have the same meaning as in the Tariff.

Complex Hybrid Class:

“Complex Hybrid Class” shall mean an ELCC Class composed of Combination Resources that combine three or more components, whereby one component is a class of Limited Duration Resource, and the other components are different Variable Resource classes, and such Combination Resources cannot be included in any other Combination Resource class. A resource that is a member of a Complex Hybrid Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.
Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, PJM Transmission Owners Agreement or Transmission Owners Agreement:

“Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement,” “PJM Transmission Owners Agreement” or “Transmission Owners Agreement” shall mean that certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on file with the Commission, as amended from time to time.

Control Area:

“Control Area” shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

(b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

(c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and each Applicable Regional Entity;

(d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

(e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation:

“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8 or, as to an FRR Entity, in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

Delivery Year:

“Delivery Year” shall mean a Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment DD or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan under RAA, Schedule 8.1.
**Demand Resource (DR):**

“Demand Resource” or “DR” shall mean a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, Annual Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource or Summer-Period Demand Resource with a demonstrated capability to provide a reduction in demand or otherwise control load in accordance with the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 that offers and that clears load reduction capability in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction or that is committed through an FRR Capacity Plan.

**Demand Resource Factor or DR Factor:**

“Demand Resource Factor” or “DR Factor” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, that factor approved from time to time by the PJM Board used to determine the unforced capacity value of a Demand Resource in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6

**Demand Resource Officer Certification Form:**

“Demand Resource Officer Certification Form” shall mean a certification as to an intended Demand Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

**Demand Resource Registration:**

“Demand Resource Registration” shall mean a registration in the Full Program Option or Capacity Only Option of the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Resource Program in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 8.

**Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan:**

“Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan” shall mean the plan required by Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 in support of an intended offer of Demand Resources in an RPM Auction, or an intended inclusion of Demand Resources in an FRR Capacity Plan.

**DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form:**

“DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form” shall mean a DER Aggregator’s certification as to an intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

**DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan:**

“DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan” shall mean the plan required by Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule
8.1 in support of an intended offer of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in an RPM Auction, or an intended inclusion of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan.

**Effective Nameplate Capacity:**

“Effective Nameplate Capacity” shall mean (i) for each Variable Resource and Combination Resource, the resource’s Maximum Facility Output; (ii) for each Limited Duration Resource, the sustained level of output that the unit can provide and maintain over a continuous period, whereby the duration of that continuous period matches the characteristic duration of the corresponding ELCC Class, with consideration given to ambient conditions expected to exist at the time of PJM system peak load, to the extent that such conditions impact such resource’s capability.

**Effective UCAP:**

“Effective UCAP” shall mean a unit of measure that represents the capacity product transacted in the Reliability Pricing Model and included in FRR Capacity Plans. One megawatt of Effective UCAP has the same capacity value of one megawatt of Unforced Capacity.

**ELCC Class:**

“ELCC Class” shall mean a defined group of ELCC Resources that share a common set of operational characteristics and for which effective load carrying capability analysis, as set forth in RAA, Schedule 9.1, will establish a unique ELCC Class UCAP and corresponding ELCC Class Rating(s). ELCC Classes shall be defined in the Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement. Members of an ELCC Class shall share a common method of calculating the ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment, provided that the individual ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment values will generally differ among ELCC Resources.

**ELCC Class Rating:**

“ELCC Class Rating” shall mean the rating factor, based on effective load carrying capability analysis, that applies to ELCC Resources that are members of an ELCC Class as part of the calculation of their Accredited UCAP.

**ELCC Class UCAP:**

“ELCC Class UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP all modeled ELCC Resources in a given ELCC Class are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

**ELCC Portfolio UCAP:**

“ELCC Portfolio UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP that all modeled ELCC Resources are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.
**ELCC Resource:**

“ELCC Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that is a Variable Resource, a Limited Duration Resource, or a Combination Resource.

**ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment:**

“ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment” shall mean the performance of a specific ELCC Resource relative to the aggregate performance of the ELCC Class to which it belongs as further described in RAA, Schedule 9.1, section F.

**Electric Cooperative:**

“Electric Cooperative” shall mean an entity owned in cooperative form by its customers that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Electric Distributor:**

“Electric Distributor” shall mean a Member that 1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership of electric distribution facilities that are used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region; or 2) is a generation and transmission cooperative or a joint municipal agency that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.

**Emergency:**

“Emergency” shall mean (i) an abnormal system condition requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent loss of firm load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or (ii) a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or (iii) a condition that requires implementation of emergency procedures as defined in the PJM Manuals.

**End-Use Customer:**

“End-Use Customer” shall mean a Member that is a retail end-user of electricity within the PJM Region. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is a retail end-user that owns generation may qualify as an End-Use customer if: (1) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates in the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average PJM capacity obligation for the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; or (2) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average energy consumed by that Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the same time period. The foregoing notwithstanding, taking retail service may not be sufficient to qualify a Member as an End-Use Customer.
Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the periods described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention. Annual Energy Efficiency Resources, Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resources are types of Energy Efficiency Resources.

Exigent Water Storage:

“Exigent Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is not typically available during normal operating conditions (as those conditions are described in the relevant FERC hydropower license), but which can be drawn upon during emergency conditions (as described in the FERC hydropower license), including in order to avoid a load shed. In an effective load carrying capability analysis, exigent storage capability from an upstream hydro facility can be considered relative to a downstream hydro facility by assessing cascading storage and flows.

Existing Demand Resource:

“Existing Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource for which the Demand Resource Provider has identified existing end-use customer sites that are registered for the current Delivery Year with PJM (even if not registered by such Demand Resource Provider) and that the Demand Resource Provider reasonably expects to have under a contract to reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is offered.

Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:

“Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for which the DER Aggregator has identified existing Component DER that are registered in a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for the current Delivery Year with PJM (even if not registered by such DER Aggregator) and that the DER Aggregator reasonably expects to have under a contract to generate or reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is offered.

Existing Generation Capacity Resource:
“Existing Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean, for purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource that, as of the date on which bidding commences for such auction: (a) is in service; or (b) is not yet in service, but has cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. A Generation Capacity Resource shall be deemed to be in service if interconnection service has ever commenced (for resources located in the PJM Region), or if it is physically and electrically interconnected to an external Control Area and is in full commercial operation (for resources not located in the PJM Region). The additional megawatts of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being, or has been, modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof shall not be deemed to be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource until such time as those megawatts (a) are in service; or (b) are not yet in service, but have cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year.

**Extended Summer Demand Resource:**

“Extended Summer Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through October and the following May, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Extended Summer Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Extended Summer Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Facilities Study Agreement:**

“Facilities Study Agreement” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Part VI, section 206.

**FERC or Commission:**

“FERC” or “Commission” shall mean the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any successor federal agency, commission or department exercising jurisdiction over the Tariff, Operating Agreement and Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:**

“Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service” shall have the meaning specified in the Tariff.

**Firm Service Level:**

“Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when an Emergency Action that triggers a Performance Assessment Interval is declared and the Locational Marginal
Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan. “Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Demand Resource shall mean the pre-determined level for which an end-use customer’s load shall be reduced, upon notification from the Curtailment Service Provider’s market operations center or its agent.

**Firm Transmission Service:**

“Firm Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service that is intended to be available at all times to the maximum extent practicable, subject to an Emergency, an unanticipated failure of a facility, or other event beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility or the Office of the Interconnection.

**Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative or FRR Alternative:**

“Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative” or “FRR Alternative” shall mean an alternative method for a Party to satisfy its obligation to provide Unforced Capacity hereunder, as set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Fixed-Tilt Solar Class:**

“Fixed-Tilt Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted in a fixed orientation.

**Forecast Pool Requirement:**

“Forecast Pool Requirement” or “FPR” shall mean the amount equal to one plus the unforced reserve margin (stated as a decimal number) for the PJM Region required pursuant to this Reliability Assurance Agreement, as approved by the PJM Board pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1.

**FRR Capacity Plan or FRR Plan:**

“FRR Capacity Plan” or “FRR Plan” shall mean a long-term plan for the commitment of Capacity Resources and Price Responsive Demand to satisfy the capacity obligations of a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative, as more fully set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**FRR Entity:**

“FRR Entity” shall mean, for the duration of such election, a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative hereunder.

**FRR Service Area:**

“FRR Service Area” shall mean (a) the service territory of an IOU as recognized by state law, rule or order; (b) the service area of a Public Power Entity or Electric Cooperative as recognized
by franchise or other state law, rule, or order; or (c) a separately identifiable geographic area that is: (i) bounded by wholesale metering, or similar appropriate multi-site aggregate metering, that is visible to, and regularly reported to, the Office of the Interconnection, or that is visible to, and regularly reported to an Electric Distributor and such Electric Distributor agrees to aggregate the load data from such meters for such FRR Service Area and regularly report such aggregated information, by FRR Service Area, to the Office of the Interconnection; and (ii) for which the FRR Entity has or assumes the obligation to provide capacity for all load (including load growth) within such area. In the event that the service obligations of an Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity are not defined by geographic boundaries but by physical connections to a defined set of customers, the FRR Service Area in such circumstances shall be defined as all customers physically connected to transmission or distribution facilities of such Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity within an area bounded by appropriate wholesale aggregate metering as described above.

**Full Program Option:**

“Full Program Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, (i) an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event, and (ii) a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

**Full Requirements Service:**

“Full Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply all of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

**Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generating Facility, or the contractual right to capacity from a specified Generating Facility, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 9 and RAA, Schedule 10, and, for Generating Facilities that are committed to an FRR Capacity Plan, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 8.1. A Generation Capacity Resource may be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource or a Planned Generation Capacity Resource.

**Generation Capacity Resource Provider:**

“Generation Capacity Resource Provider” shall mean a Member that owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output of, a Generation Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity.

**Generation Owner:**

“Generation Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership, or otherwise controls and operates one or more operating generation resources located in the PJM Region. The foregoing notwithstanding, for a planned generation resource to
qualify a Member as a Generation Owner, such resource shall have cleared an RPM auction, and for Energy Resources, the resource shall have a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM. Purchasing all or a portion of the output of a generation resource shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Generation Owner. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is primarily a retail end-user of electricity that owns generation may qualify as a Generation Owner if: (1) the generation resource is the subject of a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM; (2) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average PJM capacity obligation of the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; and (3) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within PJM over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average energy consumed by the Member and its affiliates within PJM over the same time period.

**Generator Forced Outage:**

“Generator Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

**Generator Maintenance Outage:**

“Generator Maintenance Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility qualifies as a maintenance outage pursuant to the PJM Manuals.

**Generator Planned Outage:**

“Generator Planned Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Good Utility Practice:**

“Good Utility Practice” shall mean any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather is intended to include acceptable
practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region; including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

Hybrid Resource Class:

“Hybrid Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 Section B. Each Hybrid Resource Class has a specified combination of two components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in a Capacity Storage Resource Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of a Hybrid Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage:

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage” shall mean a hydropower facility that can capture and store incoming stream flow, without use of pumps, in pondage or a reservoir, and the Generation Owner has the ability, within the constraints available in the applicable operating license, to exert material control over the quantity of stored water and output of the facility throughout an Operating Day.

Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class:

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Combination Resources that are Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage resources.

Incremental Auction:

“Incremental Auction” shall mean any of several auctions conducted for a Delivery Year after the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and before the first day of such Delivery Year, including the First Incremental Auction, Second Incremental Auction, Third Incremental Auction, or Conditional Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions (other than the Conditional Incremental Auction), shall be held for the purposes of:

(i) allowing Market Sellers that committed Capacity Resources in the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, which subsequently are determined to be unavailable to deliver the committed Unforced Capacity in such Delivery Year (due to resource retirement, resource cancellation or construction delay, resource derating, EFORd increase, a decrease in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of a Planned Demand Resource, delay or cancellation of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade, or similar occurrences) to submit Buy Bids for replacement Capacity Resources; and

(ii) allowing the Office of the Interconnection to reduce or increase the amount of committed capacity secured in prior auctions for such Delivery Year if, as a result of changed circumstances or expectations since the prior auction(s), there is, respectively, a significant
excess or significant deficit of committed capacity for such Delivery Year, for the PJM Region or for an LDA.

**Intermittent Hydropower Class:**

“Intermittent Hydropower Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are run-of-river hydropower generators that must generally pass incoming water and therefore cannot appreciably store water to later increase the output of the facility. Resources in the Intermittent Hydropower Class are not Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage resources.

**IOU:**

“IOU” shall mean an investor-owned utility with substantial business interest in owning and/or operating electric facilities in any two or more of the following three asset categories: generation, transmission, distribution.

**Landfill Gas Class:**

“Landfill Gas Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources fueled by landfill gas that, because of fuel availability patterns, cannot run consistently at installed capacity levels for 24 or more hours.

**Limited Demand Resource:**

“Limited Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will, at a minimum, be available for interruption for at least 10 Load Management Events during the summer period of June through September in the Delivery Year, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 6-hour duration. At a minimum, the Limited Demand Resource shall be available for such interruptions on weekdays, other than NERC holidays, from 12:00PM (noon) to 8:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Limited Demand Resource must be available during the summer period of June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Limited Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Limited Duration Resource:**

“Limited Duration Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that is not a Variable Resource, that is not a Combination Resource, and that is not capable of running continuously at Maximum Facility Output for 24 hours or longer. A Capacity Storage Resource is a Limited Duration Resource.

**Load Serving Entity or LSE:**
“Load Serving Entity” or “LSE” shall mean any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within the PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located within the PJM Region. Load Serving Entity shall include any end-use customer that qualifies under state rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.

Locational Reliability Charge:

“Locational Reliability Charge” shall mean the charge determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 8.

Markets and Reliability Committee:

“Markets and Reliability Committee” shall mean the committee established pursuant to the Operating Agreement as a Standing Committee of the Members Committee.

Maximum Emergency Service Level:

“Maximum Emergency Service Level” or “MESL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2017/2018 through the 2021/2022 Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when a Maximum Generation Emergency is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan.

Member:

“Member” shall have the meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

Members Committee:

“Members Committee” shall mean the committee specified in Operating Agreement, section 8 composed of the representatives of all the Members.

NERC:

“NERC” shall mean the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or any successor thereto.

Network External Designated Transmission Service:

“Network External Designated Transmission Service” shall mean the quantity of network transmission service confirmed by PJM for use by a market participant to import power and energy from an identified Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region, upon
demonstration by such market participant that it owns such Generation Capacity Resource, has an executed contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource, or has a contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource contingent upon securing firm transmission service from such resource.

**Network Resources:**

“Network Resources” shall have the meaning set forth in the PJM Tariff.

**Network Transmission Service:**

“Network Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Tariff, Part III or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

**Nominal PRD Value:**

“Nominal PRD Value” shall mean, as to any PRD Provider, an adjustment, determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1, to the peak-load forecast used to determine the quantity of capacity sought through an RPM Auction, reflecting the aggregate effect of Price Responsive Demand on peak load resulting from the Price Responsive Demand to be provided by such PRD Provider.

**Nominated Demand Resource Value:**

“Nominated Demand Resource Value” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation:**

“Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation” shall mean Behind the Meter Generation that is used by municipal electric systems, electric cooperatives, and electric distribution companies to serve load.

**Obligation Peak Load:**

“Obligation Peak Load” shall have the meaning specified in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.

**Office of the Interconnection:**

“Office of the Interconnection” shall mean the employees and agents of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., subject to the supervision and oversight of the PJM Board, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement.

**Offshore Wind Class:**
“Offshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with offshore wind turbines located in the ocean.

**Onshore Wind Class:**

“Onshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy using wind turbines and that are not in the Offshore Wind Class.

**Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Operating Agreement or PJM Operating Agreement:**

“Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,” “Operating Agreement” or “PJM Operating Agreement” shall mean that agreement, dated as of April 1, 1997 and as amended and restated as of June 2, 1997, including all Schedules, Exhibits, Appendices, addenda or supplements hereto, as amended from time to time thereafter, among the Members of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C, on file with the Commission.

**Operating Day:**

“Operating Day” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Operating Reserve:**

“Operating Reserve” shall mean the amount of generating capacity scheduled to be available for a specified period of an Operating Day to ensure the reliable operation of the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

**Ordinary Water Storage:**

“Ordinary Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is typically available during normal operating conditions pursuant to the FERC license governing the operation of the hydropower resource.

**Other Limited Duration Class:**

“Other Limited Duration Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B of this Agreement, each of which has a specified characteristic duration and consists of Limited Duration Resources that are not Capacity Storage Resources. The characteristic duration of an Other Limited Duration Class is the maximum period of time represented in the ELCC model that the resources of the class can run at a stated capability.

**Other Limited Duration Combination Class:**

“Other Limited Duration Combination Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B. Each Other Limited Duration Class has a specified combination of two
components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in an Other Limited Duration Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of an Other Limited Duration Combination Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Other Supplier:

“Other Supplier” shall mean a Member that: (i) is engaged in buying, selling or transmitting electric energy, capacity, ancillary services, Financial Transmission Rights or other services available under PJM’s governing documents in or through the Interconnection or has a good faith intent to do so, and (ii) is not a Generation Owner, Electric Distributor, Transmission Owner or End-Use Customer.

Other Variable Resource Class:

“Other Variable Resource Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are not in any other Variable Resource class, including Variable Resources that are composed of multiple components, each of which would be a Variable Resource. A resource composed of both fixed-tilt solar panels and tracking solar panels is not in this class. A resource that is a member of a Other Variable Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Partial Requirements Service:

“Partial Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply a specified portion, but not all, of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

Party:

“Party” shall mean an entity bound by the terms of the Operating Agreement.

Peak Shaving Adjustment:

“Peak Shaving Adjustment” shall mean a load forecast mechanism that allows load reductions by end-use customers to result in a downward adjustment of the summer load forecast for the associated Zone. Any End-Use Customer identified in an approved peak shaving plan shall not also participate in PJM Markets as Price Responsive Demand, Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource, Capacity Performance Demand Resource, or Economic Load Response Participant.

Percentage Internal Resources Required:
“Percentage Internal Resources Required” shall mean, for purposes of an FRR Capacity Plan, the percentage of the LDA Reliability Requirement for an LDA that must be satisfied with Capacity Resources located in such LDA.

**Performance Assessment Interval:**

“Performance Assessment Interval” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**PJM:**

“PJM” shall mean PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., including the Office of the Interconnection as referenced in the PJM Operating Agreement. When such term is being used in the RAA it shall also include the PJM Board.

**PJM Board:**

“PJM Board” shall mean the Board of Managers of the LLC, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement, except when such term is being used in Tariff, Attachment M, in which case PJM Board shall mean the Board of Managers of PJM or its designated representative, exclusive of any members of PJM Management.

**PJM Manuals:**

“PJM Manuals” shall mean the instructions, rules, procedures and guidelines established by the Office of the Interconnection for the operation, planning and accounting requirements of the PJM Region.

**PJM Region:**

“PJM Region” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

**PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin:**

“PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin” shall mean the percent installed reserve margin for the PJM Region required pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1, as approved by the PJM Board.

**PJM Tariff, Tariff, O.A.T.T., OATT or PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff:**

“PJM Tariff,” “Tariff,” “O.A.T.T., “OATT” or “PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff” shall mean that certain PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, including any schedules, appendices, or exhibits attached thereto, on file with FERC and as amended from time to time thereafter.

**Planned Demand Resource:**
“Planned Demand Resource” shall mean any Demand Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide a reduction in demand or to otherwise control load, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such reduction or control on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a Demand Resource Provider submitting a DR Sell Offer Plan shall identify as Planned Demand Resources in such plan all Demand Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing Demand Resources.

**Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:**

A “Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean any DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such generation or reduction in demand on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a DER Aggregator submitting a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall identify in such plan all DER Capacity Aggregation Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources. A Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all provisions of the DER Aggregator Participation Model described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B, prior to the applicable Delivery Year.

**Planned External Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Planned External Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a proposed Generation Capacity Resource, or a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource, that (a) is to be located outside the PJM Region, (b) participates in the generation interconnection process of a Control Area external to PJM, (c) is scheduled to be physically and electrically interconnected to the transmission facilities of such Control Area on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, and (d) is in full commercial operation prior to the first day of such Delivery Year, such that it is sufficient to provide the Installed Capacity set forth in the Sell Offer forming the basis of such resource’s commitment to the PJM Region. Prior to participation in any Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has a fully executed system impact study agreement (or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff) or, for resources which are greater than 20MWs participating in a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, an agreement or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a Facilities Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff, with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. Prior to participating in any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate it has entered into an interconnection agreement, or such other documentation that is functionally equivalent to an Interconnection Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, with the transmission
owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. A Planned External Generation Capacity Resource must provide evidence to PJM that it has been studied as a Network Resource, or such other similar interconnection product in such external Control Area, must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for or purchased transmission service to be deliverable to the PJM border, and must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for transmission service to be deliverable to the bus at which energy is to delivered, the agreements for which must have been executed prior to participation in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year. Any such resource shall cease to be considered a Planned External Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that interconnection service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

Planned Generation Capacity Resource:

“Planned Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, or additional megawatts to increase the size of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being or has been modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof, participating in the generation interconnection process under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart A, as applicable, for which: (i) Interconnection Service is scheduled to commence on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to RPM or to an FRR Capacity Plan; (ii) for any such resource seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, or for any such resource of 20 MWs or less seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, a System Impact Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a System Impact Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; (iii) for any such resource of more than 20 MWs seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a Facilities Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a Facilities Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a Facility Studies Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; and (iv) an Interconnection Service Agreement has been executed prior to any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year in which such resource plans to participate. For purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource shall cease to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that Interconnection Service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

Planning Period:

“Planning Period” shall mean the 12 months beginning June 1 and extending through May 31 of the following year, or such other period approved by the Members Committee.
**PRD Curve:**

“PRD Curve” shall mean a price-consumption curve at a PRD Substation level, if available, and otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) level, that details the base consumption level of Price Responsive Demand and the decreasing consumption levels at increasing prices.

**PRD Provider:**

“PRD Provider” shall mean a PJM Member that has entered contractual arrangements with end-use customers that satisfy the eligibility criteria for and provides Price Responsive Demand.

**PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD:**

“PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD” shall mean the expected contribution to Delivery Year peak load of a PRD Provider’s Price Responsive Demand, were such demand not to be reduced in response to price, based on the contribution of the end-use customers comprising such Price Responsive Demand to the most recent prior Delivery Year’s peak demand, escalated to the Delivery Year in question, as determined in a manner consistent with the Office of the Interconnection’s load forecasts used for purposes of the RPM Auctions.

**PRD Reservation Price:**

“PRD Reservation Price” shall mean an RPM Auction clearing price identified in a PRD Plan for Price Responsive Demand load below which the PRD Provider desires not to commit the identified load as Price Responsive Demand.

**PRD Substation:**

“PRD Substation” shall mean an electrical substation that is located in the same Zone or in the same sub-Zonal LDA as the end-use customers identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration and that, in terms of the electrical topography of the Transmission Facilities comprising the PJM Region, is as close as practicable to such loads.

**Price Responsive Demand:**

“Price Responsive Demand” or “PRD” shall mean end-use customer load registered by a PRD Provider pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 that have, as set forth in more detail in the PJM Manuals, the metering capability to record electricity consumption at an interval of one hour or less, Supervisory Control capable of curtailing such load (consistent with applicable RERRA requirements) at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection (prior to 2022/2023 Delivery Year) or a Performance Assessment Interval that triggers a PRD performance assessment (effective with 2022/2023 Delivery Year), and a retail rate structure, or equivalent contractual arrangement, capable of changing retail rates as frequently as an hourly basis, that is linked to or based upon changes in real-time Locational...
Marginal Prices at a PRD Substation level and that results in a predictable automated response to varying wholesale electricity prices.

**Price Responsive Demand Credit:**

“Price Responsive Demand Credit” shall mean a credit, based on committed Price Responsive Demand, as determined under Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1.

**Price Responsive Demand Plan or PRD Plan:**

“Price Responsive Demand Plan” or “PRD Plan” shall mean a plan, submitted by a PRD Provider and received by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, claiming a peak demand limitation due to Price Responsive Demand to support the determination of such PRD Provider’s Nominal PRD Value.

**Public Power Entity:**

“Public Power Entity” shall mean any agency, authority, or instrumentality of a state or of a political subdivision of a state, or any corporation wholly owned by any one or more of the foregoing, that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Qualifying Transmission Upgrades:**

“Qualifying Transmission Upgrades” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority:**

“Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority” or “RERRA” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Operating Agreement.

**Reliability Principles and Standards:**

“Reliability Principles and Standards” shall mean the principles and standards established by NERC or an Applicable Regional Entity to define, among other things, an acceptable probability of loss of load due to inadequate generation or transmission capability, as amended from time to time.

**Required Approvals:**

“Required Approvals” shall mean all of the approvals required for the Operating Agreement to be modified or to be terminated, in whole or in part, including the acceptance for filing by FERC and every other regulatory authority with jurisdiction over all or any part of the Operating Agreement.

**Self-Supply:**
“Self-Supply” shall have the meaning provided in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Small Commercial Customer:**

“Small Commercial Customer” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**State Consumer Advocate:**

“State Consumer Advocate” shall mean a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of which is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for the purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory commissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.

**State Regulatory Structural Change:**

“State Regulatory Structural Change” shall mean as to any Party, a state law, rule, or order that, after September 30, 2006, initiates a program that allows retail electric consumers served by such Party to choose from among alternative suppliers on a competitive basis, terminates such a program, expands such a program to include classes of customers or localities served by such Party that were not previously permitted to participate in such a program, or that modifies retail electric market structure or market design rules in a manner that materially increases the likelihood that a substantial proportion of the customers of such Party that are eligible for retail choice under such a program (a) that have not exercised such choice will exercise such choice; or (b) that have exercised such choice will no longer exercise such choice, including for example, without limitation, mandating divestiture of utility-owned generation or structural changes to such Party’s default service rules that materially affect whether retail choice is economically viable.

**Summer-Period Demand Resource:**

Summer-Period Demand Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and will be available June through October and the following May of the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Summer-Period Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale in an RPM Auction, or included as a Summer-Period Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource:**

Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements
of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Supervisory Control:**

“Supervisory Control” shall mean the capability to curtail, in accordance with applicable RERRA requirements, load registered as Price Responsive Demand at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection. Except to the extent automation is not required by the provisions of the Operating Agreement, the curtailment shall be automated, meaning that load shall be reduced automatically in response to control signals sent by the PRD Provider or its designated agent directly to the control equipment where the load is located without the requirement for any action by the end-use customer.

**Threshold Quantity:**

“Threshold Quantity” shall mean, as to any FRR Entity for any Delivery Year, the sum of (a) the Unforced Capacity equivalent (determined using the Pool-Wide Average EFORD) of the Installed Reserve Margin for such Delivery Year multiplied by the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for which such FRR Entity is responsible under its FRR Capacity Plan for such Delivery Year, plus (b) the lesser of (i) 3% of the Unforced Capacity amount determined in (a) above or (ii) 450 MW. If the FRR Entity is not responsible for all load within a Zone, the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for such entity shall be the FRR Entity’s Obligation Peak Load last determined prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, times the Base FRR Scaling Factor (as determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1).

**Tracking Solar Class:**

“Tracking Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted on trackers that align the panels with incoming sunlight over the course of the day.

**Transmission Facilities:**

“Transmission Facilities” shall mean facilities that: (i) are within the PJM Region; (ii) meet the definition of transmission facilities pursuant to FERC’s Uniform System of Accounts or have been classified as transmission facilities in a ruling by FERC addressing such facilities; and (iii) have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection to be integrated with the PJM Region transmission system and integrated into the planning and operation of the PJM Region to serve all of the power and transmission customers within the PJM Region.
Transmission Owner:

“Transmission Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities and is a signatory to the PJM Transmission Owners Agreement. Taking transmission service shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Transmission Owner.

Unforced Capacity:

“Unforced Capacity” shall mean installed capacity rated at summer conditions that is not on average experiencing a forced outage or forced derating, calculated for each Capacity Resource on the 12-month period from October to September without regard to the ownership or the contractual rights to the capacity of the unit.

Unlimited Resource:

“Unlimited Resource” shall mean a generating unit having the ability to maintain output at a stated capability continuously on a daily basis without interruption. An Unlimited Resource is a Generation Capacity Resource that is not an ELCC Resource.

Variable Resource:

“Variable Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource with output that can vary as a function of its energy source, such as wind, solar, run of river hydroelectric power without storage, and landfill gas units without an alternate fuel source. All Intermittent Resources are Variable Resources, with the exception of Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage.

Winter Peak Load (or WPL):

“Winter Peak Load” or “WPL” shall mean the average of the Demand Resource customer’s specific peak hourly load between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on the PJM defined 5 coincident peak days from December through February two Delivery Years prior the Delivery Year for which the registration is submitted. Notwithstanding, if the average use between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on a winter 5 coincident peak day is below 35% of the average hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT over all five of such peak days, then up to two such days and corresponding peak demand values may be excluded from the calculation. Upon approval by the Office of the Interconnection, a Curtailment Service Provider may provide alternative data to calculate Winter Peak Load, as outlined in the PJM Manuals, when there is insufficient hourly load data for the two Delivery Years prior to the relevant Delivery Year or if more than two days meet the exclusion criteria described above.

Zonal Capacity Price:

“Zonal Capacity Price” shall mean the clearing price required in each Zone to meet the demand for Unforced Capacity and satisfy Locational Deliverability Requirements for the LDA or LDAs
associated with such Zone. If the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA.

Zone or Zonal:

“Zone” or “Zonal” shall refer to an area within the PJM Region, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment J and RAA, Schedule 15, or as such areas may be (i) combined as a result of mergers or acquisitions or (ii) added as a result of the expansion of the boundaries of the PJM Region. A Zone shall include any Non-Zone Network Load located outside the PJM Region that is served from such Zone under Tariff, Attachment H-A.

Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor (ZWWAF):

“Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor” or “ZWWAF” shall mean the PJM zonal winter weather normalized coincident peak divided by PJM zonal average of 5 coincident peak loads in December through February.
SCHEDULE 6.2

DER Capacity Aggregation Resources qualifying under the criteria set forth below may be offered for sale in an RPM auction, or included in an FRR Capacity Plan, for any Delivery Year for which such resource qualifies.

DER Aggregators intending to offer for sale or designate for self-supply, a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any RPM Auction, or intending to include a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any FRR Capacity Plan must demonstrate, to PJM's satisfaction, that such resource shall have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is committed. As part of such demonstration, each such DER Aggregator shall submit a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan in accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in RAA, Schedule 6.2, and the PJM Manuals, no later than 30 days prior to, as applicable, the RPM Auction in which such resource is to be offered, or the deadline for submission of the FRR Capacity Plan in which such resource is to be included.

PJM may verify the DER Aggregator’s adherence to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan at any time. A DER Aggregator with a PJM-approved DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan will be permitted to offer up to the approved megawatt quantity into the subject RPM Auction or include such resource in its FRR Capacity Plan.

A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall consist of a completed template document in the form posted on the PJM website, requiring the information set forth below and in the PJM Manuals, and a DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must provide information that supports the DER Aggregator’s intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offers and demonstrate that the DER Capacity Aggregation Resources are being offered with the intention that the megawatt quantity that clears the auction is reasonably expected to be physically delivered through DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registration for the relevant Delivery Year. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall include all Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources and all Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that the DER Aggregator intends to offer into an RPM Auction or include in an FRR Capacity Plan.

The DER Aggregator shall provide the details of, and key assumptions for underlying Component DER for the Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource contained in the Sell Offer Plan, including but not limited to:

(i) Nominated megawatt quantities and method(s) of achieving generation or load reductions to meet megawatt quantities
(ii) equipment and technology to be installed or controlled
(iii) plan and ability to acquire generating resources or load reductions at customer site(s) and assumptions regarding regulatory approval of program(s), if applicable
(iv) A measurement and verification plan developed in accordance with PJM Manuals, if applicable
(v) Zone and LDA information
(vi) A schedule of an approximate timeline for procuring Component DER

DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form.
Each DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must include a DER Aggregator Officer Certification, signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification, in the form shown in the PJM Manuals, which form shall include the following certifications:

(a) that the signing officer has reviewed the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan and the information supplied to PJM in support of the Plan is true and correct as of the date of the certification; and

(b) that the DER Aggregator is submitting the Plan with the reasonable expectation, based upon its analyses as of the date of the certification, to physically deliver all megawatts that clear the RPM Auction through the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registrations by the specified Delivery Year.

As set forth in the form provided in the PJM Manuals, the certification shall specify that it does not in any way abridge, expand, or otherwise modify the current provisions of the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, and/or RAA.

The Unforced Capacity value of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource will be determined as the sum of the Unforced Capacity value of the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, accounting for any co-located load that is not Station Power, in accordance with the provisions of the PJM Manuals.

The DER Aggregator shall provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource located within the same Zone and LDA as specified in its cleared sell offer, and may be subject to deficiency charges under Tariff, Attachment DD to the extent it fails to provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the applicable DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in such location and quantity consistent with its cleared offer.

A DER Aggregator offering a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all applicable credit requirements, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q.
Attachment D

Revisions to the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff,
Operating Agreement, and
Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective February 2, 2026

(Identified by Additional Cover Pages)

(Clean Format)
Sections of the
PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

Effective February 2, 2026

(Clean Format)
Definitions – A - B

Abnormal Condition:

“Abnormal Condition” shall mean any condition on the Interconnection Facilities which, determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, is: (i) outside normal operating parameters such that facilities are operating outside their normal ratings or that reasonable operating limits have been exceeded; and (ii) could reasonably be expected to materially and adversely affect the safe and reliable operation of the Interconnection Facilities; but which, in any case, could reasonably be expected to result in an Emergency Condition. Any condition or situation that results from lack of sufficient generating capacity to meet load requirements or that results solely from economic conditions shall not, standing alone, constitute an Abnormal Condition.

Acceleration Request:

“Acceleration Request” shall mean a request pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.4A, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.4A, to accelerate or reschedule a transmission outage scheduled pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.2 or Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.9.4, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.2 or Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.9.4.

Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement:

“Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the portion of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement that is required in addition to the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to ensure adequate resources are procured to meet real-time load and operational needs, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Affected System:

“Affected System” shall mean an electric system other than the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System that may be affected by a proposed interconnection or on which a proposed interconnection or addition of facilities or upgrades may require modifications or upgrades to the Transmission System.

Affected System Operator:

“Affected System Operator” shall mean an entity that operates an Affected System or, if the Affected System is under the operational control of an independent system operator or a regional transmission organization, such independent entity.

Affiliate:

“Affiliate” shall mean any two or more entities, one of which Controls the other or that are under common Control. “Control,” as that term is used in this definition, shall mean the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct the management or policies of an entity. Ownership
of publicly-traded equity securities of another entity shall not result in Control or affiliation for purposes of the Tariff or Operating Agreement if the securities are held as an investment, the holder owns (in its name or via intermediaries) less than 10 percent (10%) of the outstanding securities of the entity, the holder does not have representation on the entity’s board of directors (or equivalent managing entity) or vice versa, and the holder does not in fact exercise influence over day-to-day management decisions. Unless the contrary is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Members Committee, Control shall be presumed to arise from the ownership of or the power to vote, directly or indirectly, ten percent or more of the voting securities of such entity.

Agreements:

“Agreements” shall mean the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, the Reliability Assurance Agreement, and/or other agreements between PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and its Members.

Ancillary Services:

“Ancillary Services” shall mean those services that are necessary to support the transmission of capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the Transmission Provider’s Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Annual Demand Resource:

“Annual Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Annual Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Annual Energy Efficiency Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Annual Resource:


Annual Resource Price Adder:

“Annual Resource Price Adder” shall mean, for Delivery Years starting June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, an addition to the marginal value of Unforced Capacity and the Extended Summer Resource Price Adder as necessary to reflect the price of Annual Resources required to meet the applicable Minimum Annual Resource Requirement.

Annual Revenue Rate:

“Annual Revenue Rate” shall mean the rate employed to assess a compliance penalty charge on a
Curtailment Service Provider und er Tariff, Attachment DD, section 11.

Annual Transmission Costs:

“Annual Transmission Costs” shall mean the total annual cost of the Transmission System for purposes of Network Integration Transmission Service shall be the amount specified in Attachment H for each Zone until amended by the applicable Transmission Owner or modified by the Commission.

Applicable Laws and Regulations:

“Applicable Laws and Regulations” shall mean all duly promulgated applicable federal, State and local laws, regulations, rules, ordinances, codes, decrees, judgments, directives, or judicial or administrative orders, permits and other duly authorized actions of any Governmental Authority having jurisdiction over the relevant parties, their respective facilities, and/or the respective services they provide.

Applicable Regional Entity:

“Applicable Regional Entity” shall mean the Regional Entity for the region in which a Network Customer, Transmission Customer, New Service Customer, or Transmission Owner operates.

Applicable Standards:

“Applicable Standards” shall mean the requirements and guidelines of NERC, the Applicable Regional Entity, and the Control Area in which the Customer Facility is electrically located; the PJM Manuals; and Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards.

Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards:

“Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards” shall mean those certain technical requirements and standards applicable to interconnections of generation and/or transmission facilities with the facilities of an Interconnected Transmission Owner or, as the case may be and to the extent applicable, of an Electric Distributor, as published by Transmission Provider in a PJM Manual provided, however, that, with respect to any generation facilities with maximum generating capacity of 2 MW or less (synchronous) or 5 MW or less (inverter-based) for which the Interconnection Customer executes a Construction Service Agreement or Interconnection Service Agreement on or after March 19, 2005, “Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards” shall refer to the “PJM Small Generator Interconnection Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards.” All Applicable Technical Requirements and Standards shall be publicly available through postings on Transmission Provider’s internet website.

Applicant:

“Applicant” shall mean an entity desiring to become a PJM Member, become a Market Participant, engage in market activities, or to take Transmission Service that has submitted the
PJM Settlement credit application, PJM Settlement credit agreement and other required submittals as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q.

Application:

“Application” shall mean a request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff.

Attachment Facilities:

“Attachment Facilities” shall mean the facilities necessary to physically connect a Customer Facility to the Transmission System or interconnected distribution facilities.

Attachment H:

“Attachment H” shall refer collectively to the Attachments to the PJM Tariff with the prefix “H” that set forth, among other things, the Annual Transmission Rates for Network Integration Transmission Service in the PJM Zones.

Auction Revenue Rights:

“Auction Revenue Rights” or “ARRs” shall mean the right to receive the revenue from the Financial Transmission Right auction, as further described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4.

Auction Revenue Rights Credits:

“Auction Revenue Rights Credits” shall mean the allocated share of total FTR auction revenues or costs credited to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4.3.

Authorized Government Agency:

“Authorized Government Agency” means a regulatory body or government agency, with jurisdiction over PJM, the PJM Market, or any entity doing business in the PJM Market, including, but not limited to, the Commission, State Commissions, and state and federal attorneys general.

Avoidable Cost Rate:

“Avoidable Cost Rate” shall mean a component of the Market Seller Offer Cap calculated in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.

Balancing Congestion Charges:
“Balancing Congestion Charges” shall be equal to the sum of congestion charges collected from Market Participants that are purchasing energy in the Real-time Energy Market minus [the sum of congestion charges paid to Market Participants that are selling energy in the Real-time Energy Market plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement between the Midcontinent Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 38), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to agreements between the Office of the Interconnection and other entities, plus any charges or credits calculated pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.8, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.8, as applicable)].

**Balancing Ratio:**

“Balancing Ratio” shall have the meaning provided in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 10A.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the maximum Unforced Capacity amount, determined by PJM, of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources that is consistent with the maintenance of reliability. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint for the PJM Region or an LDA, by first determining a reference annual loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) assuming no Base Capacity Resources, including no Base Capacity Demand Resources or Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources. The calculation for the PJM Region uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast and iteratively shifting the load distributions to result in the Installed Reserve Margin established for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). The calculation for each relevant LDA uses a daily distribution of loads under a range of weather scenarios (based on the most recent load forecast for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). For the relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for the Delivery Year in question.

For both the PJM Region and LDA analyses, PJM then models the commitment of varying amounts of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources (displacing otherwise committed generation) as interruptible from June 1 through September 30
and unavailable the rest of the Delivery Year in question and calculates the LOLE at each DR and EE level. The Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint is the combined amount of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources, stated as a percentage of the unrestricted annual peak load, that produces no more than a five percent increase in the LOLE, compared to the reference value. The Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [the Forecast Pool Requirement] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

**Base Capacity Demand Resource Price Decrement:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource Price Decrement” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a difference between the clearing price for Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and the clearing price for Base Capacity Resources and Capacity Performance Resources, representing the cost to procure additional Base Capacity Resources or Capacity Performance Resources out of merit order when the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint is binding.

**Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource” shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Base Capacity Resource:**

“Base Capacity Resource” shall mean a Capacity Resource as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(b).

**Base Capacity Resource Constraint:**

“Base Capacity Resource Constraint” for the PJM Region or an LDA, shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the maximum Unforced Capacity amount, determined by PJM, of Base Capacity Resources, including Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources, that is consistent with the maintenance of reliability. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM calculates the above Base Capacity Resource Constraint for the PJM Region or an LDA, by first determining a reference annual loss of load expectation (“LOLE”) assuming no Base Capacity Resources, including no Base Capacity Demand Resources or Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources. The calculation for the PJM Region uses the weekly load distribution from the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question (based on the most recent load forecast and iteratively shifting the load distributions to result in the Installed Reserve Margin established for the Delivery Year in question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). The calculation for each relevant LDA uses a weekly load distribution (based on the Installed Reserve Margin study and the most recent load forecast for the Delivery Year in
question) and a weekly capacity distribution (based on the cumulative capacity availability distributions developed for the Installed Reserve Margin study for the Delivery Year in question). For the relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for the Delivery Year in question. Additionally, for the PJM Region and relevant LDA calculation, the weekly capacity distributions are adjusted to reflect winter ratings.

For both the PJM Region and LDA analyses, PJM models the commitment of an amount of Base Capacity Demand Resources and Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources equal to the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraint (displacing otherwise committed generation). PJM then models the commitment of varying amounts of Base Capacity Resources (displacing otherwise committed generation) as unavailable during the peak week of winter and available the rest of the Delivery Year in question and calculates the LOLE at each Base Capacity Resource level. The Base Capacity Resource Constraint is the combined amount of Base Capacity Demand Resources, Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and Base Capacity Resources, stated as a percentage of the unrestricted annual peak load, that produces no more than a ten percent increase in the LOLE, compared to the reference value. The Base Capacity Resource Constraint shall be expressed as a percentage of the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA and is converted to Unforced Capacity by multiplying [the reliability target percentage] times [one minus the pool-wide average EFORD] times [the forecasted peak load of the PJM Region or such LDA, reduced by the amount of load served under the FRR Alternative].

**Base Capacity Resource Price Decrement:**

“Base Capacity Resource Price Decrement” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a difference between the clearing price for Base Capacity Resources and the clearing price for Capacity Performance Resources, representing the cost to procure additional Capacity Performance Resources out of merit order when the Base Capacity Resource Constraint is binding.

**Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement:**

“Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the thirty-minute reserve requirement for the PJM Region established consistent with the Applicable Standards, plus any additional thirty-minute reserves scheduled in response to an RTO-wide Hot or Cold Weather Alert or other reasons for conservative operations.

**Base Load Generation Resource**

“Base Load Generation Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that operates at least 90 percent of the hours that it is available to operate, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Base Offer Segment:**

“Base Offer Segment” shall mean a component of a Sell Offer based on an existing Generation
Capacity Resource, equal to the Unforced Capacity of such resource, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. If the Sell Offers of multiple Market Sellers are based on a single Existing Generation Capacity Resource, the Base Offer Segments of such Market Sellers shall be determined pro rata based on their entitlements to Unforced Capacity from such resource.

**Base Residual Auction:**

“Base Residual Auction” shall mean the auction conducted three years prior to the start of the Delivery Year to secure commitments from Capacity Resources as necessary to satisfy any portion of the Unforced Capacity Obligation of the PJM Region not satisfied through Self-Supply.

**Batch Load Demand Resource:**

“Batch Load Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource that has a cyclical production process such that at most times during the process it is consuming energy, but at consistent regular intervals, ordinarily for periods of less than ten minutes, it reduces its consumption of energy for its production processes to minimal or zero megawatts.

**Behind The Meter Generation:**

“Behind The Meter Generation” shall refer to a generation unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities has consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection); provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit’s capacity that is designated as a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource; or (ii) in an hour, any portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**Black Start Service:**

“Black Start Service” shall mean the capability of generating units to start without an outside electrical supply or the demonstrated ability of a generating unit with a high operating factor (subject to Transmission Provider concurrence) to automatically remain operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid.

**Border Yearly Charge:**

“Border Yearly Charge” shall mean the yearly charge determined in accordance with Tariff, Schedule 7.

**Breach:**
“Breach” shall mean the failure of a party to perform or observe any material term or condition of Tariff, Part IV or Tariff, Part VI, or any agreement entered into thereunder as described in the relevant provisions of such agreement.

Breaching Party:

“Breaching Party” shall mean a party that is in Breach of Tariff, Part IV or Tariff, Part VI and/or an agreement entered into thereunder.

Business Day:

“Business Day” shall mean a day in which the Federal Reserve System is open for business and is not a scheduled PJM holiday.

Buy Bid:

“Buy Bid” shall mean a bid to buy Capacity Resources in any Incremental Auction.

Buyer-Side Market Power:

“Buyer-Side Market Power” shall mean the ability of Capacity Market Sellers with a Load Interest to suppress RPM Auction clearing prices for the overall benefit of their (and/or affiliates) portfolio of generation and load.
Definitions – C-D

Canadian Guaranty:

“Canadian Guaranty” shall mean a Corporate Guaranty provided by an Affiliate of a Participant that is domiciled in Canada, and meets all of the provisions of Tariff, Attachment Q.

Cancellation Costs:

“Cancellation Costs” shall mean costs and liabilities incurred in connection with: (a) cancellation of supplier and contractor written orders and agreements entered into to design, construct and install Attachment Facilities, Direct Assignment Facilities and/or Customer-Funded Upgrades, and/or (b) completion of some or all of the required Attachment Facilities, Direct Assignment Facilities and/or Customer-Funded Upgrades, or specific unfinished portions and/or removal of any or all of such facilities which have been installed, to the extent required for the Transmission Provider and/or Transmission Owner(s) to perform their respective obligations under Tariff, Part IV and/or Tariff, Part VI.

Capacity:

“Capacity” shall mean the installed capacity requirement of the Reliability Assurance Agreement or similar such requirements as may be established.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit:

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective:

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Capacity Export Transmission Customer:

“Capacity Export Transmission Customer” shall mean a customer taking point to point transmission service under Tariff, Part II to export capacity from a generation resource located in the PJM Region that has qualified for an exception to the RPM must-offer requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(g).

Capacity Import Limit:

“Capacity Import Limit” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

Capacity Interconnection Rights:
“Capacity Interconnection Rights” shall mean the rights to input generation as a Generation Capacity Resource into the Transmission System at the Point of Interconnection where the generating facilities connect to the Transmission System.

**Capacity Market Buyer:**

“Capacity Market Buyer” shall mean a Member that submits bids to buy Capacity Resources in any Incremental Auction.

**Capacity Market Seller:**

“Capacity Market Seller” shall mean a Member that owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output or load reduction capability of, a Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity, and that offers such resource in the Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction.

**Capacity Performance Resource:**

“Capacity Performance Resource” shall mean a Capacity Resource as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(a).

**Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction:**

“Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14D.

**Capacity Resource:**

“Capacity Resource” shall have the meaning provided in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Capacity Resource with State Subsidy:**

“Capacity Resource with State Subsidy” shall mean (1) a Capacity Resource that is offered into an RPM Auction or otherwise assumes an RPM commitment for which the Capacity Market Seller receives or is entitled to receive one or more State Subsidies for the applicable Delivery Year; (2) a Capacity Resource that has not cleared an RPM Auction for the Delivery Year for which the Capacity Market Seller last received a State Subsidy (or any subsequent Delivery Year) shall still be considered a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy upon the expiration of such State Subsidy until the resource clears an RPM Auction; (3) a Capacity Resource that is the subject of a bilateral transaction (including but not limited to those reported pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 4.6) shall be deemed a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy to the extent an owner of the facility supporting the Capacity Resource is entitled to a State Subsidy associated with such facility even if the Capacity Market Seller is not entitled to a State Subsidy; and (4) any Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resource.
Capacity Resource Clearing Price:

“Capacity Resource Clearing Price” shall mean the price calculated for a Capacity Resource that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.

Capacity Storage Resource:

“Capacity Storage Resource” shall mean any Energy Storage Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan.

Capacity Transfer Right:

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall mean a right, allocated to LSEs serving load in a Locational Deliverability Area, to receive payments, based on the transmission import capability into such Locational Deliverability Area, that offset, in whole or in part, the charges attributable to the Locational Price Adder, if any, included in the Zonal Capacity Price calculated for a Locational Delivery Area.

Capacity Transmission Injection Rights:

“Capacity Transmission Injection Rights” shall mean the rights to schedule energy and capacity deliveries at a Point of Interconnection of a Merchant Transmission Facility with the Transmission System. Capacity Transmission Injection Rights may be awarded only to a Merchant D.C. Transmission Facility and/or Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities that connects the Transmission System to another control area. Deliveries scheduled using Capacity Transmission Injection Rights have rights similar to those under Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service or, if coupled with a generating unit external to the PJM Region that satisfies all applicable criteria specified in the PJM Manuals, similar to Capacity Interconnection Rights.

Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts:

“Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts” shall mean the greatest magnitude of megawatt power consumption available for charging in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Continuous Mode or in Charge Mode. Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts shall be the Economic Minimum for an Energy Storage Resource in Charge Mode or in Continuous Mode.

Charge Economic Minimum Megawatts:

“Charge Economic Minimum Megawatts” shall mean the smallest magnitude of megawatt power consumption available for charging in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Charge Mode. Charge Economic Minimum Megawatts shall be the Economic Maximum for an Energy Storage Resource in Charge Mode.
**Charge Mode:**

“Charge Mode” shall mean the mode of operation of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant that only includes negative megawatt quantities (i.e., the Energy Storage Resource Model Participant is only withdrawing megawatts from the grid).

**Charge Ramp Rate:**

“Charge Ramp Rate” shall mean the Ramping Capability of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Charge Mode.

**Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy:**

“Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy” shall mean a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that has cleared in an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year that is prior to the 2022/2023 Delivery Year or, starting with 2022/2023 Delivery Year, the MWs (in installed capacity) comprising a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that have cleared an RPM Auction pursuant to its Sell Offer at or above its resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price or the applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price and since then, any of those MWs (in installed capacity) comprising a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy have been, the subject of a Sell Offer into the Base Residual Auction or included in an FRR Capacity Plan at the time of the Base Residual Auction for the relevant Delivery Year.

**Cold/Warm/Hot Notification Time:**

“Cold/Warm/Hot Notification Time” shall mean the time interval between PJM notification and the beginning of the start sequence for a generating unit that is currently in its cold/warm/hot temperature state. The start sequence may include steps such as any valve operation, starting feed water pumps, startup of auxiliary equipment, etc.

**Cold/Warm/Hot Start-up Time:**

For all generating units that are not combined cycle units, “Cold/Warm/Hot Start-up Time” shall mean the time interval, measured in hours, from the beginning of the start sequence to the point after generator breaker closure, which is typically indicated by telemetered or aggregated State Estimator megawatts greater than zero for a generating unit in its cold/warm/hot temperature state. For combined cycle units, “Cold/Warm/Hot Start-up Time” shall mean the time interval from the beginning of the start sequence to the point after first combustion turbine generator breaker closure in its cold/warm/hot temperature state, which is typically indicated by telemetered or aggregated State Estimator megawatts greater than zero. For all generating units, the start sequence may include steps such as any valve operation, starting feed water pumps, startup of auxiliary equipment, etc. Other more detailed actions that could signal the beginning of the start sequence could include, but are not limited to, the operation of pumps, condensers, fans, water chemistry evaluations, checklists, valves, fuel systems, combustion turbines, starting
engines or systems, maintaining stable fuel/air ratios, and other auxiliary equipment necessary for startup.

**Cold Weather Alert:**

“Cold Weather Alert” shall mean the notice that PJM provides to PJM Members, Transmission Owners, resource owners and operators, customers, and regulators to prepare personnel and facilities for expected extreme cold weather conditions.

**Collateral:**

“Collateral” shall be a cash deposit, including any interest thereon, or a Letter of Credit issued for the benefit of PJM or PJMSettlement, in an amount and form determined by and acceptable to PJM or PJMSettlement, provided by a Participant to PJM or PJMSettlement as credit support in order to participate in the PJM Markets or take Transmission Service. “Collateral” shall also include surety bonds, except for the purpose of satisfying the FTR Credit Requirement, in which case only a cash deposit or Letter of Credit will be acceptable.

**Collateral Call:**

“Collateral Call” shall mean a notice to a Participant that additional Collateral, or possibly early payment, is required in order to remain in, or to regain, compliance with Tariff, Attachment Q.

**Commencement Date:**

“Commencement Date” shall mean the date on which Interconnection Service commences in accordance with an Interconnection Service Agreement.

**Committed Offer:**

The “Committed Offer” shall mean 1) for pool-scheduled resources, an offer on which a resource was scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection for a particular clock hour for an Operating Day, and 2) for self-scheduled resources, either the offer on which the Market Seller has elected to schedule the resource or the applicable offer for the resource determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4, or Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6, for a particular clock hour for an Operating Day.

**Completed Application:**

“Completed Application” shall mean an application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the Tariff, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Aggregation Area (CAA):**
“Compliance Aggregation Area” or “CAA” shall mean a geographic area of Zones or sub-Zones that are electrically-contiguous and experience for the relevant Delivery Year, based on Resource Clearing Prices of, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, Annual Resources and for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, Capacity Performance Resources, the same locational price separation in the Base Residual Auction, the same locational price separation in the First Incremental Auction, the same locational price separation in the Second Incremental Auction, the same locational price separation in the Third Incremental Auction.

Component DER:

“Component DER” shall mean any resource, within the PJM Region, that is located on a distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter, and is used in a DER Aggregation Resource by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER may not exceed 5 MW.

Composite Energy Offer:

“Composite Energy Offer” for generation resources shall mean the sum (in $/MWh) of the Incremental Energy Offer and amortized Start-Up Costs and amortized No-load Costs, and for Economic Load Response Participant resources the sum (in $/MWh) of the Incremental Energy Offer and amortized shutdown costs, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A and the PJM Manuals.

Conditional Incremental Auction:

“Conditional Incremental Auction” shall mean an Incremental Auction conducted for a Delivery Year if and when necessary to secure commitments of additional capacity to address reliability criteria violations arising from the delay in a Backbone Transmission upgrade that was modeled in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

Conditioned State Support:

“Conditioned State Support” shall mean any financial benefit required or incentivized by a state, or political subdivision of a state acting in its sovereign capacity, that is provided outside of PJM Markets and in exchange for the sale of a FERC-jurisdictional product conditioned on clearing in any RPM Auction, where “conditioned on clearing in any RPM Auction” refers to specific directives as to the level of the offer that must be entered for the relevant Generation Capacity Resource in the RPM Auction or directives that the Generation Capacity Resource is required to clear in any RPM Auction. Conditioned State Support shall not include any Legacy Policy.

CONE Area:

“CONE Area” shall mean the areas listed in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(A) and any LDAs established as CONE Areas pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(B).
Confidential Information:

“Confidential Information” shall mean any confidential, proprietary, or trade secret information of a plan, specification, pattern, procedure, design, device, list, concept, policy, or compilation relating to the present or planned business of a New Service Customer, Transmission Owner, or other Interconnection Party or Construction Party, which is designated as confidential by the party supplying the information, whether conveyed verbally, electronically, in writing, through inspection, or otherwise, and shall include, without limitation, all information relating to the producing party’s technology, research and development, business affairs and pricing, and any information supplied by any New Service Customer, Transmission Owner, or other Interconnection Party or Construction Party to another such party prior to the execution of an Interconnection Service Agreement or a Construction Service Agreement.

Congestion Price:

“Congestion Price” shall mean the congestion component of the Locational Marginal Price, which is the effect on transmission congestion costs (whether positive or negative) associated with increasing the output of a generation resource or decreasing the consumption by a Demand Resource, based on the effect of increased generation from or consumption by the resource on transmission line loadings, calculated as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.

Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, PJM Transmission Owners Agreement or Transmission Owners Agreement:

“Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement,” “PJM Transmission Owners Agreement” or “Transmission Owners Agreement” shall mean the certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on file with the Commission, as amended from time to time.

Constraint Relaxation Logic:

“Constraint Relaxation Logic” shall mean the logic applied in the market clearing software where the transmission limit is increased to prevent the Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor from setting the Marginal Value of a transmission constraint.

Constructing Entity:

“Constructing Entity” shall mean either the Transmission Owner or the New Services Customer, depending on which entity has the construction responsibility pursuant to Tariff, Part VI and the applicable Construction Service Agreement; this term shall also be used to refer to an Interconnection Customer with respect to the construction of the Customer Interconnection Facilities.
Construction Party:

“Construction Party” shall mean a party to a Construction Service Agreement. “Construction Parties” shall mean all of the Parties to a Construction Service Agreement.

Construction Service Agreement:

“Construction Service Agreement” shall mean either an Interconnection Construction Service Agreement or an Upgrade Construction Service Agreement.

Contingent Facilities:

“Contingent Facilities” shall mean those unbuilt Interconnection Facilities and Network Upgrades upon which the Interconnection Request’s costs, timing, and study findings are dependent and, if delayed or not built, could cause a need for restudies of the Interconnection Request or a reassessment of the Interconnection Facilities and/or Network Upgrades and/or costs and timing.

Continuous Mode:

“Continuous Mode” shall mean the mode of operation of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant that includes both negative and positive megawatt quantities (i.e., the Energy Storage Resource Model Participant is capable of continually and immediately transitioning from withdrawing megawatt quantities from the grid to injecting megawatt quantities onto the grid or injecting megawatts to withdrawing megawatts). Energy Storage Resource Model Participants operating in Continuous Mode are considered to have an unlimited ramp rate. Continuous Mode requires Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts to be zero or correspond to an injection, and Charge Economic Maximum Megawatts to be zero or correspond to a withdrawal.

Control Area:

“Control Area” shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

1. match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
2. maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice; and
(4) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Control Zone:

“Control Zone” shall have the meaning given in the Operating Agreement.

Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities:

“Controllable A.C. Merchant Transmission Facilities” shall mean transmission facilities that (1) employ technology which Transmission Provider reviews and verifies will permit control of the amount and/or direction of power flow on such facilities to such extent as to effectively enable the controllable facilities to be operated as if they were direct current transmission facilities, and (2) that are interconnected with the Transmission System pursuant to Tariff, Part IV and Tariff, Part VI.

Coordinated External Transaction:

“Coordinated External Transaction” shall mean a transaction to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.13, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.13.

Coordinated Transaction Scheduling:

“Coordinated Transaction Scheduling” or “CTS” shall mean the scheduling of Coordinated External Transactions at a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.13, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.13.

Corporate Guaranty:

“Corporate Guaranty” shall mean a legal document, in a form acceptable to PJM and/or PJMSettlement, used by a Credit Affiliate of an entity to guaranty the obligations of another entity.

Cost of New Entry:

“Cost of New Entry” or “CONE” shall mean the nominal levelized cost of a Reference Resource, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.

Costs:

As used in Tariff, Part IV, Tariff, Part VI and related attachments, “Costs” shall mean costs and expenses, as estimated or calculated, as applicable, including, but not limited to, capital
expenditures, if applicable, and overhead, return, and the costs of financing and taxes and any Incidental Expenses.

**Counterparty:**

“Counterparty” shall mean PJMSettlement as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Market Participant or other entities, including the agreements and transactions with customers regarding transmission service and other transactions under the PJM Tariff and the Operating Agreement. PJMSettlement shall not be a counterparty to (i) any bilateral transactions between Members, or (ii) any Member’s self-supply of energy to serve its load, or (iii) any Member’s self-schedule of energy reported to the Office of the Interconnection to the extent that energy serves that Member’s own load.

**Credit Affiliate:**

“Credit Affiliate” shall mean Principals, corporations, partnerships, firms, joint ventures, associations, joint stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations or entities, one of which directly or indirectly controls the other or that are both under common Control. “Control,” as that term is used in this definition, shall mean the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct the management or policies of a person or an entity.

**Credit Available for Export Transactions:**

“Credit Available for Export Transactions” shall mean a designation of credit to be used for Export Transactions that is allocated by each Market Participant from its Credit Available for Virtual Transactions, and which reduces the Market Participant's Credit Available for Virtual Transactions accordingly.

**Credit Available for Virtual Transactions:**

“Credit Available for Virtual Transactions” shall mean the Market Participant’s Working Credit Limit for Virtual Transactions calculated on its credit provided in compliance with its Peak Market Activity requirement plus available credit submitted above that amount, less any unpaid billed and unbilled amounts owed to PJMSettlement, plus any unpaid unbilled amounts owed by PJMSettlement to the Market Participant, less any applicable credit required for Minimum Participation Requirements, FTRs, RPM activity, or other credit requirement determinants as defined in Tariff, Attachment Q.

**Credit Breach:**

“Credit Breach” shall mean (a) the failure of a Participant to perform, observe, meet or comply with any requirements of Tariff, Attachment Q or other provisions of the Agreements, other than a Financial Default, or (b) a determination by PJM and notice to the Participant that a Participant represents an unreasonable credit risk to the PJM Markets; that, in either event, has not been cured or remedied after any required notice has been given and any cure period has elapsed.
Credit-Limited Offer:

“Credit-Limited Offer” shall mean a Sell Offer that is submitted by a Market Participant in an RPM Auction subject to a maximum credit requirement specified by such Market Participant.

Credit Support Default:

“Credit Support Default,” shall mean (a) the failure of any Guarantor of a Market Participant to make any payment, or to perform, observe, meet or comply with any provisions of the applicable Guaranty or Credit Support Document that has not been cured or remedied, after any required notice has been given and an opportunity to cure (if any) has elapsed, (b) a representation made or deemed made by a Guarantor in any Credit Support Document that proves to be false, incorrect or misleading in any material respect when made or deemed made, (c) the failure of a Guaranty or other Credit Support Document to be in full force and effect prior to the satisfaction of all obligations of such Participant to PJM, without PJM’s consent, or (d) a Guarantor repudiating, disaffirming, disclaiming or rejecting, in whole or in part, its obligations under the Guaranty or challenging the validity of the Guaranty.

Credit Support Document:

“Credit Support Document” shall mean any agreement or instrument in any way guaranteeing or securing any or all of a Participant’s obligations under the Agreements (including, without limitation, the provisions of Tariff, Attachment Q), any agreement entered into under, pursuant to, or in connection with the Agreements or any agreement entered into under, pursuant to, or in connection with the Agreements and/or any other agreement to which PJM, PJMSettlement and the Participant are parties, including, without limitation, any Corporate Guaranty, Letter of Credit, or agreement granting PJM and PJMSettlement a security interest.

CTS Enabled Interface:

“CTS Enabled Interface” shall mean an interface between the PJM Control Area and an adjacent Control Area at which the Office of the Interconnection has authorized the use of Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (“CTS”). The CTS Enabled Interfaces between the PJM Control Area and the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. Control Area shall be designated in the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Schedule A (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45). The CTS Enabled Interfaces between the PJM Control Area and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. shall be designated consistent with Attachment 3, section 2 of the Joint Operating Agreement between Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

CTS Interface Bid:

“CTS Interface Bid” shall mean a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on either side of a CTS Enabled Interface in accordance with the procedures of Operating...
Curtailment:

“Curtailment” shall mean a reduction in firm or non-firm transmission service in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

Curtailment Service Provider:

“Curtailment Service Provider” or “CSP” shall mean a Member or a Special Member, which action on behalf of itself or one or more other Members or non-Members, participates in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Ancillary Services markets, and/or Reliability Pricing Model by causing a reduction in demand.

Customer Facility:

“Customer Facility” shall mean Generation Facilities or Merchant Transmission Facilities interconnected with or added to the Transmission System pursuant to an Interconnection Request under Tariff, Part IV.

Customer-Funded Upgrade:

“Customer-Funded Upgrade” shall mean any Network Upgrade, Local Upgrade, or Merchant Network Upgrade for which cost responsibility (i) is imposed on an Interconnection Customer or an Eligible Customer pursuant to Tariff, Part VI, section 217, or (ii) is voluntarily undertaken by a New Service Customer in fulfillment of an Upgrade Request. No Network Upgrade, Local Upgrade or Merchant Network Upgrade or other transmission expansion or enhancement shall be a Customer-Funded Upgrade if and to the extent that the costs thereof are included in the rate base of a public utility on which a regulated return is earned.

Customer Interconnection Facilities:

“Customer Interconnection Facilities” shall mean all facilities and equipment owned and/or controlled, operated and maintained by Interconnection Customer on Interconnection Customer’s side of the Point of Interconnection identified in the appropriate appendices to the Interconnection Service Agreement and to the Interconnection Construction Service Agreement, including any modifications, additions, or upgrades made to such facilities and equipment, that are necessary to physically and electrically interconnect the Customer Facility with the Transmission System.

Daily Deficiency Rate:

“Daily Deficiency Rate” shall mean the rate employed to assess certain deficiency charges under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 7, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 9, or Tariff, Attachment DD, section 13.
**Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation:**

“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8, or, as to an FRR entity, in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Day-ahead Congestion Price:**


**Day-ahead Energy Market:**

“Day-ahead Energy Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy and payment of Transmission Congestion Charges developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.

**Day-ahead Energy Market Injection Congestion Credits:**


**Day-ahead Energy Market Transmission Congestion Charges:**

“Day-ahead Energy Market Transmission Congestion Charges” shall be equal to the sum of Day-ahead Energy Market Withdrawal Congestion Charges minus [the sum of Day-ahead Energy Market Injection Congestion Credits plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement between the Midcontinent Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 38), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM Rate Schedule FERC No. 45), plus any congestion charges calculated pursuant to agreements between the Office of the Interconnection and other entities, as applicable)].

**Day-ahead Energy Market Withdrawal Congestion Charges:**

**Day-ahead Loss Price:**


**Day-ahead Prices:**

“Day-ahead Prices” shall mean the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market.

**Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction:**

“Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction” shall mean a transaction scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to the PJM-MISO interface from a generator within the PJM balancing authority area that Pseudo-Ties into the MISO balancing authority area.

**Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves:**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves” shall mean thirty-minute reserves as defined by the ReliabilityFirst Corporation and SERC.

**Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market:**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market” shall mean the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves developed by the Office of the Interconnection as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.

**Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement:**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement” shall mean the sum of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement and Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

**Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources:**

“Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources” shall mean synchronized and non-synchronized generation resources and Demand Resources electrically located within the PJM Region that are capable of providing Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

**Day-ahead Settlement Interval:**

“Day-ahead Settlement Interval” shall mean the interval used by settlements, which shall be every one clock hour.

**Day-ahead System Energy Price:**

Deactivation:

“Deactivation” shall mean the retirement or mothballing of a generating unit governed by Tariff, Part V.

Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit:

“Deactivation Avoidable Cost Credit” shall mean the credit paid to Generation Owners pursuant to Tariff, Part V, section 114.

Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate:

“Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate” shall mean the formula rate established pursuant to Tariff, Part V, section 115.

Deactivation Date:

“Deactivation Date” shall mean the date a generating unit within the PJM Region is either retired or mothballed and ceases to operate.

Decrement Bid:

“Decrement Bid” shall mean a type of Virtual Transaction that is a bid to purchase energy at a specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market. A cleared Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

Default:

As used in the Interconnection Service Agreement and Construction Service Agreement, “Default” shall mean the failure of a Breaching Party to cure its Breach in accordance with the applicable provisions of an Interconnection Service Agreement or Construction Service Agreement.

Delivering Party:

“Delivering Party” shall mean the entity supplying capacity and energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt.

Delivery Year:
“Delivery Year” shall mean the Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan under Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

Demand Bid:

“Demand Bid” shall mean a bid, submitted by a Load Serving Entity in the Day-ahead Energy Market, to purchase energy at its contracted load location, for a specified timeframe and megawatt quantity, that if cleared will result in energy being scheduled at the specified location in the Day-ahead Energy Market and in the physical transfer of energy during the relevant Operating Day.

Demand Bid Limit:

“Demand Bid Limit” shall mean the largest MW volume of Demand Bids that may be submitted by a Load Serving Entity for any hour of an Operating Day, as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1B, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1B.

Demand Bid Screening:

“Demand Bid Screening” shall mean the process by which Demand Bids are reviewed against the applicable Demand Bid Limit, and rejected if they would exceed that limit, as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1B, and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1B.

Demand Resource:

“Demand Resource” shall mean a resource with the capability to provide a reduction in demand.

Demand Resource Factor or DR Factor:

“Demand Resource Factor” or (“DR Factor”) shall have the meaning specified in the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

DER Aggregation Resource:

“DER Aggregation Resource” shall be comprised of one or more Component DER. A DER Aggregation Resource is used by a DER Aggregator to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A DER Aggregation Resource is capable of satisfying a minimum energy and/or ancillary services market offer of 100 kW. The market participation eligibility of a DER Aggregation Resource shall be determined in accordance with the physical and operational characteristics of the underlying Component DER that comprise the DER Aggregation Resource.

DER Aggregator:
“DER Aggregator” shall mean an entity that is a Market Participant that: (i) uses one or more DER Aggregation Resources to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model; and (ii) has a fully-executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement.

**DER Aggregator Participation Model:**

“DER Aggregator Participation Model” shall mean the participation model described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B.

**DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:**

“DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean one or more DER Aggregation Resource that participates in the Reliability Pricing Model, capable of satisfying a minimum capacity market offer of 100 kW, or is otherwise treated as capacity in PJM’s markets, such as through a Fixed Resource Requirement Capacity Plan, for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year and all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Designated Agent:**

“Designated Agent” shall mean any entity that performs actions or functions on behalf of the Transmission Provider, a Transmission Owner, an Eligible Customer, or the Transmission Customer required under the Tariff.

**Designated Entity:**

“Designated Entity” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Direct Assignment Facilities:**

“Direct Assignment Facilities” shall mean facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the Tariff. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in the Service Agreement that governs service to the Transmission Customer and shall be subject to Commission approval.

**Direct Charging Energy:**

“Direct Charging Energy” shall mean the energy that an Energy Storage Resource purchases from the PJM Interchange Energy Market and (i) later resells to the PJM Interchange Energy Market; or (ii) is lost to conversion inefficiencies, provided that such inefficiencies are an unavoidable component of the conversion, storage, and discharge process that is used to resell energy back to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

**Direct Load Control:**
“Direct Load Control” shall mean load reduction that is controlled directly by the Curtailment Service Provider’s market operations center or its agent, in response to PJM instructions.

**Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts:**

“Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts” shall mean the maximum megawatt power output available for discharge in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Continuous Mode or in Discharge Mode. Discharge Economic Maximum Megawatts shall be the Economic Maximum for an Energy Storage Resource in Discharge Mode or in Continuous Mode.

**Discharge Economic Minimum Megawatts:**

“Discharge Economic Minimum Megawatts” shall mean the minimum megawatt power output available for discharge in economic dispatch by an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Discharge Mode. Discharge Economic Minimum Megawatts shall be the Economic Minimum for an Energy Storage Resource in Discharge Mode.

**Discharge Mode:**

“Discharge Mode” shall mean the mode of operation of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant that only includes positive megawatt quantities (i.e., the Energy Storage Resource Model Participant is only injecting megawatts onto the grid).

**Discharge Ramp Rate:**

“Discharge Ramp Rate” shall mean the Ramping Capability of an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant in Discharge Mode.

**Dispatch Rate:**

“Dispatch Rate” shall mean the control signal, expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour, calculated and transmitted continuously and dynamically to direct the output level of all generation resources dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the Offer Data.

**Dispatched Charging Energy:**

“Dispatched Charging Energy” shall mean Direct Charging Energy that an Energy Storage Resource Model Participant receives from the electric grid pursuant to PJM dispatch while providing one of the following services in the PJM markets: Energy Imbalance Service pursuant to Tariff, Schedule 4; Regulation; Tier 2 Synchronized Reserves; or Reactive Service. Energy Storage Resource Model Participants shall be considered to be providing Energy Imbalance Service when they are dispatchable by PJM in real-time.

**Dynamic Schedule:**
“Dynamic Schedule” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Dynamic Transfer:**

“Dynamic Transfer” shall have the same meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.
1.2 Cost-based Offers.

Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, all cost-based offers for energy or other services to be sold on the PJM Interchange Energy Market from generating resources or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not exceed the variable cost of producing such energy or other service, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 to this Agreement and applicable regulatory standards, requirements and determinations; provided that, a Market Seller may offer to the PJM Interchange Energy Market the right to call on energy from a resource the output of which has been sold on a bilateral basis, with the rate for such energy if called equal to the curtailment rate specified in the bilateral contract.
1.4B DER Aggregator Participation Model

(a) The rules and procedures for the participation of DER Aggregators are established pursuant to this section 1.4B and the PJM Manuals.

(b) In order to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, a DER Aggregator shall register each DER Aggregation Resource and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource with the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with the procedures established under the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the initiation of the registration review process by the Office of the Interconnection, a DER Aggregator shall obtain and verify, through good faith efforts and in coordination with the applicable electric distribution company, and, if necessary, any relevant Transmission Owner, the following location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection:

i. With the express written consent of the applicable Component DER, the electric distribution company customer account number and associated physical and transmission system electrical location information of the applicable Component DER, including compliance with applicable PJM and electric distribution company metering and telemetry requirements;

ii. Evidence of approval to interconnect, including but not limited to a finalized interconnection agreement, with the applicable Component DER, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, to the distribution system for identified megawatts, and identification of participation in an electric distribution company program that recognizes grid withdrawals and/or injections, including but not limited to a net energy metering program.

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

The registration review process shall commence after: (1) the Office of the Interconnection has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) the Office of the Interconnection receives a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) pre-registration activities have been completed, consisting of the DER Aggregator obtaining and verifying the location and data components described above needed for its registration.
The Office of the Interconnection shall review the registration and data submitted therein for completeness, and verify that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as defined under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement and Manuals. The DER Aggregator shall only submit a registration for Component DER that are under contract for the term of the registration, and only one DER Aggregator may operate Component DER at a specific location. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the DER Aggregator’s registration through the appropriate PJM system. A single registration shall only be comprised of individual Component DER in the same state, electric distribution company, Transmission Zone, and pricing point unless otherwise noted below. Upon receipt of notification by the Office of the Interconnection, the electric distribution company may, within 60 calendar days, review and verify, as applicable, the registration and the following information contained therein:

i. Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity;

ii. The specific PJM markets in which the DER Aggregation Resource plans to participate and, if applicable, the effective and termination dates for participation;

iii. The electric distribution company customer account number(s) which represent Component DER location(s) and related information, as defined in the PJM Manuals;

iv. Participation of the Component DER in an electric distribution company’s retail program at the time of registration, and whether such participation precludes participation of the Component DER in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM, and as defined in the PJM Manuals;

a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets the
 applicable requirements for energy market or capacity market participation.

v. The DER Aggregator’s participation in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets complies with the rules and regulations of any applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority;

vi. The Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority allows the participation of any applicable Component DER that are also end-use customers of an electric distribution company, in accordance with the provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g).

vii. The participation of the Component DER in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets do not pose a threat to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system, the public, or electric distribution company personnel.

If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In the event that the electric distribution company’s concerns are resolved within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may recommend that the Office of the Interconnection approve the registration. In the event that the concerns identified by the electric distribution company are not resolved, the electric distribution company may, within the 60 calendar day review period, recommend that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) reject the registration, (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration, or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.

Within fifteen calendar days, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and shall either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration based on the Office of the Interconnection’s review of the registration and receipt and review of the electric distribution company’s comments and recommendation, with deference given to the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities. To the extent that
no comments or recommendations are provided by the electric distribution company, including after the Office of the Interconnection provides final notice to the electric distribution company prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve the DER Aggregator’s registration.

During the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource will be assigned to the electric distribution company, the DER Aggregator, or another entity, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

All DER Aggregators shall remain in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, in accordance with their executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement, at all times while participating in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. Transmission Owners shall, in coordination with the Office of the Interconnection, provide all data to the Office of the Interconnection reasonably required to accurately represent the DER Aggregation Resource in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 1.5.4 and the PJM Manuals.

A DER Aggregator shall report to the Office of the Interconnection any proposed update to the inventory of the individual Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource, or proposed additional market services provided by the DER Aggregation Resource, identified in the DER Aggregator’s registration to reflect any proposed addition or subtraction of a Component DER or market service, and any applicable information or data associated with the Component DER or market service, in accordance with the specifications described in the PJM Manuals. Any proposed update shall not require a new registration of the existing Component DER within the approved DER Aggregation Resource. Upon notification of any proposed update, the electric distribution company shall have an opportunity to conduct a review, for a period of up to 60 calendar days, in accordance with the provisions of this section related to initial registration, and make a recommendation to the Office of the Interconnection, prior to the Office of the Interconnection approving or denying the proposed update to the DER Aggregation Resource. The DER Aggregator may continue to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using its existing approved DER Aggregation Resource during the course of any such review conducted by the electric distribution company. An inventory of the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registration that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may not be modified during the course of an applicable Delivery Year.

(c) All Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource shall interface with the same primary pricing node, except: (i) in the case of a DER Aggregation Resource that only provides ancillary services and is less than or equal to 5 MW, the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are in the same state and service territory of a single electric distribution
company; and (ii) in the case of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource(s) linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are located within a defined zone or sub-zonal Locational Deliverability Area.

The Office of the Interconnection will establish a periodic review, in coordination with the electric distribution company and DER Aggregator, no less than annually, or more frequently as needed, to identify any permanent electrical location change that would modify the pricing node associated with a DER Aggregation Resource or its underlying Component DER. During this review, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) confirm that applicable data reviewed and verified in the registration process is still complete and accurate, and (ii) request any updates to such data as a condition of continued participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(d) A DER Aggregator shall self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resource into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, as described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall be eligible, at their election, to offer a dispatchable range in submitting bidding parameters into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market.

(e) A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource shall provide telemetry for each DER Aggregation Resource participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, in accordance with the technical specifications described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource may provide telemetry for the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource. This telemetry shall represent one or more values indicative of the total electrical output of the DER Aggregation Resource and inclusive of all underlying Component DER.

A DER Aggregator shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 and the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall retain performance data for individual Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource for auditing purposes, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator is responsible for ensuring that Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. For non-interval metered residential DER Aggregation Resources, the DER Aggregator must ensure that a representative sample of Component DER have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. For DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers, DER Aggregators shall provide aggregated meter data to the Office of the Interconnection for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource. The measurement systems shall comply with the applicable electric distribution company accuracy requirements for meters, and/or as described in
the PJM Manual 01. Additional details for the configuration of such measurement systems under various specific configurations are specified in PJM Manual 14D.

The metering equipment shall meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy, or otherwise have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including potential transformers and current transformers) and the metering equipment and associated data shall meet the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals.

(f) The electric distribution company should, prior to the deadline for submission of offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, notify the DER Aggregator of any operational limitations for the Operating Day that may impact the bidding parameters of an applicable DER Aggregation Resource. In the event that the electric distribution company identifies additional operational concerns after the deadline described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, the DER Aggregator may utilize the generation rebidding period identified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.9, and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.9, to update its bidding parameters.

During the Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall dispatch DER Aggregation Resources, by communicating with the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the DER Aggregator’s submitted bidding parameters. During the Operating Day, an electric distribution company may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. Following the exercise of the electric distribution company’s override, the DER Aggregator shall reflect the override by updating the applicable bidding parameters of its DER Aggregation Resource. An electric distribution company’s override shall not excuse a DER Aggregator’s failure to perform any of the obligations established under the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, RAA, or PJM Manuals.

Any disputes regarding an electric distribution company’s exercise of its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be addressed in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

(g) The Office of the Interconnection shall not permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes
Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the electric distribution company determines that the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permits such end-use customers to participate. The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model with a DER Aggregation Resource including Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, if, during the course of the registration process described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), the electric distribution company presents any of the following evidence to PJM:

i. an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation;

ii. an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority’s legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation; or

iii. an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation.

The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the DER Aggregation Resource includes one or more Component DER that are demand response and the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has prohibited the participation of demand response in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(h) A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources containing one or more Component DER that also participate in one or more retail programs. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of a retail program, including but not limited to a Component DER participating in a retail net energy metering program.

A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources that provide multiple services in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER shall not be registered
with multiple DER Aggregation Resources, or participate as part of another Market Participant outside of the DER Aggregator Participation Model. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of another wholesale sale.

(i) DER Aggregators providing capacity using a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource shall be subject to the Day-ahead Energy Market must-offer requirement described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d), based on the technology of the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

(j) DER Aggregation Resources are subject to offer price cap and associated three pivotal supplier test provisions of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.

(k) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a MOPR Floor Offer Price, in accordance with the provisions applicable to MOPR Floor Offer Price for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2).

If a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-2), the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resources may submit a Sell Offer with a Minimum Floor Offer Price of no lower than the MW-weighted average of the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Prices (zero if not applicable) of the aggregated resources in such Sell Offer.

(l) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a Market Seller Offer Cap, in a manner consistent with the provisions applicable to Market Seller Offer Cap for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6 and Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.

(m) Projected PJM Market Revenues for DER Capacity Aggregation Resources subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price or Market Seller Offer Cap shall be determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8(d-1). The determination of PJM Market Revenues by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize either the hourly output profiles, or the Projected EAS Dispatch, as appropriate.

(n) A DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource that contains Component DER that are also load reduction resources shall be accounted for and settled in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A.
(o) Component DER interconnecting to distribution facilities for purposes of participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM exclusively through the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not be subject to the Part IV of the Tariff relating to interconnections with the Transmission System, and shall exclusively interconnect to distribution facilities pursuant to applicable state or local law.
1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer’s self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer’s Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) (i) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(ii) In the Real-time Energy Market, Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(iii) Market Participants that deviate in real-time from the amounts of Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve sales, scheduled day-ahead shall be obligated to purchase Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of
conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.13. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection’s forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers’ offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6.

1.10.1A Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. Price Responsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.
(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection: (i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer’s intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed $2,000/MWh), if any, at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Such transactions in the Real-time Energy Market, other than Coordinated Transaction Schedules and emergency energy sales and purchases, may specify a price up to $2,000/MWh. Scheduling of such transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not Dynamic Transfers to such entities pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this type is referred to as an “Up-to Congestion Transaction.” Such Up-to Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum
difference between the source and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(c–2) A Market Participant may elect to submit an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid form of Virtual Transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall specify the price for such transaction which shall be limited to $2,000/megawatt-hour.

(c-3) Up-to Congestion Transactions may only be submitted at hubs, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b). Increment Offers and Decrement Bids may be only submitted at hubs, nodes at which physical generation or load is settled, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b).

(d) Market Sellers in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy, demand reductions, or other services for the following Operating Day for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires or is required to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection. Offers for the supply of energy may be cost-based, market-based, or both, and may vary hourly. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller’s cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource, Intermittent Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources, Intermittent Resources, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency offers to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

1) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on
either a temporary or long-term basis. This includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier’s exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d) and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that have not cleared a Base Residual Auction or an Incremental Auction, were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, and were not designated as replacement capacity under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource, Economic Load Response Participant resource, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each clock hour in the offer period;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) May specify for generation resources offer parameters for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) Minimum Run Time; (2) maximum run time; (3) Start-up Costs; (4) No-load Costs; (5) Incremental Energy Offer; (6) notification time; (7) availability; (8) ramp rate; (9) Economic Minimum; (10) Economic Maximum; (11) emergency minimum MW; (12) emergency maximum MW; (13) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (14) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (15) condense to generation time constraints, and may specify offer parameters for Economic Load Response Participant resources for each
clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) minimum down time; (2) shutdown costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) notification time; (5) Economic Minimum; and (6) Economic Maximum;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with additional schedules applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer for the clock hour, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day, for which the offer is submitted, unless the Market Seller a) submits a Real-time Offer for the applicable clock hour, or b) updates the availability of its offer for that hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day, unless modified after the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market as permitted pursuant to sections 1.10.9A or 1.10.9B below;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all generation resources, except (1) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is above $1,000/megawatt-hour and less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer; and (2) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour; and

ix) Shall not exceed a demand reduction offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, except when an Economic Load Response Participant submits a cost-based offer that includes an incremental cost component that is above $1,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer but in no event greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour; and

x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,849/megawatt-hour;
b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,425/megawatt hour; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,100/megawatt-hour; and

xi) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $0.00/MWh for pumped storage hydropower units scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to provide Regulation that shall specify the megawatts of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such Regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource’s opportunity costs. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100/megawatt-hour in the case of Regulation offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $/∆MW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation
Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.6.

(g) Each component of an offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource that is constant for the entire Operating Day and does not vary hour to hour shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount, location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) (i) Offers to Supply Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Reserves By Generation Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage, shall submit offers or otherwise make their 10-minute reserve
capability available to supply Synchronized Reserve or, as applicable, Non-Synchronized Reserve, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer, in an amount equal to the available 10-minute reserve capability of such Generation Capacity Resource. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources that (A) are capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, (B) are located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region, and (C) have submitted offers for the supply of energy into the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve, as applicable.

(3) Offers for the supply of Synchronized Reserve by all generation resources must be cost-based. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. For offers to supply Synchronized Reserve, the offer price shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, where such expected value shall be recalculated annually, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, and posted on PJM’s website. The expected value of the penalty is calculated as the product of: (A) the average penalty, expressed in $/MWh, multiplied by (B) the average rate of non-performance during Synchronized Reserve events multiplied by (C) the probability a Synchronized Reserve event that will qualify for non-performance assessments will occur.

The expected value of the penalty shall be determined by an annual review of the twelve-month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the results of its annual review by no later than December 15, and the revised offer price cap shall be effective as of the following January 1; provided, however, that at the time of implementation of this rule the expected value of the penalty shall be $0.02/MWh,
and for the period from the second month after implementation through the second January 1 following such date of implementation, the expected value of the penalty shall be recalculated on a monthly basis using data from the implementation date of this rule through the 15th day of the current month, and the revised value shall be effective the 1st day of the following month.

(4) All Non-Synchronized Reserve offers shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) of this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by a synchronized resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources may submit offers for their available Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An on-line generation resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) ramp rate; (B) Economic Minimum; and (C) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.
For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (D) ramp rate; (E) condense to generation time constraints; (F) Economic Minimum; and (G) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Determination of Available Non-Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by an off-line generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources. Such hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources may submit offers for their available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Non-Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Non-Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An off-line generation resource’s available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) startup time; (B) notification time; (C) ramp rate; (D) Economic Minimum; and (E) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Non-Synchronized Reserves above its Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iv) Offers to Supply Synchronized Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets
(1) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wish to make their resources available to supply Synchronized Reserve may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All offers to supply Synchronized Reserve offers from Economic Load Response Participant resources shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, as determined in accordance with section 1.10.1A(j)(i)(3) above. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection for each clock hour for which the Economic Load Response Participant desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to reduce demand. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, may vary hourly, and shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts; (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shutdown costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Such offers may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs) per hour.

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of an Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Economic Load Response Participant resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Economic Load Response Participant resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. An Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in
the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Economic Load Response Participant resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) (i) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserve By Generation Resources

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, that is available for energy, is capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, or otherwise make their Secondary Reserve capability available. Such offers shall be for an amount equal to the resource’s available energy output achievable within thirty minutes (less its energy output achievable within ten minutes) from a request of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region that submit offers for the supply of energy into the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market and are capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Secondary Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources and Energy Storage Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, as applicable.

(3) Offers for the supply of Secondary Reserve shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) above, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Secondary Reserve Capability of Generation Resources
For each offer to supply Secondary Reserve by a generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources may submit their available Secondary Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Secondary Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(m)(i) above must submit a Secondary Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

An on-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability; and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) Economic Minimum; and (iii) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) condense to generation time constraints; (iii) Economic Minimum; and (iv) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

An off-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, shall be based on the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability and the following offer parameters submitted as part of
the resource’s energy offer: (i) startup time; (ii) notification time; (iii) ramp rate; (iv) Economic Minimum; and (v) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant resources

(1) Each Economic Load Response Participant that submits offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wishes to make their resources available to supply Secondary Reserve shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Secondary Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and include such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All Secondary Reserve offers by Economic Load Response Participant resources shall be for $0.00/MWh. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(n) A Market Participant may submit a Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction for a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that is a Pseudo-Tie into the MISO balancing authority area. Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions combine an offer to sell energy at a source with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink.

Each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction shall: (1) source at a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that Pseudo-Ties into MISO; and (2) sink at the PJM-MISO interface. A Market Participant must reserve transmission service in accordance with the PJM Tariff for each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. Megawatt quantities for Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions shall be greater than zero and less than or equal to the transmission service reserved for the Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. An accepted Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening
(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

\[
\text{Demand Bid Limit} = \text{greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point} \times 1.3), \text{ or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point} + 10\text{MW)}
\]

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity’s highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM’s highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity’s actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity’s expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead
Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to section 1.10.9 below or Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, Start-up Costs, No-load Costs and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above. Hydropower units can only be pool-scheduled if they are pumped storage units and scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource’s Start-up Costs, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of 0.1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand
in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled, or otherwise not following the dispatch orders of the Office of the Interconnection, shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(e) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource to supply Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Synchronized Reserve Market that does not deliver the scheduled megawatt quantity in the applicable real-time reserve market, shall replace the Synchronized Reserve not delivered and shall pay for such Synchronized Reserve at the applicable Real-time Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price. Market Participants shall not self-schedule a resource to provide Secondary Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(f) For energy, hydropower units, excluding pumped storage units, may only be self-scheduled.

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.
Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for Start-up Costs or No-load Costs.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of Dynamic Transfer shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller's Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to Dynamic Transfer by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market
Buyer’s load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer’s hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection’s forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by PRD Providers; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission
constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) By 1:30 p.m., or as soon as practicable thereafter, of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant’s inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the
real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, or the Real-time Energy Market or Real-time Ancillary Services Markets after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, and Real-time Ancillary Service Markets. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Operating Agreement, section 18.17.1, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants’ non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from the time the Office of the Interconnection posts the results of the Day-ahead Energy Market until 2:15 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for the next
Operating Day. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 10:00 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows and as specified in section 1.10.9A below:

   i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

   ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

   iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

   iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any Start-Up Costs.

(c) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules resulting from the rebidding period by 6:30 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. The Office of the Interconnection may also commit additional resources after such time as system conditions require. For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

1.10.9A Updating Offers in Real-time

(a) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, and such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that
resource for the clock hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals and subject to the following conditions:

(i) A market-based Real-time Offer shall not exceed the applicable energy offer caps specified in this Schedule. Once a Market Seller’s resource is committed for an applicable clock hour, the Market Seller may not increase its Incremental Energy Offer and may only submit a market-based Real-time Offer that is higher than its market-based offer that was in effect at the time of commitment to reflect increases in the resource’s cost-based Start-up Costs and cost-based No-load Costs. The Market Seller may elect not to have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only its lowest cost-based offer considered for the remainder of the Operating Day.

(ii) Cost-based Real-time Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d) and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. If a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for a particular clock hour in accordance with subsection (c) below, or if updates to a cost-based offer are required by the Market Seller’s approved Fuel Cost Policy, the Market Seller shall update its previously submitted cost-based Real-time Offer.

(iii) If a Market Seller’s available cost-based offer is not compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals at the time a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for an applicable clock hour during the Operating Day, the Market Seller must submit an updated cost-based Real-time Offer consisting of an Incremental Energy Offer, Start-up Cost and No-load Cost for that clock hour that is compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource during and through the end of the applicable clock hour to update only the following offer parameters, as further described in the PJM Manuals: (1) Economic Minimum; (2) Economic Maximum; (3) emergency minimum MW; (4) emergency maximum MW; (5) unit availability status; (6) fixed output indicator; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; and (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW. Such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that resource for the clock hour.

1.10.9B Offer Parameter Flexibility

(a) Market Sellers may, in accordance with sections 1.10.1A and 1.10.9A above, this section 1.10.9B, and the PJM Manuals, update offer parameters at any time up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, including prior to the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the close of the rebidding period specified in section 1.10.9, except that Market Sellers may not update their offers for the supply of energy, Secondary Reserve, Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or demand reduction: (1) during the period after the close
the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the posting of the Day-ahead Energy Market results pursuant to section 1.10.8(b); or (2) during the period after close of the rebidding period and prior to PJM announcing the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d).

(b) For generation resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) cost-based Start-up Costs; (2) cost-based No-load Costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) Economic Minimum and Economic Maximum; (5) emergency minimum MW and emergency maximum MW; (6) ramp rate; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (9) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, Minimum Run Time.

(c) For Economic Load Response Participant resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) shutdown costs, (2) Incremental Energy Offer; (3) Economic Minimum; (4) Economic Maximum; and (5) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, minimum down time.

(d) After the announcement of the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d), a Market Seller may submit a Real-time Offer where offer parameters may differ from the offer originally submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, except that a Market Seller may not submit a Real-time Offer that changes, of the offer parameters listed in section 1.10.1A(d), the MW amounts specified in the Incremental Energy Offer, MW amounts specified in the ramp rate, maximum run time, and availability; provided, however, Market Sellers of dual-fueled resources may submit Real-time Offers for such resources that change the availability of a submitted cost-based offer.
3.3A Economic Load Response Participants.

3.3A.1 Compensation.

Economic Load Response Participants shall be compensated pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and/or 3.3A.6 of this Schedule, for demand reduction offers submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test of section 3.3A.4; that are scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection; and that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection. Qualifying demand reductions shall be measured by: 1) comparing actual metered load to an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load or alternative CBL determined in accordance with the provisions of section 3.3A.2 or 3.3A.2.01, respectively; or 2) non-interval metered residential Direct Load Control customers, as metered on a current statistical sample of electric distribution company accounts, as described in the PJM Manuals or 3) by the MWs produced by on-Site Generators pursuant to the provisions of section 3.3A.2.02.

3.3A.2 Customer Baseline Load.

For Economic Load Response Participants that choose to measure demand reductions using an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load (“CBL”), the CBL shall be determined using the following formula for such participant’s Non-Variable Loads. Additionally, the following formula shall be used to determine a Peak Shaving Adjustment End-Use Customer’s demand reductions when determining peak shaving performance rating as described in PJM Manual 19, unless an alternative CBL is approved pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01 of this schedule:

(a) The CBL for weekdays shall be the average of the highest 4 out of the 5 most recent load weekdays in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event.

i. For the purposes of calculating the CBL for weekdays, weekdays shall not include:

1. NERC holidays;
2. Weekend days;
3. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

(i) any weekday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.4 or 3.3A.5, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

(ii) any weekday where the end-use customer location that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer
locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

4. Any weekday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage for the five days.

   ii. If a 45-day period does not include 5 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, provided there are 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the CBL shall be based on the average of those 4 weekdays. If there are not 4 eligible weekdays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

   iii. Section 3.3A.2(a)(i)(3) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 4 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(b) The CBL for weekend days and NERC holidays shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

   i. The CBL for Saturdays and Sundays/NERC holidays shall be the average of the highest 2 load days out of the 3 most recent Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event, provided that the following days shall not be used to calculate a Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday CBL:

      1. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

         a. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.5 or 3.3A.6, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

         b. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday where the end-use customer that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

      2. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage level for the three days;
3. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday that corresponds to the beginning or end of daylight savings.

ii. If a 45-day period does not include 3 Saturdays or 3 Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, provided there are 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, the CBL will be based on the average of those 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays. If there are not 2 eligible Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

iii. Section 3.3A.2(b)(i)(1) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 2 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(c) CBLs established pursuant to this section shall represent end-use customers’ actual load patterns. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that a CBL or alternative CBL does not accurately represent a customer’s actual load patterns, the CBL shall be revised accordingly pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01. Consistent with this requirement, if an Economic Load Response Participant chooses to measure load reductions using a Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of a change in its operations or the operations of the end-use customer upon whose behalf it is acting that would result in the adjustment of more than half the hours in the affected party’s Customer Baseline Load by twenty percent or more for more than twenty days.

3.3A.2.01 Alternative Customer Baseline Methodologies.

(a) During the Economic Load Response Participant registration process pursuant to section 1.5A.3 of this Schedule, the relevant Economic Load Response Participant or the Office of the Interconnection (“Interested Parties”) may, in the case of such participant’s Non-Variable Load customers, and shall, in the case of its Variable Load customers, propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2. During the Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registration process pursuant to section 8.4 of this schedule, or as otherwise approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the relevant participant or the Office of the Interconnection may propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2 of this schedule. In support of such proposal, the participant shall demonstrate that the alternative CBL method shall result in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values, as calculated in accordance with the technique specified in the PJM Manuals. Any proposal made pursuant to this section shall be provided to the other Interested Party.

(b) The Interested Parties shall have 30 days to agree on a proposal issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. The 30-day period shall start the day the proposal is provided to
the other Interested Party. If both Interested Parties agree on a proposal issued pursuant to this section, that alternative CBL calculation methodology shall be effective consistent with the date of the relevant Economic Load Response Participant registration.

(c) If agreement is not reached pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a CBL methodology that shall result, as nearly as practicable, in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values within 20 days from the expiration of the 30-day period established by subsection (b). A CBL established by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be binding upon both Interested Parties unless the Interested Parties reach agreement on an alternative CBL methodology prior to the expiration of the 20-day period established by this subsection (c).

(d) Operation of this section 3.3A.2.01 shall not delay Economic Load Response Participant registrations pursuant to Section 1.5A.3, provided that the alternative CBL established pursuant to this section shall be used for all related energy settlements made pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall periodically publish alternative CBL methodologies established pursuant to this section in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registrations will use the CBL defined on the associated economic registration for measuring demand reductions when determining the participant’s compliance with its capacity obligations pursuant to Schedule 6 of the RAA, unless it is the maximum baseload CBL as defined in the PJM Manuals, in which case the participant will use the CBL set forth in the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Response registration.

3.3A.2.02 On-Site Generators.

On-Site Generators used as the basis for Economic Load Response Participant status pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A shall be subject to the following provisions:

i. The On-Site Generator shall be used solely to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall not otherwise have been operating;

ii. If subsection (i) does not apply, the amount of energy from an On-Site Generator used to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be capable of being quantified in a manner that is acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection.

3.3A.3 Symmetric Additive Adjustment.
(a) Customer Baseline Levels established pursuant to section 3.3A.2 shall be adjusted by the Symmetric Additive Adjustment. Unless an alternative formula is approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the Symmetric Additive Adjustment shall be calculated using the following formula:

Step 1: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period ending 1 hour prior to the start of event.

Step 2: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period in the CBL that corresponds to the 3 hour period described in Step 1.

Step 3: Subtract the results of Step 2 from the results of Step 1 to determine the symmetric additive adjustment (this may be positive or negative).

Step 4: Add the symmetric additive adjustment (i.e. the results of Step 3) to each hour in the CBL that corresponds to each event hour.

(b) Following a Load Reduction Event that is submitted to the Office of the Interconnection for compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Notification window(s), if applicable, directly metered data and Customer Baseline Load and Symmetric Additive Adjustment calculation to the appropriate electric distribution company for optional review. The electric distribution company will have ten Business Days to provide the Office of the Interconnection with notification of any issues related to the metered data or calculations.

3.3A.4 Net Benefits Test.

The Office of the Interconnection shall identify each month the price on a supply curve, representative of conditions expected for that month, at which the benefit of load reductions provided by Economic Load Response Participants exceed the costs of those reductions to other loads. In formulaic terms, the net benefit is deemed to be realized at the price point on the supply curve where \((\text{Delta LMP} \times \text{MWh consumed}) > (\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}} \times \text{DR})\), where \(\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}}\) is the market clearing price after Economic Load Response is dispatched and \(\text{Delta LMP}\) is the price before Economic Load Response is dispatched minus the \(\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}}\).

The Office of the Interconnection shall update and post the Net Benefits Test results and analysis for a calendar month no later than the 15th day of the preceding calendar month. As more fully specified in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the net benefit price level in accordance with the following steps:

Step 1. Retrieve generation offers from the same calendar month (of the prior calendar year) for which the calculation is being performed, employing market-based price offers to the extent available, and cost-based offers to the extent market-based price offers are not available. To the extent that generation offers are unavailable from historical data due to the addition of a Zone to the PJM Region the Office of the Interconnection shall use the most recent generation offers that
best correspond to the characteristics of the calendar month for which the calculation is being performed, provided that at least 30 days of such data is available. If less than 30 days of data is available for a resource or group of resources, such resource[s] shall not be considered in the Net Benefits Test calculation.

Step 2: Adjust a portion of each prior-year offer representing the typical share of fuel costs in energy offers in the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals, for changes in fuel prices based on the ratio of the reference month spot price to the study month forward price. For such purpose, natural gas shall be priced at the Henry Hub price, number 2 fuel oil shall be priced at the New York Harbor price, and coal shall be priced as a blend of coal prices representative of the types of coal typically utilized in the PJM Region.

Step 3. Combine the offers to create daily supply curves for each day in the period.

Step 4. Average the daily curves for each day in the month to form an average supply curve for the study month.

Step 5. Use a non-linear least squares estimation technique to determine an equation that reasonably approximates and smooths the average supply curve.

Step 6. Determine the net benefit level as the point at which the price elasticity of supply is equal to 1 for the estimated supply curve equation established in Step 5.

3.3A.5 Market Settlements in Real-time Energy Market.

(a) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers for load reductions in the Day-ahead Energy Market by no later than 2:15 p.m. on the day prior to the Operating Day that cleared or that otherwise are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the actual kWh relief provided in excess of committed day-ahead load reductions. The offer shall contain the Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k) and shall not thereafter be subject to change; provided, however, the Economic Load Response Participant may update the previously specified minimum or maximum load reduction quantity and associated price by submitting a Real-time Offer for a clock hour by providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals no later than 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may also submit Real-time Offers for a clock hour for an Operating Day containing Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k), and may update such offers up to 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements. An Economic Load Response Participant that curtails or causes the curtailment of demand in real-time in response to PJM dispatch, and for which the applicable real-time LMP is
equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, will be compensated by PJM Settlement at the real-time Locational Marginal Price.

(b) In cases where the demand reduction follows dispatch, as defined in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o), as instructed by the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction offer price is equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, and demand reduction is not a Component DER operating as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, payment will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing demand, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the demand reduction must be committed.

Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, real-time operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) For purposes of load reductions qualifying for compensation hereunder, an Economic Load Response Participant shall accumulate credits for energy reductions in those hours when the energy delivered to the end-use customer is less than the end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval. In the event that the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant will accumulate debits at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval for the amount the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load. If the actual load reduction, compared to the desired load reduction is outside the deviation levels specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o), the Economic Load Response Participant shall be assessed balancing operating reserve charges in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions that are compensated at the applicable full LMP, in any Zone for any hour, shall be recovered from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, with the ratio shares determined as follows:

The ratio share for LSE i in zone z shall be $\frac{\text{RTL}_{i z}}{\text{RTL} + X}$ and the ratio share for party j shall be $\frac{X_j}{\text{RTL} + X}$.

Where:
\( \text{RTL} \) is the total real time load in all zones where \( \text{LMP} \geq \text{Net Benefits Test price} \);
\( \text{RTL}_i \) is the real-time load for LSE \( i \) in zone \( z \);
\( \mathbf{X} \) is the total export quantity from PJM in that hour; and
\( \mathbf{X}_j \) is the export quantity by party \( j \) from PJM.


(a) Economic Load Response Participants dispatched as a result of a qualifying demand reduction offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the reductions of kWh committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An Economic Load Response Participant that submits a demand reduction bid day ahead that is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection and for which the applicable day ahead LMP is greater than or equal to the Net Benefits Test shall be compensated by PJMSettlement at the day-ahead Locational Marginal Price.

Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements.

(b) Total payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead demand reduction bids with an offer price equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction is not dispatched as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, day-ahead operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) Economic Load Response Participants that have demand reductions committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market that deviate from the day-ahead schedule in real time shall be charged or credited for such variance at the real time LMP plus or minus an amount equal to the applicable balancing operating reserve charge in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3. Load Serving Entities that otherwise would have load that was reduced shall receive any associated operating reserve credit.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead demand reduction bids that are compensated at the applicable full, day ahead LMP under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions in any Zone for any hour shall be recovered
from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average real-time Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, in accordance with the formula prescribed in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A.5(d).

3.3A.7 Prohibited Economic Load Response Participant Market Settlements.

(a) Settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 shall be limited to demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test and are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) Demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a) shall not be eligible for settlement pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6. Examples of settlements prohibited pursuant to this section 3.3A.7(b) include, but are not limited to, the following:

i. Settlements based on variable demand where the timing of the demand reduction supporting the settlement did not change in direct response to Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii. Consecutive daily settlements that are the result of a change in normal demand patterns that are submitted to maintain a CBL that no longer reflects the relevant end-use customer’s demand;

iii. Settlements based on on-site generation data if the On-Site Generator is not supporting demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

iv. Settlements based on demand reductions that are the result of operational changes between multiple end-use customer sites in the PJM footprint;

v. Settlements that do not include all hours that the Office of the Interconnection dispatched the load reduction, or for which the load reduction cleared in the Day-ahead Market.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall disallow settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a). If the Economic Load Response Participant continues to submit settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a), then the Office of the Interconnection shall suspend the Economic Load Response Participant’s PJM Interchange Energy Market activity and refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement.

3.3A.8 Economic Load Response Participant Review Process.
(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall review the participation of an Economic Load Response Participant in the PJM Interchange Energy Market under the following circumstances:

   i. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registrations submitted pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A.3 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

   ii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

   iii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are denied by the Office of the Interconnection more than 10% of the time.

   iv. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registration will be reviewed when settlements are frequently submitted or if its actual loads frequently deviate from the previously scheduled quantities (as determined for purposes of assessing balancing operating reserves charges). PJM will notify the Participant when their registration is under review. While the Participant’s registration is under review by PJM, the Participant may continue economic load reductions but all settlements will be denied by PJM until the registration review is resolved pursuant to subsection (i) or (ii) below. PJM will require the Participant to provide information within 30 days to support that the settlements were submitted for load reduction activity done in response to price and not submitted based on the End-Use Customer’s normal operations.

      i) If the Participant is unable to provide adequate supporting information to substantiate the load reductions submitted for settlement, PJM will terminate the registration and may refer the Participant to either the Market Monitoring Unit or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for further investigation.

      ii) If the Participant does provide adequate supporting information, the settlements denied by PJM will be resubmitted by the Participant for review according to existing PJM market rules. Further, PJM may introduce an alternative Customer Baseline Load if the existing Customer Baseline Load does not adequately reflect what the customer load would have been absent a load reduction.

   v. The electric distribution company may only deny settlements during the normal settlement review process for inaccurate data including, but not limited to: meter data, line loss factor, Customer Baseline Load calculation, interval meter owner and a known recurring End-Use Customer outage or holiday.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall have thirty days to conduct a review pursuant to this section 3.3A.8. The Office of the Interconnection may refer the matter to the
PJM MMU and/or the FERC Office of Enforcement if the review indicates the relevant Economic Load Response Participant and/or relevant electric distribution company or LSE is engaging in activity that is inconsistent with the PJM Interchange Energy Market rules governing Economic Load Response Participants.
6.4 Offer Price Caps.

6.4.1 Applicability.

(a) If, at any time, it is determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Sections 1.10.8 or 6.1 of this Schedule that any generation resource may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, the offer prices for energy from such resource shall be capped as specified below. For such generation resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, if the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped for the entire commitment period, and such offer prices will be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and committed at the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest overall system production cost. For such generation resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market such offer prices shall be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and dispatched on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost in accordance with 6.4.1(g) until the earlier of: (i) the resource is released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection; (ii) the end of the Operating Day; or (iii) the start of the generation resource’s next pre-existing commitment.

The offer on which a resource is committed shall initially be determined at the time of the commitment. If any of the resource’s Incremental Energy Offer, No-load Cost or Start-Up Cost are updated for any portion of the offer capped hours subsequent to commitment, the Office of the Interconnection will redetermine the level of the offer cap using the updated offer values. The Office of the Interconnection will dispatch the resource on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

Resources that are self-scheduled to run in either the Day-ahead Energy Market or in the Real-time Energy Market are subject to the provisions of this section 6.4. The offer on which a resource is dispatched shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the offer price of such resource and as further limited as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A.

In accordance with section 6.4.1(h), a generation resource that is offer capped in the Real-time Energy Market but released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection will be subject to the three pivotal supplier test and further offer capping, as applicable, if the resource is committed for a period later in the same Operating Day.

(b) The energy offer price by any generation resource requested to be dispatched in accordance with Section 6.3 of this Schedule shall be capped at the levels specified in Section 6.4.2 of this Schedule. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the affected resource is so scheduled, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. Energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the price of such resource.

(c) Generation resources subject to an offer price cap shall be paid for energy at the applicable Locational Marginal Price.
(e) Offer price caps under section 6.4 of this Schedule shall be suspended for a generation resource with respect to transmission limit(s) for any period in which a generation resource is committed by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day or any period for which the generation resource has been self-scheduled where (1) there are not three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch under subsection (a) that are jointly pivotal with respect to such transmission limit(s), and (2) the Market Seller of the generation resource, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, is not pivotal (“three pivotal supplier test”). In the event the Office of the Interconnection system is unable to perform the three pivotal supplier test for a Market Seller, generation resources of that Market Seller that are dispatched to control transmission constraints will be dispatched on the resource’s market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

(f) For the purposes of conducting the three pivotal supplier test in subsection (e), the following applies:

(i) All megawatts of available incremental supply, including available self-scheduled supply for which the power distribution factor (“dfax”) has an absolute value equal to or greater than the dfax used by the Office of the Interconnection’s system operators when evaluating the impact of generation with respect to the constraint (“effective megawatts”) will be included in the available supply analysis at costs equal to the cost-based offers of the available incremental supply adjusted for dfax (“effective costs”). The Office of the Interconnection will post on the PJM website the dfax value used by operators with respect to a constraint when it varies from three percent.

(ii) The three pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of the relevant market incremental supply up to and including all such supply available at an effective cost equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price calculated using effective costs and effective megawatts and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint.

(iii) Offer price caps will apply on a generation supplier basis (i.e. not a generating unit by generating unit basis) and only the generation suppliers that fail the three pivotal supplier test with respect to any hour in the relevant period will have their units that are dispatched with respect to the constraint offer capped. A generation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Supply controlled by a generation supplier or its affiliates by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise will be included as supply of that generation supplier; supply owned by a generation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party by contract or otherwise will be included as supply of that third party.
A generation supplier’s units, including self-scheduled units, are offer capped if, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, the generation supplier is pivotal.

(iv) In the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall include price sensitive demand, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids as demand or supply, as applicable, in the relevant market.

(g) In the Real-time Energy Market, the schedule on which offer capped resources will be placed shall be determined using dispatch cost, where dispatch cost is calculated pursuant to the following formulas:

\[
\text{Dispatch cost for the applicable hour} = ((\text{Incremental Energy Offer @ Economic Minimum for the hour \ [$/MWh]} \times \text{Economic Minimum for the hour \ [MW]}) + \text{No-load Cost for the hour \ [$/H]})
\]

(i) For resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market, the resource is committed on the offer with the lowest Total Dispatch cost at the time of commitment,

where:

\[
\text{Total Dispatch cost} = \text{Sum of hourly dispatch cost over a resource’s minimum run time \ [$]} + \text{Start-Up Cost \ [$]}
\]

(ii) For resources operating in real-time pursuant to a day-ahead or real-time commitment, and whose offers are updated after commitment, the resource is dispatched on the offer with the lowest dispatch cost for the each of the updated hours.

(iii) However, once the resource is dispatched on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the determination of the cheapest schedule.

(h) A generation resource that was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, is operating in real time, and may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, will be offer price capped, subject to the outcome of a three pivotal supplier test, for each hour the resource operates beyond its committed hours or Minimum Run Time, whichever is greater, or in the case of resources self-scheduled in the Real-time Energy Market, for each hour the resource operates beyond its first hour of operation, in accordance with the following provisions.

(i) If the resource is operating on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the results of the three pivotal supplier test.
(ii) If the resource is operating on a market-based offer and the Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test then the resource will be dispatched on the cheaper of its market-based offer or the cost-based offer representing the offer cap as determined by section 6.4.2, whichever results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined under section 6.4.1(g).

(iii) If the Market Seller passes the three pivotal supplier test and the resource is currently operating on a market-based offer then the resource will remain on that offer, unless the Market Seller elects to not have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only the cost-based offer that represents the offer cap level as determined under section 6.4.2 considered for dispatch in which case the resource will be dispatched on its cost-based offer for the remainder of the Operating Day.

6.4.2 Level.

(a) The offer price cap shall be one of the amounts specified below, as specified in advance by the Market Seller for the affected unit:

(i) The weighted average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus at which energy from the capped resource was delivered during a specified number of hours during which the resource was dispatched for energy in economic merit order, the specified number of hours to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection and to be a number of hours sufficient to result in an offer price cap that reflects reasonably contemporaneous competitive market conditions for that unit;

(ii) For offers of $2,000/MWh or less, the incremental operating cost of the generation resource or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals (“incremental cost”), plus up to the lesser of 10% of such costs or $100 MWh, the sum of which shall not exceed $2,000/MWh; and, for offers greater than $2,000/MWh, the incremental cost of the generation resource;

(iii) For units that are frequently offer capped (“Frequently Mitigated Unit” or “FMU”), and for which the unit’s market-based offer was greater than its cost based offer, the following shall apply:

(a) For units that are offer capped for 60% or more of their run hours, but less than 70% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10% or (ii) incremental cost plus $20 per megawatt-hour;

(b) For units that are offer capped for 70% or more of their run hours,
but less than 80% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10%, or (ii) incremental cost plus $30 per megawatt-hour;

(c) For units that are offer capped for 80% or more of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental costs plus 10%; or (ii) incremental cost plus $40 per megawatt-hour.

(b) For purposes of section 6.4.2(a)(iii), a generating unit shall qualify for the specified offer cap upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit, pursuant to Section II.A of the Attachment M-Appendix, that it is a “Frequently Mitigated Unit” because it meets all of the following criteria:

(i) The unit was offer capped for the applicable percentage of its run hours, determined on a rolling 12-month basis, effective with a one month lag.

(ii) The unit’s Projected PJM Market Revenues plus the unit’s PJM capacity market revenues on a rolling 12-month basis, divided by the unit’s MW of installed capacity (in $/MW-year) are less than its accepted unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) (excluding APIR and ARPIR), or its default Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) if no unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is accepted for the BRAs for the Delivery Years included in the rolling 12-month period, determined pursuant to Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Attachment DD of the Tariff. (The relevant Avoidable Cost Rate is the weighted average of the Avoidable Cost Rates for each Delivery Year included in the rolling 12-month period, weighted by month.)

(iii) No portion of the unit is included in a FRR Capacity Plan or receiving compensation under Part V of the Tariff.

(iv) The unit is internal to the PJM Region and subject only to PJM dispatch.

(c) Any generating unit, without regard to ownership, located at the same site as a Frequently Mitigated Unit qualifying under Sections 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall become an “Associated Unit” upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Section II.A of Attachment M-Appendix, that it meets all of the following criteria:

1. The unit has the identical electric impact on the transmission system as the FMU;

2. The unit (i) belongs to the same design class (where a design class includes generation that is the same size and utilizes the same technology, without regard to manufacturer) and uses the identical primary fuel as the FMU or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder;
3. The unit (i) has an average daily cost-based offer, as measured over the preceding 12-month period, that is less than or equal to the FMU’s average daily cost-based offer adjusted to include the currently applicable FMU adder or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder.

The offer cap for an associated unit shall be equal to the incremental operating cost of such unit, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, plus the applicable percentage adder or dollar per megawatt-hour adder as specified in Section 6.4.2(a)(iii)(a), (b), or (c) for the unit with which it is associated.

(d) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information and in compliance with the FERC Market Rules, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate or non-compliant information.

6.4.3 Verification of Cost-Based Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based energy offer for a generation resource that includes an Incremental Energy Offer greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the Incremental Energy Offer component of such cost-based offer. For each Incremental Energy Offer segment greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate whether such offer segment exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that generation resource by determining the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost for each segment in accordance with the following formula:

Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost ($/MWh segment in accordance with the following formula: @ MW) =

\[
\left[ \left( \text{Maximum Allowable Operating Rate}_i \right) - \left( \text{Bid Production Cost }_{i-1} \right) \right] / (\text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1})
\]

where

\[ i = \text{an offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer, which is comprised of a pairing of price ($/MWh) and a megawatt quantity} \]

Maximum Allowable Operating Rate ($/hour @ MW) =

\[
\left[ \left( \text{Heat Input }_i @ \text{MW}_i \right) \times \left( \text{Performance Factor} \right) \times \left( \text{Fuel Cost} \right) \right] \times (1 + A)
\]

where
Heat Input = a point on the heat input curve (in MMBtu/hr), determined in accordance with PJM Manual 15, describing the resource’s operational characteristics for converting the applicable fuel input (MMBtu) into energy (MWh) specified in the Incremental Energy Offer;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent; and

A = Cost adder, in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(ii) of this Schedule.

Bid Production Cost ($/hour @ MW) =
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i) - \frac{1}{2} \times UBS \times (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i - P_{i-1}) + \text{No-Load Cost}
\]

where

MW = the MW quantity per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

P = the price (in dollars per megawatt-hour) per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

UBS = Uses Bid-Slope = 0 for block-offer resources (i.e., a resource with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a step function curve); and 1 for all other resources (i.e., resources with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a sloped offer curve); and

If the price submitted for the offer segment is less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost then that offer segment shall be deemed verified and is eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price. If the price submitted for the offer segment is greater than the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost, then the Market Seller’s cost-based offer for that segment and all segments at an equal or greater price are deemed not verified and are not eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price and such offer shall be price capped at the greater of $1,000/megawatt-hour or the offer price of the most expensive verified segment on the Incremental Energy Offer for the purpose of setting Locational Marginal Prices; provided however, such Market Seller shall be allowed to submit a challenge to a non-verification determination, including supporting documentation, to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. Upon review of such documentation, the Office of the Interconnection may determine that the Market Seller’s cost-
based offer is verified and eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described above.

(i) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is greater than zero, the first segment shall be screened as a block-loaded segment \((UBS=0)\) as if there was a preceding \(MW_{i-1}\) of zero. The Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost calculation for the first incremental would use a preceding Bid Production Cost \(_{i-1}\) (at zero MW) equal to the energy No-Load Cost.

(ii) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and is the only bid-in segment to be verified, then the segment shall be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(iii) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and there are additional segments to be verified, then the first segment shall be deemed verified only if the second segment is deemed verified. If the second segment is deemed not verified, then the first segment shall also be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(b) If an Economic Load Response Participant a cost-based demand reduction offer that includes incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, in order for that offer to be eligible to determine the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate the incremental costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection, and may not include shutdown costs.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the
Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

6.4.3A Verification of Fast-Start Resource Composite Energy Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based offer for a generation resource that is a Fast-Start Resource that results in a Composite Energy Offer that is greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the offer components:

Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost components of each offer segment shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the test described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3.

Start-Up Cost component shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the following formula:

\[
\text{Start-Up Cost ($)} = \left[ \left( \text{Performance Factor} \times \text{Start Fuel} \times \text{Fuel Cost} \right) + \text{Start Maintenance Adder} + \text{Additional Start Labor} + \text{Station Service Cost} \right] \times (1 + A)
\]

Where:

Start Fuel = fuel consumed from first fire of start process to breaker closing plus fuel expended from breaker opening of the previous shutdown to initialization of the (hot) unit start-up, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements;

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy under Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Start Maintenance Adder = an adder based on all available maintenance expense history for the defined Maintenance Period regardless of unit
ownership. Only expenses incurred as a result of electric production qualify for inclusion. Only Maintenance Adders specified as $/Start, $/MMBtu, or $/equivalent operating hour can be included in the Start Maintenance Adder;

Start Additional Labor = additional labor costs for startup required above normal station manning levels; and

Station Service Cost = station service usage (MWh) during start-up multiplied by the 12-month rolling average off-peak energy prices as updated quarterly by the Office of the Interconnection.

A = cost adder, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.2(a)(ii).

(b) Should the submitted Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above for any segment, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices):

(i) the Incremental Energy Offer for each segment shall be capped at the lesser of the cap described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 6.4.3 or the submitted Incremental Energy Offer; and

(ii) the amortized No-load cost shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(c) Should the submitted Start-Up Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Start-Up Costs shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(d) If an Economic Load Response Participant submits an offer to reduce demand for a Fast-Start Resource where the maximum segment of the resulting Composite Energy Offer exceeds $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate such costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting
documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs and shutdown costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental and shutdown costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental and shutdown costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

Should the submitted shutdown cost exceed the reasonably supported costs for that resource, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the shutdown costs shall be adjusted as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).
ATTACHMENT N-4

FORM DER AGGREGATOR PARTICIPATION
SERVICE AGREEMENT
DER AGGREGATOR PARTICIPATION SERVICE AGREEMENT
Among
PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C.
And
[Name of DER Aggregator]
DER AGGREGATOR PARTICIPATION SERVICE AGREEMENT

By and Among

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

And

[Name of DER Aggregator]

1.0 This DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement (“DAPSA”), dated and effective as of ___________, is entered into, by and between, the following entities (hereinafter referred to individually as “Party” or collectively as “the Parties”), for purposes of facilitating the participation of a DER Aggregator in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, and the PJM Manuals (“DER Aggregator Participation Service”).

a. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”), the Regional Transmission Organization for the PJM Region, administrator of the DER Aggregator Participation Model, provider of DER Aggregator Participation Service, and a NERC-registered Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, and Transmission Operator; and

b. [Name of DER Aggregator], the DER Aggregator taking DER Aggregator Participation Service from PJM; and

2.0 In consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, together with other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby mutually acknowledged by PJM and the DER Aggregator the Parties agree as follows:

a. PJM shall provide DER Aggregator Participation Service to the DER Aggregator, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, and the PJM Manuals.

b. The DER Aggregator has met all requisite qualification and eligibility criteria for receiving DER Aggregator Participation Service from PJM, shall comply with all operational and safety directives of PJM, and shall comply with all applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, and the PJM Manuals. The DER Aggregator attests that it is currently, and will remain, in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, during the term of this DAPSA.

3.0 Service under this DAPSA shall commence on the later of: (i) the date it is executed and made effective by the Parties, as indicated below in Section 6.0 and above in Section 1.0; or (ii) if this DAPSA is filed with the Commission unexecuted by one
Party, upon the date it is permitted to become effective by the Commission. Service under this DAPSA shall terminate in accordance with the applicable provisions of the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement, including, but not limited to, Operating Agreement, section 15.1, on such date as mutually agreed upon by the Parties, or as otherwise established by the Commission.

4.0 All portions of the Tariff and the Operating Agreement pertinent to the subject matter of this DAPSA and not otherwise made a part hereof are hereby incorporated herein and made a part hereof.

5.0 Any notice or request made to or by any Party regarding this DAPSA shall be made to the representatives of another Party as indicated below.

PJM:

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
2750 Monroe Blvd.
Audubon, PA 19403-2497

DER Aggregator:

_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________  

6.0 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this DAPSA to be executed by their respective authorized officials.

PJM: **PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.**

By: ____________________ ____________________ ____________________
    Name                  Title                  Date

Printed name of signer:

__________________________________________________________

DER Aggregator: [Name]

By: ____________________ ____________________ ____________________
    Name                  Title                  Date

Printed name of signer:

__________________________________________________________
5.14 Clearing Prices and Charges

a) Capacity Resource Clearing Prices

For each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a clearing price to be paid for each megawatt-day of Unforced Capacity that clears in such auction. The Capacity Resource Clearing Price for each LDA will be the marginal value of system capacity for the PJM Region, without considering locational constraints, adjusted as necessary by any applicable Locational Price Adders, Annual Resource Price Adders, Extended Summer Resource Price Adders, Limited Resource Price Decrements, Sub-Annual Resource Price Decrements, Base Capacity Demand Resource Price Decrements, and Base Capacity Resource Price Decrements, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection based on the optimization algorithm. If a Capacity Resource is located in more than one Locational Deliverability Area, it shall be paid the highest Locational Price Adder in any applicable LDA in which the Sell Offer for such Capacity Resource cleared. The Annual Resource Price Adder is applicable for Annual Resources only. The Extended Summer Resource Price Adder is applicable for Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources.

The Locational Price Adder applicable to each cleared Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource is determined during the post-processing of the RPM Auction results consistent with the manner in which the auction clearing algorithm recognizes the contribution of Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource Sell Offers in satisfying an LDA’s reliability requirement. For each LDA with a positive Locational Price Adder with respect to the immediate higher level LDA, starting with the lowest level constrained LDAs and moving up, PJM determines the quantity of equally matched Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources and Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources located and cleared within that LDA. Up to this quantity, the cleared Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources and Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources with the lowest Sell Offer prices will be compensated using the highest Locational Price Adder applicable to such LDA; and any remaining Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources cleared within the LDA are effectively moved to the next higher level constrained LDA, where they are considered in a similar manner for compensation.

b) Resource Make-Whole Payments

If a Sell Offer specifies a minimum block, and only a portion of such block is needed to clear the market in a Base Residual or Incremental Auction, the MW portion of such Sell Offer needed to clear the market shall clear, and such Sell Offer shall set the marginal value of system capacity. In addition, the Capacity Market Seller shall receive a Resource Make-Whole Payment equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such auction times the difference between the Sell Offer's minimum block MW quantity and the Sell Offer's cleared MW quantity. If the Sell Offer price of a cleared Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource exceeds the applicable Capacity Resource Clearing Price, the Capacity Market Seller shall receive a Resource Make-Whole Payment equal to the difference between the Sell Offer price and Capacity Resource Clearing Price in such RPM Auction. The cost for any such Resource Make-Whole Payments required in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for adjustment of prior capacity commitments shall be collected pro rata from all LSEs in the LDA in which such payments were made, based on their Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations. The cost for any such Resource Make-Whole
Payments required in an Incremental Auction for capacity replacement shall be collected from all Capacity Market Buyers in the LDA in which such payments were made, on a pro-rata basis based on the MWs purchased in such auction.

c) New Entry Price Adjustment

A Capacity Market Seller that submits a Sell Offer based on a Planned Generation Capacity Resource that clears in the BRA for a Delivery Year may, at its election, submit Sell Offers with a New Entry Price Adjustment in the BRAs for the two immediately succeeding Delivery Years if:

1. Such Capacity Market Seller provides notice of such election at the time it submits its Sell Offer for such resource in the BRA for the first Delivery Year for which such resource is eligible to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource. When the Capacity Market Seller provides notice of such election, it must specify whether its Sell Offer is contingent upon qualifying for the New Entry Price Adjustment. The Office of the Interconnection shall not clear such contingent Sell Offer if it does not qualify for the New Entry Price Adjustment.

2. All or any part of a Sell Offer from the Planned Generation Capacity Resource submitted in accordance with section 5.14(c)(1) is the marginal Sell Offer that sets the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for the LDA.

3. Acceptance of all or any part of a Sell Offer that meets the conditions in section 5.14(c)(1)-(2) in the BRA increases the total Unforced Capacity committed in the BRA (including any minimum block quantity) for the LDA in which such Resource will be located from a megawatt quantity below the LDA Reliability Requirement, minus the Short Term Resource Procurement Target, to a megawatt quantity at or above a megawatt quantity at the price-quantity point on the VRR Curve at which the price is 0.40 times the applicable Net CONE divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd).

4. Such Capacity Market Seller submits Sell Offers in the BRA for the two immediately succeeding Delivery Years for the entire Unforced Capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource committed in the first BRA under section 5.14(c)(1)-(2) equal to the lesser of: A) the price in such seller’s Sell Offer for the BRA in which such resource qualified as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource that satisfies the conditions in section 5.14(c)(1)-(3); or B) 0.90 times the Net CONE applicable in the first BRA in which such Planned Generation Capacity Resource meeting the conditions in section 5.14(c)(1)-(3) cleared, on an Unforced Capacity basis, for such LDA.

5. If the Sell Offer is submitted consistent with section 5.14(c)(1)-(4) the foregoing conditions, then:

   (i) in the first Delivery Year, the Resource sets the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for the LDA and all cleared resources in the LDA receive the Capacity Resource Clearing Price set by the Sell Offer as the marginal
offer, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.12(a) and section 5.14(a) above.

(ii) in either of the subsequent two BRAs, if any part of the Sell Offer from the Resource clears, it shall receive the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for such LDA for its cleared capacity and for any additional minimum block quantity pursuant to section 5.14(b) above; or

(iii) if the Resource does not clear, it shall be deemed resubmitted at the highest price per MW-day at which the megawatt quantity of Unforced Capacity of such Resource that cleared the first-year BRA will clear the subsequent-year BRA pursuant to the optimization algorithm described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.12(a), and

(iv) the resource with its Sell Offer submitted shall clear and shall be committed to the PJM Region in the amount cleared, plus any additional minimum-block quantity from its Sell Offer for such Delivery Year, but such additional amount shall be no greater than the portion of a minimum-block quantity, if any, from its first-year Sell Offer satisfying section 5.14(c)(1)-(3) above that is entitled to compensation pursuant to section 5.14(b) above; and

(v) the Capacity Resource Clearing Price, and the resources cleared, shall be re-determined to reflect the resubmitted Sell Offer. In such case, the Resource for which the Sell Offer is submitted pursuant to section 5.14(c)(1)-(4) above shall be paid for the entire committed quantity at the Sell Offer price that it initially submitted in such subsequent BRA. The difference between such Sell Offer price and the Capacity Resource Clearing Price (as well as any difference between the cleared quantity and the committed quantity), will be treated as a Resource Make-Whole Payment in accordance with section 5.14(b) above. Other capacity resources that clear the BRA in such LDA receive the Capacity Resource Clearing Price as determined in section 5.14(a) above.

6. The failure to submit a Sell Offer consistent with section 5.14(c)(i)-(iii) above in the BRA for Delivery Year 3 shall not retroactively revoke the New Entry Price Adjustment for Delivery Year 2. However, the failure to submit a Sell Offer consistent with section 5.14(c)(4) above in the BRA for Delivery Year 2 shall make the resource ineligible for the New Entry Pricing Adjustment for Delivery Years 2 and 3.

7. For each Delivery Year that the foregoing conditions are satisfied, the Office of the Interconnection shall maintain and employ in the auction clearing for such LDA a separate VRR Curve, notwithstanding the outcome of the test referenced in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(ii).

8. On or before August 1, 2012, PJM shall file with FERC under FPA section 205, as determined necessary by PJM following a stakeholder process, tariff changes to
establish a long-term auction process as a not unduly discriminatory means to provide adequate long-term revenue assurances to support new entry, as a supplement to or replacement of this New Entry Price Adjustment.

d) Qualifying Transmission Upgrade Payments

A Capacity Market Seller that submitted a Sell Offer based on a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade that clears in the Base Residual Auction shall receive a payment equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price, including any Locational Price Adder, of the LDA into which the Qualifying Transmission Upgrade is to increase Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit, less the Capacity Resource Clearing Price, including any Locational Price Adder, of the LDA from which the upgrade was to provide such increased CETL, multiplied by the megawatt quantity of increased CETL cleared from such Sell Offer. Such payments shall be reflected in the Locational Price Adder determined as part of the Final Zonal Capacity Price for the Zone associated with such LDAs, and shall be funded through a reduction in the Capacity Transfer Rights allocated to Load-Serving Entities under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.15, as set forth in that section. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to any cleared capacity transaction resulting from a Sell Offer based on a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade.

e) Locational Reliability Charge

In accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement, each LSE shall incur a Locational Reliability Charge (subject to certain offsets and other adjustments as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14B, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14C, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14D, Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14E and Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.15) equal to such LSE’s Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in a Zone during such Delivery Year multiplied by the applicable Final Zonal Capacity Price in such Zone. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the LSEs’ obligations to pay, and payments of, Locational Reliability Charges.

f) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Zonal Capacity Prices in accordance with the following, based on the optimization algorithm:

   i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post the Preliminary Zonal Capacity Prices for each Delivery Year following the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The Preliminary Zonal Capacity Price for each Zone shall be the sum of: 1) the marginal value of system capacity for the PJM Region, without considering locational constraints; 2) the Locational Price Adder, if any, for the LDA in which such Zone is located; provided however, that if the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA; 3) an adjustment, if required, to account for adders paid to Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources in the LDA for which the zone is located; 4) an adjustment, if required, to account for Resource Make-Whole Payments; and (5) an adjustment, if required to provide sufficient revenue for payment of any PRD Credits, all as determined in accordance with the optimization algorithm.
ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post the Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price following each Incremental Auction. The Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price for each Zone shall equal the sum of: (1) the average marginal value of system capacity weighted by the Unforced Capacity cleared in all auctions previously conducted for such Delivery Year (excluding any Unforced Capacity cleared as replacement capacity); (2) the average Locational Price Adder weighted by the Unforced Capacity cleared in all auctions previously conducted for such Delivery Year (excluding any Unforced Capacity cleared as replacement capacity); (3) an adjustment, if required, to account for adders paid to Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources for all auctions previously conducted for such Delivery Year (excluding any Unforced Capacity cleared as replacement capacity); (4) an adjustment, if required, to account for Resource Make-Whole Payments for all actions previously conducted (excluding any Resource Make-Whole Payments to be charged to the buyers of replacement capacity); and (5) an adjustment, if required to provide sufficient revenue for payment of any PRD Credits. The Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price may decrease if Unforced Capacity is decommitted or the Resource Clearing Price decreases in an Incremental Auction.

iii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post the Final Zonal Capacity Price for each Delivery Year after the final auction is held for such Delivery Year, as set forth above. The Final Zonal Capacity Price for each Zone shall equal the Adjusted Zonal Capacity Price, as further adjusted to reflect any decreases in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of any existing Demand Resource cleared in the Base Residual Auction and Second Incremental Auction.

g) Resource Substitution Charge

Each Capacity Market Buyer in an Incremental Auction securing replacement capacity shall pay a Resource Substitution Charge equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price resulting from such auction multiplied by the megawatt quantity of Unforced Capacity purchased by such Market Buyer in such auction.

h) Minimum Offer Price Rule for Certain New Generation Capacity Resources that are not Capacity Resources with State Subsidy for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year.

1) The provisions of this section 5.14(h) shall not be effective after the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. For purposes of this section, the Net Asset Class Costs of New Entry shall be asset-class estimates of competitive, cost-based nominal levelized Cost of New Entry, net of energy and ancillary service revenues. Determination of the gross Cost of New Entry component of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be consistent with the methodology used to determine the Cost of New Entry set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv)(A) of this Attachment. This section only applies to new Generation Capacity Resources that do not receive or are not entitled to receive a State Subsidy, meaning that such resources are not Capacity Resources with State Subsidy. To the extent a new Generation Capacity Resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy, then the provisions in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1) apply.

The gross Cost of New Entry component of Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be, for purposes of the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the values
indicated in the table below for each CONE Area for a combustion turbine generator (“CT”), and a combined cycle generator (“CC”) respectively, and shall be adjusted for subsequent Delivery Years in accordance with subsection (h)(2) below. For purposes of Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the same as that used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The estimated energy and ancillary service revenues for each type of plant shall be determined as described in subsection (h)(3) below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be zero for: (i) Sell Offers based on nuclear, coal or Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle facilities; or (ii) Sell Offers based on hydroelectric, wind, or solar facilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONE Area</th>
<th>CT $/MW-yr</th>
<th>CC $/MW-yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>132,200</td>
<td>185,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>130,300</td>
<td>176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>128,990</td>
<td>172,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>130,300</td>
<td>179,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The gross Cost of New Entry component of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs in the same manner as set forth for the cost of new entry in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v)(B), provided, however, that the Applicable BLS Composite Index used for CC plants shall be calculated from the three indices referenced in that section but weighted 25% for the wages index, 60% for the construction materials index, and 15% for the turbines index, and provided further that nothing herein shall preclude the Office of the Interconnection from filing to change the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry for any Delivery Year pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act.

(3) For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, for purposes of this provision, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for a combustion turbine generator shall be that determined by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(A), provided that the energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each CONE Area shall be based on the Zone within such CONE Area that has the highest energy revenue estimate calculated under the methodology in that subsection. The net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for a combined cycle generator shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine generator in the previous sentence, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6.501 MMbtu/MWh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource shall be $2.11 per MWh, a 10% adder will not be included in the energy offer, and the reactive service revenues shall be $3,350 per MW-year.

(4) Any Sell Offer that is based on either (i) or (ii), and (iii): i) a Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region that is submitted in an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year unless a Sell Offer based on that resource has cleared an RPM Auction for that or any prior Delivery Year, or until a Sell Offer based on that resource clears an RPM auction for that or any subsequent Delivery Year; or ii) a Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region (where such Sell Offer is based solely on such resource) that requires sufficient transmission investment for delivery to the PJM Region to indicate a long-term
commitment to providing capacity to the PJM Region, unless a Sell Offer based on that resource has cleared an RPM Auction for that or any prior Delivery Year, or until a Sell Offer based on that resource clears an RPM Auction for that or any subsequent Delivery Year;

iii) in any LDA for which a separate VRR Curve is established for use in the Base Residual Auction for the Delivery Year relevant to the RPM Auction in which such offer is submitted, and that is less than 90 percent of the applicable Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry or, if there is no applicable Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry, less than 70 percent of the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry for a combustion turbine generator as provided in subsection (h)(1) above shall be set to equal 90 percent of the applicable Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry (or set equal to 70 percent of such cost for a combustion turbine, where there is no otherwise applicable net asset class figure), unless the Capacity Market Seller obtains the prior determination from the Office of the Interconnection described in subsection (5) hereof. This provision applies to Sell Offers submitted in Incremental Auctions conducted after December 19, 2011, provided that the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry values for any such Incremental Auctions for the 2012-13 or 2013-14 Delivery Years shall be the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry values posted by the Office of the Interconnection for the Base Residual Auction for the 2014-15 Delivery Year.

(5) Unit-Specific Exception. A Sell Offer meeting the criteria in subsection (4) shall be permitted and shall not be re-set to the price level specified in that subsection if the Capacity Market Seller obtains a determination from the Office of the Interconnection or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer, that such Sell Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry were the resource to rely solely on revenues from PJM-administered markets. The following process and requirements shall apply to requests for such determinations:

i) The Capacity Market Seller may request such a determination by no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit its Sell Offer, by submitting simultaneously to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a written request with all of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose, the Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the minimum offer level expected to be established under subsection (4). If the minimum offer level subsequently established for the relevant Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall be required.

ii) As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller must include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the planned generation resource, as well as estimates of offsetting net revenues, or, sufficient data for the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit to produce an estimate. Estimates of costs or revenues shall be supported at a level of detail comparable to the cost and revenue estimates used to support the Net Asset Class Cost of New Entry established under this section 5.14(h). As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, supporting documentation for project costs may
include, as applicable and available, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction–period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. Such documentation also shall identify and support any sunk costs that the Capacity Market Seller has reflected as a reduction to its Sell Offer. The request shall include a certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for an exception hereunder.

The request also shall identify all revenue sources relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above.

For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, in making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well defined, forward-looking dispatch models, designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services markets. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel prices may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of variable operation and maintenance costs, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors and ancillary service capabilities.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a resource-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices, and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, and plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.
iii) A Sell Offer evaluated hereunder shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer’s competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry is below the minimum offer level prescribed by subsection (4), based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs estimated for subsection (4), including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller’s business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant’s costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than estimated for subsection (4). Capacity Market Sellers shall be asked to demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller’s business are consistent with the standards of this subsection. Failure to adequately support such costs or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in denial of an exception hereunder by the Office of the Interconnection.

iv) The Market Monitoring Unit shall review the information and documentation in support of the request and shall provide its findings whether the proposed Sell Offer is acceptable, in accordance with the standards and criteria hereunder, in writing, to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review all exception requests and documentation and shall provide in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, and the Market Monitoring Unit, its determination whether the requested Sell Offer is acceptable and if not it shall calculate and provide to such Capacity Market Seller, a minimum Sell Offer based on the data and documentation received, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the requested Sell Offer is acceptable, the Capacity Market Seller Shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer to which it agrees to commit by no later than sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction.

h-1) Minimum Offer Price Rule for Capacity Resources with State Subsidy for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year.

(1) **General Rule.** The provisions of this section 5.14(h-1) shall not be effective after the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. For the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, any Sell Offer based on either a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or a Cleared Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy submitted in any RPM Auction shall have an offer price no lower than the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless the Capacity Market Seller qualifies for an exemption with respect to such Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy prior to the submission of such offer.

(A) **Effect of Exemption.** To the extent a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction is based on a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that qualifies for any of the exemptions defined in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-1)(4)-(8), the Sell Offer for such resource shall not be limited by the MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless otherwise specified.
(B) Effect of Exception. To the extent a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for any Delivery Year is based on a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy for which the Capacity Market Seller obtains, prior to the submission of such offer, a resource-specific exception, such offer may include an offer price below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price applicable to such resource type, but no lower than the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price determined in such exception process.

(C) Process for Establishing a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy.

(i) By no later than one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction conducted for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, each Capacity Market Seller must certify to the Office of Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, whether or not each Capacity Resource (other than Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource) that the Capacity Market Seller intends to offer into the RPM Auction qualifies as a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy (including by way of Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resource) and identify (with specificity) any State Subsidy. Capacity Market Sellers that intend to offer a Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource into the RPM Auction shall certify to the Office of Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, whether or not such Demand Resource or Energy Efficiency Resource qualifies as a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy no later than thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction conducted for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. All Capacity Market Sellers shall be responsible for each certification irrespective of any guidance developed by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit. A Capacity Resource shall be deemed a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy if the Capacity Market Seller fails to timely certify whether or not a Capacity Resource is entitled to a State Subsidy unless the Capacity Market Seller receives a waiver from the Commission. Notwithstanding, if a Capacity Market Seller submits a timely resource-specific exception pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) for the relevant Delivery Year, and PJM approves the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, then the Capacity Market Seller may use such floor price regardless of whether it timely certified whether or not the resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy.

(ii) The requirements in subsection (i) above do not apply to Capacity Resources for which the Market Seller designated whether or not it is subject to a State Subsidy and the associated subsidies to which the Capacity Resource is entitled in a prior Delivery Year, unless there has been a change in the set of those State Subsidy(ies), or for those which are eligible for the Demand Resource or Energy Efficiency exemption, Capacity Storage Resource exemption, Self-Supply Entity exemption, or the Renewable Portfolio Standard exemption.

(iii) Once a Capacity Market Seller has certified a Capacity Resource as a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy, the status of such Capacity Resource will remain unchanged unless and until the Capacity Market Seller (or a subsequent Capacity Market Seller) that owns or controls such Capacity Resource provides a certification of a change in such status, the Office of the Interconnection removes such status, or by FERC order. All Capacity Market Sellers shall have an ongoing obligation to certify to the Office of Interconnection and
the Market Monitoring Unit a Capacity Resource’s material change in status as a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy within 30 days of such material change, unless such material change occurs within 30 days of the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, in which case the Market Seller must notify PJM no later than 5 days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year. Nothing in this provision shall supersede the requirement for all Capacity Market Sellers to certify to the Office of Interconnection whether its resource meets the criteria of a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(1)(C)(i).

(2) Minimum Offer Price Rule. Any Sell Offer for a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that does not qualify for any of the exemptions, as defined in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-1)(4)-(8), shall have an offer price no lower than the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price is higher than the applicable Market Seller Offer Cap, in which circumstance the Capacity Resource with State Subsidy must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process to participate in an RPM Auction.

(A) New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. For a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on the net cost of new entry for each resource type, shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (i) the resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below or (ii) if applicable, the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price for the applicable resource based on the gross cost of new entry values shown in the table below, net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type and Zone in which the resource is located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Type</th>
<th>Gross Cost of New Entry (2022/2023 $/ MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Solar PV</td>
<td>$271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking Solar PV</td>
<td>$290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onshore Wind</td>
<td>$420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Wind</td>
<td>$1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Energy Storage</td>
<td>$532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Backed Demand Resource</td>
<td>$254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gross cost of new entry values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the gross cost of new
entry values must be converted to a net cost of new entry by subtracting the estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, as determined below, from the gross cost of new entry. However, the resultant net cost of new entry of the battery energy storage resource type in the table above must be multiplied by 2.5. The net cost of new entry based on nameplate capacity is then converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day. For Delivery Years through the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, to determine the applicable UCAP MW-day value, the net cost of new entry is adjusted as follows: for thermal generation resource types and battery energy storage resource types, the applicable class average EFORd; for wind and solar generation resource types, the applicable class average capacity value factor; or for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the Forecast Pool Requirement, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction. For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, to determine the applicable UCAP MW-day value, the net cost of new entry is adjusted as follows: for thermal generation resource types, the applicable class average EFORd; for battery storage, wind, and solar resource types, the applicable ELCC Class Rating; or for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the Forecast Pool Requirement, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction. The resulting default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of the actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.

The default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price for load-backed Demand Resources (i.e., the MW portion of Demand Resources that is not supported by generation) shall be separately determined for each Locational Deliverability Area as the MW-weighted average offer price of load-backed Demand Resources from the most recent three Base Residual Auctions, where the MW weighting shall be determined based on the portion of each Sell Offer for a load-backed portion of the Demand Resource that is supported by end-use customer locations on the registrations used in the pre-registration process for such Base Residual Auctions, as described in the PJM Manuals.

For generation-backed Demand Resources that are not powered by diesel generators, the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price applicable to their technology type. Generation-backed Demand Resources using a technology type for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below to participate in an RPM Auction.

The default gross cost of new entry for Energy Efficiency Resources shall be $644/ICAP MW-Day, which shall be offset by projected wholesale energy savings, as well as transmission and distribution savings of $95/ICAP MW-Day, to determine the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price (Net Cost of New Entry), where the projected wholesale energy savings are determined utilizing the cost and performance data of relevant programs offered by representative energy efficiency programs with sufficiently detailed publicly available data. The wholesale energy savings, in $/ICAP MW-day, shall be calculated prior to each RPM Auction and be equal to the average annual energy savings of 6,221 MWh/ICAP MW times the weighted average of the annual real-time Forward Hourly LMPs of the Zones of the representative energy
efficiency programs, where the weighting is developed from the annual energy savings in the relevant Zones, divided by 365.

To determine the adjusted applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Prices for all resource types except for load-backed Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the gross costs of new entry utilizing, for combustion turbine and combined cycle resource types, the same Applicable BLS Composite Index applied for such Delivery Year to adjust the CONE value used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv), and for all other resource types, the “BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets” component of the Applicable BLS Composite Index used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be replaced with the “BLS Producer Price Index Final Demand, Goods Less Food & Energy, Private Capital Equipment” when adjusting the gross costs of new entry. The resultant value shall then be then adjusted further by a factor of 1.022 for nuclear, coal, combustion turbine, combine cycle, and generation-backed Demand Resource types or 1.01 for solar, wind, and storage resource types to reflect the annual decline in bonus depreciation scheduled under federal corporate tax law. Updated estimates of the net energy and ancillary service revenues for each default resource type and applicable Zone, which shall include, but are not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 shall then be subtracted from the adjusted gross costs of new entry to determine the adjusted New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. The net energy and ancillary services revenue shall be the average of the net energy and ancillary services revenues that the resource is projected to receive from the PJM energy and ancillary service markets for the applicable Delivery Year from three separate simulations, with each such simulation using forward prices shaped using historical data from one of each of the three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction to take account of year-to-year variability in such hourly shapes. Each net energy and ancillary services revenue simulation shall be conducted in accordance with the following and the PJM Manuals:

(i) for nuclear resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue determined by the product of [average annual day-ahead Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone, times 8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources] minus the total annual cost to produce energy determined by the product of [8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources times $9.02/MWh for a single unit plant or $7.66/MWh for a multi-unit plant] where these hourly cost rates include fuel costs and variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(ii) for coal resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 650 MW coal unit (with heat rate of 8,638 BTU/kWh and variable operations and maintenance variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, of $9.50/MWh) using day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices, and daily forecasted coal prices, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(iii) for combustion turbine resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in a manner consistent with the methodology
described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(B) for the Reference Resource combustion turbine.

(iv) for combined cycle resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine resource type, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6,501 BTU/kwh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, shall be $2.11/MWh, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year.

(v) for solar PV resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a solar resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual net energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the solar output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone applicable to such hour with this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year. Two separate solar resource models are used, one model for a fixed panel resource and a second model for a tracking panel resource;

(vi) for onshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a wind resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the wind output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone applicable to such hour with this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(vii) for offshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue equal to the product of [the average annual real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone times 8,760 hours times an assumed annual capacity factor of 45%], plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(viii) for Capacity Storage Resource, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate shall be estimated by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 1 MW, 4MWh resource, with an 85% roundtrip efficiency, and assumed to be dispatched between 95% and 5% state of charge against day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year; and

(ix) for generation-backed Demand Resource, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate shall be zero dollars.

New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource for the relevant RPM Auction.

(B) Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Prices.
(i) For a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy, the applicable Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (a) based on the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below, or (b) if available, the default Avoidable Cost Rate for the applicable resource type shown in the table below, net of projected PJM market revenues equal to the resource’s net energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type, as determined in accordance with subsection (ii) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Resource Type</th>
<th>Default Gross ACR (2022/2023) ($/MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - single</td>
<td>$697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - dual</td>
<td>$445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar PV (fixed and tracking)</td>
<td>$40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Onshore</td>
<td>$83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel-backed Demand Response</td>
<td>$3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load-backed Demand Response</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The default gross Avoidable Cost Rate values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the default Avoidable Cost Rate values must be net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, and then the difference is ultimately converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day, where the UCAP MW-day value will be determined based on: for Delivery Years through the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, the resource-specific EFORd for thermal generation resource types, resource-specific capacity value factor for solar and wind generation resource types (based on the ratio of Capacity Interconnection Rights to nameplate capacity, appropriately time-weighted for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights), or the Forecast Pool Requirement for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction, and for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the resource-specific EFORd for thermal generation resource types and on the resource-specific Accredited UCAP value for solar and wind resource types (with appropriate time-weighting for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights), or the Forecast Pool Requirement for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction. The resulting default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.
Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2022, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the default Avoidable Cost Rates for Capacity Resources with State Subsidies that have cleared in an RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses of the avoidable costs of such resource types. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall propose either to modify or retain the default Avoidable Cost Rate values stated in the table above. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the default Avoidable Cost Rate values are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such proposed modifications with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

For generation-backed Demand Resources that are not powered by diesel generators, the default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be the default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price applicable to their technology type. Generation-backed Demand Resources using a technology type for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below to participate in an RPM Auction.

Cleared Capacity Resources with State Subsidy for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a resource-specific value determined in accordance with the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource.

(ii) The net energy and ancillary services revenue is equal to forecasted net revenues which shall be determined in accordance with the applicable resource type net energy and ancillary services revenue determination methodology set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(2)(A)(i) through (ix) and using the subject resource’s operating parameters as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals based on (a) offers submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market over the calendar year preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction; (b) the resource-specific operating parameters approved, as applicable, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 (including any Fuel Costs, emissions costs, Maintenance Adders, and Operating Costs); (c) the resource’s EFORd; (d) Forward Hourly LMPs at the generation bus as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(C)(6); and (e) the resource’s stated annual revenue requirement for reactive services; plus any unit-specific bilateral contract. In addition, the following resource type-specific parameters shall be considered: (f) for combustion turbine, combined cycle, and coal resource types: the installed capacity rating, ramp rate (which shall be equal to the maximum ramp rate included in the resource’s energy offers over the most recent previous calendar year preceding the determination for the RPM Auction), and the heat rate as determined as the resource’s average heat rate at full load as submitted to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, where for combined cycle resources heat rates will be determined at base load and at peak load (e.g., without duct burners and with duct burners), as applicable; (g) for nuclear resource type: an
average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources to account for refueling outages; (h) for solar and wind resource types: the resource’s output profiles for the most recent three calendar years, as available; and (i) for battery storage resource type: the nameplate capacity rating (on a MW / MWh basis).

To the extent the resource has not achieved commercial operation, the operating parameters used in the simulation of the net energy and ancillary service revenues will be based on the manufacturer’s specifications and/or from parameters used for other existing, comparable resources, as developed by the Market Monitoring Unit and the Capacity Market Seller, and accepted by the Office of the Interconnection.

A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy based on a net energy and ancillary services revenue determination that does not use the foregoing methodology or parameter inputs stated for that resource type shall, at its election, submit a request for a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price for such Capacity Resource pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-1)(3) below.

(3) Resource-Specific Exception. A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy below the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price may, at its election, submit a request for a resource-specific exception for such Capacity Resource. A Sell Offer below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, but no lower than the resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, shall be permitted if the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from the Office of the Interconnection or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer. The resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price determined under this provision shall be based on the resource-specific EFORd for thermal generation resource types, on the resource-specific Accredited UCAP value for ELCC Resources (where for solar and wind generation resource types the Accredited UCAP shall be appropriately time-weighted for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights), or the Forecast Pool Requirement for Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources, as applicable to the relevant RPM Auction and shall be applied to each MW offered by the resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource. Such Sell Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost were the resource to rely solely on revenues exclusive of any State Subsidy. All supporting data must be provided for all requests. The following requirements shall apply to requests for such determinations:

(A) The Capacity Market Seller shall submit a written request with all of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit the resource-specific exception request to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit no later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit its Sell Offer. For such purpose, the Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the default Minimum Floor Offer Prices, determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-1)(2)(A) and (B). If the final applicable default Minimum Floor Offer Price subsequently established for the relevant
Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall be required.

(B) For a resource-specific exception for a New Entry Capacity Resource with State Subsidy, the Capacity Market Seller must include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the Capacity Resource, as well as estimates of offsetting net revenues.

The financial modeling assumptions for calculating Cost of New Entry for Generation Capacity Resources and generation-backed Demand Resources shall be: (i) nominal levelization of gross costs, (ii) asset life of twenty years, (iii) no residual value, (iv) all project costs included with no sunk costs excluded, (v) use first year revenues (which may include revenues from the sale of renewable energy credits for purposes other than state-mandated or state-sponsored programs), and (vi) weighted average cost of capital based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to build the Capacity Resource. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to utilize an asset life other than twenty years (but no greater than 35 years) shall provide evidence to support the use of a different asset life, including but not limited to, the asset life term for such resource as utilized in the Capacity Market Seller’s financial accounting (e.g., independently audited financial statements), or project financing documents for the resource or evidence of actual costs or financing assumptions of recent comparable projects to the extent the seller has not executed project financing for the resource (e.g., independent project engineer opinion or manufacturer’s performance guarantee), or opinions of third-party experts regarding the reasonableness of the financing assumptions used for the project itself or in comparable projects. Capacity Market Sellers may also rely on evidence presented in federal filings, such as its FERC Form No. 1 or an SEC Form 10-K, to demonstrate an asset life other than 20 years of similar asset projects.

Supporting documentation for project costs may include, as applicable and available, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction-period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. In addition to the certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, the request must include a certification that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for a resource-specific exception hereunder. The request also shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any State Subsidies) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary
services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel prices may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of, variable operation and maintenance expenses, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of net revenues should be consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, including, but not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a resource-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.

The default assumptions for calculating resource-specific Cost of New Entry for Energy Efficiency Resources shall be based on, as supported by documentation provided by the Capacity Market Seller: the nominal-levelized annual cost to implement the Energy Efficiency program or to install the Energy Efficiency measure reflective of the useful life of the implemented Energy Efficiency equipment, and the offsetting savings associated with avoided wholesale energy costs and other claimed savings provided by implementing the Energy Efficiency program or installing the Energy Efficiency measure.

The default assumptions for calculating resource-specific Cost of New Entry for load-backed Demand Resources shall be based on, as supported by documentation provided by the Capacity Market Seller, program costs required for the resource to meet the capacity obligations of a Demand Resource, including all fixed operating and maintenance cost and weighted average cost of capital based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to develop the Demand Resource.

For generation-backed Demand Resources, the determination of a resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price shall consider all costs associated with the generation unit supporting the Demand Resource, and demand charge management benefits at the retail level (as supported by documentation at the end-use customer level) may also be considered as an additional offset to
such costs. Supporting documentation (at the end-use customer level) may include, but is not limited to, historic end-use customer bills and associated analysis that identifies the annual retail avoided cost from the operation of such generation unit.

(C) For a Resource-Specific Exception for a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is a generation resource, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit a Sell Offer consistent with the unit-specific Market Seller Offer Cap process pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8; except that the 10% uncertainty adder may not be included in the “Adjustment Factor.” In addition and notwithstanding the requirements of Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8, the Capacity Market Seller shall, at its election, include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support projected energy and ancillary services markets revenues. Such a request shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any State Subsidies) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel sources may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of variable operation and maintenance expenses, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of revenues should include, but would not be limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a resource-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.
The resource-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price for a Cleared Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is a generation-backed Demand Resource will be determined based on all costs associated with the generation unit supporting the Demand Resource, and demand charge management benefits at the retail level (as supported by documentation at the end-use customer level) may also be considered as an additional offset to such costs. Supporting documentation (at the end-use customer level) may include but is not limited to, historic end-use customer bills and associated analysis that identifies the annual retail avoided cost from the operation of such generation unit.

(D) A Sell Offer evaluated at the resource-specific exception shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer’s competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of new entry is below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller’s business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant’s costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than those estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price. Capacity Market Sellers shall demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller’s business are consistent with the standards of this subsection. Failure to adequately support such costs or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in denial of a resource-specific exception by the Office of the Interconnection.

(E) The Capacity Market Seller must submit a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer, certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of the resource-specific exception request and that to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (1) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection to support its request for an exception is true and correct; (2) the Capacity Market Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the request for the exception; and (3) the request satisfies the criteria for the exception.

(F) The Market Monitoring Unit shall review, in an open and transparent manner with the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection, the information and documentation in support of the request and shall provide its findings whether the proposed Sell Offer is acceptable, in accordance with the standards and criteria hereunder, in writing, to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review, in an open and transparent manner, all exception requests and documentation and shall provide in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, and the Market Monitoring Unit, its determination whether the requested Sell Offer is acceptable and if not it shall calculate and provide to such Capacity Market Seller, a minimum Sell Offer based on the data and documentation received, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. After the Office of the Interconnection determines with the advice and input of Market Monitor, the acceptable minimum Sell Offer, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer to which it agrees to
commit by no later than sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, and in making such determination, the Capacity Market Seller may consider the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and may select such default value if it is lower than the resource-specific determination. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules based on the lower of the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and the resource-specific determination unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

(4) Competitive Exemption.

(A) A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy may be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule under this subsection 5.14(h-1) in any RPM Auction if the Capacity Market Seller certifies to the Office of Interconnection, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, that the Capacity Market Seller of such Capacity Resource elects to forego receiving any State Subsidy for the applicable Delivery Year no later than thirty (30) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the competitive exemption is not available to Capacity Resources with State Subsidy that (A) are owned or offered by Self-Supply Entities unless the Self-Supply Entity certifies, subject to PJM and Market Monitor review, that the Capacity Resource will not accept a State Subsidy, including any financial benefit that is the result of being owned by a regulated utility, such that retail ratepayers are held harmless, (B) are no longer entitled to receive a State Subsidy but are still considered a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy solely because they have not cleared an RPM Auction since last receiving a State Subsidy, or (C) are Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resources or is the subject of a bilateral transaction (including but not limited to those reported pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 4.6) and not all Capacity Market Sellers of the supporting facility unanimously elect the competitive exemption and certify that no State Subsidy will be received associated with supporting the resource (unless the underlying Capacity Resource that is the subject of a bilateral transaction has not received, is not receiving, and is not entitled to receive any State Subsidy except those that are assigned (i.e., renewable energy credits) to the off-takers of a bilateral transaction and the Capacity Market Seller of such Capacity Resource can demonstrate and certify that the Capacity Market Seller’s rights and obligations of its share of the capacity, energy, and assignable State Subsidy associated with the underlying Capacity Resource are in pro rata shares). A new Generation Capacity Resource that is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy may elect the competitive exemption; however, in such instance, the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price will be determined in accordance with the minimum offer price rules for certain new Generation Capacity Resources as provided in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h), which apply the minimum offer price rule to the new Generation Capacity Resources located in an LDA where a separate VRR Curve is established as provided in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h)(4).

(B) The Capacity Market Seller shall not receive a State Subsidy for any part of the relevant Delivery Year in which it elects a competitive exemption or certifies that it is not a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy.

(5) Self-Supply Entity exemption. A Capacity Resource that was owned, or bilaterally contracted, by a Self-Supply Entity on December 19, 2019, shall be exempt from the
Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Resource remains owned or bilaterally contracted by such Self-Supply Entity and satisfies at least one of the criteria specified below:

(A) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019;

(B) is the subject of an interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement executed by the interconnection customer on or before December 19, 2019; or

(C) is the subject of an unexecuted interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement filed by PJM with the Commission on or before December 19, 2019.

(6) Renewable Portfolio Standard Exemption. A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy shall be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Resource (1) receives or is entitled to receive State Subsidies through renewable energy credits or equivalent credits associated with a state-mandated or state-sponsored renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) program or equivalent program as of December 19, 2019 and (2) satisfies at least one of the following criteria:

(A) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019;

(B) is the subject of an interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement executed by the interconnection customer on or before December 19, 2019; or

(C) is the subject of an unexecuted interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement filed by PJM with the Commission on or before December 19, 2019.


(A) A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is Demand Resource or an Energy Efficiency Resource shall be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Resource satisfies at least one of the following criteria:

(i) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019. For purposes of this subsection (A), individual customer location registrations that participated as Demand Resource and cleared in an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019, and were submitted to PJM no later than 45 days prior to the BRA for the
2022/2023 Delivery Year shall be deemed eligible for the Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource Exemption; or

(ii) has completed registration on or before December 19, 2019; or

(iii) is supported by a post-installation measurement and verification report for Energy Efficiency Resources approved by PJM on or before December 19, 2019 (calculated for each installation period, Zone and Sub-Zone by using the greater of the latest approved post-installation measurement and verification report prior to December 19, 2019 or the maximum MW cleared for a Delivery Year across all auctions conducted prior to December 19, 2019).

(B) All registered locations that qualify for the Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource exemption shall continue to remain exempt even if the MW of nominated capacity increases between RPM Auctions unless any MW increase in the nominated capacity is due to an investment made for the sole purpose of increasing the curtailment capability of the location in the capacity market. In such case, the MW of increased capability will not be qualified for the Demand Resource and Energy Efficiency Resource exemption.

(8) Capacity Storage Resource Exemption. A Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is a Capacity Storage Resource shall be exempt from the Minimum Offer Price Rule if such Capacity Storage Resource satisfies at least one of the following criteria:

(A) has successfully cleared an RPM Auction prior to December 19, 2019;

(B) is the subject of an interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement executed by the interconnection customer on or before December 19, 2019; or

(C) is the subject of an unexecuted interconnection construction service agreement, interim interconnection service agreement, interconnection service agreement or wholesale market participation agreement filed by PJM with the Commission on or before December 19, 2019.

(9) Procedures and Remedies in Cases of Suspected Fraud or Material Misrepresentation or Omissions in Connection with a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy. In the event the Office of the Interconnection, with advice and input from the Market Monitoring Unit, reasonably believes that a certification of a Capacity Resource’s status contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations or omissions such that the Capacity Market Seller’s Capacity Resource is a Capacity Resource with a State Subsidy (including whether the Capacity Resource is a Jointly Owned Cross-Subsidized Capacity Resource) or does not qualify for a competitive exemption or contains information that is inconsistent with the resource-specific exception, then:
(A) A Capacity Market Seller shall, within five (5) business days upon receipt of the request for additional information, provide any supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate whether such Capacity Resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or whether the Capacity Market Seller is eligible for the competitive exemption. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Capacity Resource’s status as a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy is different from that specified by the Capacity Market Seller or is not eligible for a competitive exemption pursuant to subsection (4) above, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify, in writing, the Capacity Market Seller of such determination by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, if the Office of Interconnection determines that the subject resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy or is not eligible for a competitive exemption pursuant to subsection (4) above, such Capacity Resource shall be subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule, unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

(B) if the Office of the Interconnection does not provide written notice of suspected fraudulent or material misrepresentation or omission at least sixty-five (65) days before the start of the relevant RPM Auction, then the Office of the Interconnection may file the certification that contains any alleged fraudulent or material misrepresentation or omission with FERC. In such event, if the Office of Interconnection determines that a resource is a Capacity Resource with State Subsidy that is subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule, the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules on that basis unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC. The Office of the Interconnection shall implement any remedies ordered by FERC; and

(C) prior to applying the Minimum Offer Price Rule, the Office of the Interconnection, with advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, shall notify the affected Capacity Market Seller and, to the extent practicable, provide the Capacity Market Seller an opportunity to explain the alleged fraudulent or material misrepresentation or omission. Any filing to FERC under this provision shall seek fast track treatment and neither the name nor any identifying characteristics of the Capacity Market Seller or the resource shall be publicly revealed, but otherwise the filing shall be public. The Capacity Market Seller may submit a revised certification for that Capacity Resource for subsequent RPM Auctions, including RPM Auctions held during the pendency of the FERC proceeding. In the event that the Capacity Market Seller is cleared by FERC from such allegations of fraudulent or material misrepresentations or omissions then the certification shall be restored to the extent and in the manner permitted by FERC. The remedies required by this subsection to be requested in any filing to FERC shall not be exclusive of any other remedies or penalties that may be pursued against the Capacity Market Seller.

h-2) Minimum Offer Price Rule Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year

1 Certification Requirement.

(A) By no later than one hundred and fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period of any RPM Auction conducted for the 2024/2025 Delivery
(B) All Capacity Market Sellers shall be responsible for the accuracy of each certification and its conformance with the Tariff irrespective of any guidance developed by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit.

(C) Once a Capacity Market Seller has certified whether or not a Generation Capacity Resource is receiving or expected to receive Conditioned State Support, the certification requirements in subsection (A)(i) above do not apply and the status of such Generation Capacity Resource will remain unchanged unless and until the Capacity Market Seller (or a subsequent Capacity Market Seller of the underlying resource) that owns or controls such Generation Capacity Resource provides a certification of a change in such status, the Office of the Interconnection removes such status, or by FERC order. All Capacity Market Sellers shall have an ongoing obligation to certify to the Office of Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit a Generation Capacity Resource’s material change in status regarding whether such resource is receiving or expected to receive Conditioned State Support within 30 days of such material change. Nothing in this provision shall supersede the requirement for all Capacity Market Sellers to certify to the Office of Interconnection pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(ii).

(2) Determining Generation Capacity Resources Subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule.

(A) Conditioned State Support.

(i) If the Office of the Interconnection reasonably believes a government policy or program would provide Conditioned State Support or a Capacity Market Seller certifies that it is receiving or is expected to receive Conditioned State Support associated with a given Generation Capacity Resource, the Office of Interconnection shall submit, pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, a filing at FERC indicating the Office of the Interconnection’s intent to classify the government policy or program from which that support is derived as Conditioned State Support (and adding such policy or program to the list in Tariff, Attachment DD-3) and apply the Minimum Offer Price Rule to each Generation Capacity Resource reasonably expected to receive such Conditioned State Support. If FERC has already
ruled on whether a specific government program or policy constitutes Conditioned State Support and such policy or program is listed in Tariff, Attachment DD-3, the Office of the Interconnection shall not be required to submit the filing described in the preceding sentence.

(ii) Government policies or programs that do not provide payments or other financial benefit outside of PJM markets and do not provide payment or other financial benefit in exchange for the sale of a FERC-jurisdictional product conditioned on clearing in any RPM Auction do not constitute Conditioned State Support. Examples of such government policies that do not constitute Conditioned State Support may include, but are not limited to: policies designed to procure, incent, or require environmental attributes, whether bundled or unbundled (e.g., Renewable Energy Credits, Zero Emission Credits; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative); economic development programs and policies; tax incentives; state retail default service auctions; policies or programs that provide incentives related to fuel supplies; any contract, legally enforceable obligation, or rate pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act or any other state-administered federal regulatory program (e.g., Cross-State Air Pollution Rule). In addition, Conditioned State Support shall not be determined solely based on the business model of the Capacity Market Seller, such that the fact that a Self-Supply Entity is the Capacity Market Seller, for example, is not a basis for determining Conditioned State Support.

(iii) Upon FERC acceptance (whether by order or operation of law) that a government policy or program or contract with a state entity constitutes Conditioned State Support, a Generation Capacity Resource for which a Capacity Market Seller certifies pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(i) that it is receiving Conditioned State Support or is reasonably expected to receive such Conditioned State Support, as identified by the Office of the Interconnection, with the advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, will be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule.

(B) Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power

(i) If a Capacity Market Seller does not certify that it acknowledges the prohibition of the Exercise of Buyer Side Market Power and the Capacity Market Seller intends to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power for this Generation Capacity Resource, then the underlying Capacity Resource shall be subject to the MOPR pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(i). If the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit reasonably suspects that a certification submitted under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1)(A)(ii) contains fraudulent or material misrepresentations such that the Capacity Market Seller’s Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power or otherwise reasonably suspects that a Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall initiate a fact-specific review into the facts and circumstances regarding the Generation Capacity Resource and whether the Capacity Market Seller has the ability and incentive to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power with respect to such Generation Capacity Resource. During such fact-specific review, the Capacity Market Seller will have the opportunity to explain and justify why a Sell Offer for the Generation Capacity Resource would not be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power. The Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Capacity Market Seller of the bases for inquiry and
initiation of review at least 135 days in advance of the RPM Auction conducted for the 2024/2025 Delivery Year and all subsequent Delivery Years, and by the date posted on the PJM website for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year.

In initiating a review, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall provide the affected Capacity Market Seller, in writing, the basis for its inquiry, including, but not limited to, the Generation Capacity Resource(s), and the purported beneficiary of any price suppression. The Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may request from the Capacity Market Seller additional information and documentation that is reasonably related to the basis for its inquiry, provided that, the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit shall confer with the Capacity Market Seller in advance of any such requests. The Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information and documentation requested by the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit, and any other information and documentation the Capacity Market Seller believes may justify the conduct or action in question as not representing an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, within 15 days or other such timeline as agreed to in writing by the Office of the Interconnection, Market Monitoring Unit and Capacity Market Seller.

The fact-specific review will determine, as necessary, whether a Capacity Market Seller has the ability and incentive to submit a Sell Offer for the Generation Capacity Resource that could be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, as follows:

(a) To determine whether a Capacity Market Seller may have Buyer Side Market Power associated with the Generation Capacity Resource for the applicable RPM Auction, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit will perform ex-ante testing to determine the extent to which a shift in the supply curve by a number of megawatts equal to the size of the Generation Capacity Resource would affect RPM Auction clearing prices, where such analysis would reflect expected supply and demand conditions in the region of the market clearing prices and quantities in recent RPM Auctions, would reflect whether the relevant LDAs have been constrained in recent RPM Auctions, and would reflect reasonably expected material changes in an LDA including the modeling of the LDA and expected changes in supply and demand for the applicable Delivery Year. To the extent the foregoing analyses show that the Generation Capacity Resource would have a material effect on RPM Auction clearing prices, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed to have the ability to exercise Buyer Side Market Power.

(b) To determine whether the Capacity Market Seller’s submission of a Sell Offer at any given price level for such Generation Capacity Resource may constitute an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall perform ex-ante testing to determine whether, given the ability to suppress prices identified in the relevant LDAs and the PJM Region, such price suppression would be economically beneficial to the Capacity Market Seller by comparing its expected cost with its economic benefit, and where the expected cost shall reflect the excess economic costs of the resource above expected market revenues, and the expected benefit shall reflect the expected cost savings to the expected net short position (based on estimated capacity obligations and owned and contracted capacity measured on a three-year average basis for the three years starting with the first day of the Delivery Year associated with the RPM Auction in which the
Generation Capacity Resource is being offered) in the relevant LDAs and RTO multiplied by the price change resulting from offering the resource uneconomically. In this analysis, the Office of Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit shall consider whether any capacity obligations in which the capacity costs based on RPM Auction clearing prices are directly passed through to load and consider whether the price of any contracted capacity passes through RPM Auction clearing prices. If the expected benefit outweighs the expected cost, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed to have the incentive to exercise Buyer Side Market Power. If a resource offer can be justified, economically or otherwise, without consideration of the benefit to the Capacity Market Seller of the suppressed prices, the Capacity Market Seller shall be deemed not to have the incentive to exercise Buyer Side Market Power with respect to that resource. Out-of-market compensation (such as from renewable energy credits and zero emission credits) that are not tied to either Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs the submission of an offer to lower market clearing prices may be used to support the economics of the resource under review.

(ii) The following nonexhaustive list of circumstances would preclude an inquiry into or determination regarding an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power in the course of a review initiated pursuant to subsection (i) above: (a) the Generation Capacity Resource is a merchant generation supply resources that is not contracted to an entity with a Load Interest; (b) the Generation Capacity Resource is acquired by or under the contractual control of the Capacity Market Seller through a competitive and non-discriminatory procurement process open to new and existing resources; or (c) the Generation Capacity Resource is owned by or bilaterally contracted to a Self-Supply Seller and such resource is demonstrated as consistent with or included in the Self-Supply Seller’s long-range resource plan (e.g., a long-range hedging plan) that is approved or otherwise reviewed and accepted by the RERRA, provided that any such plan approval or contracts do not direct the submission of an uneconomic offer to deliberately lower market clearing prices or for the Capacity Market Seller to otherwise perform an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power. In addition, to the extent a Generation Capacity Resource may receive compensation in support of characteristics aligned with well-demonstrated customer preferences, such compensation shall not, in and of itself, be a basis for the determination of Buyer-Side Market Power.

(iii) Based on the foregoing tests and fact-specific review, including the facts and circumstances of the Generation Capacity Resource, the Office of the Interconnection, with the advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, shall determine whether a Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power. If the Office of the Interconnection, with the advice and input of the Market Monitoring Unit, determines that a Generation Capacity Resource may be the subject of a Sell Offer that would be an Exercise of Buyer-Side Market Power or the Capacity Market Seller certifies that it intends to exercise Buyer-Side Market Power, then such resource will be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule. If the resource will be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule, the Office of the Interconnection shall include in the notice a written explanation for such determination. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with the Office of the Interconnection’s determination of whether a given Generation Capacity Resource is subject to the Minimum Offer Price Rule may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection
will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules based on its determination hereunder unless FERC by order directs otherwise.

(C) Failure to timely submit a certification. Any Generation Capacity Resource for which a Capacity Market Seller has not timely submitted the certifications required under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(1) shall be subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Capacity Market Seller submits a timely unit-specific exception pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) for the relevant Delivery Year, and PJM approves the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, then the Capacity Market Seller may use such floor price regardless of whether it timely submitted the foregoing certifications.

(3) Minimum Offer Price Rule. Any Sell Offer for a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) shall have an offer price no lower than the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, unless the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price is higher than the applicable Market Seller Offer Cap, in which circumstance the Capacity Market Seller, to participate in an RPM Auction, must request a unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process, and the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price shall establish the offer level for such resource.

(A) New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. For a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and for which a Sell Offer based on that resource, or any uprate of such Generation Capacity Resource participating in the generation interconnection process under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart A, that has not cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on the net cost of new entry for the resource type, shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (i) the unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) below or (ii) if applicable, the default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price for the applicable resource based on the gross cost of new entry values shown in the table below, as adjusted for Delivery Years subsequent to the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type and Zone in which the resource is located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Type</th>
<th>Gross Cost of New Entry (2022/2023 $/ MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Solar PV</td>
<td>$271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking Solar PV</td>
<td>$290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onshore Wind</td>
<td>$420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Wind</td>
<td>$1,155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The gross cost of new entry values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the gross cost of new entry values must be converted to a net cost of new entry by subtracting the estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, as determined below, from the gross cost of new entry. However, the resultant net cost of new entry of the battery energy storage resource type in the table above must be multiplied by 2.5. The net cost of new entry based on nameplate capacity is then converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day. For the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, to determine the applicable UCAP MW-day value, the net cost of new entry is adjusted as follows: for battery storage, wind, and solar resource types, the applicable ELCC Class Rating; or for all other generation resource types, the applicable class average EFORd. The resulting default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of the actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.

Commencing with the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the default gross costs of new entry in the table above and post the preliminary estimates of the adjusted applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Prices on its website, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for each Base Residual Auction. To determine the adjusted applicable default New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Prices for all resource types, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the gross costs of new entry utilizing, for combustion turbine and combined cycle resource types, the same Applicable BLS Composite Index applied for such Delivery Year to adjust the CONE value used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(iv), and for all other resource types, the “BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets” component of the Applicable BLS Composite Index used to determine the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be replaced with the “BLS Producer Price Index Final Demand, Goods Less Food & Energy, Private Capital Equipment” when adjusting the gross costs of new entry. The resultant value shall then be then adjusted further by a factor of 1.022 for nuclear, coal, combustion turbine, and combine cycle resource types or 1.01 for solar, wind, and storage resource types to reflect the annual decline in bonus depreciation scheduled under federal corporate tax law. Updated estimates of the net energy and ancillary service revenues for each default resource type and applicable Zone, which shall include, but are not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 shall then be subtracted from the adjusted gross costs of new entry to determine the adjusted New Entry MOPR Floor Offer Price. The net energy and ancillary services revenue shall be the average of the net energy and ancillary services revenues that the resource is projected to receive from the PJM energy and ancillary service markets for the applicable Delivery Year from three separate simulations, with each such simulation using forward prices shaped using historical data from one of each of the three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction to take account of year-to-year variability in such hourly shapes. Each net energy and ancillary services revenue simulation shall be conducted in accordance with the following and the PJM Manuals:
(i) for nuclear resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue determined by the product of [average annual day-ahead Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone, times 8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources] minus the total annual cost to produce energy determined by the product of [8,760 hours times the annual average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources times $9.02/MWh for a single unit plant or $7.66/MWh for a multi-unit plant] where these hourly cost rates include fuel costs and variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(ii) for coal resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 650 MW coal unit (with heat rate of 8,638 BTU/kWh and variable operations and maintenance variable operation and maintenance expenses, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, of $9.50/MWh) using day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices, and daily forecasted coal prices, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(iii) for combustion turbine resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in a manner consistent with the methodology described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(B) for the Reference Resource combustion turbine.

(iv) for combined cycle resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined in the same manner as that prescribed for a combustion turbine resource type, except that the heat rate assumed for the combined cycle resource shall be 6,501 BTU/kwh, the variable operations and maintenance expenses for such resource, inclusive of Maintenance Adder costs, shall be $2.11/MWh, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year.

(v) for solar PV resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a solar resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual net energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the solar output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone and applicable to such hour with this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year. Two separate solar resource models are used, one model for a fixed panel resource and a second model for a tracking panel resource;

(vi) for onshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined using a wind resource model that provides the average MW output level, expressed as a percentage of nameplate rating, by hour of day (for each of the 24-hours of a day) and by calendar month (for each of the twelve months of a year). The annual energy market revenues are determined by multiplying the wind output level of each hour by the real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone applicable to such hour with
this product summed across all of the hours of an annual period, plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year;

(vii) for offshore wind resource type, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate for each Zone shall be determined by the gross energy market revenue equal to the product of [the average annual real-time Forward Hourly LMP for such Zone times 8,760 hours times an assumed annual capacity factor of 45%], plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year; and

(viii) for Capacity Storage Resource, the net energy and ancillary services revenue estimate shall be estimated by the Projected EAS Dispatch of a 1 MW, 4MWh resource, with an 85% roundtrip efficiency, and assumed to be dispatched between 95% and 5% state of charge against day-ahead and real-time Forward Hourly LMPs for such Zone and Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices plus reactive services revenue of $3,350/MW-year.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2022, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the default gross cost of new entry values. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses of the fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs for such resource types. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall propose either to modify or retain the default gross cost of new entry values stated in the table above. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the default gross cost of new entry values are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such proposed modifications with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

Any Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has not previously cleared an RPM Auction for that or any prior Delivery Year and for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource for the relevant RPM Auction.

(B) Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Prices.

(i) For a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and for which a Sell Offer based on that resource has previously cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, the applicable Cleared MOPR Floor Offer Price shall be, at the election of the Capacity Market Seller, (a) based on the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) below, or (b) if available, the default Avoidable Cost Rate for the applicable resource type shown in the table below, as adjusted for Delivery Years subsequent for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year to reflect changes in avoidable costs, net of projected PJM market revenues equal to the resource’s net
energy and ancillary service revenues for the resource type, as determined in accordance with subsection (ii) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Resource Type</th>
<th>Default Gross ACR (2022/2023) ($/MW-day) (Nameplate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - single</td>
<td>$697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear - dual</td>
<td>$445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle</td>
<td>$56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar PV (fixed and tracking)</td>
<td>$40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Onshore</td>
<td>$83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The default gross Avoidable Cost Rate values in the table above are expressed in dollars per MW-day in terms of nameplate megawatts. For purposes of submitting a Sell Offer, the default Avoidable Cost Rate values must be net of estimated net energy and ancillary service revenues, and then the difference is ultimately converted to Unforced Capacity (“UCAP”) MW-day, where the UCAP MW-day value will be determined based on the 2023/2024 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the resource-specific Accredited UCAP value for solar and wind resource types (with appropriate time-weighting for any winter Capacity Interconnection Rights) or the resource-specific EFORd for all other generation resource types and on. The resulting default Cleared MOPR Floor Offer price in UCAP/MW-day terms shall be applied to each MW offered for the Capacity Resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource.

Commencing with the Base Residual Auction for the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the default Avoidable Cost Rates in the table above, and post the adjusted values on its website, by no later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for each Base Residual Auction. To determine the adjusted Avoidable Cost Rates, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the 10-year average Handy-Whitman Index in order to adjust the Gross ACR values to account for expected inflation. Updated estimates of the net energy and ancillary service revenues shall be determined on a resource-specific basis in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8(d) and the PJM Manuals.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2022, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the default Avoidable Cost Rates for Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) that have cleared in an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year. Such review may include, without limitation, analyses of the avoidable costs of such resource types. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall propose either to modify or retain the default Avoidable Cost Rate values stated in the table above. The Office of the Interconnection shall post publicly and solicit stakeholder comment.
regarding the proposal. If, as a result of this process, changes to the default Avoidable Cost Rate values are proposed, the Office of the Interconnection shall file such proposed modifications with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

Any Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has previously cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year and for which there is no default MOPR Floor Offer Price provided in accordance with this section, including hybrid resources, must seek a unit-specific value determined in accordance with the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price process below to participate in an RPM Auction. Failure to obtain a unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price will result in the Office of the Interconnection rejecting any Sell Offer based on such resource.

(ii) The net energy and ancillary services revenue is equal to forecasted net revenues which shall be determined in accordance with the applicable resource type net energy and ancillary services revenue determination methodology set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(3)(A) through (ix) and using the subject resource’s operating parameters as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals based on (a) offers submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market over the calendar year preceding the time of the determination for the RPM Auction; (b) the resource-specific operating parameters approved, as applicable, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 (including any Fuel Costs, emissions costs, Maintenance Adders, and Operating Costs); (c) the resource’s EFORd; (d) Forward Hourly LMPs at the generation bus as determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(v-1)(C)(6); and (e) the resource’s stated annual revenue requirement for reactive services; plus any unit-specific bilateral contract. In addition, the following resource type-specific parameters shall be considered; (f) for combustion turbine, combined cycle, and coal resource types: the installed capacity rating, ramp rate (which shall be equal to the maximum ramp rate included in the resource’s energy offers over the most recent previous calendar year preceding the determination for the RPM Auction), and the heat rate as determined as the resource’s average heat rate at full load as submitted to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, where for combined cycle resources heat rates will be determined at base load and at peak load (e.g., without duct burners and with duct burners), as applicable; (g) for nuclear resource type: an average equivalent availability factor of all PJM nuclear resources to account for refueling outages; (h) for solar and wind resource types: the resource’s output profiles for the most recent three calendar years, as available; and (i) for battery storage resource type: the nameplate capacity rating (on a MW / MWh basis).

To the extent the resource has not achieved commercial operation, the operating parameters used in the simulation of the net energy and ancillary service revenues will be based on the manufacturer’s specifications and/or from parameters used for other existing, comparable resources, as developed by the Market Monitoring Unit and the Capacity Market Seller, and accepted by the Office of the Interconnection.

A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a Generation Capacity Resource that has previously cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year and where such Sell Offer is based on a net energy and ancillary services revenue determination that does
not use the foregoing methodology or parameter inputs stated for that resource type shall, at its
election, submit a request for a unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price for such Capacity
Resource pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(4) below.

(4) **Unit-Specific Exception.** A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a
Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the
provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule below the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer
Price may, at its election, submit a request for a unit-specific exception for such Capacity
Resource. A Capacity Market Seller intending to submit a Sell Offer in any RPM Auction for a
Generation Capacity Resource that is under a fact-specific review for Buyer-Side Market Power
pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2)(B)(ii), and where the offer is below the
applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price may, at its election, submit a request for a unit-
specific exception for such Capacity Resource. A Sell Offer below the default
MOPR Floor Offer Price, but no lower than the unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price, shall be
permitted if the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from the Office of the Interconnection
or the Commission, prior to the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit the Sell Offer. The
unit-specific MOPR Floor Offer Price determined under this provision shall be based on the unit-
specific Accredited UCAP value for battery energy storage resource types and for solar and wind
generation resource types (appropriately time-weighted for any winter Capacity Interconnection
Rights) or on the unit-specific EFORd for all other generation resource types, and shall be
applied to each MW offered by the resource regardless of actual Sell Offer quantity and
regardless of whether the Sell Offer is for a Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource. Such Sell
Offer is permissible because it is consistent with the competitive, cost-based, fixed, net cost of
the resource. All supporting data must be provided for all requests. The following requirements
shall apply to requests for such determinations:

(A) The Capacity Market Seller shall submit a written request with all
of the required documentation as described below and in the PJM Manuals. For such purpose,
the Capacity Market Seller shall submit the unit-specific exception request to the Office of the
Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit no later than one hundred twenty (120) days
prior to the commencement of the offer period for the RPM Auction in which it seeks to submit
its Sell Offer. For such purpose, the Office of the Interconnection shall post, by no later than one
hundred fifty (150) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM
Auction, a preliminary estimate for the relevant Delivery Year of the default Minimum Floor
Offer Prices, determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-2)(3)(A) and (B). If
the final applicable default Minimum Floor Offer Price subsequently established for the relevant
Delivery Year is less than the Sell Offer, the Sell Offer shall be permitted and no exception shall
be required.

(B) For a unit-specific exception for a Generation Capacity Resource
that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment
DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has never cleared an RPM Auction, the Capacity Market Seller
must include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support the
fixed development, construction, operation, and maintenance costs of the Capacity Resource, as
well as estimates of offsetting net revenues.
The financial modeling assumptions for calculating Cost of New Entry for Generation Capacity Resources shall be: (i) nominal levelization of gross costs, (ii) asset life of twenty years, (iii) no residual value, (iv) all project costs included with no sunk costs excluded, (v) use first year revenues (which may include revenues from the sale of renewable energy credits or any other revenues outside of PJM markets that do not constitute Conditioned State Support), and (vi) weighted average cost of capital based on the actual cost of capital for the entity proposing to build the Capacity Resource. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Market Seller that seeks to utilize an asset life other than twenty years (but no greater than 35 years) shall provide evidence to support the use of a different asset life, including but not limited to, the asset life term for such resource as utilized in the Capacity Market Seller’s financial accounting (e.g., independently audited financial statements), or project financing documents for the resource or evidence of actual costs or financing assumptions of recent comparable projects to the extent the seller has not executed project financing for the resource (e.g., independent project engineer opinion or manufacturer’s performance guarantee), or opinions of third-party experts regarding the reasonableness of the financing assumptions used for the project itself or in comparable projects. Capacity Market Sellers may also rely on evidence presented in federal filings, such as its FERC Form No. 1 or an SEC Form 10-K, to demonstrate an asset life other than 20 years of similar asset projects.

Supporting documentation for project costs may include, as applicable and available, a complete project description; environmental permits; vendor quotes for plant or equipment; evidence of actual costs of recent comparable projects; bases for electric and gas interconnection costs and any cost contingencies; bases and support for property taxes, insurance, operations and maintenance (“O&M”) contractor costs, and other fixed O&M and administrative or general costs; financing documents for construction-period and permanent financing or evidence of recent debt costs of the seller for comparable investments; and the bases and support for the claimed capitalization ratio, rate of return, cost-recovery period, inflation rate, or other parameters used in financial modeling. In addition to the certification, signed by an officer of the Capacity Market Seller, the request must include a certification that the claimed costs accurately reflect, in all material respects, the seller’s reasonably expected costs of new entry and that the request satisfies all standards for a unit-specific exception hereunder. The request also shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any Conditioned State Support or bilateral contracts that direct submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, evidence of compensation outside the PJM market not tied to Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel prices may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of, variable operation and
maintenance expenses, which may include Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of net revenues should be consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, including, but not limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a unit-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.

(C) For a Unit-Specific Exception for a Generation Capacity Resource that is subject to the provisions of the Minimum Offer Price Rule pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2)(2) and that has previously cleared an RPM Auction, the Capacity Market Seller shall submit a Sell Offer consistent with the unit-specific Market Seller Offer Cap process pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8; except that the 10% uncertainty adder may not be included in the “Adjustment Factor.” In addition and notwithstanding the requirements of Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8, the Capacity Market Seller shall, at its election, include in its request for an exception under this subsection documentation to support projected energy and ancillary services markets revenues. Such a request shall identify all revenue sources (exclusive of any Conditioned State Support or bilateral contracts that direct submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices) relied upon in the Sell Offer to offset the claimed fixed costs, including, without limitation, long-term power supply contracts, tolling agreements, evidence of compensation outside of PJM markets not tied to Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices, or tariffs on file with state regulatory agencies, and shall demonstrate that such offsetting revenues are consistent, over a reasonable time period identified by the Capacity Market Seller, with the standard prescribed above. In making such demonstration, the Capacity Market Seller may rely upon revenues projected by well-defined, forward-looking dispatch models designed to generally follow the rules and processes of PJM’s energy and ancillary services market. Such models must utilize publicly available forward prices for electricity and fuel in the PJM Region. Any modifications made to the forward electricity and fuel prices must similarly use publicly available data. Alternative forward prices for fuel may be used if accompanied by contractual evidence showing the applicability of the alternative fuel price. Where forward fuel markets are not available, publicly available estimates of future fuel sources may be used. The model shall also contain estimates of variable operation and maintenance expenses, which may include
Maintenance Adders, and emissions allowance prices. Documentation for net revenues also must include, as available and applicable, plant performance and capability information, including heat rate, start-up times and costs, forced outage rates, planned outage schedules, maintenance cycle, fuel costs and other variable operations and maintenance expenses, capacity factors, and ancillary service capabilities. Any evaluation of revenues should include, but would not be limited to, consideration of Fuel Costs, Maintenance Adders and Operating Costs, as applicable, pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 2.

In the alternative, the Capacity Market Seller may request that the Market Monitoring Unit, subject to acceptance by the Office of Interconnection, produce a unit-specific Energy & Ancillary Services Offset value for such resource using the Forward Hourly LMPs, Forward Hourly Ancillary Service Prices and either Forward Daily Natural Gas Prices for combustion turbines and combined cycle resources, or forecasted fuel prices for other resource types, plus plant parameters and capability information specific to the dispatch of the resource, as outlined above. In addition to the documentation identified herein and in the PJM Manuals, the Capacity Market Seller shall provide any additional supporting information reasonably requested by the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit to evaluate the Sell Offer. Requests for additional documentation will not extend the deadline by which the Office of the Interconnection or the Market Monitoring Unit must provide their determinations of the Minimum Offer Price Rule exception request.

(D) A Sell Offer evaluated at the unit-specific exception shall be permitted if the information provided reasonably demonstrates that the Sell Offer’s competitive, fixed, cost-based offer level is below the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, based on competitive cost advantages relative to the costs estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price, including, without limitation, competitive cost advantages resulting from the Capacity Market Seller’s business model, financial condition, tax status, access to capital or other similar conditions affecting the applicant’s costs, or based on net revenues that are reasonably demonstrated hereunder to be higher than those estimated by the default MOPR Floor Offer Price. Capacity Market Sellers shall demonstrate that claimed cost advantages or sources of net revenue that are irregular or anomalous, that do not reflect arm’s-length transactions, or that are not in the ordinary course of the Capacity Market Seller’s business are consistent with the standards of this subsection, and that out-of-market compensation is not tied to Conditioned State Support or a bilateral contract that directs submission of an offer to lower RPM Auction clearing prices. Failure to adequately support such claimed cost advantages or revenues so as to enable the Office of the Interconnection to make the determination required in this section will result in the elimination of consideration of the unsupported element(s) of a unit-specific exception by the Office of the Interconnection.

(E) The Capacity Market Seller must submit a sworn, notarized certification of a duly authorized officer, certifying that the officer has personal knowledge of the unit-specific exception request and that to the best of his/her knowledge and belief: (1) the information supplied to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of Interconnection to support its request for an exception is true and correct; (2) the Capacity Market Seller has disclosed all material facts relevant to the request for the exception; and (3) the request satisfies the criteria for the exception.
(F) The Market Monitoring Unit shall review, in an open and transparent manner with the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection, the information and documentation in support of the request and shall provide its findings whether the proposed Sell Offer is acceptable, in accordance with the standards and criteria hereunder, in writing, to the Capacity Market Seller and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for such auction. The Office of the Interconnection shall also review, in an open and transparent manner, all exception requests and documentation and shall provide in writing to the Capacity Market Seller, and the Market Monitoring Unit, its determination whether the requested Sell Offer is acceptable and if not it shall calculate and provide to such Capacity Market Seller, a minimum Sell Offer based on the data and documentation received, by no later than sixty-five (65) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction. After the Office of the Interconnection determines with the advice and input of Market Monitor, the acceptable minimum Sell Offer, the Capacity Market Seller shall notify the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, in writing, of the minimum level of Sell Offer to which it agrees to commit by no later than sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, and in making such determination, the Capacity Market Seller may consider the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and may select such default value if it is lower than the unit-specific determination. A Capacity Market Seller that is dissatisfied with any determination hereunder may seek any remedies available to it from FERC; provided, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will proceed with administration of the Tariff and market rules based on the lower of the applicable default MOPR Floor Offer Price and the unit-specific determination unless and until ordered to do otherwise by FERC.

i) Capacity Export Charges and Credits

(1) Charge

Each Capacity Export Transmission Customer shall incur for each day of each Delivery Year a Capacity Export Charge equal to the Reserved Capacity of Long-Term Firm Transmission Service used for such export (“Export Reserved Capacity”) multiplied by (the Final Zonal Capacity Price for such Delivery Year for the Zone encompassing the interface with the Control Area to which such capacity is exported minus the Final Zonal Capacity Price for such Delivery Year for the Zone in which the resources designated for export are located, but not less than zero). If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the amount of Reserved Capacity described above shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in proportion to the flows from such resource through each such Zone directly to such interface under CETO/CETL analysis conditions, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection using procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. The amount of the Reserved Capacity that is associated with a fully controllable facility that crosses such interface shall be completely apportioned to the Zone within which such facility terminates.

(2) Credit

To recognize the value of firm Transmission Service held by any such Capacity Export Transmission Customer, such customer assessed a charge under section 5.14(i)(1) above also shall receive a credit, comparable to the Capacity Transfer Rights provided to Load-Serving
Entities under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.15. Such credit shall be equal to the locational capacity price difference specified in section 5.14(i)(1) above times the Export Customer’s Allocated Share determined as follows:

Export Customer’s Allocated Share equals

\[(\text{Export Path Import} \times \text{Export Reserved Capacity}) / \]

\[(\text{Export Reserved Capacity} + \text{Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations of all LSEs in such Zone}).\]

Where:

“Export Path Import” means the megawatts of Unforced Capacity imported into the export interface Zone from the Zone in which the resource designated for export is located.

If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the amount of Export Reserved Capacity shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in the same manner as set forth in subsection (i)(1) above.

(3) Distribution of Revenues

Any revenues collected from the Capacity Export Charge with respect to any capacity export for a Delivery Year, less the credit provided in subsection (i)(2) for such Delivery Year, shall be distributed to the Load Serving Entities in the export-interface Zone that were assessed a Locational Reliability Charge for such Delivery Year, pro rata based on the Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations of such Load-serving Entities in such Zone during such Delivery Year. If more than one Zone forms the interface with such Control Area, then the revenues shall be apportioned among such Zones for purposes of the above calculation in the same manner as set forth in subsection (i)(1) above.

5.14A [Reserved.]


A. This transition provision applies only with respect to Generation Capacity Resources with existing capacity commitments for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years that experience reductions in verified installed capacity available for sale as a direct result of revised generating unit capability verification test procedures effective with the summer 2014 capability tests, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. A Generation Capacity Resource meeting the description of the preceding sentence, and the Capacity Market Seller of such a resource, are hereafter in this section 5.14B referred to as an “Affected Resource” and an “Affected Resource Owner,” respectively.

B. For each of its Affected Resources, an Affected Resource Owner is required to provide documentation to the Office of the Interconnection sufficient to show a reduction in installed
capacity value as a direct result of the revised capability test procedures. Upon acceptance by the Office of the Interconnection, the Affected Resource’s installed capacity value will be updated in the eRPM system to reflect the reduction, and the Affected Resource’s Capacity Interconnection Rights value will be updated to reflect the reduction, effective June 1, 2014. The reduction’s impact on the Affected Resource’s existing capacity commitments for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year will be determined in Unforced Capacity terms, using the final EFORd value established by the Office of the Interconnection for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year as applied to the Third Incremental Auction for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year, to convert installed capacity to Unforced Capacity. The reduction’s impact on the Affected Resource’s existing capacity commitments for each of the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 Delivery Years will be determined in Unforced Capacity terms, using the EFORd value from each Sell Offer in each applicable RPM Auction, applied on a pro-rata basis, to convert installed capacity to Unforced Capacity. The Unforced Capacity impact for each Delivery Year represents the Affected Resource’s capacity commitment shortfall, resulting wholly and directly from the revised capability test procedures, for which the Affected Resource Owner is subject to a Capacity Resource Deficiency Charge for the Delivery Year, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8, unless the Affected Resource Owner (i) provides replacement Unforced Capacity, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8.1, prior to the start of the Delivery Year to resolve the Affected Resource’s total capacity commitment shortfall; or (ii) requests relief from Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges that result wholly and directly from the revised capability test procedures by electing the transition mechanism described in this section 5.14B (“Transition Mechanism”).

C. Under the Transition Mechanism, an Affected Resource Owner may elect to have the Unforced Capacity commitments for all of its Affected Resources reduced for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years to eliminate the capacity commitment shortfalls, across all of its Affected Resources, that result wholly and directly from the revised capability test procedures, and for which the Affected Resource Owner otherwise would be subject to Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges for the Delivery Year. In electing this option, the Affected Resource Owner relinquishes RPM Auction Credits associated with the reductions in Unforced Capacity commitments for all of its Affected Resources for the Delivery Year, and Locational Reliability Charges as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(e) of this Attachment DD are adjusted accordingly. Affected Resource Owners wishing to elect the Transition Mechanism for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year must notify the Office of the Interconnection by May 30, 2014. Affected Resource Owners wishing to elect the Transition Mechanism for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year must notify the Office of the Interconnection by July 25, 2014.

D. The Office of the Interconnection will offset the total reduction (across all Affected Resources and Affected Resource Owners) in Unforced Capacity commitments associated with the Transition Mechanism for the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 Delivery Years by applying corresponding adjustments to the quantity of Buy Bid or Sell Offer activity in the upcoming Incremental Auctions for each of those Delivery Years, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.12(b)(ii) and 5.12(b)(iii).

E. By electing the Transition Mechanism, an Affected Resource Owner may receive relief from applicable Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years, and a Locational UCAP Seller that sells Locational UCAP based on an Affected Resource owned by the Affected Resource Owner may receive relief from
applicable Capacity Resource Deficiency Charges for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year, to the extent that the Affected Resource Owner demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection, that an inability to deliver the amount of Unforced Capacity previously committed for the 2014/2015, 2015/2016, or 2016/2017 Delivery Years is due to a reduction in verified installed capacity available for sale as a direct result of revised generating unit capability verification test procedures effective with the summer 2014 capability tests, as set forth in the PJM Manuals; provided, however, that the Affected Resource Owner must provide the Office of the Interconnection with all information deemed necessary by the Office of the Interconnection to assess the merits of the request for relief.

5.14C Demand Response Operational Resource Flexibility Transition Provision for RPM Delivery Years 2015/2016 and 2016/2017

A. This transition provision applies only to Demand Resources for which a Curtailment Service Provider has existing RPM commitments for the 2015/2016 or 2016/2017 Delivery Years (alternatively referred to in this section 5.14C as “Applicable Delivery Years” and each an “Applicable Delivery Year”) that (i) cannot satisfy the 30-minute notification requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; (ii) are not excepted from the 30-minute notification requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; and (iii) cleared in the Base Residual Auction or First Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year, or cleared in the Base Residual Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. A Demand Resource meeting these criteria and the Curtailment Service Provider of such a resource are hereafter in this section 5.14C referred to as an “Affected Demand Resource” and an “Affected Curtailment Service Provider,” respectively.

B. For this section 5.14C to apply to an Affected Demand Resource, the Affected Curtailment Service Provider must notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing, with regard to the following information by the applicable deadline:

i) For each applicable Affected Demand Resource: the number of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year by end-use customer site that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, calculated based on the most current information available to the Affected Curtailment Service Provider; the end-use customer name; electric distribution company’s account number for the end-use customer; address of end-use customer; type of Demand Resource (i.e., Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR); the Zone or sub-Zone in which the end-use customer is located; and, a detailed description of why the end-use customer cannot comply with the 30-minute notification requirement or qualify for one of the exceptions to the 30-minute notification requirement provided in Tariff, Attachment DD-1 section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6.

ii) If applicable, a detailed analysis that quantifies the amount of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year for prospective customer sales that could not be contracted by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider because of the 30-minute notification requirement provided in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and
the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6 that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, by type of Demand Resource (i.e. Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR) and by Zone and sub-Zone, as applicable. The analysis should include the amount of Unforced Capacity expected from prospective customer sales for each Applicable Delivery Year and must include supporting detail to substantiate the difference in reduced sales expectations. The Affected Curtailment Service Provider should maintain records to support its analysis.

1. For the 2015/2016 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Third Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year.

2. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Second or Third Incremental Auctions for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year.

3. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision must not have sold or offered to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, and may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the modeled LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year.

C. For the Third Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016 Delivery Year and the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall publish aggregate information on the undeliverable megawatts declared under this transition provision (hereafter, “non-viable megawatts”), by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, concurrently with its posting of planning parameters for the applicable Scheduled Incremental Auction. Non-viable megawatts for a Scheduled Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year represent those megawatts meeting the criteria of subsection A above and declared in accordance with subsection B above. Prior to each Third Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply adjustments equal to the declared non-viable megawatt quantity to the quantity of Buy Bid or Sell Offer activity in the upcoming Scheduled Incremental Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.12(b)(ii) and 5.12(b)(iii). Prior to the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the recalculated PJM Region Reliability Requirement and recalculated LDA Reliability Requirements, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c), by the applicable quantity of declared non-viable megawatts, and shall update the PJM Region
Reliability Requirement and each LDA Reliability Requirement for such Second Incremental Auction only if the combined change of the applicable adjustment and applicable recalculation is greater than or equal to the lessor of (i) 500 megawatts or (ii) one percent of the prior PJM Region Reliability Requirement or one percent of the prior LDA Reliability Requirement, as applicable.

D. Prior to the start of each Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall reduce, by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, the capacity commitment of each Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year based on the non-viable megawatts declared by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider under this transition provision. If the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cleared megawatts from multiple Affected Demand Resources of the same type and Zone or sub-Zone, or cleared megawatts in multiple RPM Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the reduction in capacity commitment by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone across the applicable Affected Demand Resources and relevant RPM Auctions. Such allocation shall be performed on a pro-rata basis, based on megawatts cleared by the Affected Demand Resources in the relevant RPM Auctions.

E. For each Applicable Delivery Year, an Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year relinquishes an Affected Demand Resource’s RPM Auction Credits for the amount of capacity commitment reduction as determined under subsection D above. Locational Reliability Charges as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(e) are also adjusted accordingly.

5.14D Capacity Performance and Base Capacity Transition Provision for RPM Delivery Years 2016/2017 and 2017/2018

A. This transition provision applies only for procuring Capacity Performance Resources for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years.

B. For both the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, PJM will hold a Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction to procure Capacity Performance Resources.

1. For each Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction, the optimization algorithm shall consider:

   • the target quantities of Capacity Performance Resources specified below;
   • the Sell Offers submitted in such auction.

The Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid based on the quantity of Capacity Performance Resources specified for that Delivery Year. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid, at a price no higher than 0.5 times the Net CONE value for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year, for a quantity of Capacity Performance Resources equal to 60 percent of the updated Reliability Requirement for the PJM Region. For the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid, at a price no higher than 0.6 times the Net CONE value
for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year, for a quantity of Capacity Performance Resources equal to 70 percent of the updated Reliability Requirement for the PJM Region.

2. For each Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a clearing price to be paid for each megawatt-day of Unforced Capacity that clears in such auction. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for any Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction shall not exceed 0.5 times the Net CONE value for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year. For the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Capacity Resource Clearing Price for any Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction shall not exceed 0.6 times the Net CONE value for the PJM Region determined for the Base Residual Auction for that Delivery Year.

3. A Capacity Market Seller may offer any Capacity Resource that has not been committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, that qualifies as a Capacity Performance Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(a) and that (i) has not cleared an RPM Auction for that Delivery Year; or (ii) has cleared in an RPM Auction for that Delivery Year. A Capacity Market Seller may offer an external Generation Capacity Resource to the extent that such resource: (i) is reasonably expected, by the relevant Delivery Year, to meet all applicable requirements to be treated as equivalent to PJM Region internal generation that is not subject to NERC tagging as an interchange transaction; (ii) has long-term firm transmission service confirmed on the complete transmission path from such resource into PJM; and (iii) is, by written commitment of the Capacity Market Seller, subject to the same obligations imposed on Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 to offer their capacity into RPM Auctions.

4. Capacity Resources that already cleared an RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, retain the capacity obligations for that Delivery Year, and clear in a Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction for the same Delivery Year shall: (i) receive a payment equal to the Capacity Resource Clearing Price as established in that Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction; and (ii) not be eligible to receive a payment for clearing in any prior RPM Auction for that Delivery Year.

D. All Capacity Performance Resources that clear in a Capacity Performance Transition Incremental Auction will be subject to the Non-Performance Charge set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 10A.


A. This transition provision applies only to Demand Resources for which a Curtailment Service Provider has existing RPM commitments for the 2016/2017, 2017/2018, or 2018/2019 Delivery Years (alternatively referred to in this section 5.14E as “Applicable Delivery Years” and each an “Applicable Delivery Year”) that (i) qualified as Legacy Direct Load Control before June 1, 2016 as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section G and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; (ii) cannot meet the requirements for using statistical sampling for residential
non-interval metered customers as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section K and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6; and (iii) cleared in the Base Residual Auction or First Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, cleared in the Base Residual Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, or cleared in the Base Residual Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year. A Demand Resource meeting these criteria and the Curtailment Service Provider of such a resource are hereafter in this section 5.14E referred to as an “Affected Demand Resource” and an “Affected Curtailment Service Provider,” respectively.

B. For this section 5.14E to apply to an Affected Demand Resource, the Affected Curtailment Service Provider must notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing, with regard to the following information, by the applicable deadline:

   i) For each applicable Affected Demand Resource: the number of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year by end-use customer site that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, calculated based on the most current information available to the Affected Curtailment Service Provider; electric distribution company’s account number for the end-use customer; address of end-use customer; type of Demand Resource (i.e., Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR); the Zone or sub-Zone in which the end-use customer is located; and, a detailed description of why the end-use customer cannot comply with statistical sampling for residential non-interval metered customers requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section K and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6.

   ii) If applicable, a detailed analysis that quantifies the amount of cleared megawatts of Unforced Capacity for the Applicable Delivery Year for prospective customer sales that could not be contracted by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider because of the statistical sampling for residential non-interval metered customers requirement as described in Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section K and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6 that the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cannot deliver, by type of Demand Resource (i.e. Limited DR, Annual DR, Extended Summer DR) and by Zone and sub-Zone, as applicable. The analysis should include the amount of Unforced Capacity expected from prospective customer sales for each Applicable Delivery Year and must include supporting detail to substantiate the difference in reduced sales expectations. The Affected Curtailment Service Provider should maintain records to support its analysis.

1. For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the Second and/or Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the matching LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the Second or Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year.

2. For the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters
for the First, Second and/or Third Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the matching LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the First, Second or Third Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year.

3. For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, the notice shall be provided by no later than seven (7) days prior to the posting by the Office of the Interconnection of planning parameters for the First, Second and/or Third Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year. Such Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision may not sell or offer to sell megawatts in the matching LDA or sub-LDA where an Affected Demand Resource is located in the First, Second or Third Incremental Auctions for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year.

C. For the Second and Third Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, and the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auctions for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall publish aggregate information on the undeliverable megawatts declared under this transition provision (hereafter, “non-viable megawatts”), by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, concurrently with its posting of planning parameters for the applicable Scheduled Incremental Auction. Non-viable megawatts for a Scheduled Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year represent those megawatts meeting the criteria of subsection A above and declared in accordance with subsection B above. Prior to each Scheduled Incremental Auction for an Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall make adjustments equal to the declared non-viable megawatt quantity to the quantity of Buy Bid or Sell Offer activity in the upcoming Scheduled Incremental Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.12(b)(ii) and 5.12(b)(iii). Prior to the Second Incremental Auction for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, the First and Second Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, and the First and Second Incremental Auction for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the recalculated PJM Region Reliability Requirement and recalculated LDA Reliability Requirements, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c), by the applicable quantity of declared non-viable megawatts, and shall update the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and each LDA Reliability Requirement for such Incremental Auction only if the combined change of the applicable adjustment and applicable recalculation is greater than or equal to the lessor of (i) 500 megawatts or (ii) one percent of the prior PJM Region Reliability Requirement or one percent of the prior LDA Reliability Requirement, as applicable.

D. Prior to the start of each Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall reduce, by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone, the capacity commitment of each Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year based on the non-viable megawatts declared by the Affected Curtailment Service Provider under this transition provision. If the Affected Curtailment Service Provider cleared megawatts from multiple Affected Demand Resources of the same type and Zone or sub-Zone, or cleared MWs in multiple RPM Auctions for the Applicable Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the reduction in capacity commitment by type of Demand Resource and by Zone or sub-Zone across the applicable Affected Demand Resources and relevant RPM Auctions. Such allocation shall be performed on a pro-rata basis, based on megawatts cleared by the Affected Demand Resources in the relevant RPM Auctions.
E. For each Applicable Delivery Year, an Affected Curtailment Service Provider that utilizes this transition provision for the Applicable Delivery Year relinquishes an Affected Demand Resource’s RPM Auction credits for the amount of capacity commitment reduction as determined under subsection D above. Locational Reliability Charges as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(e) are also adjusted accordingly.
6.6A Offer Requirement for Capacity Performance Resources

(a) For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the installed capacity of every Generation Capacity Resource located in the PJM Region that is capable (or that reasonably can become capable) of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be offered as a Capacity Performance Resource by the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls all or part of such resource (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in all RPM Auctions for each such Delivery Year, less any amount determined by the Office of the Interconnection to be eligible for an exception to the Capacity Performance Resource must-offer requirement, where installed capacity is determined as of the date on which bidding commences for each RPM Auction pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.6.6.

(b) Determinations of EFORd and Unforced Capacity made under this section 6.6 as to a Generation Capacity Resource shall govern the offers required under this section as to the same Generation Capacity Resource.

(c) Exceptions to the requirement in subsection (a) shall be permitted only for a resource which the Capacity Market Seller demonstrates is reasonably expected to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Intermittent Resources, Capacity Storage Resources, Demand Resources, and Energy Efficiency Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources shall not be required to offer as a Capacity Performance Resource, but shall not be precluded from being offered as a Capacity Performance Resource at a level that demonstrably satisfies such requirements. Exceptions shall be determined using the same timeline and procedures as specified in section 6.6.

Effective with the 2023/2024 Delivery Year, Capacity Market Sellers seeking an exception for a Base Residual Auction on the basis that a resource is incapable of meeting the Capacity Performance Resource requirement shall include a documented plan with the submission of their request showing the steps the Capacity Market Seller intends to pursue for the resource to become physically capable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource. Such plan shall include (i) a timeline for design, permitting, procurement, and construction milestones, as applicable, where such timeline shall not exceed one Base Residual Auction exception, and (ii) evidence of corporate commitment (e.g., an SEC filing, a press release, or a letter from a duly authorized corporate officer indicating intent to make such investment). Periodic updates on the progress, shall be provided by the Capacity Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit for their review by no later than (i) one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the commencement of the offer period for subsequent Incremental Auctions for the applicable Delivery Years, and (ii) the December 1 that last precedes subsequent Base Residual Auctions. The Capacity Market Seller shall also immediately notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit of any material changes to the plan that may occur. Upon request by a Capacity Market Seller, a one year extension to the plan timeline shall be permissible only for delays not caused by the Capacity Market Seller, and that could not have been remedied through the exercise of due diligence by the Capacity Market Seller. In no event may an exception be requested by the Capacity Market Seller for more than two Base Residual Auctions.
Failure to submit a documented plan, or lack of good faith effort by a Capacity Market Seller to make an Existing Generation Capacity Resource physically capable of meeting the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource in accordance with a documented plan, shall result in the removal of the resource’s Capacity Resource status effective with the first future Delivery Year for which the resource was granted an exception, no earlier than the 2023/2024 Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection shall amend the applicable Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement to reflect any such removal of the Capacity Interconnection Rights, and shall report the amended agreement to the Commission in the same manner as the original (e.g. FERC Filing or Electronic Quarterly Reports). The Office of the Interconnection shall file the amended agreement unexecuted if the Interconnection Customer or wholesale market participant does not sign the amended Interconnection Service Agreement or wholesale market participation agreement. The required change in Capacity Resource status shall only apply to those Generation Capacity Resources that are shown to be physically incapable of satisfying the requirements of a Capacity Performance Resource.

(d) A resource not exempted or excepted under subsection (c) hereof that is capable of qualifying as a Capacity Performance Resource and does not offer into an RPM Auction as a Capacity Performance Resource shall be subject to the same restrictions on subsequent offers, and other possible remedies, as specified in section 6.6.
10A. CHARGES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE AND CREDITS FOR PERFORMANCE

(a) For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and any subsequent Delivery Year (and for certain purposes for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years as provided in subsections (h) and (i) hereof), each Capacity Market Seller that commits a Capacity Resource for a Delivery Year (whether through an RPM Auction, a bilateral transaction, or as Locational UCAP), each Locational UCAP Seller that sells Locational UCAP from a Capacity Resource for a Delivery Year, and for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years each PRD Provider that commits Price Responsive Demand for a Delivery Year, shall be charged to the extent the performance of each of its committed Capacity Resources or Price Responsive Demand during all or any part of a clock-hour when an Emergency Action is in effect falls short of the expected performance of such resources (as determined herein) and the revenue from such charges shall be provided to Market Participants with generation, demand response resources, or Price Responsive Demand that perform during such hour in excess of the level expected based on commitments (if any) of such resources.

(b) Performance shall be measured for purposes of this assessment during each Performance Assessment Interval.

(c) For each Performance Assessment Interval, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether, and the extent to which, the actual performance of each Capacity Resource and Locational UCAP has fallen short of the performance expected of such committed Capacity Resource, and the magnitude of any such shortfall, based on the following formula:

\[
\text{Performance Shortfall} = \text{Expected Performance} - \text{Actual Performance}
\]

Where the result of such formula is a positive number and where:

Expected Performance =

for Generation Capacity Resources (including external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve a declared Emergency Action; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, performance of external Generation Capacity Resources shall be assessed only during Performance Assessment Hours for Emergency Actions declared for the entire PJM Region) and Capacity Storage Resources: [(Resource Committed Capacity * the Balancing Ratio)];

where

Resource Committed Capacity = the total megawatts of Unforced Capacity of the Capacity Resource committed by such Capacity Market Seller or Locational UCAP Seller; and

The Balancing Ratio = (All Actual Generation Performance, Storage Resource Performance, DER Aggregation Resource Performance, Net Energy Imports,
Price Responsive Demand Bonus Performance effective with the 2022/2023 Delivery Year, and Demand Response Bonus Performance) / (All Committed Generation, Storage Capacity, and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource); provided, however, that Net Energy Imports shall be included in the calculation of the Balancing Ratio only for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by any external Generation Capacity Resource would have helped resolve the Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; and provided further that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, Net Energy Imports shall be included in the calculation of the Balancing Ratio only for any Performance Assessment Hour for which the Emergency Action was declared for the entire PJM Region; and provided further that the Balancing Ratio shall not exceed a value of 1.0.

for purposes of which

All Committed Generation, Storage Capacity, and DER Aggregation Capacity = the total megawatts of Unforced Capacity of all Generation Capacity Resources (including external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve the declared Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, performance of external Generation Capacity Resources shall be assessed only during Performance Assessment Hours for Emergency Actions declared for the entire PJM Region), all Capacity Storage Resources, and all DER Capacity Aggregation Resources, including only unforced capacity of generating resources within the aggregation, and excluding load reduction capacity committed by all Capacity Market Sellers, FRR Entities, Locational UCAP Sellers;

All Actual Generation Performance, Storage Resource Performance, and DER Aggregation Resource Performance = the total amount of Actual Performance for all generation resources (including external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve the declared Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, performance of external Generation Capacity Resources shall be assessed only during Performance Assessment Hours for Emergency Actions declared for the entire PJM Region), storage resources and DER Aggregation Resources (calculated as actual performance for all generating Component DER and all bonus performance from demand resource as calculated in (g) below) during the interval;

Net Energy Imports = the sum of interchange transactions importing energy into PJM (not including those associated with external Generation Capacity Resources and therefore included in All Actual Generation Performance) minus the sum of interchange transactions exporting energy out of PJM, but not less than zero;
Demand Response Bonus Performance = the sum of Bonus performance provided by Demand Response resources as calculated in (g) below;

Price Responsive Demand Bonus Performance = the sum of Bonus performance provided by Price Responsive Demand as calculated in (g) below;

and for Demand Resources, Energy Efficiency Resources, and Qualifying Transmission Upgrades: Resource Committed Capacity;

where

Resource Committed Capacity = the total megawatts of capacity committed from such Capacity Resource committed capacity without making any adjustment for the Forecast Pool Requirement

for DER Aggregation Resource, the sum of generation and storage Component DER calculated as (Resource Committed Capacity * the Balancing Ratio) and the sum of demand resource, and energy efficiency resource calculated as (Resource Committed Capacity).

and for PRD Provider: Price Responsive Demand Committed

where

Price Responsive Demand Committed = the Nominal PRD Value committed by the PRD Provider in the area defined by the Performance Assessment Interval, adjusted to account for any PRD registrations in such area that were not subject to compliance measurement.

and

Actual Performance =

for each generation resource, the metered output of energy delivered to PJM by such resource plus the resource’s real-time reserve or regulation assignment, if any, during the Performance Assessment Interval;

for each storage resource, the metered output of energy delivered to PJM by such resource plus the resource’s real-time reserve or regulation assignment, if any, during the Performance Assessment Interval;

for each Demand Resource, the demand response provided to PJM by such resource, plus such resource’s real-time reserve or regulation assignment, if any, during the Performance Assessment Interval, as established through the PJM demand response settlement procedure consistent with the standards specified in
for each PRD Provider, the actual load reduction provided by the PRD Provider during a Performance Assessment Interval, determined in accordance with RAA, Schedule 6.1.N and the PJM Manuals;

for each Energy Efficiency Resource, the load reduction quantity approved by PJM subsequent to the pre-delivery year submittal of a post-installation measurement and verification report; and

for each Qualified Transmission Upgrade, the megawatt quantity cleared by such Qualified Transmission Upgrade if it is in service during the Performance Assessment Interval, and zero if it is not in service during such Performance Assessment Interval; and

for each DER Aggregation Resource, the sum of Component DER calculated in accordance with the generation resource, storage resource, demand resource, and energy efficiency resource calculations herein.

Such calculation shall encompass all resources and Price Responsive Demand located in the area defined by the Emergency Action; provided, however, that Performance Shortfall shall be calculated for external Generation Capacity Resources for any Performance Assessment Interval for which performance by such external resource would have helped resolve the declared Emergency Action that was the subject to the Performance Assessment Hour; provided, however, that for any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, Performance Shortfall shall be calculated for external Generation Capacity Resources only during Performance Assessment Hours which the Emergency Action was declared for the entire PJM Region. At the start of the Delivery Year, PJM will inform the Capacity Market Seller of an external resource as to which Locational Deliverability Area it has been assigned. For purposes of this provision, Qualifying Transmission Upgrades shall be deemed to be located in the Locational Deliverability Area into which such upgrade increased the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit, and a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade shall be included in calculations of Expected Performance and Actual Performance only if, and to the extent that, the declared Emergency Action encompasses the Locational Deliverability Area into which such upgrade increased the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit. The Performance Shortfall shall be calculated for each Performance Assessment Interval, and any committed Capacity Resource for which the above calculation produces a negative number for a Performance Assessment Interval shall not have a Performance Shortfall for such Performance Assessment Interval. For any resource that is partially committed as a Capacity Performance Resource and partially committed as a Base Capacity Resource, the performance of such resource during a Performance Assessment Interval shall first be attributed to the resource’s Capacity Performance Resource obligation; any performance by such resource in excess of the Capacity Performance Resource’s Expected Performance shall be attributed to the resource’s Base Capacity Resource obligation.

(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c) above, a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP of a Capacity Market Seller or Locational UCAP Seller shall not be considered in the calculation
of a Performance Shortfall for a Performance Assessment Interval to the extent such Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP was unavailable during such Performance Assessment Interval solely because the resource on which such Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP is based was on a Generator Planned Outage or Generator Maintenance Outage approved by the Office of the Interconnection, or was not scheduled to operate by the Office of the Interconnection, or was online but was scheduled down, by the Office of the Interconnection, based on a determination by the Office of the Interconnection that such scheduling action was appropriate to the security-constrained economic dispatch of the PJM Region. Such a resource shall be considered in the calculation of a Performance Shortfall if it otherwise was needed and would have been scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection to perform, but was not scheduled to operate, or was scheduled down, solely due to: (i) any operating parameter limitations submitted in the resource’s offer, or (ii) the seller’s submission of a market-based offer higher than its cost-based. In addition, notwithstanding subsection (c) above, a Price Responsive Demand registration shall not be considered in the calculation of a Performance Shortfall or Bonus Performance for a Performance Assessment Interval when the PRD Curve associated with such registration in the PJM Real-time Energy Market indicates a price point where no demand reduction is expected at the real-time LMP recorded during the Performance Assessment Interval.

(e) Subject to the Non-Performance Charge Limit specified in subsection (f) hereof, each Capacity Market Seller and Locational UCAP Seller shall be assessed a Non-Performance Charge for each of its Capacity Resources or Locational UCAP that has a Performance Shortfall for a Performance Assessment Interval based on the following formula, applied to each such resource:

\[
\text{Non-Performance Charge} = \text{Performance Shortfall} \times \text{Non-Performance Charge Rate}
\]

Where

For Capacity Performance Resources and Seasonal Capacity Performance Resources, the Non-Performance Charge Rate = (Net Cost of New Entry (stated in terms of installed capacity) for the LDA and Delivery Year for which such calculation is performed * (the number of days in the Delivery Year / 30) / (the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals in an hour).

and for Base Capacity Resources the Non-Performance Charge Rate = (Weighted Average Resource Clearing Price applicable to the resource * (the number of days in the Delivery Year / 30) (the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals in an hour)

(f) The Non-Performance Charges for each Capacity Performance Resource (including Locational UCAP from such a resource) and each PRD Provider for a Delivery Year shall not exceed a Non-Performance Charge Limit equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource or such PRD Provider times the number of days in the Delivery Year. All references to Net Cost of New Entry in this section 10A shall be to the Net Cost of New Entry for the LDA and Delivery Year for which the calculation is performed. The total Non-Performance Charges for each Base Capacity Resource (including Locational UCAP from such a resource) for a Delivery Year shall not exceed a Non-
Performance Charge Limit equal to the total payments due such Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP under Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14 for such Delivery Year. The Non-Performance Charges for each Seasonal Capacity Performance Resource for a Delivery Year shall not exceed a Non-Performance Charge Limit equal to 1.5 times the Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource times the number of days in the season applicable to such resource.

(g) Revenues collected from assessment of Non-Performance Charges for a Performance Assessment Interval shall be distributed to each Market Participant, whether or not such Market Participant committed a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP for a Performance Assessment Interval, that provided energy or load reductions above the levels expected for such resource during such interval. For purposes of this provision, the performance expected of a resource, and the revenue distribution payment, if any, for a resource, shall be determined in accordance with the following formulae:

Formula 1: Market Participant Bonus Performance = Actual Performance – Expected Performance

and

Formula 2: Performance Payment = (Market Participant Bonus Performance / All Market Participants Bonus Performance) * Non-Performance Charge Revenues.

Where the result of Formula 1 is a positive number and where:

Actual Performance is as defined in subsection (c), provided, however, that Actual Performance for purposes of this calculation shall not exceed the megawatt level at which such resource was scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the Performance Assessment Intervals; and provided further that Actual Performance for a Market Participant that imports energy into the PJM Region during such Performance Assessment Interval shall be the net import, if any, from all interchange transactions scheduled by such Market Participant during such Performance Assessment Interval;

Expected Performance is as defined in subsection (c), provided, however, that for purposes of this calculation, Expected Performance shall be zero for any resource that is not a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP, or that is a Capacity Resource or Locational UCAP, but for which the Performance Assessment Interval occurs outside the resource’s capacity obligation period, including, without limitation, a Base Capacity Demand Resource providing demand response during non-summer months; and

All Market Participants Bonus Performance is the sum of the results of calculating Formula 1 of this subsection (g) for all Market Participants that have Bonus Performance during such Performance Assessment Interval.

(h) The provisions of this section 10A shall apply during the 2016/2017 Delivery Year, provided that:
(i) Non-Performance Charges shall be determined solely for and assessed solely on, Capacity Performance Resources committed for such Delivery Year;

(ii) The Non-Performance Charge shall be 0.5 times the Non-Performance Charge calculated under subsection (e) hereof; and

(iii) The Non-Performance Charge Limit for a Delivery Year shall be 0.75 times Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource times 365.

(i) The provisions of this section 10A shall apply during the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, provided that:

(i) Non-Performance Charges shall be determined solely for, and assessed solely on, Capacity Performance Resources committed for such Delivery Year;

(ii) The Non-Performance Charge shall be 0.6 times the Non-Performance Charge calculated under subsection (e) hereof; and

(iii) The Non-Performance Charge Limit for a Delivery Year shall be 0.9 times Net Cost of New Entry times the megawatts of Unforced Capacity committed by such resource times 365.

(j) The Office of the Interconnection shall bill charges and credits for performance during Performance Assessment Intervals within three calendar months after the calendar month that included such Performance Assessment Intervals, provided, for any Non-Performance Charge, the amount shall be divided by the number of months remaining in the Delivery Year for which no invoice has been issued, and the resulting amount shall be invoiced each such remaining month in the Delivery Year or during the first month of the next Delivery Year if three months do not remain in the current Delivery Year.
11B DER CAPACITY AGGREGATION RESOURCE TEST FAILURE CHARGE

Each DER Capacity Aggregation Resource committed in a Delivery Year shall be obligated to simultaneously test all applicable Component DER within the aggregation, on an annual basis, as described in the PJM Manuals. The DER Aggregator may perform an unlimited number of tests during each such period. The Office of Interconnection may, at its discretion, cancel a test and allow a retest, to ensure system reliability. The DER Aggregator shall notify the applicable electric distribution company at least seven business days prior to each such test, and the electric distribution company may cancel the test consistent with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(f). If none of the tests during a testing period certify full delivery of the megawatt amount of nominated capacity the DER Aggregator committed, for such Delivery Year, the DER Aggregator shall be assessed a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charge equal to the net capability testing shortfall, multiplied by the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charge rate.

The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charge rate shall equal such Seller’s Weighted Daily Revenue Rate in such Zone for the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that tested plus the greater of (0.20 times the Weighted Daily Revenue Rate in such Zone for the product(s) tested or $20/MW-day). Such charge shall be assessed daily and charged monthly (or otherwise in accordance with customary PJM billing practices in effect at the time); provided, however, that a lump sum payment may be required to reflect amounts due, as a result of a test failure, from the start of the Delivery Year to the day that charges are reflected in regular billing.

Revenues collected from assessment of DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Test Failure Charges shall be distributed to Load Serving Entities that were charged a Locational Reliability Charge for the Delivery Year for which the DER Aggregation Test Failure Charge was assessed, pro-rata based on such Load Serving Entities’ Daily Unforced Capacity Obligations.
Sections of the PJM Operating Agreement

Effective February 2, 2026

(Clean Format)
1.2 **Cost-based Offers.**

Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, all cost-based offers for energy or other services to be sold on the PJM Interchange Energy Market from generating resources or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not exceed the variable cost of producing such energy or other service, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 to this Agreement and applicable regulatory standards, requirements and determinations; provided that, a Market Seller may offer to the PJM Interchange Energy Market the right to call on energy from a resource the output of which has been sold on a bilateral basis, with the rate for such energy if called equal to the curtailment rate specified in the bilateral contract.
1.4B DER Aggregator Participation Model

(a) The rules and procedures for the participation of DER Aggregators are established pursuant to this section 1.4B and the PJM Manuals.

(b) In order to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, a DER Aggregator shall register each DER Aggregation Resource and DER Capacity Aggregation Resource with the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with the procedures established under the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the initiation of the registration review process by the Office of the Interconnection, a DER Aggregator shall obtain and verify, through good faith efforts and in coordination with the applicable electric distribution company, and, if necessary, any relevant Transmission Owner, the following location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection:

i. With the express written consent of the applicable Component DER, the electric distribution company customer account number and associated physical and transmission system electrical location information of the applicable Component DER, including compliance with applicable PJM and electric distribution company metering and telemetry requirements;

ii. Evidence of approval to interconnect, including but not limited to a finalized interconnection agreement, with the applicable Component DER, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, to the distribution system for identified megawatts, and identification of participation in an electric distribution company program that recognizes grid withdrawals and/or injections, including but not limited to a net energy metering program.

Disputes between the DER Aggregator and the electric distribution company regarding the location and data components needed for the DER Aggregator’s registration with the Office of the Interconnection described above shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

The registration review process shall commence after: (1) the Office of the Interconnection has an executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement on file, to be used for all DER Aggregation Resources associated with the DER Aggregator; (2) the Office of the Interconnection receives a complete registration from the DER Aggregator, in a form specified in the PJM Manuals; and (3) pre-registration activities have been completed, consisting of the DER Aggregator obtaining and verifying the location and data components described above needed for its registration.
The Office of the Interconnection shall review the registration and data submitted therein for completeness, and verify that the DER Aggregator meets the eligibility criteria for participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model, as defined under the PJM Tariff and Operating Agreement and Manuals. The DER Aggregator shall only submit a registration for Component DER that are under contract for the term of the registration, and only one DER Aggregator may operate Component DER at a specific location. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the DER Aggregator’s registration through the appropriate PJM system. A single registration shall only be comprised of individual Component DER in the same state, electric distribution company, Transmission Zone, and pricing point unless otherwise noted below. Upon receipt of notification by the Office of the Interconnection, the electric distribution company may, within 60 calendar days, review and verify, as applicable, the registration and the following information contained therein:

i. Operational and physical characteristics, including an inventory of the individual Component DER location-specific capability to reduce load and/or produce electricity;

ii. The specific PJM markets in which the DER Aggregation Resource plans to participate and, if applicable, the effective and termination dates for participation;

iii. The electric distribution company customer account number(s) which represent Component DER location(s) and related information, as defined in the PJM Manuals;

iv. Participation of the Component DER in an electric distribution company’s retail program at the time of registration, and whether such participation precludes participation of the Component DER in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM, and as defined in the PJM Manuals;

a. Component DER that participate in a net energy metering retail program may only participate with grid injections in the PJM ancillary services markets, and may not participate in PJM energy or capacity markets, unless:

1. the electric distribution company confirms to the Office of the Interconnection that participation of the Component DER in a net energy metering retail program or tariff approved by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority will not violate the restrictions on duplicative compensation, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(h) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(h); and

2. the Office of the Interconnection determines that the participation of the Component DER otherwise meets the
v. The DER Aggregator’s participation in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets complies with the rules and regulations of any applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority;

vi. The Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority allows the participation of any applicable Component DER that are also end-use customers of an electric distribution company, in accordance with the provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(g), and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(g).

vii. The participation of the Component DER in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary service markets do not pose a threat to the reliable and safe operation of the distribution system, the public, or electric distribution company personnel.

If the electric distribution company identifies concerns based on factors (i) through (vii) within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may notify the Office of the Interconnection and the DER Aggregator, and the electric distribution company and the DER Aggregator may first attempt to resolve those concerns bilaterally, or in accordance with applicable state or local law, prior to seeking initiation of the dispute resolution process described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 5. Disputes arising under any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be resolved in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

In the event that the electric distribution company’s concerns are resolved within the 60 calendar day review period, the electric distribution company may recommend that the Office of the Interconnection approve the registration. In the event that the concerns identified by the electric distribution company are not resolved, the electric distribution company may, within the 60 calendar day review period, recommend that the Office of the Interconnection: (i) reject the registration, (ii) approve the registration with certain operational limitations on the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration, or (iii) approve the registration with the removal of one or more specific Component DER from the DER Aggregation Resource identified in the registration.

Within fifteen calendar days, the Office of the Interconnection shall apply the applicable pricing points to the Component DER, and shall either approve or deny the DER Aggregator’s registration based on the Office of the Interconnection’s review of the registration and receipt and review of the electric distribution company’s comments and recommendation, with deference given to the electric distribution company’s assessment of the impact of the DER Aggregator’s registration on the safety and reliability of distribution facilities. To the extent that
no comments or recommendations are provided by the electric distribution company, including after the Office of the Interconnection provides final notice to the electric distribution company prior to the expiration of the 60 calendar day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall approve the DER Aggregator’s registration.

During the registration process, the responsibility for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching the DER Aggregation Resource will be assigned to the electric distribution company, the DER Aggregator, or another entity, in accordance with any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority.

All DER Aggregators shall remain in full compliance with the tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the applicable electric distribution company, and the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, in accordance with their executed DER Aggregator Participation Service Agreement, at all times while participating in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. Transmission Owners shall, in coordination with the Office of the Interconnection, provide all data to the Office of the Interconnection reasonably required to accurately represent the DER Aggregation Resource in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 1.5.4 and the PJM Manuals.

A DER Aggregator shall report to the Office of the Interconnection any proposed update to the inventory of the individual Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource, or proposed additional market services provided by the DER Aggregation Resource, identified in the DER Aggregator’s registration to reflect any proposed addition or subtraction of a Component DER or market service, and any applicable information or data associated with the Component DER or market service, in accordance with the specifications described in the PJM Manuals. Any proposed update shall not require a new registration of the existing Component DER within the approved DER Aggregation Resource. Upon notification of any proposed update, the electric distribution company shall have an opportunity to conduct a review, for a period of up to 60 calendar days, in accordance with the provisions of this section related to initial registration, and make a recommendation to the Office of the Interconnection, prior to the Office of the Interconnection approving or denying the proposed update to the DER Aggregation Resource. The DER Aggregator may continue to participate in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using its existing approved DER Aggregation Resource during the course of any such review conducted by the electric distribution company. An inventory of the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registration that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may not be modified during the course of an applicable Delivery Year.

(c) All Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource shall interface with the same primary pricing node, except: (i) in the case of a DER Aggregation Resource that only provides ancillary services and is less than or equal to 5 MW, the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are in the same state and service territory of a single electric distribution
company; and (ii) in the case of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource(s) linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may interface with multiple primary pricing nodes, so long as those primary pricing nodes are located within a defined zone or sub-zonal Locational Deliverability Area.

The Office of the Interconnection will establish a periodic review, in coordination with the electric distribution company and DER Aggregator, no less than annually, or more frequently as needed, to identify any permanent electrical location change that would modify the pricing node associated with a DER Aggregation Resource or its underlying Component DER. During this review, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) confirm that applicable data reviewed and verified in the registration process is still complete and accurate, and (ii) request any updates to such data as a condition of continued participation in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(d) A DER Aggregator shall self-schedule their DER Aggregation Resource into the PJM Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market based on bidding parameters for the applicable technology-type, as described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall be eligible, at their election, to offer a dispatchable range in submitting bidding parameters into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market.

(e) A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource shall provide telemetry for each DER Aggregation Resource participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM through the DER Aggregator Participation Model, in accordance with the technical specifications described in the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator or the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource may provide telemetry for the individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource. This telemetry shall represent one or more values indicative of the total electrical output of the DER Aggregation Resource and inclusive of all underlying Component DER.

A DER Aggregator shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection all individual Component DER meter data necessary to facilitate the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with Operating Agreement, section 14 and the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator shall retain performance data for individual Component DER in a DER Aggregation Resource for auditing purposes, in accordance with the PJM Manuals. A DER Aggregator is responsible for ensuring that Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. For non-interval metered residential DER Aggregation Resources, the DER Aggregator must ensure that a representative sample of Component DER have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis, as set forth in the PJM Manuals. For DER Aggregation Resources containing Component DER that are mass market customers, DER Aggregators shall provide aggregated meter data to the Office of the Interconnection for the settlement of the DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource. The measurement systems shall comply with the applicable electric distribution company accuracy requirements for meters, and/or as described in
the PJM Manual 01. Additional details for the configuration of such measurement systems under various specific configurations are specified in PJM Manual 14D.

The metering equipment shall meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy, or otherwise have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including potential transformers and current transformers) and the metering equipment and associated data shall meet the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals.

(f) The electric distribution company should, prior to the deadline for submission of offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, as described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, notify the DER Aggregator of any operational limitations for the Operating Day that may impact the bidding parameters of an applicable DER Aggregation Resource. In the event that the electric distribution company identifies additional operational concerns after the deadline described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A, the DER Aggregator may utilize the generation rebidding period identified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.9, and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.9, to update its bidding parameters.

During the Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall dispatch DER Aggregation Resources, by communicating with the entity responsible for physically operating the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource and/or dispatching a DER Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the DER Aggregator’s submitted bidding parameters. During the Operating Day, an electric distribution company may exercise its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority. Following the exercise of the electric distribution company’s override, the DER Aggregator shall reflect the override by updating the applicable bidding parameters of its DER Aggregation Resource. An electric distribution company’s override shall not excuse a DER Aggregator’s failure to perform any of the obligations established under the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, RAA, or PJM Manuals.

Any disputes regarding an electric distribution company’s exercise of its ability to override the physical operation of a DER Aggregation Resource or individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource, for purposes of maintaining safe and reliable operation of distribution facilities, pursuant to any applicable tariffs, agreements, and operating procedures of the electric distribution company, and/or the rules and regulations of any Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, shall be addressed in accordance with applicable state or local law, and shall not be arbitrated or in any way resolved by the Office of the Interconnection or through the dispute resolution processes under Operating Agreement, Schedule 5.

(g) The Office of the Interconnection shall not permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes
Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the electric distribution company determines that the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permits such end-use customers to participate. The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model with a DER Aggregation Resource including Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, if, during the course of the registration process described above in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B(b) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B(b), the electric distribution company presents any of the following evidence to PJM:

i. an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation;

ii. an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority’s legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation; or

iii. an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer’s participation.

The Office of the Interconnection shall permit a DER Aggregator to participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model if the applicable DER Aggregation Resource includes Component DER that are end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year, as identified by the electric distribution company, unless the DER Aggregation Resource includes one or more Component DER that are demand response and the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority has prohibited the participation of demand response in the DER Aggregator Participation Model.

(h) A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources containing one or more Component DER that also participate in one or more retail programs. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of a retail program, including but not limited to a Component DER participating in a retail net energy metering program.

A DER Aggregator may participate in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model using DER Aggregation Resources that provide multiple services in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets through the DER Aggregator Participation Model. A Component DER shall not be registered
with multiple DER Aggregation Resources, or participate as part of another Market Participant outside of the DER Aggregator Participation Model. The Office of the Interconnection shall only credit a DER Aggregator for the sale of a product in the PJM energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets if that same product is not also credited as part of another wholesale sale.

(i) DER Aggregators providing capacity using a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource shall be subject to the Day-ahead Energy Market must-offer requirement described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(d) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.10.1A(d), based on the technology of the Component DER within the DER Aggregation Resource linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

(j) DER Aggregation Resources are subject to offer price cap and associated three pivotal supplier test provisions of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.

(k) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a MOPR Floor Offer Price, in accordance with the provisions applicable to MOPR Floor Offer Price for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14(h-2).

If a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14(h-2), the Capacity Market Seller that owns or controls such resources may submit a Sell Offer with a Minimum Floor Offer Price of no lower than the MW-weighted average of the applicable MOPR Floor Offer Prices (zero if not applicable) of the aggregated resources in such Sell Offer.

(l) A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource containing DER Aggregation Resource(s) with Component DER directly connected to distribution facilities not co-located with retail end-use load other than Station Power may be subject to a Market Seller Offer Cap, in a manner consistent with the provisions applicable to Market Seller Offer Cap for Generation Capacity Resources, as described in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6 and Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.E.

(m) Projected PJM Market Revenues for DER Capacity Aggregation Resources subject to the Minimum Floor Offer Price or Market Seller Offer Cap shall be determined in accordance with Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.8(d-1). The determination of PJM Market Revenues by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize either the hourly output profiles, or the Projected EAS Dispatch, as appropriate.

(n) A DER Aggregator’s DER Aggregation Resource that contains Component DER that are also load reduction resources shall be accounted for and settled in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A.
(o) Component DER interconnecting to distribution facilities for purposes of participating in the energy, capacity, and/or ancillary services markets of PJM exclusively through the DER Aggregator Participation Model shall not be subject to the Part IV of the Tariff relating to interconnections with the Transmission System, and shall exclusively interconnect to distribution facilities pursuant to applicable state or local law.
1.10 Scheduling.

1.10.1 General.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall administer scheduling processes to implement a Day-ahead Energy Market and a Real-time Energy Market. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of energy that clear the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a Generating Market Buyer’s self-schedule or self-supply of its generation resources up to that Generating Market Buyer’s Equivalent Load.

(b) The Day-ahead Energy Market shall enable Market Participants to purchase and sell energy through the PJM Interchange Energy Market at Day-ahead Prices and enable Transmission Customers to reserve transmission service with Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges based on locational differences in Day-ahead Prices. Up-to Congestion Transactions submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not require transmission service and Transmission Customers shall not reserve transmission service for such Up-to Congestion Transactions. Market Participants whose purchases and sales, and Transmission Customers whose transmission uses are scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy, or pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges, at the applicable Day-ahead Prices for the amounts scheduled.

(c) (i) In the Real-time Energy Market, Market Participants that deviate from the amounts of energy purchases or sales scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to purchase or sell energy for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(ii) In the Real-time Energy Market, Transmission Customers that deviate from the transmission uses, scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be obligated to pay Transmission Congestion Charges and Transmission Loss Charges for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(iii) Market Participants that deviate in real-time from the amounts of Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve sales, scheduled day-ahead shall be obligated to purchase Secondary Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or Synchronized Reserve for the amount of the deviations at the applicable Real-time Prices or price differences, unless otherwise specified by this Schedule.

(d) The following scheduling procedures and principles shall govern the commitment of resources to the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market over a period extending from one week to one hour prior to the real-time dispatch. Scheduling encompasses the day-ahead and hourly scheduling process, through which the Office of the Interconnection determines the Day-ahead Energy Market and determines, based on changing forecasts of conditions and actions by Market Participants and system constraints, a plan to serve the hourly
energy and reserve requirements of the Internal Market Buyers and the purchase requests of the External Market Buyers in the least costly manner, subject to maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region. Scheduling does not encompass Coordinated External Transactions, which are subject to the procedures of Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.13. Scheduling shall be conducted as specified in section 1.10.1A below, subject to the following condition. If the Office of the Interconnection’s forecast for the next seven days projects a likelihood of Emergency conditions, the Office of the Interconnection may commit, for all or part of such seven day period, to the use of generation resources with notification or start-up times greater than one day as necessary in order to alleviate or mitigate such Emergency, in accordance with the Market Sellers’ offers for such units for such periods and the specifications in the PJM Manuals. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection to alleviate or mitigate an Emergency will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6.

1.10.1A  Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Market Scheduling.

The following actions shall occur not later than 11:00 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in order to comply with the practical requirements and the economic and efficiency objectives of the scheduling process specified in this Schedule.

(a) Each Market Participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection specifications of the amount and location of its customer loads and/or energy purchases to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each hour of the next Operating Day, such specifications to comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Each Market Buyer shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of the prices, if any, at which it desires not to include its load in the Day-ahead Energy Market rather than pay the Day-ahead Price. PRD Providers that have committed Price Responsive Demand in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, any desired updates to their previously submitted PRD Curves, provided that such updates are consistent with their Price Responsive Demand commitments, and provided further that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. PriceResponsive Demand that has been committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement shall be presumed available for the next Operating Day in accordance with the most recently submitted PRD Curve unless the PRD Curve is updated to indicate otherwise. PRD Providers may also submit PRD Curves for any Price Responsive Demand that is not committed in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement; provided that PRD Providers that are not Load Serving Entities for the Price Responsive Demand at issue may only submit PRD Curves for the Real-time Energy Market. All PRD Curves shall be on a PRD Substation basis, and shall specify the maximum time period required to implement load reductions.
(b) Each Generating Market Buyer shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection:
(i) hourly schedules for resource increments, including hydropower units, self-scheduled by the Market Buyer to meet its Equivalent Load; and (ii) the Dispatch Rate at which each such self-scheduled resource will disconnect or reduce output, or confirmation of the Market Buyer’s intent not to reduce output.

(c) All Market Participants shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection schedules for any energy exports, energy imports, and wheel through transactions involving use of generation or Transmission Facilities as specified below, and shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the transaction is to be scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. Any Market Participant that elects to schedule an export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market may specify the price (such price not to exceed $2,000/MWh), if any, at which the export, import or wheel through transaction will be wholly or partially curtailed. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the applicable interface pricing point. Any Market Participant that elects not to schedule its export, import or wheel through transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall inform the Office of the Interconnection if the parties to the transaction are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion and Loss Charges in the Real-time Energy Market in order to complete any such scheduled transaction. Such transactions in the Real-time Energy Market, other than Coordinated Transaction Schedules and emergency energy sales and purchases, may specify a price up to $2,000/MWh. Scheduling of such transactions shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications in the PJM Manuals and the following requirements:

i) Market Participants shall submit schedules for all energy purchases for delivery within the PJM Region, whether from resources inside or outside the PJM Region;

ii) Market Participants shall submit schedules for exports for delivery outside the PJM Region from resources within the PJM Region that are not Dynamic Transfers to such entities pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.12; and

iii) In addition to the foregoing schedules for exports, imports and wheel through transactions, Market Participants shall submit confirmations of each scheduled transaction from each other party to the transaction in addition to the party submitting the schedule, or the adjacent Control Area.

(c-1) A Market Participant may elect to submit in the Day-ahead Energy Market a form of Virtual Transaction that combines an offer to sell energy at a source, with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink. The Office of Interconnection will schedule these transactions only to the extent this difference in Locational Marginal Prices is within the maximum amount specified by the Market Participant. A Virtual Transaction of this type is referred to as an “Up-to Congestion Transaction.” Such Up-to Congestion Transactions may be wholly or partially scheduled depending on the price difference between the source and sink locations in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The maximum difference between the source
and sink prices that a participant may specify shall be limited to +/- $50/MWh. The foregoing price specification shall apply to the price difference between the specified source and sink in the day-ahead scheduling process only. An accepted Up-to Congestion Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(c–2) A Market Participant may elect to submit an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid form of Virtual Transaction in the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall specify the price for such transaction which shall be limited to $2,000/megawatt-hour.

(c–3) Up-to Congestion Transactions may only be submitted at hubs, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b). Increment Offers and Decrement Bids may be only submitted at hubs, nodes at which physical generation or load is settled, Residual Metered Load and interfaces not described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 2.6A(b).

(d) Market Sellers in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall submit offers for the supply of energy, demand reductions, or other services for the following Operating Day for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires or is required to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection. Offers for the supply of energy may be cost-based, market-based, or both, and may vary hourly. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that is committed as a Capacity Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD or RAA, Schedule 8.1, and that has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers for the available capacity of such Generation Capacity Resource, or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer. Such offers shall be based on the ICAP equivalent of the Market Seller’s cleared UCAP capacity commitment, provided, however, where the underlying resource is a Capacity Storage Resource, Intermittent Resource or a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the Market Seller shall satisfy the must offer requirement by either self-scheduling or offering the unit as a dispatchable resource, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, where the hourly day-ahead self-scheduled values for such Capacity Storage Resources, Intermittent Resources, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource may vary hour to hour from the capacity commitment. Any offer not designated as a Maximum Emergency offer shall be considered available for scheduling and dispatch under both Emergency and non-Emergency conditions. Offers may only be designated as Maximum Emergency offers to the extent that the Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource falls into at least one of the following categories:

i) Environmental limits. If the resource has a limit on its run hours imposed by a federal, state, or other governmental agency that will significantly limit its availability, on either a temporary or long-term basis. This
includes a resource that is limited to operating only during declared PJM capacity emergencies by a governmental authority.

ii) Fuel limits. If physical events beyond the control of the resource owner result in the temporary interruption of fuel supply and there is limited on-site fuel storage. A fuel supplier’s exercise of a contractual right to interrupt supply or delivery under an interruptible service agreement shall not qualify as an event beyond the control of the resource owner.

iii) Temporary emergency conditions at the unit. If temporary emergency physical conditions at the resource significantly limit its availability.

iv) Temporary megawatt additions. If a resource can provide additional megawatts on a temporary basis by oil topping, boiler over-pressure, or similar techniques, and such megawatts are not ordinarily otherwise available.

The submission of offers for resource increments that are not committed as a Capacity Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD or RAA, Schedule 8.1 shall be optional, but any such offers must contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d), and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. Energy offered from generation resources that are not committed as a Capacity Resource under Tariff, Attachment DD or RAA, Schedule 8.1 shall not be supplied from resources that are included in or otherwise committed to supply the Operating Reserves of a Control Area outside the PJM Region.

The foregoing offers:

i) Shall specify the Generation Capacity Resource, Economic Load Response Participant resource, or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource and energy or demand reduction amount, respectively, for each clock hour in the offer period;

ii) Shall specify the amounts and prices for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day for each resource component offered by the Market Seller to the Office of the Interconnection;

iii) May specify for generation resources offer parameters for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) Minimum Run Time; (2) maximum run time; (3) Start-up Costs; (4) No-load Costs; (5) Incremental Energy Offer; (6) notification time; (7) availability; (8) ramp rate; (9) Economic Minimum; (10) Economic Maximum; (11) emergency minimum MW; (12) emergency maximum MW; (13) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (14) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (15) condense to generation time constraints, and may specify offer parameters for
Economic Load Response Participant resources for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day, as applicable and in accordance with section 1.10.9B below, including: (1) minimum down time; (2) shutdown costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) notification time; (5) Economic Minimum; and (6) Economic Maximum;

iv) Shall set forth any special conditions upon which the Market Seller proposes to supply a resource increment, including any curtailment rate specified in a bilateral contract for the output of the resource, or any cancellation fees;

v) May include a schedule of offers for prices and operating data contingent on acceptance by the deadline specified in this Schedule, with additional schedules applicable if accepted after the foregoing deadline;

vi) Shall constitute an offer to submit the resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch in accordance with the terms of the offer for the clock hour, which offer shall remain open through the Operating Day, for which the offer is submitted, unless the Market Seller a) submits a Real-time Offer for the applicable clock hour, or b) updates the availability of its offer for that hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals;

vii) Shall be final as to the price or prices at which the Market Seller proposes to supply energy or other services to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, such price or prices being guaranteed by the Market Seller for the period extending through the end of the following Operating Day, unless modified after the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market as permitted pursuant to sections 1.10.9A or 1.10.9B below;

viii) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour for all generation resources, except (1) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is above $1,000/megawatt-hour and less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer; and (2) when a Market Seller’s cost-based offer is greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to $2,000/megawatt-hour;

ix) Shall not exceed a demand reduction offer price of $1,000/megawatt-hour, except when an Economic Load Response Participant submits a cost-based offer that includes an incremental cost component that is above $1,000/megawatt-hour, then its market-based offer must be less than or equal to the cost-based offer but in no event greater than $2,000/megawatt-hour;
x) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2, and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement, minus $1.00;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,000/megawatt-hour, plus [the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement divided by 2]; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,100/megawatt hour; and

xi) Shall not exceed an offer price as follows for Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participants with:

a) a 30 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,849/megawatt-hour;

b) an approved 60 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provision of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,425/megawatt-hour; and

c) an approved 120 minute lead time, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD-1, section A.2 and the parallel provisions of RAA, Schedule 6, $1,100/megawatt-hour; and

xi) Shall not exceed an energy offer price of $0.00/MWh for pumped storage hydropower units scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(e) A Market Seller that wishes to make a resource available to sell Regulation service shall submit an offer for Regulation for each clock hour for which the Market Seller desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to provide Regulation that shall specify the megawatts of Regulation being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, the Regulation Zone for which such Regulation is offered, the price of the capability offer in dollars per MW, the price of the performance offer in Dollars per change in MW, and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer and the resource’s opportunity costs. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. The total of the performance offer multiplied by the historical average mileage used in the market clearing plus the capability offer shall not exceed $100/megawatt-hour in the case of Regulation.
offered for all Regulation Zones. In addition to any market-based offer for Regulation, the Market Seller also shall submit a cost-based offer. A cost-based offer must be in the form specified in the PJM Manuals and consist of the following components as well as any other components specified in the PJM Manuals:

i. The costs (in $/MW) of the fuel cost increase due to the steady-state heat rate increase resulting from operating the unit at lower megawatt output incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the capability offer;

ii. The cost increase (in $/ΔMW) in costs associated with movement of the regulation resource incurred from the provision of Regulation shall apply to the performance offer; and

iii. An adder of up to $12.00 per megawatt of Regulation provided applied to the capability offer.

Qualified Regulation capability must satisfy the measurement and verification tests specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Each Market Seller owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative shall submit a forecast of the availability of each such Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for the next seven days. A Market Seller (i) may submit a non-binding forecast of the price at which it expects to offer a generation resource increment to the Office of the Interconnection over the next seven days, and (ii) shall submit a binding offer for energy, along with Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, if any, for the next seven days or part thereof, for any generation resource with minimum notification or start-up requirement greater than 24 hours. Such resources committed by the Office of the Interconnection will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor otherwise be made whole for its hours of operation for the duration of any portion of such commitment that exceeds the maximum start-up and notification times for such resources during Hot Weather Alerts and Cold Weather Alerts, consistent with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2.3 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6.

(g) Each component of an offer by a Market Seller of a Generation Capacity Resource that is constant for the entire Operating Day and does not vary hour to hour shall remain in effect for subsequent Operating Days until superseded or canceled.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall post the total hourly loads scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as well as, its estimate of the combined hourly load of the Market Buyers for the next four days, and peak load forecasts for an additional three days.

(i) Except for Economic Load Response Participants, all Market Participants may submit Virtual Transactions that apply to the Day-ahead Energy Market only. Such Virtual Transactions must comply with the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals and must specify amount,
location and price, if any, at which the Market Participant desires to purchase or sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of a defined number of bid/offer segments in the Day-ahead Energy Market, as specified in the PJM Manuals, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to 10:00 a.m. EPT on the day that the Day-ahead Energy Market will clear. For purposes of this provision, a bid/offer segment is each pairing of price and megawatt quantity submitted as part of an Increment Offer or Decrement Bid. For purposes of applying this provision to an Up-to Congestion Transaction, a bid/offer segment shall refer to the pairing of a source and sink designation, as well as price and megawatt quantity, that comprise each Up-to Congestion Transaction.

(j) (i) Offers to Supply Synchronized and Non-Synchronized Reserves By Generation Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage, shall submit offers or otherwise make their 10-minute reserve capability available to supply Synchronized Reserve or, as applicable, Non-Synchronized Reserve, including any portion that is self-scheduled by the Generating Market Buyer, in an amount equal to the available 10-minute reserve capability of such Generation Capacity Resource. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources that (A) are capable of providing Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, (B) are located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region, and (C) have submitted offers for the supply of energy into the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Synchronized Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve and Non-Synchronized Reserve, as applicable.
(3) Offers for the supply of Synchronized Reserve by all generation resources must be cost-based. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. For offers to supply Synchronized Reserve, the offer price shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, where such expected value shall be recalculated annually, in accordance with the PJM Manuals, and posted on PJM’s website. The expected value of the penalty is calculated as the product of: (A) the average penalty, expressed in $/MWh, multiplied by (B) the average rate of non-performance during Synchronized Reserve events multiplied by (C) the probability a Synchronized Reserve event that will qualify for non-performance assessments will occur.

The expected value of the penalty shall be determined by an annual review of the twelve-month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the results of its annual review by no later than December 15, and the revised offer price cap shall be effective as of the following January 1; provided, however, that at the time of implementation of this rule the expected value of the penalty shall be $0.02/MWh, and for the period from the second month after implementation through the second January 1 following such date of implementation, the expected value of the penalty shall be recalculated on a monthly basis using data from the implementation date of this rule through the 15th day of the current month, and the revised value shall be effective the 1st day of the following month.

(4) All Non-Synchronized Reserve offers shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) of this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by a synchronized resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation
resources, Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, and DER Aggregation Resources may submit offers for their available Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An on-line generation resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) ramp rate; (B) Economic Minimum; and (C) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (D) ramp rate; (E) condense to generation time constraints; (F) Economic Minimum; and (G) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Synchronized Reserves above the Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Determination of Available Non-Synchronized Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply reserves by an off-line generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources. Such hydroelectric generation resources or Energy Storage Resources may submit offers for their available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability as part of their
offer into the Non-Synchronized Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(j)(i) above must submit a Non-Synchronized Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) An off-line generation resource’s available Non-Synchronized Reserve capability shall be determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals and based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (A) startup time; (B) notification time; (C) ramp rate; (D) Economic Minimum; and (E) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Synchronized Reserve maximum MW, where Synchronized Reserve maximum MW may be lower than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Non-Synchronized Reserves above its Synchronized Reserve maximum MW.

(iv) Offers to Supply Synchronized Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant Resources in the Day-ahead and Real-time Reserve Markets

(1) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wish to make their resources available to supply Synchronized Reserve may submit offers to supply Synchronized Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Synchronized Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All offers to supply Synchronized Reserve offers from Economic Load Response Participant resources shall not exceed the expected value of the penalty for failing to provide Synchronized Reserve, as determined in accordance with section 1.10.1A(j)(i)(3) above. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(k) An Economic Load Response Participant that wishes to participate in the Day-ahead Energy Market by reducing demand shall submit an offer to reduce demand to the Office of the Interconnection for each clock hour for which the Economic Load Response Participant desires to make its resource available to the Office of the Interconnection to reduce demand. The offer must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, may vary hourly, and shall specify: (i) the amount of the
offered curtailment in minimum increments of .1 megawatts: (ii) the Day-ahead Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load, subject to section 1.10.1A(d)(ix); and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shutdown costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum of number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Such offers may be updated each hour, up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs) per hour.

(l) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of an Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or that offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit demand reduction bids for the available load reduction capability of the Economic Load Response Participant resource. The submission of demand reduction bids for Economic Load Response Participant resource increments that were not committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that have not cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, shall be optional, but any such bids must contain the information required to be included in such bids, as specified in the PJM Economic Load Response Program. An Economic Load Response Participant resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, or that was self-supplied or offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, may submit a demand reduction bid in the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in the Economic Load Response Program; provided, however, that in the event of an Emergency PJM shall require Economic Load Response Participant resources to reduce load, notwithstanding that the Zonal LMP at the time such Emergency is declared is below the price identified in the demand reduction bid.

(m) (i) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserve By Generation Resources

(1) Market Sellers owning or controlling the output of a Generation Capacity Resource that was committed in an FRR Capacity Plan, self-supplied, offered and cleared in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, or designated as replacement capacity, as specified in Tariff, Attachment DD, that is available for energy, is capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, and has not been rendered unavailable by a Generator Planned Outage, a Generator Maintenance Outage, or a Generator Forced Outage shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, or otherwise make their Secondary Reserve capability available. Such offers shall be for an amount equal to the resource’s available energy output achievable within thirty minutes (less its energy output achievable within ten minutes) from a request of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers of Generation Capacity Resources subject to this must-offer requirement that do not make the reserve capability of such resources available when such resource is able to operate with a dispatchable range (e.g. through offering a fixed output) will be in violation of this provision.

(2) Market Sellers of all other generation resources located within the metered boundaries of the PJM Region that submit offers for the supply of energy into the
Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market and are capable of providing Secondary Reserve, as specified in the PJM Manuals, shall be deemed to have made their reserve capability available to provide Secondary Reserve in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or Real-time Energy Market for each clock hour for which the Market Seller submits an available offer to supply energy; provided, however that hydroelectric generation resources and Energy Storage Resources are not automatically deemed available to provide reserves based on the submission of an available energy offer but may submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve, as applicable.

(3) Offers for the supply of Secondary Reserve shall be for $0.00/MWh. Consistent with the resource’s offer to supply energy, such offers may vary hourly and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this subsection (d) above, section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(ii) Determination of Available Secondary Reserve Capability of Generation Resources

(1) For each offer to supply Secondary Reserve by a generation resource, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability offered in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market in accordance with the PJM Manuals; except, however, that the Office of the Interconnection will not make such determination for hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources. Hydroelectric generation resources, Energy Storage Resources, or DER Aggregation Resources may submit their available Secondary Reserve capability as part of their offer into the Secondary Reserve market, provided that such offer equals or exceeds 0.1 MW; however, any such resource which is subject to the must offer requirements in section 1.10.1A(m)(i) above must submit a Secondary Reserve offer which specifies the MW of available Secondary Reserve capability in order to remain compliant with such requirements.

(2) (A) An on-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, except for generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, shall be based on the resource’s current performance and initial energy output, the resource’s available Synchronized Reserve capability; and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) Economic Minimum; and (iii) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification
to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(B) For generation resources capable of synchronous condensing, the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability shall be based on the following offer parameters submitted as part of the energy offer: (i) ramp rate; (ii) condense to generation time constraints; (iii) Economic Minimum; and (iv) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(C) An off-line generation resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability, shall be based on the resource’s available Secondary Reserve capability and the following offer parameters submitted as part of the resource’s energy offer: (i) startup time; (ii) notification time; (iii) ramp rate; (iv) Economic Minimum; and (v) the lesser of Economic Maximum and Secondary Reserve maximum MW, where a resource’s Secondary Reserve maximum MW may be less than the Economic Maximum only where the Market Seller has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, submitted justification to the Office of the Interconnection that the resource has an operating configuration that prevents it from reliably providing Secondary Reserves above its Secondary Reserve maximum MW.

(iii) Offers to Supply Secondary Reserves by Economic Load Response Participant resources

(1) Each Economic Load Response Participant that submits offers to reduce demand into the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market and wishes to make their resources available to supply Secondary Reserve shall submit offers to supply Secondary Reserve from such resources, where such offers shall specify the megawatts of Secondary Reserve being offered, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts and include such other information specified by the Office of the Interconnection as may be necessary to evaluate the offer. Such offers may vary hourly, and may be updated each hour up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour during the Operating Day.

(2) All Secondary Reserve offers by Economic Load Response Participant resources shall be for $0.00/MWh. Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection and
shall contain the information specified in the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, this section 1.10.1A(d), section 1.10.9B below, and the PJM Manuals, as applicable.

(n) A Market Participant may submit a Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction for a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that is a Pseudo-Tie into the MISO balancing authority area. Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions combine an offer to sell energy at a source with a bid to buy the same megawatt quantity of energy at a sink where such transaction specifies the maximum difference between the Locational Marginal Prices at the source and sink.

Each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction shall: (1) source at a Market Participant’s generator within the PJM balancing authority area that Pseudo-Ties into MISO; and (2) sink at the PJM-MISO interface. A Market Participant must reserve transmission service in accordance with the PJM Tariff for each Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. Megawatt quantities for Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transactions shall be greater than zero and less than or equal to the transmission service reserved for the Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction. An accepted Day-Ahead Pseudo-Tie Transaction results in scheduled injection at a specified source and scheduled withdrawal of the same megawatt quantity at a specified sink in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

1.10.1B Demand Bid Scheduling and Screening

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall apply Demand Bid Screening to all Demand Bids submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market for each Load Serving Entity, separately by Zone. Using Demand Bid Screening, the Office of the Interconnection will automatically reject a Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bids in any future Operating Day for which the Load Serving Entity submits bids if the total megawatt volume of such bids would exceed the Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit for any hour in such Operating Day, unless the Office of the Interconnection permits an exception pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(b) On a daily basis, PJM will update and post each Load Serving Entity’s Demand Bid Limit in each applicable Zone. Such Demand Bid Limit will apply to all Demand Bids submitted by that Load Serving Entity for each future Operating Day for which it submits bids. The Demand Bid Limit is calculated using the following equation:

Demand Bid Limit = greater of (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point * 1.3), or (Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point + 10MW)

Where:

1. Zonal Peak Demand Reference Point = for each Zone: the product of (a) LSE Recent Load Share, multiplied by (b) Peak Daily Load Forecast.
2. LSE Recent Load Share is the Load Serving Entity’s highest share of Network Load in each Zone for any hour over the most recently available seven Operating Days for which PJM has data.
3. Peak Daily Load Forecast is PJM’s highest available peak load forecast for each applicable Zone that is calculated on a daily basis.

(c) A Load Serving Entity whose Demand Bids are rejected as a result of Demand Bid Screening may change its Demand Bids to reduce its total megawatt volume to a level that does not exceed its Demand Bid Limit, and may resubmit them subject to the applicable rules related to bid submission outlined in Tariff, Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

(d) PJM may allow a Load Serving Entity to submit bids in excess of its Demand Bid Limit when circumstances exist that will cause, or are reasonably expected to cause, a Load Serving Entity’s actual load to exceed its Demand Bid Limit on a given Operating Day. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes in load commitments due to state sponsored auctions, mergers and acquisitions between PJM Members, and sales and divestitures between PJM Members. A Load Serving Entity may submit a written exception request to the Office of Interconnection for a higher Demand Bid Limit for an affected Operating Day. Such request must include a detailed explanation of the circumstances at issue and supporting documentation that justify the Load Serving Entity’s expectation that its actual load will exceed its Demand Bid Limit.

1.10.2 Pool-scheduled Resources.

Pool-scheduled resources are those resources for which Market Participants submitted offers to sell energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market and offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market, which the Office of the Interconnection scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market as well as generators committed by the Office of the Interconnection subsequent to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Such resources shall be committed to provide energy in the real-time dispatch unless the schedules for such units are revised pursuant to section 1.10.9 below or Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.11. Pool-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Pool-scheduled resources shall be selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the prices offered for energy and demand reductions and related services, whether the resource is expected to be needed to maintain system reliability during the Operating Day, Start-up Costs, No-load Costs, and cancellation fees, and the specified operating characteristics, offered by Market Sellers to the Office of the Interconnection by the offer deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above. Hydropower units can only be pool-scheduled if they are pumped storage units and scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the hydro optimization tool in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(b) A resource that is scheduled by a Market Participant to support a bilateral sale, or that is self-scheduled by a Generating Market Buyer, shall not be selected by the Office of the Interconnection as a pool-scheduled resource except in an Emergency.

(c) Market Sellers offering energy from hydropower or other facilities with fuel or environmental limitations may submit data to the Office of the Interconnection that is sufficient
to enable the Office of the Interconnection to determine the available operating hours of such facilities.

(d) The Market Seller of a resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall receive payments or credits for energy, demand reductions or related services, or for Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, from the Office of the Interconnection on behalf of the Market Buyers in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3. Alternatively, the Market Seller shall receive, in lieu of Start-up Costs and No-load Costs, its actual costs incurred, if any, up to a cap of the resource’s Start-up Costs, if the Office of the Interconnection cancels its selection of the resource as a pool-scheduled resource and so notifies the Market Seller before the resource is synchronized.

(e) Market Participants shall make available their pool-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone.

(f) Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall specify: (i) the amount of the offered curtailment, which must equal or exceed 0.1 megawatts, in minimum increments of 0.1 megawatts; (ii) the real-time Locational Marginal Price above which the end-use customer will reduce load; and (iii) at the Economic Load Response Participant’s option, shut-down costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs, opportunity costs, and/or a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Economic Load Response Participants submitting offers to reduce demand in the Day-ahead Energy Market and/or the Real-time Energy Market may establish an incremental offer curve, provided that such offer curve shall be limited to ten price pairs (in MWs). Economic Load Response Participants offering to reduce demand shall also indicate the hours that the demand reduction is not available.

1.10.3 Self-scheduled Resources.

Self-scheduled resources shall be governed by the following principles and procedures.

(a) Each Generating Market Buyer shall use all reasonable efforts, consistent with Good Utility Practice, not to self-schedule resources in excess of its Equivalent Load.

(b) The offered prices of resources that are self-scheduled and not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in determining Locational Marginal Prices.

(c) Market Participants shall make available their self-scheduled resources to the Office of the Interconnection for coordinated operation to supply the Operating Reserves needs of the applicable Control Zone, by submitting an offer as to such resources.

(d) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market that does not deliver the energy in the Real-time Energy Market, shall replace the energy not
delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(e) A Market Participant self-scheduling a resource to supply Synchronized Reserve in the Day-ahead Synchronized Reserve Market that does not deliver the scheduled megawatt quantity in the applicable real-time reserve market, shall replace the Synchronized Reserve not delivered and shall pay for such Synchronized Reserve at the applicable Real-time Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price. Market Participants shall not self-schedule a resource to provide Secondary Reserve or Non-Synchronized Reserve.

(f) For energy, hydropower units, excluding pumped storage units, may only be self-scheduled.

(g) A resource that has been self-scheduled shall not receive payments or credits for Start-up Costs or No-load Costs

1.10.4 Capacity Resources.

(a) A Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that is selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that does not deliver energy as scheduled shall be deemed to have experienced a Generator Forced Outage to the extent of such energy not delivered. A Market Participant offering such Generation Capacity Resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace the energy not delivered with energy from the Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Energy from a Generation Capacity Resource committed to service of PJM loads under the Reliability Pricing Model or Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market may be sold on a bilateral basis by the Market Seller, may be self-scheduled, or may be offered for dispatch during the Operating Day in accordance with the procedures specified in this Schedule. Such a Generation Capacity Resource that has not been scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that has been sold on a bilateral basis must be made available upon request to the Office of the Interconnection for scheduling and dispatch during the Operating Day if the Office of the Interconnection declares a Maximum Generation Emergency. Any such resource so scheduled and dispatched shall receive the applicable Real-time Price for energy delivered.

1.10.5 External Resources.

(a) External Resources may submit offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market, in accordance with the day-ahead and real-time scheduling processes specified above. An External Resource selected as a pool-scheduled resource shall be made available for scheduling and dispatch at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and except as specified below shall
be compensated on the same basis as other pool-scheduled resources. External Resources that are not capable of Dynamic Transfer shall, if selected by the Office of the Interconnection on the basis of the Market Seller’s Offer Data, be block loaded on an hourly scheduled basis. Market Sellers shall offer External Resources to the PJM Interchange Energy Market on either a resource-specific or an aggregated resource basis. A Market Participant whose pool-scheduled resource does not deliver the energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall replace such energy not delivered as scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market with energy from the PJM Real-time Energy Market and shall pay for such energy at the applicable Real-time Price.

(b) Offers for External Resources from an aggregation of two or more generating units shall so indicate, and shall specify, in accordance with the Offer Data requirements specified by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) energy prices; (ii) hours of energy availability; (iii) a minimum dispatch level; (iv) a maximum dispatch level; and (v) unless such information has previously been made available to the Office of the Interconnection, sufficient information, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to enable the Office of the Interconnection to model the flow into the PJM Region of any energy from the External Resources scheduled in accordance with the Offer Data.

(c) Offers for External Resources on a resource-specific basis shall specify the resource being offered, along with the information specified in the Offer Data as applicable.

1.10.6 External Market Buyers.

(a) Deliveries to an External Market Buyer not subject to Dynamic Transfer by the Office of the Interconnection shall be delivered on a block loaded basis to the bus or buses at the electrical boundaries of the PJM Region, or in such area with respect to an External Market Buyer’s load within such area not served by Network Service, at which the energy is delivered to or for the External Market Buyer. External Market Buyers shall be charged (which charge may be positive or negative) at either the Day-ahead Prices or Real-time Prices, whichever is applicable, for energy at the foregoing bus or buses.

(b) An External Market Buyer’s hourly schedules for energy purchased from the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall conform to the ramping and other applicable requirements of the interconnection agreement between the PJM Region and the Control Area to which, whether as an intermediate or final point of delivery, the purchased energy will initially be delivered.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall curtail deliveries to an External Market Buyer if necessary to maintain appropriate reserve levels for a Control Zone as defined in the PJM Manuals, or to avoid shedding load in such Control Zone.

1.10.7 Bilateral Transactions.

Bilateral transactions as to which the parties have notified the Office of the Interconnection by the deadline specified in section 1.10.1A above that they elect not to be included in the Day-ahead Energy Market and that they are not willing to incur Transmission Congestion Charges in the Real-time Energy Market shall be curtailed by the Office of the Interconnection as necessary to reduce or alleviate transmission congestion. Bilateral transactions that were not included in
the Day-ahead Energy Market and that are willing to incur congestion charges and bilateral transactions that were accepted in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall continue to be implemented during periods of congestion, except as may be necessary to respond to Emergencies.

1.10.8 Office of the Interconnection Responsibilities.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall use its best efforts to determine (i) the least-cost means of satisfying the projected hourly requirements for energy, Operating Reserves, and other ancillary services of the Market Buyers, including the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, of the Day-ahead Energy Market, and (ii) the least-cost means of satisfying the Operating Reserve and other ancillary service requirements for any portion of the load forecast of the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day in excess of that scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market. In making these determinations, the Office of the Interconnection shall take into account: (i) the Office of the Interconnection’s forecasts of PJM Interchange Energy Market and PJM Region energy requirements, giving due consideration to the energy requirement forecasts and purchase requests submitted by Market Buyers and PRD Curves properly submitted by PRD Providers; (ii) the offers submitted by Market Sellers; (iii) the availability of limited energy resources; (iv) the capacity, location, and other relevant characteristics of self-scheduled resources; (v) the objectives of each Control Zone for Operating Reserves, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vi) the requirements of each Regulation Zone for Regulation and other ancillary services, as specified in the PJM Manuals; (vii) the benefits of avoiding or minimizing transmission constraint control operations, as specified in the PJM Manuals; and (viii) such other factors as the Office of the Interconnection reasonably concludes are relevant to the foregoing determination, including, without limitation, transmission constraints on external coordinated flowgates to the extent provided by Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.7.6. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop a Day-ahead Energy Market based on the foregoing determination, and shall determine the Day-ahead Prices resulting from such schedule. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the planned schedule for a hydropower resource to the operator of that resource as necessary for plant safety and security, and legal limitations on pond elevations.

(b) By 1:30 p.m., or as soon as practicable thereafter, of the day before each Operating Day, or such other deadline as may be specified by the Office of the Interconnection in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post the aggregate Day-ahead Energy Market results; (ii) post the Day-ahead Prices; and (iii) inform the Market Sellers, Market Buyers, and Economic Load Response Participants of their scheduled injections, withdrawals, and demand reductions respectively. The foregoing notwithstanding, the deadlines set forth in this subsection shall not apply if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data due to extraordinary circumstances. For purposes of this subsection, extraordinary circumstances shall mean a technical malfunction that limits, prohibits or otherwise interferes with the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to obtain Market Participant bid/offer data prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day. Extraordinary circumstances do not include a Market Participant’s inability to submit bid/offer data to the Office of the Interconnection. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day
as a result of such extraordinary circumstances, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Members as soon as practicable.

(c) Following posting of the information specified in section 1.10.8(b), and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall revise its schedule of generation resources to reflect updated projections of load, conditions affecting electric system operations in the PJM Region, the availability of and constraints on limited energy and other resources, transmission constraints, and other relevant factors.

(d) Market Buyers shall pay PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall be paid by PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is positive. Market Buyers shall be paid by PJMSettlement and Market Sellers shall pay PJMSettlement for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Prices when the Day-ahead Price is negative. Economic Load Response Participants shall be paid for scheduled demand reductions pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.3A. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Office of the Interconnection is unable to clear the Day-ahead Energy Market prior to 11:59 p.m. on the day before the affected Operating Day due to extraordinary circumstances as described in subsection (b) above, no settlements shall be made for the Day-ahead Energy Market, no scheduled megawatt quantities shall be established, and no Day-ahead Prices shall be established for that Operating Day. Rather, for purposes of settlements for such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize a scheduled megawatt quantity and price of zero and all settlements, including Financial Transmission Right Target Allocations, will be based on the real-time quantities and prices as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5.

(e) If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in prices and/or cleared quantities in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, or the Real-time Energy Market or Real-time Ancillary Services Markets after it has posted the results for these markets on its Web site, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 12:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the initial publication of the results for the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the Operating Day for the Real-time Energy Market and Real-time Ancillary Services Markets, and no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fifth Business Day following the initial publication of the results in the Day-ahead Energy Market and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post on its Web site the corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the tenth calendar day following the Operating Day for the Day-ahead Energy Market, Real-time Energy Market, and Day-ahead Ancillary Services Markets, and Real-time Ancillary Service Markets. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be
considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced market results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(f) Consistent with Operating Agreement, section 18.17.1, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Operating Agreement or in the PJM Tariff, to allow the tracking of Market Participants’ non-aggregated bids and offers over time as required by FERC Order No. 719, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on its Web site the non-aggregated bid data and Offer Data submitted by Market Participants (for participation in the PJM Interchange Energy Market) approximately four months after the bid or offer was submitted to the Office of the Interconnection.

1.10.9 Hourly Scheduling.

(a) Following the initial posting by the Office of the Interconnection of the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-ahead Energy Market, and subject to the right of the Office of the Interconnection to schedule and dispatch pool-scheduled resources and to direct that schedules be changed in an Emergency, and absent extraordinary circumstances preventing the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market, a generation rebidding period shall exist. Typically the rebidding period shall be from the time the Office of the Interconnection posts the results of the Day-ahead Energy Market until 2:15 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. However, should the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market be significantly delayed, the Office of the Interconnection may establish a revised rebidding period. During the rebidding period, Market Participants may submit revisions to generation Offer Data for the next Operating Day. Adjustments to the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be settled at the applicable Real-time Prices, and shall not affect the obligation to pay or receive payment for the quantities of energy scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(b) A Market Participant may adjust the schedule of a resource under its dispatch control on an hour-to-hour basis beginning at 6:30 p.m. of the day before each Operating Day, provided that the Office of the Interconnection is notified not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, as follows and as specified in section 1.10.9A below:

i) A Generating Market Buyer may self-schedule any of its resource increments, including hydropower resources, not previously designated as self-scheduled and not selected as a pool-scheduled resource in the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of a non-firm bilateral transaction; or

iii) A Market Participant may request the scheduling of deliveries or receipts of Spot Market Energy; or

iv) A Generating Market Buyer may remove from service a resource increment, including a hydropower resource, that it had previously designated as self-scheduled, provided that the Office of the
Interconnection shall have the option to schedule energy from any such resource increment that is a Capacity Resource at the price offered in the scheduling process, with no obligation to pay any Start-Up Costs.

(c) An External Market Buyer may refuse delivery of some or all of the energy it requested to purchase in the Day-ahead Energy Market by notifying the Office of the Interconnection of the adjustment in deliveries not later than 65 minutes prior to the hour in which the adjustment is to take effect, but any such adjustment shall not affect the obligation of the External Market Buyer to pay for energy scheduled on its behalf in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the applicable Day-ahead Prices.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules resulting from the rebidding period by 6:30 p.m. on the day before each Operating Day. The Office of the Interconnection may also commit additional resources after such time as system conditions require. For each hour in the Operating Day, as soon as practicable after the deadlines specified in the foregoing subsection of this section 1.10, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide External Market Buyers and External Market Sellers and parties to bilateral transactions with any revisions to their schedules for the hour.

1.10.9A Updating Offers in Real-time

(a) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, and such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that resource for the clock hour, as further described in the PJM Manuals and subject to the following conditions:

   (i) A market-based Real-time Offer shall not exceed the applicable energy offer caps specified in this Schedule. Once a Market Seller’s resource is committed for an applicable clock hour, the Market Seller may not increase its Incremental Energy Offer and may only submit a market-based Real-time Offer that is higher than its market-based offer that was in effect at the time of commitment to reflect increases in the resource’s cost-based Start-up Costs and cost-based No-load Costs. The Market Seller may elect not to have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only its lowest cost-based offer considered for the remainder of the Operating Day.

   (ii) Cost-based Real-time Offers shall be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection’s Offer Data specification, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sections 1.10.1A(d) and 1.10.9B, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals, as applicable. If a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for a particular clock hour in accordance with subsection (c) below, or if updates to a cost-based offer are required by the Market Seller’s approved Fuel Cost Policy, the Market Seller shall update its previously submitted cost-based Real-time Offer.
(iii) If a Market Seller’s available cost-based offer is not compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals at the time a Market Seller submits a market-based Real-time Offer for an applicable clock hour during the Operating Day, the Market Seller must submit an updated cost-based Real-time Offer consisting of an Incremental Energy Offer, Start-up Cost, and No-load Cost for that clock hour that is compliant with Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and the PJM Manuals.

(b) Each Market Seller may submit Real-time Offers for a resource during and through the end of the applicable clock hour to update only the following offer parameters, as further described in the PJM Manuals: (1) Economic Minimum; (2) Economic Maximum; (3) emergency minimum MW; (4) emergency maximum MW; (5) unit availability status; (6) fixed output indicator; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; and (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW. Such Real-time Offers shall supersede any previous offer for that resource for the clock hour.

1.10.9B Offer Parameter Flexibility

(a) Market Sellers may, in accordance with sections 1.10.1A and 1.10.9A above, this section 1.10.9B, and the PJM Manuals, update offer parameters at any time up to 65 minutes before the applicable clock hour, including prior to the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the close of the rebidding period specified in section 1.10.9, except that Market Sellers may not update their offers for the supply of energy, Secondary Reserve, Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, or demand reduction: (1) during the period after the close of the Day-ahead Energy Market and prior to the posting of the Day-ahead Energy Market results pursuant to section 1.10.8(b); or (2) during the period after close of the rebidding period and prior to PJM announcing the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d).

(b) For generation resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) cost-based Start-up Costs; (2) cost-based No-load Costs; (3) Incremental Energy Offer; (4) Economic Minimum and Economic Maximum; (5) emergency minimum MW and emergency maximum MW; (6) ramp rate; (7) Synchronized Reserve maximum MW; (8) Secondary Reserve maximum MW; and (9) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, Minimum Run Time.

(c) For Economic Load Response Participant resource offers, Market Sellers may vary for each clock hour during the entire Operating Day the following offer parameters: (1) shutdown costs, (2) Incremental Energy Offer; (3) Economic Minimum; (4) Economic Maximum; and (5) for Real-time Offers only, (i) notification time and (ii) for uncommitted hours only, minimum down time.

(d) After the announcement of the results of the rebidding period pursuant to section 1.10.9(d), a Market Seller may submit a Real-time Offer where offer parameters may differ from the offer originally submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market, except that a Market Seller may
not submit a Real-time Offer that changes, of the offer parameters listed in section 1.10.1A(d), the MW amounts specified in the Incremental Energy Offer, MW amounts specified in the ramp rate, maximum run time, and availability; provided, however, Market Sellers of dual-fueled resources may submit Real-time Offers for such resources that change the availability of a submitted cost-based offer.
3.3A Economic Load Response Participants.

3.3A.1 Compensation.

Economic Load Response Participants shall be compensated pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and/or 3.3A.6 of this Schedule, for demand reduction offers submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test of section 3.3A.4; that are scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection; and that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection. Qualifying demand reductions shall be measured by: 1) comparing actual metered load to an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load or alternative CBL determined in accordance with the provisions of section 3.3A.2 or 3.3A.2.01, respectively; or 2) non-interval metered residential Direct Load Control customers, as metered on a current statistical sample of electric distribution company accounts, as described in the PJM Manuals or 3) by the MWs produced by on-Site Generators pursuant to the provisions of section 3.3A.2.02.

3.3A.2 Customer Baseline Load.

For Economic Load Response Participants that choose to measure demand reductions using an end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load (“CBL”), the CBL shall be determined using the following formula for such participant’s Non-Variable Loads. Additionally, the following formula shall be used to determine a Peak Shaving Adjustment End-Use Customer’s demand reductions when determining peak shaving performance rating as described in PJM Manual 19, unless an alternative CBL is approved pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01 of this schedule:

(a) The CBL for weekdays shall be the average of the highest 4 out of the 5 most recent load weekdays in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event.

i. For the purposes of calculating the CBL for weekdays, weekdays shall not include:

1. NERC holidays;
2. Weekend days;
3. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

   (i) any weekday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.4 or 3.3A.5, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

   (ii) any weekday where the end-use customer location that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer
locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

4. Any weekday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage for the five days.

ii. If a 45-day period does not include 5 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, provided there are 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the CBL shall be based on the average of those 4 weekdays. If there are not 4 eligible weekdays, the CBL shall be determined in accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

iii. Section 3.3A.2(a)(i)(3) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not include 4 weekdays that meet the conditions in subsection (a)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 4 day requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(b) The CBL for weekend days and NERC holidays shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:

i. The CBL for Saturdays and Sundays/NERC holidays shall be the average of the highest 2 load days out of the 3 most recent Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, in the 45 calendar day period preceding the relevant load reduction event, provided that the following days shall not be used to calculate a Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday CBL:

1. Event days. For the purposes of this section an event day shall be either:

   a. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday that an Economic Load Response Participant submits a settlement pursuant to section 3.3A.5 or 3.3A.6, provided that Event Days shall exclude such days if the settlement is denied by the relevant LSE or electric distribution company or is disallowed by the Office of the Interconnection; or

   b. any Saturday and Sunday/NERC holiday where the end-use customer that is registered in the Economic Load Response program is also registered as a Demand Resource, and all end-use customer locations on the relevant Economic Load Response registration have been dispatched by PJM during an emergency event.

2. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday where the average daily event period usage is less than 25% of the average event period usage level for the three days;
3. Any Saturday or Sunday/NERC holiday that corresponds to the beginning
or end of daylight savings.

ii. If a 45-day period does not include 3 Saturdays or 3 Sundays/NERC
holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this section, provided there
are 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays that meet the conditions in subsection (b)(i) of this
section, the CBL will be based on the average of those 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays.
If there are not 2 eligible Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, the CBL shall be determined in
accordance with subsection (iii) of this section.

iii. Section 3.3A.2(b)(i)(1) notwithstanding, if a 45-day period does not
include 2 Saturdays or Sundays/NERC holidays, respectively, that meet the conditions in
subsection (b)(i) of this section, event days will be used as necessary to meet the 2 day
requirement to calculate the CBL, provided that any such event days shall be the highest load
event days within the relevant 45-day period.

(c) CBLs established pursuant to this section shall represent end-use customers’
actual load patterns. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that a CBL or alternative
CBL does not accurately represent a customer’s actual load patterns, the CBL shall be revised
accordingly pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01. Consistent with this requirement, if an Economic
Load Response Participant chooses to measure load reductions using a Customer Baseline Load,
the Economic Load Response Participant shall inform the Office of the Interconnection of a
change in its operations or the operations of the end-use customer upon whose behalf it is acting
that would result in the adjustment of more than half the hours in the affected party’s Customer
Baseline Load by twenty percent or more for more than twenty days.

3.3A.2.01 Alternative Customer Baseline Methodologies.

(a) During the Economic Load Response Participant registration process pursuant to
section 1.5A.3 of this Schedule, the relevant Economic Load Response Participant or the Office
of the Interconnection (“Interested Parties”) may, in the case of such participant’s Non-Variable
Load customers, and shall, in the case of its Variable Load customers, propose an alternative
CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the relevant end-use customer’s consumption
pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to section 3.3A.2. During the Emergency and
Pre-Emergency Load Response registration process pursuant to section 8.4 of this schedule, or as
otherwise approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the relevant participant or the Office of
the Interconnection may propose an alternative CBL calculation that more accurately reflects the
relevant end-use customer’s consumption pattern relative to the CBL determined pursuant to
section 3.3A.2 of this schedule. In support of such proposal, the participant shall demonstrate
that the alternative CBL method shall result in an hourly relative root mean square error of
twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values, as calculated in accordance with the
technique specified in the PJM Manuals. Any proposal made pursuant to this section shall be
provided to the other Interested Party.

(b) The Interested Parties shall have 30 days to agree on a proposal issued pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section. The 30-day period shall start the day the proposal is provided to
the other Interested Party. If both Interested Parties agree on a proposal issued pursuant to this section, that alternative CBL calculation methodology shall be effective consistent with the date of the relevant Economic Load Response Participant registration.

(c) If agreement is not reached pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a CBL methodology that shall result, as nearly as practicable, in an hourly relative root mean square error of twenty percent or less compared to actual hourly values within 20 days from the expiration of the 30-day period established by subsection (b). A CBL established by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be binding upon both Interested Parties unless the Interested Parties reach agreement on an alternative CBL methodology prior to the expiration of the 20-day period established by this subsection (c).

(d) Operation of this section 3.3A.2.01 shall not delay Economic Load Response Participant registrations pursuant to Section 1.5A.3, provided that the alternative CBL established pursuant to this section shall be used for all related energy settlements made pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall periodically publish alternative CBL methodologies established pursuant to this section in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Emergency and Pre-Emergency Load Response registrations will use the CBL defined on the associated economic registration for measuring demand reductions when determining the participant’s compliance with its capacity obligations pursuant to Schedule 6 of the RAA, unless it is the maximum baseload CBL as defined in the PJM Manuals, in which case the participant will use the CBL set forth in the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Response registration.

3.3A.2.02 On-Site Generators.

On-Site Generators used as the basis for Economic Load Response Participant status pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A shall be subject to the following provisions:

i. The On-Site Generator shall be used solely to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market and shall not otherwise have been operating;

ii. If subsection (i) does not apply, the amount of energy from an On-Site Generator used to enable an Economic Load Response Participant to provide demand reductions in response to the Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be capable of being quantified in a manner that is acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection.

3.3A.3 Symmetric Additive Adjustment.
(a) Customer Baseline Levels established pursuant to section 3.3A.2 shall be adjusted by the Symmetric Additive Adjustment. Unless an alternative formula is approved by the Office of the Interconnection, the Symmetric Additive Adjustment shall be calculated using the following formula:

Step 1: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period ending 1 hour prior to the start of event.

Step 2: Calculate the average usage over the 3 hour period in the CBL that corresponds to the 3 hour period described in Step 1.

Step 3: Subtract the results of Step 2 from the results of Step 1 to determine the symmetric additive adjustment (this may be positive or negative).

Step 4: Add the symmetric additive adjustment (i.e. the results of Step 3) to each hour in the CBL that corresponds to each event hour.

(b) Following a Load Reduction Event that is submitted to the Office of the Interconnection for compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide the Notification window(s), if applicable, directly metered data and Customer Baseline Load and Symmetric Additive Adjustment calculation to the appropriate electric distribution company for optional review. The electric distribution company will have ten Business Days to provide the Office of the Interconnection with notification of any issues related to the metered data or calculations.

3.3A.4 Net Benefits Test.

The Office of the Interconnection shall identify each month the price on a supply curve, representative of conditions expected for that month, at which the benefit of load reductions provided by Economic Load Response Participants exceed the costs of those reductions to other loads. In formulaic terms, the net benefit is deemed to be realized at the price point on the supply curve where 

\[(\text{Delta LMP} \times \text{MWh consumed}) > (\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}} \times DR)\]

where \(\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}}\) is the market clearing price after Economic Load Response is dispatched and Delta LMP is the price before Economic Load Response is dispatched minus the \(\text{LMP}_{\text{NEW}}\).

The Office of the Interconnection shall update and post the Net Benefits Test results and analysis for a calendar month no later than the 15th day of the preceding calendar month. As more fully specified in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the net benefit price level in accordance with the following steps:

Step 1. Retrieve generation offers from the same calendar month (of the prior calendar year) for which the calculation is being performed, employing market-based price offers to the extent available, and cost-based offers to the extent market-based price offers are not available. To the extent that generation offers are unavailable from historical data due to the addition of a Zone to the PJM Region the Office of the Interconnection shall use the most recent generation offers that
best correspond to the characteristics of the calendar month for which the calculation is being performed, provided that at least 30 days of such data is available. If less than 30 days of data is available for a resource or group of resources, such resource[s] shall not be considered in the Net Benefits Test calculation.

Step 2: Adjust a portion of each prior-year offer representing the typical share of fuel costs in energy offers in the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals, for changes in fuel prices based on the ratio of the reference month spot price to the study month forward price. For such purpose, natural gas shall be priced at the Henry Hub price, number 2 fuel oil shall be priced at the New York Harbor price, and coal shall be priced as a blend of coal prices representative of the types of coal typically utilized in the PJM Region.

Step 3. Combine the offers to create daily supply curves for each day in the period.

Step 4. Average the daily curves for each day in the month to form an average supply curve for the study month.

Step 5. Use a non-linear least squares estimation technique to determine an equation that reasonably approximates and smooths the average supply curve.

Step 6. Determine the net benefit level as the point at which the price elasticity of supply is equal to 1 for the estimated supply curve equation established in Step 5.

3.3A.5 Market Settlements in Real-time Energy Market.

(a) Economic Load Response Participants that submit offers for load reductions in the Day-ahead Energy Market by no later than 2:15 p.m. on the day prior to the Operating Day that cleared or that otherwise are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the actual kWh relief provided in excess of committed day-ahead load reductions. The offer shall contain the Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k) and shall not thereafter be subject to change; provided, however, the Economic Load Response Participant may update the previously specified minimum or maximum load reduction quantity and associated price by submitting a Real-time Offer for a clock hour by providing notice to the Office of the Interconnection in the form and manner specified in the PJM Manuals no later than 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may also submit Real-time Offers for a clock hour for an Operating Day containing Offer Data specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.10.1A(k), and may update such offers up to 65 minutes prior to such clock hour. Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements. An Economic Load Response Participant that curtails or causes the curtailment of demand in real-time in response to PJM dispatch, and for which the applicable real-time LMP is
equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, will be compensated by PJM Settlement at the real-time Locational Marginal Price.

(b) In cases where the demand reduction follows dispatch, as defined in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o-1), as instructed by the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction offer price is equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test, and demand reduction is not a Component DER operating as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, payment will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing demand, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the demand reduction must be committed.

Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, real-time operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) For purposes of load reductions qualifying for compensation hereunder, an Economic Load Response Participant shall accumulate credits for energy reductions in those hours when the energy delivered to the end-use customer is less than the end-use customer’s Customer Baseline Load at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval. In the event that the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load, the Economic Load Response Participant will accumulate debits at the applicable Locational Marginal Price for the Real-time Settlement Interval for the amount the end-use customer’s hourly energy consumption is greater than the Customer Baseline Load. If the actual load reduction, compared to the desired load reduction is outside the deviation levels specified in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3(o), the Economic Load Response Participant shall be assessed balancing operating reserve charges in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions that are compensated at the applicable full LMP, in any Zone for any hour, shall be recovered from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, with the ratio shares determined as follows:

The ratio share for LSE i in zone z shall be $\frac{\text{RTL}_{iz}}{\text{RTL} + \text{X}}$ and the ratio share for party j shall be $\frac{\text{X}_j}{\text{RTL} + \text{X}}$.

Where:
RTL is the total real time load in all zones where LMP ≥ Net Benefits Test price; 
RTL\_iz is the real-time load for LSE i in zone z; 
X is the total export quantity from PJM in that hour; and 
X\_j is the export quantity by party j from PJM.

### 3.3A.6 Market Settlements in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

(a) Economic Load Response Participants dispatched as a result of a qualifying demand reduction offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be compensated for reducing demand based on the reductions of kWh committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market. An Economic Load Response Participant that submits a demand reduction bid day ahead that is accepted by the Office of the Interconnection and for which the applicable day ahead LMP is greater than or equal to the Net Benefits Test shall be compensated by PJMSettlement at the day-ahead Locational Marginal Price.

Economic Load Response Participants may, at their option, combine separately registered loads that have a common pricing point into a single portfolio for purposes of offering and dispatching their load reduction capability; provided however that any load reductions will continue to be measured and verified at the individual registration level prior to aggregation at the portfolio level for purposes of energy market and balancing operating reserves settlements.

(b) Total payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead demand reduction bids with an offer price equal to or greater than the threshold price established under the Net Benefits Test that follow the dispatch instructions of the Office of the Interconnection, and the demand reduction is not dispatched as part of a DER Aggregation Resource, will not be less than the total value of the demand reduction bid. For the purposes of this subsection, the total value of a demand reduction bid shall include any submitted start-up costs associated with reducing load, including direct labor and equipment costs and opportunity costs and any costs associated with a minimum number of contiguous hours for which the load reduction must be committed. Any shortfall between the applicable Locational Marginal Price and the total value of the demand reduction bid will be made up through normal, day-ahead operating reserves. In all cases under this subsection, the applicable zonal or aggregate (including nodal) Locational Marginal Price shall be used as appropriate for the individual end-use customer.

(c) Economic Load Response Participants that have demand reductions committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market that deviate from the day-ahead schedule in real time shall be charged or credited for such variance at the real time LMP plus or minus an amount equal to the applicable balancing operating reserve charge in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2.3. Load Serving Entities that otherwise would have load that was reduced shall receive any associated operating reserve credit.

(d) The cost of payments to Economic Load Response Participants for accepted day-ahead demand reduction bids that are compensated at the applicable full, day ahead LMP under this section (excluding any portion of the payments recovered as operating reserves pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) for load reductions in any Zone for any hour shall be recovered
from Market Participants on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time exports from the PJM Region and from Load Serving Entities on a ratio-share basis based on their real-time loads in each Zone for which the load-weighted average real-time Locational Marginal Price for the hour during which such load reduction occurred is greater than or equal to the price determined under the Net Benefits Test for that month, in accordance with the formula prescribed in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.3A.5(d).

3.3A.7 Prohibited Economic Load Response Participant Market Settlements.

(a) Settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 shall be limited to demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market that satisfy the Net Benefits Test and are dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) Demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a) shall not be eligible for settlement pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6. Examples of settlements prohibited pursuant to this section 3.3A.7(b) include, but are not limited to, the following:

i. Settlements based on variable demand where the timing of the demand reduction supporting the settlement did not change in direct response to Locational Marginal Prices in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

ii. Consecutive daily settlements that are the result of a change in normal demand patterns that are submitted to maintain a CBL that no longer reflects the relevant end-use customer’s demand;

iii. Settlements based on on-site generation data if the On-Site Generator is not supporting demand reductions executed in response to the Locational Marginal Price in the Real-time Energy Market and/or the Day-ahead Energy Market;

iv. Settlements based on demand reductions that are the result of operational changes between multiple end-use customer sites in the PJM footprint;

v. Settlements that do not include all hours that the Office of the Interconnection dispatched the load reduction, or for which the load reduction cleared in the Day-ahead Market.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall disallow settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a). If the Economic Load Response Participant continues to submit settlements for demand reductions that do not meet the requirements of section 3.3A.7(a), then the Office of the Interconnection shall suspend the Economic Load Response Participant’s PJM Interchange Energy Market activity and refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement.

3.3A.8 Economic Load Response Participant Review Process.
(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall review the participation of an Economic Load Response Participant in the PJM Interchange Energy Market under the following circumstances:

i. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registrations submitted pursuant to Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.5A.3 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

ii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are disputed more than 10% of the time by any relevant electric distribution company(ies) or Load Serving Entity(ies).

iii. An Economic Load Response Participant’s settlements pursuant to sections 3.3A.5 and 3.3A.6 are denied by the Office of the Interconnection more than 10% of the time.

iv. An Economic Load Response Participant’s registration will be reviewed when settlements are frequently submitted or if its actual loads frequently deviate from the previously scheduled quantities (as determined for purposes of assessing balancing operating reserves charges). PJM will notify the Participant when their registration is under review. While the Participant’s registration is under review by PJM, the Participant may continue economic load reductions but all settlements will be denied by PJM until the registration review is resolved pursuant to subsection (i) or (ii) below. PJM will require the Participant to provide information within 30 days to support that the settlements were submitted for load reduction activity done in response to price and not submitted based on the End-Use Customer’s normal operations.

i) If the Participant is unable to provide adequate supporting information to substantiate the load reductions submitted for settlement, PJM will terminate the registration and may refer the Participant to either the Market Monitoring Unit or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for further investigation.

ii) If the Participant does provide adequate supporting information, the settlements denied by PJM will be resubmitted by the Participant for review according to existing PJM market rules. Further, PJM may introduce an alternative Customer Baseline Load if the existing Customer Baseline Load does not adequately reflect what the customer load would have been absent a load reduction.

v. The electric distribution company may only deny settlements during the normal settlement review process for inaccurate data including, but not limited to: meter data, line loss factor, Customer Baseline Load calculation, interval meter owner and a known recurring End-Use Customer outage or holiday.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall have thirty days to conduct a review pursuant to this section 3.3A.8. The Office of the Interconnection may refer the matter to the
PJM MMU and/or the FERC Office of Enforcement if the review indicates the relevant Economic Load Response Participant and/or relevant electric distribution company or LSE is engaging in activity that is inconsistent with the PJM Interchange Energy Market rules governing Economic Load Response Participants.
6.4 Offer Price Caps.

6.4.1 Applicability.

(a) If, at any time, it is determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Sections 1.10.8 or 6.1 of this Schedule that any generation resource may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, the offer prices for energy from such resource shall be capped as specified below. For such generation resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, if the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped for the entire commitment period, and such offer prices will be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and committed at the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest overall system production cost. For such generation resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market such offer prices shall be capped at a cost-based offer in accordance with section 6.4.2 and dispatched on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost in accordance with 6.4.1(g) until the earlier of: (i) the resource is released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection; (ii) the end of the Operating Day; or (iii) the start of the generation resource’s next pre-existing commitment.

The offer on which a resource is committed shall initially be determined at the time of the commitment. If any of the resource’s Incremental Energy Offer, No-load Cost or Start-Up Cost are updated for any portion of the offer capped hours subsequent to commitment, the Office of the Interconnection will redetermine the level of the offer cap using the updated offer values. The Office of the Interconnection will dispatch the resource on the market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

Resources that are self-scheduled to run in either the Day-ahead Energy Market or in the Real-time Energy Market are subject to the provisions of this section 6.4. The offer on which a resource is dispatched shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the offer price of such resource and as further limited as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A.

In accordance with section 6.4.1(h), a generation resource that is offer capped in the Real-time Energy Market but released from its commitment by the Office of the Interconnection will be subject to the three pivotal supplier test and further offer capping, as applicable, if the resource is committed for a period later in the same Operating Day.

(b) The energy offer price by any generation resource requested to be dispatched in accordance with Section 6.3 of this Schedule shall be capped at the levels specified in Section 6.4.2 of this Schedule. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the affected resource is so scheduled, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. Energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the price of such resource.

(c) Generation resources subject to an offer price cap shall be paid for energy at the applicable Locational Marginal Price.
Offer price caps under section 6.4 of this Schedule shall be suspended for a generation resource with respect to transmission limit(s) for any period in which a generation resource is committed by the Office of the Interconnection for the Operating Day or any period for which the generation resource has been self-scheduled where (1) there are not three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch under subsection (a) that are jointly pivotal with respect to such transmission limit(s), and (2) the Market Seller of the generation resource, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, is not pivotal (“three pivotal supplier test”). In the event the Office of the Interconnection system is unable to perform the three pivotal supplier test for a Market Seller, generation resources of that Market Seller that are dispatched to control transmission constraints will be dispatched on the resource’s market-based offer or cost-based offer which results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined in accordance with section 6.4.1(g).

For the purposes of conducting the three pivotal supplier test in subsection (e), the following applies:

(i) All megawatts of available incremental supply, including available self-scheduled supply for which the power distribution factor ("dfax") has an absolute value equal to or greater than the dfax used by the Office of the Interconnection’s system operators when evaluating the impact of generation with respect to the constraint ("effective megawatts") will be included in the available supply analysis at costs equal to the cost-based offers of the available incremental supply adjusted for dfax ("effective costs"). The Office of the Interconnection will post on the PJM website the dfax value used by operators with respect to a constraint when it varies from three percent.

(ii) The three pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of the relevant market incremental supply up to and including all such supply available at an effective cost equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price calculated using effective costs and effective megawatts and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint.

(iii) Offer price caps will apply on a generation supplier basis (i.e. not a generating unit by generating unit basis) and only the generation suppliers that fail the three pivotal supplier test with respect to any hour in the relevant period will have their units that are dispatched with respect to the constraint offer capped. A generation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Supply controlled by a generation supplier or its affiliates by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise will be included as supply of that generation supplier; supply owned by a generation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party by contract or otherwise will be included as supply of that third party.
A generation supplier’s units, including self-scheduled units, are offer capped if, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, the generation supplier is pivotal.

(iv) In the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall include price sensitive demand, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids as demand or supply, as applicable, in the relevant market.

(g) In the Real-time Energy Market, the schedule on which offer capped resources will be placed shall be determined using dispatch cost, where dispatch cost is calculated pursuant to the following formulas:

\[
\text{Dispatch cost for the applicable hour} = ((\text{Incremental Energy Offer} \times \text{Economic Minimum for the hour} \ [\$/MWh] \times \text{Economic Minimum for the hour} \ [\text{MW}]) + \text{No-load Cost for the hour} \ [\$/H])
\]

(i) For resources committed in the Real-time Energy Market, the resource is committed on the offer with the lowest Total Dispatch cost at the time of commitment,

where:

\[
\text{Total Dispatch cost} = \text{Sum of hourly dispatch cost over a resource’s minimum run time} \ [\$] + \text{Start-Up Cost} \ [\$]
\]

(ii) For resources operating in real-time pursuant to a day-ahead or real-time commitment, and whose offers are updated after commitment, the resource is dispatched on the offer with the lowest dispatch cost for the each of the updated hours.

(iii) However, once the resource is dispatched on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the determination of the cheapest schedule.

(h) A generation resource that was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, is operating in real time, and may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, will be offer price capped, subject to the outcome of a three pivotal supplier test, for each hour the resource operates beyond its committed hours or Minimum Run Time, whichever is greater, or in the case of resources self-scheduled in the Real-time Energy Market, for each hour the resource operates beyond its first hour of operation, in accordance with the following provisions.

(i) If the resource is operating on a cost-based offer, it will remain on a cost-based offer regardless of the results of the three pivotal supplier test.
(ii) If the resource is operating on a market-based offer and the Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test then the resource will be dispatched on the cheaper of its market-based offer or the cost-based offer representing the offer cap as determined by section 6.4.2, whichever results in the lowest dispatch cost as determined under section 6.4.1(g).

(iii) If the Market Seller passes the three pivotal supplier test and the resource is currently operating on a market-based offer then the resource will remain on that offer, unless the Market Seller elects to not have its market-based offer considered for dispatch and to have only the cost-based offer that represents the offer cap level as determined under section 6.4.2 considered for dispatch in which case the resource will be dispatched on its cost-based offer for the remainder of the Operating Day.

6.4.2 Level.

(a) The offer price cap shall be one of the amounts specified below, as specified in advance by the Market Seller for the affected unit:

(i) The weighted average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus at which energy from the capped resource was delivered during a specified number of hours during which the resource was dispatched for energy in economic merit order, the specified number of hours to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection and to be a number of hours sufficient to result in an offer price cap that reflects reasonably contemporaneous competitive market conditions for that unit;

(ii) For offers of $2,000/MWh or less, the incremental operating cost of the generation resource or resources participating under the DER Aggregator Participation Model as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals (“incremental cost”), plus up to the lesser of 10% of such costs or $100 MWh, the sum of which shall not exceed $2,000/MWh; and, for offers greater than $2,000/MWh, the incremental cost of the generation resource;

(iii) For units that are frequently offer capped (“Frequently Mitigated Unit” or “FMU”), and for which the unit’s market-based offer was greater than its cost based offer, the following shall apply:

(a) For units that are offer capped for 60% or more of their run hours, but less than 70% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10% or (ii) incremental cost plus $20 per megawatt-hour;

(b) For units that are offer capped for 70% or more of their run hours, but less than 80% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater
of either (i) incremental cost plus 10%, or (ii) incremental cost plus $30 per megawatt-hour;

(c) For units that are offer capped for 80% or more of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental costs plus 10%; or (ii) incremental cost plus $40 per megawatt-hour.

(b) For purposes of section 6.4.2(a)(iii), a generating unit shall qualify for the specified offer cap upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit, pursuant to Section II.A of the Attachment M-Appendix, that it is a “Frequently Mitigated Unit” because it meets all of the following criteria:

(i) The unit was offer capped for the applicable percentage of its run hours, determined on a rolling 12-month basis, effective with a one month lag.

(ii) The unit’s Projected PJM Market Revenues plus the unit’s PJM capacity market revenues on a rolling 12-month basis, divided by the unit’s MW of installed capacity (in $/MW-year) are less than its accepted unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) (excluding APIR and ARPIR), or its default Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) if no unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is accepted for the BRAs for the Delivery Years included in the rolling 12-month period, determined pursuant to Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Attachment DD of the Tariff. (The relevant Avoidable Cost Rate is the weighted average of the Avoidable Cost Rates for each Delivery Year included in the rolling 12-month period, weighted by month.)

(iii) No portion of the unit is included in a FRR Capacity Plan or receiving compensation under Part V of the Tariff.

(iv) The unit is internal to the PJM Region and subject only to PJM dispatch.

(c) Any generating unit, without regard to ownership, located at the same site as a Frequently Mitigated Unit qualifying under Sections 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall become an “Associated Unit” upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Section II.A of Attachment M-Appendix, that it meets all of the following criteria:

1. The unit has the identical electric impact on the transmission system as the FMU;

2. The unit (i) belongs to the same design class (where a design class includes generation that is the same size and utilizes the same technology, without regard to manufacturer) and uses the identical primary fuel as the FMU or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder;

3. The unit (i) has an average daily cost-based offer, as measured over the
preceding 12-month period, that is less than or equal to the FMU’s average daily cost-based offer adjusted to include the currently applicable FMU adder or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder.

The offer cap for an associated unit shall be equal to the incremental operating cost of such unit, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, plus the applicable percentage adder or dollar per megawatt-hour adder as specified in Section 6.4.2(a)(iii)(a), (b), or (c) for the unit with which it is associated.

(d) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information and in compliance with the FERC Market Rules, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate or non-compliant information.

6.4.3 Verification of Cost-Based Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based energy offer for a generation resource that includes an Incremental Energy Offer greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the Incremental Energy Offer component of such cost-based offer. For each Incremental Energy Offer segment greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate whether such offer segment exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that generation resource by determining the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost for each segment in accordance with the following formula:

\[
\text{Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost} = \frac{[ \text{Maximum Allowable Operating Rate}_i - \text{Bid Production Cost}_{i-1} ]}{\text{MW}_i - \text{MW}_{i-1}}
\]

where

- \(i\) = an offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer, which is comprised of a pairing of price ($/MWh) and a megawatt quantity

\[
\text{Maximum Allowable Operating Rate} = \frac{[ \text{Heat Input}_i \times \text{Performance Factor} \times \text{Fuel Cost} ] \times (1 + A)}{\text{MW}_i}
\]

where

- \(\text{Heat Input}\) = a point on the heat input curve (in MMBtu/hr), determined in accordance with PJM Manual 15, describing the resource’s operational
characteristics for converting the applicable fuel input (MMBtu) into energy (MWh) specified in the Incremental Energy Offer;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Operating Agreement, Schedule 2, and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent; and

A = Cost adder, in accordance with section 6.4.2(a)(ii) of this Schedule.

Bid Production Cost ($/hour @ MW) =

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i) - \frac{1}{2} \times UBS \times (MW_i - MW_{i-1}) \times (P_i - P_{i-1}) \] + No-Load Cost

where

MW = the MW quantity per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

P = the price (in dollars per megawatt-hour) per offer segment within the Incremental Energy Offer;

UBS = Uses Bid-Slope = 0 for block-offer resources (i.e., a resource with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a step function curve); and 1 for all other resources (i.e., resources with an Incremental Energy Offer that uses a sloped offer curve); and

If the price submitted for the offer segment is less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost then that offer segment shall be deemed verified and is eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price. If the price submitted for the offer segment is greater than the Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost, then the Market Seller’s cost-based offer for that segment and all segments at an equal or greater price are deemed not verified and are not eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price and such offer shall be price capped at the greater of $1,000/megawatt-hour or the offer price of the most expensive verified segment on the Incremental Energy Offer for the purpose of setting Locational Marginal Prices; provided however, such Market Seller shall be allowed to submit a challenge to a non-verification determination, including supporting documentation, to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals. Upon review of such documentation, the Office of the Interconnection may determine that the Market Seller’s cost-based offer is verified and eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described above.
(i) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is greater than zero, the first segment shall be screened as a block-loaded segment \((UBS=0)\) as if there was a preceding MW\(_{i-1}\) of zero. The Maximum Allowable Incremental Cost calculation for the first incremental would use a preceding Bid Production Cost \(_{i-1}\) (at zero MW) equal to the energy No-Load Cost.

(ii) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and is the only bid-in segment to be verified, then the segment shall be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(iii) For the first incremental segment \((i=1)\), when the MW in the segment is equal to zero, and there are additional segments to be verified, then the first segment shall be deemed verified only if the second segment is deemed verified. If the second segment is deemed not verified, then the first segment shall also be deemed not verified and subject to the rules as described above.

(b) If an Economic Load Response Participant a cost-based demand reduction offer that includes incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, in order for that offer to be eligible to determine the applicable Locational Marginal Price as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate the incremental costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection, and may not include shutdown costs.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.
6.4.3A Verification of Fast-Start Resource Composite Energy Offers Over $1,000/Megawatt-hour

(a) If a Market Seller submits a cost-based offer for a generation resource that is a Fast-Start Resource that results in a Composite Energy Offer that is greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Office of the Interconnection shall apply a formulaic screen to verify the reasonableness of the offer components:

Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost components of each offer segment shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the test described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3.

Start-Up Cost component shall be evaluated for whether it exceeds the reasonably expected costs for that resource by applying the following formula:

\[
\text{Start-Up Cost ($)} = \left[ \left( \text{Performance Factor} \times (\text{Start Fuel}) \times (\text{Fuel Cost}) \right) + \text{Start Maintenance Adder} + \text{Additional Start Labor} + \text{Station Service Cost} \right] \times (1 + A)
\]

Where:

Start Fuel = fuel consumed from first fire of start process to breaker closing plus fuel expended from breaker opening of the previous shutdown to initialization of the (hot) unit start-up, excluding normal plant heating/auxiliary equipment fuel requirements;

Fuel Cost = applicable fuel cost as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection at a geographically appropriate commodity trading hub, plus 10 percent;

Performance Factor = a scaling factor that is a calculated ratio of actual fuel burn to either theoretical fuel burn (i.e., design Heat Input) or other current tested Heat Input, which is determined annually in accordance with the Market Seller’s PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy under Operating Agreement, Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, reflecting the resource’s actual ability to convert fuel into energy (normal operation is 1.0);

Start Maintenance Adder = an adder based on all available maintenance expense history for the defined Maintenance Period regardless of unit ownership. Only expenses incurred as a result of electric production qualify for inclusion. Only Maintenance Adders specified as $/Start,
$/MMBtu, or $/equivalent operating hour can be included in the Start Maintenance Adder;

Start Additional Labor = additional labor costs for startup required above normal station manning levels; and

Station Service Cost = station service usage (MWh) during start-up multiplied by the 12-month rolling average off-peak energy prices as updated quarterly by the Office of the Interconnection.

A = cost adder, in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.2(a)(ii).

(b) Should the submitted Incremental Energy Offer and No-load Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above for any segment, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices):

(i) the Incremental Energy Offer for each segment shall be capped at the lesser of the cap described above in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.4.3 or the submitted Incremental Energy Offer; and

(ii) the amortized No-load cost shall be adjusted as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(c) Should the submitted Start-Up Cost exceed the reasonably expected costs for that resource as calculated pursuant to subsection (a) above, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Start-Up Costs shall be adjusted as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).

(d) If an Economic Load Response Participant submits an offer to reduce demand for a Fast-Start Resource where the maximum segment of the resulting Composite Energy Offer exceeds $1,000/megawatt-hour, then, in order for that Composite Energy Offer to be eligible to set the applicable Locational Marginal Price under Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the Economic Load Response Participant must validate such costs with the end use customer(s) and, upon request, submit to the Office of the Interconnection supporting documentation demonstrating that the end-use customer’s costs in providing such
demand reduction are greater than $1,000/megawatt-hour in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) The supporting documentation must explain and support the quantification of the end-use customer’s incremental costs and shutdown costs; and

(ii) The end use customer’s incremental and shutdown costs shall include quantifiable cost incurred for not consuming electricity when dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, such as wages paid without production, lost sales, damaged products that cannot be sold, or other incremental costs as defined in the PJM Manuals or as approved by the Office of the Interconnection.

If upon review of the supporting documentation for the Economic Load Response Participant’s, cost-based offer by the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer was not reasonably supported by incremental and shutdown costs greater than or equal to $1,000/megawatt-hour, the Office of the Interconnection and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may refer the matter to the FERC Office of Enforcement for investigation.

Should the submitted shutdown cost exceed the reasonably supported costs for that resource, then for the determination of Locational Marginal Prices as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.5 (for determining Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.6 (for determining Day-ahead Prices), the shutdown costs shall be adjusted as described in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4 (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Real-time Prices) and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 2.4A (Determination of Energy Offers Used in Calculating Day-ahead Prices).
Sections of the
PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement

Effective February 2, 2026

(Clean Format)
ARTICLE 1 – DEFINITIONS

Unless the context otherwise specifies or requires, capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned herein or in the Schedules hereto, or in the PJM Tariff or PJM Operating Agreement if not otherwise defined in this Agreement, for all purposes of this Agreement (such definitions to be equally applicable to both the singular and the plural forms of the terms defined). Unless otherwise specified, all references herein to Articles, Sections or Schedules, are to Articles, Sections or Schedules of this Agreement. As used in this Agreement:

Accredited UCAP:

“Accredited UCAP” shall mean the quantity of Unforced Capacity, as denominated in Effective UCAP, that an ELCC Resource is capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

Agreement:

“Agreement” shall mean this Reliability Assurance Agreement, together with all Schedules hereto, as amended from time to time.

Annual Demand Resource:

“Annual Demand Resource” shall mean a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such Delivery Year by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of June through October and the following May, and 6:00AM through 9:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time for the months of November through April unless there is an Office of the Interconnection approved maintenance outage during October through April. The Annual Demand Resource must be available in the corresponding Delivery year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Annual Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

Annual Energy Efficiency Resource:

“Annual Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer and winter periods described in such Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

Applicable Regional Entity:
“Applicable Regional Entity” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**Base Capacity Demand Resource:**

“Base Capacity Demand Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through September of a Delivery Year, and will be available to the Office of the Interconnection for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Base Capacity Demand Resource must be available June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or self-supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Base Capacity Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean, for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Base Capacity Resource:**

“Base Capacity Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Base Residual Auction:**

“Base Residual Auction” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Behind The Meter Generation:**

“Behind The Meter Generation” shall refer to a generating unit that delivers energy to load without using the Transmission System or any distribution facilities (unless the entity that owns or leases the distribution facilities consented to such use of the distribution facilities and such consent has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection; provided, however, that Behind The Meter Generation does not include (i) at any time, any portion of such generating unit’s capacity that is designated as a Generation Capacity Resource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource or (ii) in any hour, any portion of the output of such generating unit that is sold to another entity for consumption at another electrical location or into the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
Black Start Capability:

“Black Start Capability” shall mean the ability of a generating unit or station to go from a shutdown condition to an operating condition and start delivering power without assistance from the power system.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (CETO):

“Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective” or “CETO” shall mean the amount of electric energy that a given area must be able to import in order to remain within a loss of load expectation of one event in 25 years when the area is experiencing a localized capacity emergency, as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Without limiting the foregoing, CETO shall be calculated based in part on EFORD determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 5, Paragraph C.

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL):

Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit” or “CETL” shall mean the capability of the transmission system to support deliveries of electric energy to a given area experiencing a localized capacity emergency as determined in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Capacity Import Limit:

For any Delivery Year up to and including the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, “Capacity Import Limit” shall mean, (a) for the PJM Region, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines for each Delivery Year, through appropriate modeling and the application of engineering judgment, the transmission system can receive, in aggregate at the interface of the PJM Region with all external balancing authority areas and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus (2) the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin; and (b) for certain source zones identified in the PJM manuals as groupings of one or more balancing authority areas, (1) the maximum megawatt quantity of external Generation Capacity Resources that PJM determines the transmission system can receive at the interface of the PJM Region with each such source zone and deliver to load in the PJM Region under capacity emergency conditions without violating applicable reliability criteria on any bulk electric system facility of 100kV or greater, internal or external to the PJM Region, that has an electrically significant response to transfers on such interface, minus the then-applicable Capacity Benefit Margin times (2) the ratio of the maximum import quantity from each such source zone divided by the PJM total maximum import quantity. As more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, PJM shall make such determination based on the latest peak load forecast for the studied period, the same computer simulation model of loads, generation and transmission topography employed in the determination of Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit for such Delivery Year, including external facilities from an industry standard model of the loads, generation, and transmission topography.
of the Eastern Interconnection under peak conditions. PJM shall specify in the PJM Manuals the areas and minimum distribution factors for identifying monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers on the PJM interface. Employing such tools, PJM shall model increased power transfers from external areas into PJM to determine the transfer level at which one or more reliability criteria is violated on any monitored bulk electric system facilities that have an electrically significant response to such transfers. For the PJM Region Capacity Import Limit, PJM shall optimize transfers from other source areas not experiencing any reliability criteria violations as appropriate to increase the Capacity Import Limit. The aggregate megawatt quantity of transfers into PJM at the point where any increase in transfers on the interface would violate reliability criteria will establish the Capacity Import Limit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region shall not be subject to the Capacity Import Limit if the Capacity Market Seller seeks an exception thereto by demonstrating to PJM, by no later than five (5) business days prior to the commencement of the offer period for the relevant RPM Auction, that such resource meets all of the following requirements:

(i) it has, at the time such exception is requested, met all applicable requirements to be pseudo-tied into the PJM Region, or the Capacity Market Seller has committed in writing that it will meet such requirements, unless prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond the control of the Capacity Market Seller, prior to the relevant Delivery Year;

(ii) at the time such exception is requested, it has long-term firm transmission service confirmed on the complete transmission path from such resource into PJM; and

(iii) it is, by written commitment of the Capacity Market Seller, subject to the same obligations imposed on Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6 to offer their capacity into RPM Auctions; provided, however, that (a) the total megawatt quantity of all exceptions granted hereunder for a Delivery Year, plus the Capacity Import Limit for the applicable interface determined for such Delivery Year, may not exceed the total megawatt quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service on such interface that PJM has confirmed for such Delivery Year; and (b) if granting a qualified exception would result in a violation of the rule in clause (a), PJM shall grant the requested exception but reduce the Capacity Import Limit by the quantity necessary to ensure that the total quantity of Network External Designated Transmission Service is not exceeded.

Capacity Only Option:

“Capacity Only Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

Capacity Performance Resource:

“Capacity Performance Resource” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Capacity Resources:
“Capacity Resources” shall mean megawatts of (i) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources meeting the requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedules 9 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 10 that are or will be owned by or contracted to a Party and that are or will be committed to satisfy that Party's obligations under the Reliability Assurance Agreement, or to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, for a Delivery Year; (ii) net capacity from Existing Generation Capacity Resources or Planned Generation Capacity Resources not owned or contracted for by a Party which are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in such Schedules 9 and 10; or (iii) load reduction capability provided by Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources that are accredited to the PJM Region pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6; or (iv) generation and load reduction capability provided by a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and the PJM Manuals.

Capacity Resource Provider:

“Capacity Resource Provider” shall mean a Member that (1) owns, or has the contractual authority to control the output of, a Generation Capacity Resource, that has not transferred such authority to another entity; (2) or a DER Aggregator that has a contractual relationship to use a Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource.

Capacity Storage Resource Class:

“Capacity Storage Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement, each of which is composed of (1) Capacity Storage Resources with the same specified characteristic duration of 4, 6, 8, and 10 hours or; (2) storage device Component DER. The characteristic duration of an Energy Storage Resource Class is the ratio of the modeled MWh energy storage capability of members of the class to the modeled MW power capability of members of the class.

Capacity Transfer Right:

“Capacity Transfer Right” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

Combination Resource:

“Combination Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, or a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, that has a component that has the characteristics of a Limited Duration Resource combined with (i) a component that has the characteristics of an Unlimited Resource or (ii) a component that has the characteristics of a Variable Resource.

Compliance Aggregation Area (CAA):

“Compliance Aggregation Area” or “CAA” shall have the same meaning as in the Tariff.
Complex Hybrid Class:

“Complex Hybrid Class” shall mean an ELCC Class composed of Combination Resources that combine three or more components, whereby one component is a class of Limited Duration Resource, and the other components are different Variable Resource classes, and such Combination Resources cannot be included in any other Combination Resource class. A resource that is a member of a Complex Hybrid Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, PJM Transmission Owners Agreement or Transmission Owners Agreement:

“Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement,” “PJM Transmission Owners Agreement” or “Transmission Owners Agreement” shall mean that certain Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, dated as of December 15, 2005, by and among the Transmission Owners and by and between the Transmission Owners and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on file with the Commission, as amended from time to time.

Control Area:

“Control Area” shall mean an electric power system or combination of electric power systems bounded by interconnection metering and telemetry to which a common generation control scheme is applied in order to:

   (a) match the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);

   (b) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;

   (c) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of NERC and each Applicable Regional Entity;

   (d) maintain power flows on transmission facilities within appropriate limits to preserve reliability; and

   (e) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation:
“Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation” shall mean the capacity obligation of a Load Serving Entity during the Delivery Year, determined in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8 or, as to an FRR Entity, in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Delivery Year:**

“Delivery Year” shall mean a Planning Period for which a Capacity Resource is committed pursuant to the auction procedures specified in Tariff, Attachment DD or pursuant to an FRR Capacity Plan under RAA, Schedule 8.1.

**Demand Resource (DR):**

“Demand Resource” or “DR” shall mean a Limited Demand Resource, Extended Summer Demand Resource, Annual Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource or Summer-Period Demand Resource with a demonstrated capability to provide a reduction in demand or otherwise control load in accordance with the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 that offers and that clears load reduction capability in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction or that is committed through an FRR Capacity Plan.

**Demand Resource Factor or DR Factor:**

“Demand Resource Factor” or “DR Factor” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, that factor approved from time to time by the PJM Board used to determine the unforced capacity value of a Demand Resource in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6

**Demand Resource Officer Certification Form:**

“Demand Resource Officer Certification Form” shall mean a certification as to an intended Demand Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

**Demand Resource Registration:**

“Demand Resource Registration” shall mean a registration in the Full Program Option or Capacity Only Option of the Emergency or Pre-Emergency Load Resource Program in accordance with Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 8.

**Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan:**

“Demand Resource Sell Offer Plan” shall mean the plan required by Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 in support of an intended offer of Demand Resources in an RPM Auction, or an intended inclusion of Demand Resources in an FRR Capacity Plan.
**DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form:**

“DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form” shall mean a DER Aggregator’s certification as to an intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer, in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1 and the PJM Manuals.

**DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan:**


**Effective Nameplate Capacity:**

“Effective Nameplate Capacity” shall mean (i) for each Variable Resource and Combination Resource, that is a Generation Capacity Resource, the resource’s Maximum Facility Output; (ii) for each Variable Resource and Combination Resource, that is an individual Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, the device’s maximum energy production capability, as defined by the resource’s state interconnection agreement; or (iii) for each Limited Duration Resource, the sustained level of output that the device can provide and maintain over a continuous period, whereby the duration of that continuous period matches the characteristic duration of the corresponding ELCC Class, with consideration given to ambient conditions expected to exist at the time of PJM system peak load, to the extent that such conditions impact such resource’s capability.

**Effective UCAP:**

“Effective UCAP” shall mean a unit of measure that represents the capacity product transacted in the Reliability Pricing Model and included in FRR Capacity Plans. One megawatt of Effective UCAP has the same capacity value of one megawatt of Unforced Capacity.

**ELCC Class:**

“ELCC Class” shall mean a defined group of ELCC Resources that share a common set of operational characteristics and for which effective load carrying capability analysis, as set forth in RAA, Schedule 9.1, will establish a unique ELCC Class UCAP and corresponding ELCC Class Rating(s). ELCC Classes shall be defined in the Schedule 9.1, section B of this Agreement. Members of an ELCC Class shall share a common method of calculating the ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment, provided that the individual ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment values will generally differ among ELCC Resources.

**ELCC Class Rating:**
“ELCC Class Rating” shall mean the rating factor, based on effective load carrying capability analysis, that applies to ELCC Resources that are members of an ELCC Class as part of the calculation of their Accredited UCAP.

**ELCC Class UCAP:**

“ELCC Class UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP all modeled ELCC Resources in a given ELCC Class are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

**ELCC Portfolio UCAP:**

“ELCC Portfolio UCAP” shall mean the aggregate Effective UCAP that all modeled ELCC Resources are capable of providing in a given Delivery Year.

**ELCC Resource:**

“ELCC Resource” shall mean a Variable Resource, a Limited Duration Resource, or a Combination Resource that also is either (a) a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, or (b) a Generation Capacity Resource.

**ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment:**

“ELCC Resource Performance Adjustment” shall mean the performance of a specific ELCC Resource relative to the aggregate performance of the ELCC Class to which it belongs as further described in RAA, Schedule 9.1, section F.

**Electric Cooperative:**

“Electric Cooperative” shall mean an entity owned in cooperative form by its customers that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Electric Distributor:**

“Electric Distributor” shall mean a Member that 1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership of electric distribution facilities that are used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region; or 2) is a generation and transmission cooperative or a joint municipal agency that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.

**Emergency:**

“Emergency” shall mean (i) an abnormal system condition requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent loss of firm load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or (ii) a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures
in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or (iii) a condition that requires implementation of emergency procedures as defined in the PJM Manuals.

**End-Use Customer:**

“End-Use Customer” shall mean a Member that is a retail end-user of electricity within the PJM Region. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is a retail end-user that owns generation may qualify as an End-Use customer if: (1) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates in the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average PJM capacity obligation for the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; or (2) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period does not exceed the average energy consumed by that Member and its affiliates within the PJM region over the same time period. The foregoing notwithstanding, taking retail service may not be sufficient to qualify a Member as an End-Use Customer.

**Energy Efficiency Resource:**

“Energy Efficiency Resource” shall mean a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of RAA, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the periods described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention. Annual Energy Efficiency Resources, Base Capacity Energy Efficiency Resources and Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resources are types of Energy Efficiency Resources.

**Exigent Water Storage:**

“Exigent Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is not typically available during normal operating conditions (as those conditions are described in the relevant FERC hydropower license), but which can be drawn upon during emergency conditions (as described in the FERC hydropower license), including in order to avoid a load shed. In an effective load carrying capability analysis, exigent storage capability from an upstream hydro facility can be considered relative to a downstream hydro facility by assessing cascading storage and flows.

**Existing Demand Resource:**

“Existing Demand Resource” shall mean a Demand Resource for which the Demand Resource Provider has identified existing end-use customer sites that are registered for the current Delivery
Year with PJM (even if not registered by such Demand Resource Provider) and that the Demand Resource Provider reasonably expects to have under a contract to reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is offered.

Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:

“Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for which the DER Aggregator has identified existing Component DER that are registered in a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource for the current Delivery Year with PJM (even if not registered by such DER Aggregator) and that the DER Aggregator reasonably expects to have under a contract to generate or reduce load based on PJM dispatch instructions by the start of the Delivery Year for which such DER Capacity Aggregation Resource is offered.

Existing Generation Capacity Resource:

“Existing Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean, for purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource that, as of the date on which bidding commences for such auction: (a) is in service; or (b) is not yet in service, but has cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year. A Generation Capacity Resource shall be deemed to be in service if interconnection service has ever commenced (for resources located in the PJM Region), or if it is physically and electrically interconnected to an external Control Area and is in full commercial operation (for resources not located in the PJM Region). The additional megawatts of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being, or has been, modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof shall not be deemed to be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource until such time as those megawatts (a) are in service; or (b) are not yet in service, but have cleared any RPM Auction for any prior Delivery Year.

Extended Summer Demand Resource:

“Extended Summer Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will be available June through October and the following May, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 10-hour duration between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Extended Summer Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as an Extended Summer Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

Facilities Study Agreement:

“Facilities Study Agreement” shall have the same meaning as in Tariff, Part VI, section 206.

FERC or Commission:
“FERC” or “Commission” shall mean the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any successor federal agency, commission or department exercising jurisdiction over the Tariff, Operating Agreement and Reliability Assurance Agreement.

**Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service:**

“Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service” shall have the meaning specified in the Tariff.

**Firm Service Level:**

“Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2022/2023 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when an Emergency Action that triggers a Performance Assessment Interval is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan. “Firm Service Level” or “FSL” of Demand Resource shall mean the pre-determined level for which an end-use customer’s load shall be reduced, upon notification from the Curtailment Service Provider’s market operations center or its agent.

**Firm Transmission Service:**

“Firm Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service that is intended to be available at all times to the maximum extent practicable, subject to an Emergency, an unanticipated failure of a facility, or other event beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility or the Office of the Interconnection.

**Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative or FRR Alternative:**

“Fixed Resource Requirement Alternative” or “FRR Alternative” shall mean an alternative method for a Party to satisfy its obligation to provide Unforced Capacity hereunder, as set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

**Fixed-Tilt Solar Class:**

“Fixed-Tilt Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted in a fixed orientation.

**Forecast Pool Requirement:**

“Forecast Pool Requirement” or “FPR” shall mean the amount equal to one plus the unforced reserve margin (stated as a decimal number) for the PJM Region required pursuant to this Reliability Assurance Agreement, as approved by the PJM Board pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1.

**FRR Capacity Plan or FRR Plan:**
“FRR Capacity Plan” or “FRR Plan” shall mean a long-term plan for the commitment of Capacity Resources and Price Responsive Demand to satisfy the capacity obligations of a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative, as more fully set forth in the Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1.

FRR Entity:

“FRR Entity” shall mean, for the duration of such election, a Party that has elected the FRR Alternative hereunder.

FRR Service Area:

“FRR Service Area” shall mean (a) the service territory of an IOU as recognized by state law, rule or order; (b) the service area of a Public Power Entity or Electric Cooperative as recognized by franchise or other state law, rule, or order; or (c) a separately identifiable geographic area that is: (i) bounded by wholesale metering, or similar appropriate multi-site aggregate metering, that is visible to, and regularly reported to, the Office of the Interconnection, or that is visible to, and regularly reported to an Electric Distributor and such Electric Distributor agrees to aggregate the load data from such meters for such FRR Service Area and regularly report such aggregated information, by FRR Service Area, to the Office of the Interconnection; and (ii) for which the FRR Entity has or assumes the obligation to provide capacity for all load (including load growth) within such area. In the event that the service obligations of an Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity are not defined by geographic boundaries but by physical connections to a defined set of customers, the FRR Service Area in such circumstances shall be defined as all customers physically connected to transmission or distribution facilities of such Electric Cooperative or Public Power Entity within an area bounded by appropriate wholesale aggregate metering as described above.

Full Program Option:

“Full Program Option” shall mean participation in Emergency Load Response Program or Pre-Emergency Program which allows, pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD and as applicable, (i) an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event, and (ii) a capacity payment for the ability to reduce load during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

Full Requirements Service:

“Full Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply all of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

Generation Capacity Resource:

“Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generating Facility, or the contractual right to capacity from a specified Generating Facility, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 9
and RAA, Schedule 10, and, for Generating Facilities that are committed to an FRR Capacity Plan, that meets the requirements of RAA, Schedule 8.1. A Generation Capacity Resource may be an Existing Generation Capacity Resource or a Planned Generation Capacity Resource.

Generation Owner:

“Generation Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership, or otherwise controls and operates one or more operating generation resources located in the PJM Region. The foregoing notwithstanding, for a planned generation resource to qualify a Member as a Generation Owner, such resource shall have cleared an RPM auction, and for Energy Resources, the resource shall have a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM. Purchasing all or a portion of the output of a generation resource shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Generation Owner. For purposes of Members Committee sector classification, a Member that is primarily a retail end-user of electricity that owns generation may qualify as a Generation Owner if: (1) the generation resource is the subject of a FERC-jurisdictional interconnection agreement or wholesale market participation agreement within PJM; (2) the average physical unforced capacity owned by the Member and its affiliates over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average PJM capacity obligation of the Member and its affiliates over the same time period; and (3) the average energy produced by the Member and its affiliates within PJM over the five Planning Periods immediately preceding the relevant Planning Period exceeds the average energy consumed by the Member and its affiliates within PJM over the same time period.

Generator Forced Outage:

“Generator Forced Outage” shall mean an immediate reduction in output or capacity or removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit by reason of an Emergency or threatened Emergency, unanticipated failure, or other cause beyond the control of the owner or operator of the facility, as specified in the relevant portions of the PJM Manuals. A reduction in output or removal from service of a generating unit in response to changes in market conditions shall not constitute a Generator Forced Outage.

Generator Maintenance Outage:

“Generator Maintenance Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit in order to perform repairs on specific components of the facility, if removal of the facility qualifies as a maintenance outage pursuant to the PJM Manuals.

Generator Planned Outage:

“Generator Planned Outage” shall mean the scheduled removal from service, in whole or in part, of a generating unit for inspection, maintenance or repair with the approval of the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Good Utility Practice:
“Good Utility Practice” shall mean any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather is intended to include acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region; including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Hybrid Resource Class:**

“Hybrid Resource Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 Section B. Each Hybrid Resource Class has a specified combination of two components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in a Capacity Storage Resource Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of a Hybrid Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage:**

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage” shall mean a hydropower facility that can capture and store incoming stream flow, without use of pumps, in pondage or a reservoir, and the Generation Owner has the ability, within the constraints available in the applicable operating license, to exert material control over the quantity of stored water and output of the facility throughout an Operating Day.

**Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class:**

“Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Combination Resources that are Hydropower With Non-Pumped Storage resources.

**Incremental Auction:**

“Incremental Auction” shall mean any of several auctions conducted for a Delivery Year after the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and before the first day of such Delivery Year, including the First Incremental Auction, Second Incremental Auction, Third Incremental Auction, or Conditional Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions (other than the Conditional Incremental Auction), shall be held for the purposes of:

1. allowing Market Sellers that committed Capacity Resources in the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year, which subsequently are determined to be unavailable to deliver the committed Unforced Capacity in such Delivery Year (due to resource retirement, resource cancellation or construction delay,
resource derating, EFORd increase, a decrease in the Nominated Demand Resource Value of a Planned Demand Resource, delay or cancellation of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade, or similar occurrences) to submit Buy Bids for replacement Capacity Resources; and

(ii) allowing the Office of the Interconnection to reduce or increase the amount of committed capacity secured in prior auctions for such Delivery Year if, as a result of changed circumstances or expectations since the prior auction(s), there is, respectively, a significant excess or significant deficit of committed capacity for such Delivery Year, for the PJM Region or for an LDA.

**Intermittent Hydropower Class:**

“Intermittent Hydropower Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are run-of-river hydropower generators that must generally pass incoming water and therefore cannot appreciably store water to later increase the output of the facility. Resources in the Intermittent Hydropower Class are not Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage resources.

**IOU:**

“IOU” shall mean an investor-owned utility with substantial business interest in owning and/or operating electric facilities in any two or more of the following three asset categories: generation, transmission, distribution.

**Landfill Gas Class:**

“Landfill Gas Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources fueled by landfill gas that, because of fuel availability patterns, cannot run consistently at installed capacity levels for 24 or more hours.

**Limited Demand Resource:**

“Limited Demand Resource” shall mean, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, and for FRR Capacity Plans Delivery Years through May 31, 2019, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and that will, at a minimum, be available for interruption for at least 10 Load Management Events during the summer period of June through September in the Delivery Year, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption for at least a 6-hour duration. At a minimum, the Limited Demand Resource shall be available for such interruptions on weekdays, other than NERC holidays, from 12:00PM (noon) to 8:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Limited Demand Resource must be available during the summer period of June through September in the corresponding Delivery Year to be offered for sale or Self-Supplied in an RPM Auction, or included as a Limited Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Limited Duration Resource:**
“Limited Duration Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource or a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, that is not a Variable Resource, that is not a Combination Resource, and that is not capable of running continuously at Maximum Facility Output for 24 hours or longer. A Capacity Storage Resource is a Limited Duration Resource.

**Load Serving Entity or LSE:**

“Load Serving Entity” or “LSE” shall mean any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within the PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant to state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located within the PJM Region. Load Serving Entity shall include any end-use customer that qualifies under state rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.

**Locational Reliability Charge:**

“Locational Reliability Charge” shall mean the charge determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 8.

**Markets and Reliability Committee:**

“Markets and Reliability Committee” shall mean the committee established pursuant to the Operating Agreement as a Standing Committee of the Members Committee.

**Maximum Emergency Service Level:**

“Maximum Emergency Service Level” or “MESL” of Price Responsive Demand for the 2017/2018 through the 2021/2022 Delivery Years shall mean the level, determined at a PRD Substation level, to which Price Responsive Demand shall be reduced during the Delivery Year when a Maximum Generation Emergency is declared and the Locational Marginal Price exceeds the price associated with such Price Responsive Demand identified by the PRD Provider in its PRD Plan.

**Member:**

“Member” shall have the meaning provided in the Operating Agreement.

**Members Committee:**

“Members Committee” shall mean the committee specified in Operating Agreement, section 8 composed of the representatives of all the Members.

**NERC:**
“NERC” shall mean the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or any successor thereto.

**Network External Designated Transmission Service:**

“Network External Designated Transmission Service” shall mean the quantity of network transmission service confirmed by PJM for use by a market participant to import power and energy from an identified Generation Capacity Resource located outside the PJM Region, upon demonstration by such market participant that it owns such Generation Capacity Resource, has an executed contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource, or has a contract to purchase power and energy from such Generation Capacity Resource contingent upon securing firm transmission service from such resource.

**Network Resources:**

“Network Resources” shall have the meaning set forth in the PJM Tariff.

**Network Transmission Service:**

“Network Transmission Service” shall mean transmission service provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions set forth in Tariff, Part III or transmission service comparable to such service that is provided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.

**Nominal PRD Value:**

“Nominal PRD Value” shall mean, as to any PRD Provider, an adjustment, determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1, to the peak-load forecast used to determine the quantity of capacity sought through an RPM Auction, reflecting the aggregate effect of Price Responsive Demand on peak load resulting from the Price Responsive Demand to be provided by such PRD Provider.

**Nominated Demand Resource Value:**

“Nominated Demand Resource Value” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation:**

“Non-Retail Behind the Meter Generation” shall mean Behind the Meter Generation that is used by municipal electric systems, electric cooperatives, and electric distribution companies to serve load.

**Obligation Peak Load:**

“Obligation Peak Load” shall have the meaning specified in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.
Office of the Interconnection:

“Office of the Interconnection” shall mean the employees and agents of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., subject to the supervision and oversight of the PJM Board, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement.

Offshore Wind Class:

“Offshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with offshore wind turbines located in the ocean.

Onshore Wind Class:

“Onshore Wind Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy using wind turbines and that are not in the Offshore Wind Class.

Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Operating Agreement or PJM Operating Agreement:

“Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,” “Operating Agreement” or “PJM Operating Agreement” shall mean that agreement, dated as of April 1, 1997 and as amended and restated as of June 2, 1997, including all Schedules, Exhibits, Appendices, addenda or supplements hereto, as amended from time to time thereafter, among the Members of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C, on file with the Commission.

Operating Day:

“Operating Day” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

Operating Reserve:

“Operating Reserve” shall mean the amount of generating capacity scheduled to be available for a specified period of an Operating Day to ensure the reliable operation of the PJM Region, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

Ordinary Water Storage:

“Ordinary Water Storage” shall mean water stored in the pondage or reservoir of a hydropower resource which is typically available during normal operating conditions pursuant to the FERC license governing the operation of the hydropower resource.

Other Limited Duration Class:

“Other Limited Duration Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B of this Agreement, each of which has a specified characteristic duration and consists of
Limited Duration Resources that are not Capacity Storage Resources. The characteristic duration of an Other Limited Duration Class is the maximum period of time represented in the ELCC model that the resources of the class can run at a stated capability.

**Other Limited Duration Combination Class:**

“Other Limited Duration Combination Class” shall mean the ELCC Classes specified in RAA Schedule 9.1 section B. Each Other Limited Duration Class has a specified combination of two components, whereby, absent being part of a Combination Resource, one component would be in an Other Limited Duration Class, and the other component would be in a Variable Resource Class or would be an Unlimited Resource. A resource that is a member of an Other Limited Duration Combination Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Other Supplier:**

“Other Supplier” shall mean a Member that: (i) is engaged in buying, selling or transmitting electric energy, capacity, ancillary services, Financial Transmission Rights or other services available under PJM’s governing documents in or through the Interconnection or has a good faith intent to do so, and (ii) is not a Generation Owner, Electric Distributor, Transmission Owner or End-Use Customer.

**Other Variable Resource Class:**

“Other Variable Resource Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that are not in any other Variable Resource class, including Variable Resources that are composed of multiple components, each of which would be a Variable Resource. A resource composed of both fixed-tilt solar panels and tracking solar panels is not in this class. A resource that is a member of a Other Variable Resource Class has a single Point Of Interconnection, unless the resource is controlled in an integrated fashion, is at a single site, and is approved by PJM to be considered a single resource in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

**Partial Requirements Service:**

“Partial Requirements Service” shall mean wholesale service to supply a specified portion, but not all, of the power needs of a Load Serving Entity to serve end-users within the PJM Region that are not satisfied by its own generating facilities.

**Party:**

“Party” shall mean an entity bound by the terms of the Operating Agreement.

**Peak Shaving Adjustment:**
“Peak Shaving Adjustment” shall mean a load forecast mechanism that allows load reductions by end-use customers to result in a downward adjustment of the summer load forecast for the associated Zone. Any End-Use Customer identified in an approved peak shaving plan shall not also participate in PJM Markets as Price Responsive Demand, Demand Resource, Base Capacity Demand Resource, Capacity Performance Demand Resource, or Economic Load Response Participant.

**Percentage Internal Resources Required:**

“Percentage Internal Resources Required” shall mean, for purposes of an FRR Capacity Plan, the percentage of the LDA Reliability Requirement for an LDA that must be satisfied with Capacity Resources located in such LDA.

**Performance Assessment Interval:**

“Performance Assessment Interval” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**PJM:**

“PJM” shall mean PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., including the Office of the Interconnection as referenced in the PJM Operating Agreement. When such term is being used in the RAA it shall also include the PJM Board.

**PJM Board:**

“PJM Board” shall mean the Board of Managers of the LLC, acting pursuant to the Operating Agreement, except when such term is being used in Tariff, Attachment M, in which case PJM Board shall mean the Board of Managers of PJM or its designated representative, exclusive of any members of PJM Management.

**PJM Manuals:**

“PJM Manuals” shall mean the instructions, rules, procedures and guidelines established by the Office of the Interconnection for the operation, planning and accounting requirements of the PJM Region.

**PJM Region:**

“PJM Region” shall have the same meaning as provided in the Operating Agreement.

**PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin:**

“PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin” shall mean the percent installed reserve margin for the PJM Region required pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 4.1, as approved by the PJM Board.
PJM Tariff, Tariff, O.A.T.T., OATT or PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff:

“PJM Tariff,” “Tariff,” “O.A.T.T., “OATT” or “PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff” shall mean that certain PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, including any schedules, appendices, or exhibits attached thereto, on file with FERC and as amended from time to time thereafter.

Planned Demand Resource:

“Planned Demand Resource” shall mean any Demand Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide a reduction in demand or to otherwise control load, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such reduction or control on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a Demand Resource Provider submitting a DR Sell Offer Plan shall identify as Planned Demand Resources in such plan all Demand Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing Demand Resources.

Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource:

A “Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource” shall mean any DER Capacity Aggregation Resource that does not currently have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, but that is scheduled to be capable of providing such generation or reduction in demand on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed, as determined in accordance with the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2. As set forth in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.2 and Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1, a DER Aggregator submitting a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall identify in such plan all DER Capacity Aggregation Resources in excess of those that qualify as Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources. A Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all provisions of the DER Aggregator Participation Model described in Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 1.4B and Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 1.4B, prior to the applicable Delivery Year.

Planned External Generation Capacity Resource:

“Planned External Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a proposed Generation Capacity Resource, or a proposed increase in the capability of a Generation Capacity Resource, that (a) is to be located outside the PJM Region, (b) participates in the generation interconnection process of a Control Area external to PJM, (c) is scheduled to be physically and electrically interconnected to the transmission facilities of such Control Area on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to satisfy the reliability requirements of the PJM Region, and (d) is in full commercial operation prior to the first day of such Delivery Year, such that it is sufficient to provide the Installed Capacity set forth in the Sell Offer forming the basis of such resource’s commitment to the PJM Region. Prior to participation in any Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that it has a fully executed system impact study agreement (or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff) or, for
resources which are greater than 20MWs participating in a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, an agreement or other documentation which is functionally equivalent to a Facilities Study Agreement under the PJM Tariff), with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. Prior to participating in any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate it has entered into an interconnection agreement, or such other documentation that is functionally equivalent to an Interconnection Service Agreement under the PJM Tariff, with the transmission owner to whose transmission facilities or distribution facilities the resource is being directly connected, and, as applicable, the transmission provider. A Planned External Generation Capacity Resource must provide evidence to PJM that it has been studied as a Network Resource, or such other similar interconnection product in such external Control Area, must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for or purchased transmission service to be deliverable to the PJM border, and must provide contractual evidence that it has applied for transmission service to be deliverable to the bus at which energy is to delivered, the agreements for which must have been executed prior to participation in any Reliability Pricing Model Auction for such Delivery Year. Any such resource shall cease to be considered a Planned External Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that interconnection service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction, in which case it shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for purposes of the mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for all subsequent Delivery Years.

**Planned Generation Capacity Resource:**

“Planned Generation Capacity Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource, or additional megawatts to increase the size of a Generation Capacity Resource that is being or has been modified to increase the number of megawatts of available installed capacity thereof, participating in the generation interconnection process under Tariff, Part IV, Subpart A, as applicable, for which: (i) Interconnection Service is scheduled to commence on or before the first day of the Delivery Year for which such resource is to be committed to RPM or to an FRR Capacity Plan; (ii) for any such resource seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, or for any such resource of 20 MWs or less seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction, a System Impact Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a System Impact Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a System Impact Study Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; (iii) for any such resource of more than 20 MWs seeking to offer into a Base Residual Auction for the 2019/2020 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a Facilities Study Agreement (or, for resources for which a Facilities Study Agreement is not required, has such other agreement or documentation that is functionally equivalent to a Facility Studies Agreement) has been executed prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year; and (iv) an Interconnection Service Agreement has been executed prior to any Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year in which such resource plans to participate. For purposes of the must-offer requirement and mitigation of offers for any RPM Auction for a Delivery Year, a Generation Capacity Resource shall cease to be considered a Planned Generation Capacity Resource as of the earlier of (i) the date that Interconnection Service commences as to such resource; or (ii) the resource has cleared an RPM Auction for any Delivery Year, in which case it
shall become an Existing Generation Capacity Resource for any RPM Auction for all subsequent 
Delivery Years.

Planning Period:

“Planning Period” shall mean the 12 months beginning June 1 and extending through May 31 of 
the following year, or such other period approved by the Members Committee.

PRD Curve:

“PRD Curve” shall mean a price-consumption curve at a PRD Substation level, if available, and 
otherwise at a Zonal (or sub-Zonal LDA, if applicable) level, that details the base consumption 
level of Price Responsive Demand and the decreasing consumption levels at increasing prices.

PRD Provider:

“PRD Provider” shall mean a PJM Member that has entered contractual arrangements with end-
use customers that satisfy the eligibility criteria for and provides Price Responsive Demand.

PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD:

“PRD Provider’s Zonal Expected Peak Load Value of PRD” shall mean the expected 
contribution to Delivery Year peak load of a PRD Provider’s Price Responsive Demand, were 
such demand not to be reduced in response to price, based on the contribution of the end-use 
customers comprising such Price Responsive Demand to the most recent prior Delivery Year’s 
peak demand, escalated to the Delivery Year in question, as determined in a manner consistent 
with the Office of the Interconnection’s load forecasts used for purposes of the RPM Auctions.

PRD Reservation Price:

“PRD Reservation Price” shall mean an RPM Auction clearing price identified in a PRD Plan for 
Price Responsive Demand load below which the PRD Provider desires not to commit the 
identified load as Price Responsive Demand.

PRD Substation:

“PRD Substation” shall mean an electrical substation that is located in the same Zone or in the 
same sub-Zonal LDA as the end-use customers identified in a PRD Plan or PRD registration and 
that, in terms of the electrical topography of the Transmission Facilities comprising the PJM 
Region, is as close as practicable to such loads.

Price Responsive Demand:

“Price Responsive Demand” or “PRD” shall mean end-use customer load registered by a PRD 
Provider pursuant to Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 that have, as set forth in 
more detail in the PJM Manuals, the metering capability to record electricity consumption at an
interval of one hour or less, Supervisory Control capable of curtailing such load (consistent with applicable RERRA requirements) at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection (prior to 2022/2023 Delivery Year) or a Performance Assessment Interval that triggers a PRD performance assessment (effective with 2022/2023 Delivery Year), and a retail rate structure, or equivalent contractual arrangement, capable of changing retail rates as frequently as an hourly basis, that is linked to or based upon changes in real-time Locational Marginal Prices at a PRD Substation level and that results in a predictable automated response to varying wholesale electricity prices.

**Price Responsive Demand Credit:**

“Price Responsive Demand Credit” shall mean a credit, based on committed Price Responsive Demand, as determined under Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1.

**Price Responsive Demand Plan or PRD Plan:**

“Price Responsive Demand Plan” or “PRD Plan” shall mean a plan, submitted by a PRD Provider and received by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6.1 and procedures specified in the PJM Manuals, claiming a peak demand limitation due to Price Responsive Demand to support the determination of such PRD Provider’s Nominal PRD Value.

**Public Power Entity:**

“Public Power Entity” shall mean any agency, authority, or instrumentality of a state or of a political subdivision of a state, or any corporation wholly owned by any one or more of the foregoing, that is engaged in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy.

**Qualifying Transmission Upgrades:**

“Qualifying Transmission Upgrades” shall have the meaning specified in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority:**

“Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority” or “RERRA” shall have the meaning specified in the PJM Operating Agreement.

**Reliability Principles and Standards:**

“Reliability Principles and Standards” shall mean the principles and standards established by NERC or an Applicable Regional Entity to define, among other things, an acceptable probability of loss of load due to inadequate generation or transmission capability, as amended from time to time.

**Required Approvals:**
“Required Approvals” shall mean all of the approvals required for the Operating Agreement to be modified or to be terminated, in whole or in part, including the acceptance for filing by FERC and every other regulatory authority with jurisdiction over all or any part of the Operating Agreement.

**Self-Supply:**

“Self-Supply” shall have the meaning provided in Tariff, Attachment DD.

**Small Commercial Customer:**

“Small Commercial Customer” shall have the same meaning as in the PJM Tariff.

**State Consumer Advocate:**

“State Consumer Advocate” shall mean a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of which is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for the purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory commissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.

**State Regulatory Structural Change:**

“State Regulatory Structural Change” shall mean as to any Party, a state law, rule, or order that, after September 30, 2006, initiates a program that allows retail electric consumers served by such Party to choose from among alternative suppliers on a competitive basis, terminates such a program, expands such a program to include classes of customers or localities served by such Party that were not previously permitted to participate in such a program, or that modifies retail electric market structure or market design rules in a manner that materially increases the likelihood that a substantial proportion of the customers of such Party that are eligible for retail choice under such a program (a) that have not exercised such choice will exercise such choice; or (b) that have exercised such choice will no longer exercise such choice, including for example, without limitation, mandating divestiture of utility-owned generation or structural changes to such Party’s default service rules that materially affect whether retail choice is economically viable.

**Summer-Period Demand Resource:**

Summer-Period Demand Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a resource that is placed under the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, and will be available June through October and the following May of the Delivery Year, and will be available for an unlimited number of interruptions during such months by the Office of the Interconnection, and will be capable of maintaining each such interruption between the hours of 10:00AM to 10:00PM Eastern Prevailing Time. The Summer-Period Demand Resource must be available June through October and the following May in the corresponding Delivery Year to be...
offered for sale in an RPM Auction, or included as a Summer-Period Demand Resource in an FRR Capacity Plan for the corresponding Delivery Year.

**Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource:**

Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource shall mean, for the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, a project, including installation of more efficient devices or equipment or implementation of more efficient processes or systems, meeting the requirements of Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and exceeding then-current building codes, appliance standards, or other relevant standards, designed to achieve a continuous (during the summer peak periods as described in Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals) reduction in electric energy consumption that is not reflected in the peak load forecast prepared for the Delivery Year for which the Summer-Period Energy Efficiency Resource is proposed, and that is fully implemented at all times during such Delivery Year, without any requirement of notice, dispatch, or operator intervention.

**Supervisory Control:**

“Supervisory Control” shall mean the capability to curtail, in accordance with applicable RERRA requirements, load registered as Price Responsive Demand at each PRD Substation identified in the relevant PRD Plan or PRD registration in response to a Maximum Generation Emergency declared by the Office of the Interconnection. Except to the extent automation is not required by the provisions of the Operating Agreement, the curtailment shall be automated, meaning that load shall be reduced automatically in response to control signals sent by the PRD Provider or its designated agent directly to the control equipment where the load is located without the requirement for any action by the end-use customer.

**Threshold Quantity:**

“Threshold Quantity” shall mean, as to any FRR Entity for any Delivery Year, the sum of (a) the Unforced Capacity equivalent (determined using the Pool-Wide Average EFORD) of the Installed Reserve Margin for such Delivery Year multiplied by the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for which such FRR Entity is responsible under its FRR Capacity Plan for such Delivery Year, plus (b) the lesser of (i) 3% of the Unforced Capacity amount determined in (a) above or (ii) 450 MW. If the FRR Entity is not responsible for all load within a Zone, the Preliminary Forecast Peak Load for such entity shall be the FRR Entity’s Obligation Peak Load last determined prior to the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, times the Base FRR Scaling Factor (as determined in accordance with Reliability Assurance Agreement, Schedule 8.1).

**Tracking Solar Class:**

“Tracking Solar Class” shall mean an ELCC Class consisting of Variable Resources that produce electrical energy with solar panels that are primarily mounted on trackers that align the panels with incoming sunlight over the course of the day.
**Transmission Facilities:**

“Transmission Facilities” shall mean facilities that: (i) are within the PJM Region; (ii) meet the definition of transmission facilities pursuant to FERC’s Uniform System of Accounts or have been classified as transmission facilities in a ruling by FERC addressing such facilities; and (iii) have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection to be integrated with the PJM Region transmission system and integrated into the planning and operation of the PJM Region to serve all of the power and transmission customers within the PJM Region.

**Transmission Owner:**

“Transmission Owner” shall mean a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities and is a signatory to the PJM Transmission Owners Agreement. Taking transmission service shall not be sufficient to qualify a Member as a Transmission Owner.

**Unforced Capacity:**

“Unforced Capacity” shall mean installed capacity rated at summer conditions that is not on average experiencing a forced outage or forced derating, calculated for each Capacity Resource on the 12-month period from October to September without regard to the ownership of or the contractual rights to the capacity of the unit.

**Unlimited Resource:**

“Unlimited Resource” shall mean a generating unit having the ability to maintain output at a stated capability continuously on a daily basis without interruption. An Unlimited Resource is a Generation Capacity Resource that is not an ELCC Resource.

**Variable Resource:**

“Variable Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource or a generation Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource that is linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, with output that can vary as a function of its energy source, such as wind, solar, run of river hydroelectric power without storage, and landfill gas units without an alternate fuel source. All Intermittent Resources are Variable Resources, with the exception of Hydropower with Non-Pumped Storage.

**Winter Peak Load (or WPL):**

“Winter Peak Load” or “WPL” shall mean the average of the Demand Resource customer’s specific peak hourly load between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on the PJM defined 5 coincident peak days from December through February two Delivery Years prior the Delivery Year for which the registration is submitted. Notwithstanding, if the average use between hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT on a winter 5 coincident peak day is below 35% of the average hours ending 7:00 EPT through 21:00 EPT over all five of such peak days,
then up to two such days and corresponding peak demand values may be excluded from the calculation. Upon approval by the Office of the Interconnection, a Curtailment Service Provider may provide alternative data to calculate Winter Peak Load, as outlined in the PJM Manuals, when there is insufficient hourly load data for the two Delivery Years prior to the relevant Delivery Year or if more than two days meet the exclusion criteria described above.

**Zonal Capacity Price:**

“Zonal Capacity Price” shall mean the clearing price required in each Zone to meet the demand for Unforced Capacity and satisfy Locational Deliverability Requirements for the LDA or LDAs associated with such Zone. If the Zone contains multiple LDAs with different Capacity Resource Clearing Prices, the Zonal Capacity Price shall be a weighted average of the Capacity Resource Clearing Prices for such LDAs, weighted by the Unforced Capacity of Capacity Resources cleared in each such LDA.

**Zone or Zonal:**

“Zone” or “Zonal” shall refer to an area within the PJM Region, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment J and RAA, Schedule 15, or as such areas may be (i) combined as a result of mergers or acquisitions or (ii) added as a result of the expansion of the boundaries of the PJM Region. A Zone shall include any Non-Zone Network Load located outside the PJM Region that is served from such Zone under Tariff, Attachment H-A.

**Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor (ZWWAF):**

“Zonal Winter Weather Adjustment Factor” or “ZWWAF” shall mean the PJM zonal winter weather normalized coincident peak divided by PJM zonal average of 5 coincident peak loads in December through February.
SCHEDULE 6.2

DER Capacity Aggregation Resources qualifying under the criteria set forth below may be offered for sale in an RPM auction, or included in an FRR Capacity Plan, for any Delivery Year for which such resource qualifies.

DER Aggregators intending to offer for sale or designate for self-supply, a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any RPM Auction, or intending to include a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in any FRR Capacity Plan must demonstrate, to PJM's satisfaction, that such resource shall have the capability to provide generation or reduction in demand, on or before the start of the Delivery Year for which such resource is committed. As part of such demonstration, each such DER Aggregator shall submit a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan in accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in RAA, Schedule 6.2, and the PJM Manuals, no later than 30 days prior to, as applicable, the RPM Auction in which such resource is to be offered, or the deadline for submission of the FRR Capacity Plan in which such resource is to be included.

PJM may verify the DER Aggregator’s adherence to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan at any time. A DER Aggregator with a PJM-approved DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan will be permitted to offer up to the approved megawatt quantity into the subject RPM Auction or include such resource in its FRR Capacity Plan.

A DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall consist of a completed template document in the form posted on the PJM website, requiring the information set forth below and in the PJM Manuals, and a DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must provide information that supports the DER Aggregator’s intended DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offers and demonstrate that the DER Capacity Aggregation Resources are being offered with the intention that the megawatt quantity that clears the auction is reasonably expected to be physically delivered through DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registration for the relevant Delivery Year. The DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan shall include all Existing DER Capacity Aggregation Resources and all Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that the DER Aggregator intends to offer into an RPM Auction or include in an FRR Capacity Plan.

The DER Aggregator shall provide the details of, and key assumptions for underlying Component DER for the Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource contained in the Sell Offer Plan, including but not limited to:

(i) Nominated megawatt quantities and method(s) of achieving generation or load reductions to meet megawatt quantities

(ii) Equipment and technology to be installed or controlled

(iii) Plan and ability to acquire generating resources or load reductions at customer site(s) and assumptions regarding regulatory approval of program(s), if applicable
(iv) A measurement and verification plan developed in accordance with PJM Manuals, if applicable
(v) Zone and LDA information
(vi) A schedule of an approximate timeline for procuring Component DER

DER Aggregator Officer Certification Form.
Each DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan must include a DER Aggregator Officer Certification, signed by an officer of the DER Aggregator that is duly authorized to provide such a certification, in the form shown in the PJM Manuals, which form shall include the following certifications:

(a) that the signing officer has reviewed the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource Sell Offer Plan and the information supplied to PJM in support of the Plan is true and correct as of the date of the certification; and

(b) that the DER Aggregator is submitting the Plan with the reasonable expectation, based upon its analyses as of the date of the certification, to physically deliver all megawatts that clear the RPM Auction through the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource registrations by the specified Delivery Year.

As set forth in the form provided in the PJM Manuals, the certification shall specify that it does not in any way abridge, expand, or otherwise modify the current provisions of the PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, and/or RAA.

The Unforced Capacity value of a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource will be determined as the sum of the Unforced Capacity value of the Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, accounting for any co-located load that is not Station Power, in accordance with the provisions of the PJM Manuals.

The DER Aggregator shall provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to a DER Capacity Aggregation Resource located within the same Zone and LDA as specified in its cleared sell offer, and may be subject to deficiency charges under Tariff, Attachment DD to the extent it fails to provide Component DER within a DER Aggregation Resource registered and linked to the applicable DER Capacity Aggregation Resource in such location and quantity consistent with its cleared offer.

A DER Aggregator offering a Planned DER Capacity Aggregation Resource must comply with all applicable credit requirements, as set forth in Tariff, Attachment Q.
Attachment E

Affidavit of Donald Bielak
on behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. )
Docket No. ER22-___-000

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD BIELAK
ON BEHALF OF PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C

1. My name is Donald Bielak, and my business address is 2750 Monroe Blvd., Audubon, Pennsylvania, 19403. My current title is Sr. Manager – Dispatch at PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”). I am submitting this affidavit on behalf of PJM, in support of its proposed Order No. 2222 compliance filing.

2. Specifically, in this affidavit, I provide support for PJM’s proposal to utilize a nodal model for energy market participation in its DER Aggregator Participation Model. In short, PJM’s decision to require that DER Aggregation Resources participating in the energy market be defined nodally, rather than multi-nodally, is fundamentally predicated on a determination that a multi-nodal model would raise significant concerns regarding PJM’s ability to maintain compliance with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) mandatory Reliability Standards TOP-001, R1, R12, and R14, as well as IRO-009, R1, R2, R3, and R4, and lead to degradation in accurate market pricing and operational constraint control. This determination is based on PJM’s unique system topology, congestion patterns, and operating practices.

I. QUALIFICATIONS

3. I joined PJM in September of 2004 and have been under continuous full-time employment since January of 2007. As Sr. Manager – Dispatch, I am responsible for the oversight and operation of the Valley Forge and Milford Control Centers. This function includes ensuring the reliable operation of the power grid, in accordance with all PJM and NERC reliability standards pertaining to the functions of Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, and Transmission Operator. In addition, I am responsible for ensuring the efficient economic dispatch of the system under the existing PJM market rules and neighboring Joint Operating Agreements.

4. Prior to this position, I served as an Engineer in the Engineering Support department, as a Sr. Engineer in the Markets Coordination department, as a Reliability Engineer, and then as Manager – Reliability Engineering. As the Manager for the Reliability Engineering group, I managed the group responsible for coordinating day-ahead and real-time operating plans between PJM, its members Transmission Owners and Generation Owners, and our neighboring entities. As a Reliability Engineer prior to this, I performed these functions
directly. In my previous engineering positions I supported the Energy Management System ("EMS") and the Security Constrained Economic Dispatch ("SCED") application.

5. I hold a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, and a Master of Science degree in Engineering Management, all from Drexel University.

II. NODES IN THE PJM SYSTEM

6. In the PJM model, there are two types of nodes: Electrical Nodes ("Enodes") and Pricing Nodes ("Pnodes"). It is important to clearly define these terms to best understand why PJM refers to its DER Aggregator Participation Model locational requirements for energy market participation as nodal.

A. Enodes

7. Enodes are all connection points between physical equipment. Branches like lines, transformers, breakers, and disconnects connect between two Enodes. Injections like loads, generators, and capacitors connect to an individual Enode. Enodes are used for determining System Operating Limits, which will be discussed later in this affidavit. For reference, the PJM internal model contains 86,397 Enodes, 10,251 of which have loads. A load, in this context, is where PJM stops modeling the Bulk Electric System ("BES"). A load is typically a step-down transformer to a sub-transmission or distribution level voltage.

B. Pnodes

8. Pnodes are Enodes that are priced in the PJM market. Generally, Pnodes are Enodes that have load or generation but can also be any weighted combinations of Enodes. The PJM internal model contains approximately 10,000 bus Pnodes reflecting internal loads as previously defined. Pnodes have unique distribution factors ("DFAX") and losses based on current topology and constraints in PJM’s nodal energy markets. A Pnode is not directly correlated with an address or even substation location. It is a grouping of electrically interconnected customers or suppliers.

9. PJM calculates some aggregate Pnodes for zones, hubs, RTO, and other uses. PJM markets calculate a locational price at each Pnode, which assumes everything at that Pnode has the same impact (DFAX) on any given constraint.

III. CONSTRAINT CONTROL

10. In understanding the role that DER Aggregation Resources will play in PJM system reliability, it is important to define PJM’s responsibility to control System Operating Limits ("SOLs") and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits ("IROLs"). This is commonly referred to as “constraint control.” PJM has clear decision-making authority to act and to direct actions to be taken by Transmission Operators, Transmission Owners, Balancing Authorities, Generator Operators, Load-Serving Entities, and Purchasing-Selling Entities within its Reliability Coordinator Area, to preserve the integrity and reliability of the BES.
PJM monitors SOL and IROL limits via the PJM Energy Management System (“EMS”). An SOL can be between any two Enodes in the PJM model. PJM Dispatch prioritizes constraints based on the impact to system reliability. IROL facilities are facilities that if exceeded have the potential to result in wide-area voltage collapse. All BES facilities and “Reliability and Markets” sub-BES facilities as listed on the PJM Transmission Facilities pages¹ are considered SOLs, including the subset of SOLs that make up the PJM-defined IROLs.

11. In accordance with PJM Manual 37: Reliability Coordination, PJM Dispatch will implement controlling actions in the following order if time permits:
   - Non-cost measures
   - Curtailing “not-willing-to-pay” transactions that adversely impact the constraint.
   - Cost-effective re-dispatch:
     - Dispatch sufficient generation to control constraints within the allotted timeframe.
     - Review regulation assignments and their impact on constrained operations.
     - Localized constraints may require de-committing specific regulating units.
     - Direct generation shift via Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (“SCED”) and phone to ensure generation is following set-points.
     - Review initial dispatch orders to ensure cost-effective constraint control.
     - Monitor generation dispatch and contact units that are not performing.
     - Manually direct generation as required.

A. **Non-Cost Actions**

12. As described in PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations, PJM dispatch utilizes all available non-cost measures prior to generation re-dispatch. Non-cost measures include, but are not limited to:
   - Phase Angle Regulator (“PAR”) adjustments.
   - Transformer tap adjustments.
   - Mega Volt Amperes Reactive (“MVAR”) adjustments.
   - Switching capacitors/reactors in/out of service.
   - Switching transmission facilities in/out of service.
   - Curtailing transactions “not-willing-to-pay” congestion.

13. A DER Aggregation Resource would not fit into any of these categories for non-cost action. DER Aggregation Resources are aggregations of resources which may inject back onto the electrical system, and their nature would require them to be redispached off-cost in order to assist in constraint control.

¹ Available here: https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/ops-analysis/transmission-facilities.aspx. Note that this information is designated as Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII), and access must be requested through PJM’s CEII processes.
B. **Off-Cost Actions**

14. As described in PJM Manual 12: Balancing Operations, once non-cost measures are exhausted, PJM Dispatch begins to re-dispatch generation. PJM will initiate re-dispatch on a cost-effective basis using the PJM Real-Time Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (“RT-SCED”) solution. RT-SCED uses the DFAX of each Pnode provided by the EMS for each constraint to determine effective controlling actions when operating off-cost. The following demonstrates the off-cost actions taken to control SOLs and IROLs on the PJM system:

- **Contingency Operations:** PJM will initiate off-cost if reasonable controlling actions are available with an impact effect generally greater than 5 percent. Once off-cost is initiated, RT-SCED tools will re-dispatch generation based on dollar-per-megawatt effect, considering all online flexible units with an impact of greater than zero percent unless a specific impact threshold is defined for the off-cost action. PJM will initiate a Post Contingency Local Load Relief Warning/Action if post-contingency flows exceed designated ratings and insufficient resources are available to control the overloaded facilities.

- **Normal/Actual Overload:** In general, PJM initiates off-cost and utilizes controlling actions greater than 5 percent impact; however, since an actual overload causes real-time equipment degradation on the affected facility, PJM will load generation with an impact effect of less than 5 percent. Once off-cost is initiated, the RT-SCED tool will re-dispatch generation based on dollar-per-megawatt effect, considering all on-line flexible units with an impact of 1 percent or greater. The RT-SCED software continues to monitor projected flows on constrained facilities and sends ramp-limited set points to optimize re-dispatch for constraint control to the designated threshold.

15. The off-cost action for constraint control is the most common controlling action. Under PJM’s proposed DER Aggregator Participation Model, DER Aggregation Resources will be expected to be dispatched in accordance to BES pricing, which is developed nodally at the transmission level.

16. In accordance with PJM Manual 3: Transmission Operations, PJM Dispatch utilizes EMS Network Applications and market tools in order to maintain system reliability. Network applications evaluate pre/post-contingency thermal and voltage limits. In addition, the Transfer Limit Calculator (“TLC”) simulates transfers in order to assess voltage collapse conditions for reactive interfaces. PJM Operators generate reports which provide generator shift factors, phase angle regulator sensitivity factors, and load distribution factors. The information contained within these reports, the PJM State Estimator solution, and unit bid information serves as the input data for PJM Market Tools. Through the use of PJM Market Tools, PJM Operators have the ability to use cost-effective generation adjustments to control thermal/voltage constraints on a pre-contingency basis.
IV. IMPACTS OF DER AGGREGATION RESOURCES

17. As previously outlined, SOLs are defined between Enodes and are controlled by calculated impacts from generators located at Pnodes. DER Aggregation Resources, from PJM’s perspective, will reside behind loads, and loads are no different than generators in their proximity impacts. Generation is separated from load and used as the primary means of constraint control, because it is dispatchable and because it is not homogeneous. Instead, load is forecasted, as it is predictable and highly correlated with other nearby loads. It moves gradually and is assumed to be highly geographically correlated.

18. As previously mentioned, constraint control is almost entirely dependent on generation redispatch and is highly nodal. Generators are not related to each other, and are individually dispatched. Constraint control requires PJM have a node-specific dispatchable resource, namely generation, and only when all other controlling actions are exhausted is load used to control constraints by being shed. Even in this case, load shed is also nodally analyzed, even though it is on the demand side of the equation. Each load has a unique impact (DFAX) and price point, which is reflected in its Locational Marginal Price (“LMP”). As the PJM system is optimized to provide the least overall costs, it is very often constrained in some locations, as the full capacity of all BES equipment is utilized. As such, every load, where the DER Aggregation Resource will be recognized, has a discrete and typically unique impact on the constraint, which results in different prices. Even an unconstrained system has different loss components at each load, which also lead to different prices. Nodal prices directly show the difference in delivery costs based on constraints and losses at all times throughout the PJM system. Load pricing across PJM is not close to uniform and therefore aggregating across multiple Pnodes could not be considered equivalent.

19. As generation technologies shift to more renewable and distributed generation options, some of the fundamental assumptions about load break down. As discussed, constraint control is really the domain of generation, where load is not dispatched. This assumption assumes loads are highly correlated with other nearby loads. Distribution-connected generation and load reduction technologies create non-homogeneous load response across transmission zones, which leads not just to forecast error, but also risks the fundamental assumptions behind scheduling generation and never needing to schedule load for constraint control. Nodal information about resources on the distribution system that are responding to wholesale electric prices more directly restores some separation and clarity between supply and demand, and protects PJM’s ability to perform constraint control for reliability purposes. DER Aggregation Resources providing that locational resolution, to the same nodal detail level as PJM planned generators, ensures adjusting LMP at a nodal level has a predictable impact on transmission constraints. That direct correlation between adjusting price and constraint relief is a fundamental requirement of wholesale markets. If nodal control erodes in favor of diffuse response from larger aggregations, LMP changes will no longer directly correlate with constraint relief, and PJM cannot reliably operate a power market on the bulk power grid.
20. With all of these factors being accounted for, PJM has determined that the current level of distribution aggregation provided by the existing transmission-level Pnode methodology is as broad as technically feasible to continue using market pricing as a means of operational control. Permitting any broader level of aggregation for DER would lead to a fundamental breakdown of determining net effects of generation resources on constraints (DFAX) and therefore congestion pricing. As such, it would deprive PJM Operators of off-cost operations, which has already been established as the primary means of constraint control on the PJM system. Without off-cost operations as a reliable means of constraint control, there are significant concerns within PJM Operations regarding the ability to exercise PJM’s Operating Plan to acceptably maintain SOLs and IROLs per NERC Standards TOP-001, R1, R12, and R14, as well as IRO-009, R1, R2, R3, and R4, respectively. As described above, this determination is based on PJM’s unique system topology, congestion patterns, and operating practices.

V. EXISTING DEMAND RESPONSE MODEL

21. There is an existing participation model in PJM in which the behavior of the resource allows for broader aggregation, known as Demand Response (“DR”). Under this model, very small resources are able to participate in PJM’s various markets. This model cannot be relied upon for accurate constraint control, for the reasons described above associated with the inability for RT SCED to accurately calculate the amount of constraint control across multiple Pnodes. However, as long as there is offsetting load from a BES perspective, the resource can aggregate across wide areas of PJM and has very small market entry requirements. It can count for capacity without any real-time telemetry requirements, and presents a flexible solution for many small resources. DR’s limitation is simply needing to be comprised solely of non-injecting resources. In being a resource which simply offsets load, it is clear that the DR resource will not be altering the load pattern and behavior significantly as previously defined. Smaller, more diffuse resources can still participate without these requirements by offsetting load through DR and should explore that already-existing model. The DER Aggregator Participation Model is more robust and will be scalable to treat these injecting resources more like what they are – generators.

VI. CONCLUSION

22. PJM is responsible for maintaining reliability of the BES. Part of this responsibility is monitoring and controlling SOLs, which are defined as an exceedance of a limit between any two Enodes. In order to control these constraints, PJM Dispatch uses a variety of non-cost and off-cost options. As previously demonstrated, using DER Aggregation Resources for constraint control would be an off-cost option. In order to accurately control the SOLs, the PJM EMS calculates the DFAX of each Pnode, which in the movement of generation or load at each Pnode will have the same equivalent effect on the SOL. Pnodes are inherently aggregates of the sub-transmission and distribution systems. As such, each Component DER must be located at the same Pnode to be part of the same DER Aggregation Resource. The DER Aggregation Resource will be dispatched, or possibly
redispatched, as a single resource, and therefore must have the same effect on the BES to accurately control SOLs.

23. This concludes my affidavit.
VERIFICATION OF DONALD BIELAK

Donald Bielak, being first duly sworn, deposes and states on this date of February 1, 2022, that he is the Donald Bielak referred to in the foregoing document entitled “Affidavit of Donald Bielak on Behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,” that he has read the same and is familiar with the contents thereof, and that the testimony set forth therein is true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.¹

/s/ Donald Bielak
Donald Bielak
Sr. Manager – Dispatch
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

¹ In accordance with the Commission’s December 8, 2021 Order Extending Blanket Waiver of In-Person Meeting and Document Notarization Requirements, PJM has omitted a notarized verification with this affidavit. See Temporary Action to Facilitate Social Distancing, 177 FERC ¶ 61,174 (2021).