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September 27, 2017

Honorable Kimberly D. Bose Secretary Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 888 First Street, N.E., Room 1A Washington, D.C. 20426

Re: PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER18-459-003

Compliance Filing Concerning OVEC Integration

### Dear Secretary Bose:

In compliance with the August 31, 2018 Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("Commission") in the above referenced proceeding, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM") hereby submits to the Commission revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("Tariff"), Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement") and the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region ("PJM RAA") to incorporate previously accepted, intervening revisions, submitted in other proceedings<sup>2</sup>, that are not reflected in the tariff records submitted in this proceeding. PJM is requesting an effective date of December 1, 2018, for the revisions, consistent with the effective date previously ordered by the Commission in this proceeding. No substantive changes to the Tariff, Operating Agreement, or RAA are being made in this filing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation,* Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-459-002 (August 31, 2018) ("August 31 Order").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Docket Nos. ER17-217-004, ER17-775-003, ER18-750-000, ER18-761-000, ER18-893-000, ER18-1245-000, ER18-1245-001, ER18-1730-000, ER18-1493-000, ER18-1893-000, and ER18-2109-000.

# I. SATISFACTION OF THE COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AUGUST 31 ORDER, BACKGROUND AND PERTINENT PJM FILINGS

On December 15, 2017, PJM and OVEC submitted tariff filings which proposed: (1) to transfer OVEC's existing Commission-approved transmission and ancillary service rates and annual revenue requirement from the OVEC Open Access Transmission Tariff to PJM's Tariff; (2) modifications to PJM's Tariff, Operating Agreement, RAA, and the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement in connection with OVEC's integration into PJM; and (3) to provide grandfathered treatment to four agreements. The Commission accepted PJM and OVEC's filing on February 13, 2018.<sup>3</sup>

On April 17, 2018, PJM and OVEC submitted a tariff filing requesting to delay the effective date of the tariff records from March 1, 2018 to December 31, 9998. On July 2, 2018, the Commission granted the request to delay, subject to a compliance filing, in which PJM and OVEC were required to apprise the Commission of the actual effective date, and submit new versions of the revised tariff sheets, at least 30 days prior to the actual effective date.<sup>4</sup>

On July 12, 2018, PJM and OVEC submitted a compliance filing providing the Commission with the effective date of December 1, 2018, for the tariff records previously accepted by the Commission, to facilitate OVEC's integration into PJM. The Commission accepted the compliance filing in its August 31 Order.

In compliance with the Commission's August 31 Order, PJM submits this filing to correct: (i) changes that were previously accepted by the Commission but were overwritten due to the change in effective date, from March 1, 2018 to December 1, 2018, in this proceeding; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation, 162 FERC ¶ 61,098 (2018).

 $<sup>^4</sup>$ PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation, 164 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2018).

(ii) to remove the italicization of language as it is no longer pending since it has been accepted by the Commission in the intervening filings and/or in this proceeding.

Specifically, PJM proposes to revise the following:

- Tariff, Table of Contents: to incorporate revisions from the following intervening filings as previously accepted by the Commission:
  - Filing submitted by PJM, on behalf of Jersey Central Power & Light Co.,
     in Docket No. ER17-217-004, filed on December 21, 2017 with an effective date of January 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission on December 27, 2017<sup>5</sup>;
  - PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-750-000, filed on January 30, 2018, with an effective date of April 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission on March 19, 2018<sup>6</sup>;
  - o PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-893-000, filed on February 21, 2018, with an effective date of April 23, 2018<sup>7</sup>;
  - PJM's compliance filing in Docket No. ER18-1629-000, filed on May 15,
     2018, with an effective date of October 1, 2018<sup>8</sup>;
  - PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-1730-000, filed on June 1, 2018, with an effective date of August 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission on July 31, 2018<sup>9</sup>; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>*PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 161 FERC ¶ 63,029 (2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-750-000 (March 19, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-893-000 (April 13, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The compliance filing was submitted pursuant to Order No. 842 and while still pending, the revisions to the Table of Contents section are being treated as accepted due to the requested effective date of October 1, 2018.

o Filing submitted by PJM, on behalf of Silver Run Electric, LLC, in Docket No. ER18-1983-000, filed on July 9, 2018, with an effective date of June 27, 2018, and accepted by the Commission on August 24, 2018<sup>10</sup>.

# • Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2:

 PJM's filing in Docket No. ER17-775-003, filed on March 23, 2018, with an effective date of April 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission on July 17, 2018<sup>11</sup>.

# • Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4:

o PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-1245-000, filed on March 30, 2018, with an effective date of June 1, 2018, and accepted by the Commission on May 31, 2018<sup>12</sup>, subject to further compliance, and the subsequent compliance filing submitted in ER18-1245-001, on July 2, 2018, with an effective date of June 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission on August 3, 2018<sup>13</sup>.

# • For Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10:

 PJM's filing in Docket No. ER17-775-003, filed on March 23, 2018, with an effective date of April 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission in the above-referenced July 17 Order.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,073 (2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-1983-000 (August 24, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER17-775-003 (July 17, 2018) ("July 17 Order").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 163 FERC ¶ 61,165 (2018) ("May 31 Order").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-1245-001 (August 3, 2018) ("August 3 Order").

# • For Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2:

o PJM's filing in Docket No. ER17-775-003, filed on March 23, 2018, with an effective date of April 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission in the above-referenced July 17 Order.

# • For Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4:

o PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-1245-000, filed on March 30, 2018, with an effective date of June 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission in its May 31 Order, and the subsequent compliance filing submitted in ER18-1245-001, on July 2, 2018, with an effective date of June 1, 2018, accepted by the Commission in its August 3 Order.

# • For RAA, Schedule 17:

- o PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-761-000, filed on January 31, 2018, with an effective date of December 31, 2017, accepted by the Commission on March 5, 2018<sup>14</sup>:
- PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-1483-000, filed on April 30, 2018, with an effective date of March 31, 2018, accepted by the Commission on June 25, 2018<sup>15</sup>; and
- o PJM's filing in Docket No. ER18-2109-000, filed on July 31, 2018, with an effective date of June 30, 2018, accepted by the Commission on September 19, 2018<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-761-000 (March 5, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-1483-000 (June 25, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Letter Order, Docket No. ER18-2109-000 (September 19, 2018).

The tariff records are being filed in clean format only, as substitute versions with no new substantive changes.

#### II. DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSED TARIFF REVISIONS

To ensure that Tariff, Table of Contents; Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 3.2; Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4; Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4; and RAA Schedule 17 reflect all Commission-accepted language effective as of December 1, 2018, pursuant to prior Commission orders, PJM hereby submits clean-up versions of the sections in clean format as accepted in the aforementioned accepted filings. The revisions are merely ministerial, simply incorporate previously accepted language and/or the removal of the italicization of pending language as it is accepted and no longer pending. The revisions do not make any substantive modifications.

#### III. **EFFECTIVE DATE**

Consistent with the August 31 Order, the effective date for the revised tariff records reflecting the intervening revisions, as well as the revisions related to the OVEC integration is December 1, 2018.

#### IV. **DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED**

PJM encloses with this transmittal letter:

- Attachment A a clean version of Tariff, Table of Contents; Tariff, Attachment 1) K-Appendix, section 3.2; Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 7.4; Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 3.2; Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4; and RAA Schedule 17; and
- Attachment B a PDF version clearly identifying the redlined and italicized 2) language from the source filings.

# V. CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS

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### VI. SERVICE

PJM has served a copy of this filing on all PJM Members and on all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region by posting this filing electronically. In accordance with the Commission's regulations, <sup>17</sup> PJM will post a copy of this filing to the FERC filings section of its internet site, located at the following link: http://www.pjm.com/documents/fercmanuals/ferc-filings.aspx with a specific link to the newly-filed document, and will send an email on the same date as this filing to all PJM Members and all state utility regulatory commissions in the PJM Region<sup>18</sup> alerting them that this filing has been made by PJM and is available by following such link. If the document is not immediately available by using the referenced link, the document will be available through the referenced link within 24 hours of the filing. Also, a copy of this filing will be available on the FERC's eLibrary website located at the link: http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp in accordance with following the Commission's regulations and Order No. 714.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James M. Burlew
James M. Burlew
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See 18C.F.R §§ 35.2(e) and 385.2010(f)(3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> PJM already maintains, updates and regularly uses e-mail lists for all PJM Members and affected state commissions.

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding.

Dated at Audubon, PA, this 27<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2018.

/s/ James M. Burlew
James M. Burlew
Attorney for
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

# Attachment A

PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, PJM Operating Agreement and PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement

(Clean Format)

# Section(s) of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff

(Clean Format)

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- 16.0 Addendum of Interconnection Requirements for a Wind Generation Facility
- 17.0 Infrastructure Security of Electric System Equipment and Operations and Control Hardware and Software is Essential to Ensure Day-to-Day Reliability and Operational Security

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### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

# 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

### 3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for the Real-time Settlement Intervals in an hour.

Regulation Charge = Hourly Regulation Obligation Share \* (sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour)

- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- (c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the

generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) To determine the Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the Regulation market performance-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Regulation market capability-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the Regulation market performance-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the Regulation market capability-clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their

order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & \text{Correlation Score} = r_{\text{Signal}, \text{Response}(\delta, \delta + 5 \text{ Min});} \\ & \delta \text{=0 to 5 Min} \end{aligned} where \delta is delay.
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\epsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

## 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

## 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

- (a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.
- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

## 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

- (a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the applicable offer for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.
- (b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for Start-up Costs and Noload Costs and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price for Start-up Costs (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and No-load Costs and energy summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate

in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.
- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Realtime Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following Segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two Segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is

limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's Total Operating Reserve Offer, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction (excluding quantity deviations caused by an increase in the Market Seller's Real-time Offer), from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for Segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits

accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

- (f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.
- (f-1) With the exception of Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource's Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller of a Flexible Resource shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Generation Resource Maximum Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described in section 3.2.3 (f).
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:
    - the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer plus No-load Costs, plus (D) the Start-up Cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Dayahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set

- of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Dayahead Energy Market, or
- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.

Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource's Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be eligible to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs under any applicable provisions of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

- (f-2) A Market Seller of a hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the

generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour:

C = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.
- For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.
- (m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for

Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & \text{(UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1}) \\ & \text{(UDSLAtime}_{t-1}) \end{aligned} }_{t-1} \\ & \text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \left( \text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right) }_{t-1} \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not

following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing
  Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time
  Settlement Interval MWh –Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

- (p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.
  - (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
    - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that

occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

- (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
- (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
- (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

### 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour

("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.
  - ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
  - iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each (d) Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- (j) In the event a generation resource or Demand Resource that either has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized

Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

- (k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(1), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

### 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Realtime Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to

determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non- Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

# 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.
- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the

Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

- (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
- (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
- (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, and are allocated as Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling

Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (ii) below.

- A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to (i) the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
- (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.
- (e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch

algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.
- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Generation Resource Maximum Output, if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).
- (f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or

as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)}where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the lesser of the Final Offer or Committed Offer;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing

for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.

- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.
- (m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the

Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

## 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers (b) associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with postcontingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's applicable interval cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with postcontingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The

total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

# 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

## 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

# 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

- (a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.
- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

# **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant's internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

# 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.4. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3(b). If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) In accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.
  - (ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.1(d)(ii) shall be distributed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and

7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that

has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction (c) Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission

- Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.
- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed

- megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

# 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction

Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

# 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

#### 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission

Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.

- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# **5.10** Auction Clearing Requirements

The Office of the Interconnection shall clear each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction for a Delivery Year in accordance with the following:

a) Variable Resource Requirement Curve

The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and for such Locational Deliverability Areas as determined appropriate in accordance with subsection (a)(iii) for such Delivery Year to establish the level of Capacity Resources that will provide an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards. It is recognized that the variable resource requirement reflected in the Variable Resource Requirement Curve can result in an optimized auction clearing in which the level of Capacity Resources committed for a Delivery Year exceeds the PJM Region Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target) or Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Year through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the Zones associated with such LDA) for such Delivery Year. For any auction, the Updated Forecast Peak Load, and Short-Term Resource Procurement Target applicable to such auction, shall be used, and Price Responsive Demand from any applicable approved PRD Plan, including any associated PRD Reservation Prices, shall be reflected in the derivation of the Variable Resource Requirement Curves, in accordance with the methodology specified in the PJM Manuals.

i) Methodology to Establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve

Prior to the Base Residual Auction, in accordance with the schedule in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region as follows:

- Each Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be plotted on a graph on which Unforced Capacity is on the x-axis and price is on the y-axis;
- For the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), and (iv) a vertical line from point (3) to the x-axis, where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 3%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years

- through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For point (2), price equals: (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset) divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 1%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
- For point (3), price equals [0.2 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 5%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), and (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 0.2%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
  - For point (2), price equals: [0.75 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 2.9%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
  - For point (3), price equals zero and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target.

- ii) For any Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for each LDA for which:
  - A. the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with NERC and Applicable Regional Entity guidelines; or
  - B. such LDA had a Locational Price Adder in any one or more of the three immediately preceding Base Residual Auctions; or
  - C. such LDA is determined in a preliminary analysis by the Office of the Interconnection to be likely to have a Locational Price Adder, based on historic offer price levels; provided however that for the Base Residual Auction conducted for the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2012, the Eastern Mid-Atlantic Region ("EMAR"), Southwest Mid-Atlantic Region ("SWMAR"), and Mid-Atlantic Region ("MAR") LDAs shall employ separate Variable Resource Requirement Curves regardless of the outcome of the above three tests; and provided further that the Office of the Interconnection may establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for an LDA not otherwise qualifying under the above three tests if it finds that such is required to achieve an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards, in which case the Office of the Interconnection shall post such finding, such LDA, and such Variable Resource Requirement Curve on its internet site no later than the March 31 last preceding the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The same process as set forth in subsection (a)(i) shall be used to establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for any such LDA, except that the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for such LDA shall be substituted for the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be substituted for the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target. For purposes of calculating the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit under this section, all generation resources located in the PJM Region that are, or that qualify to become, Capacity Resources, shall be modeled at their full capacity rating, regardless of the amount of capacity cleared from such resource for the immediately preceding Delivery Year.

For each such LDA, for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall (a) determine the Net Cost of New Entry for each Zone in such LDA, with such Net Cost of New Entry equal to the applicable Cost of New Entry value for such Zone minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset value for such Zone, and (b) compute the average of the Net Cost of New Entry values of all such Zones to determine the Net Cost of New Entry for such LDA; provided however, that the Net Cost of New Entry for an LDA may

be greater than, but shall be no less than, the Net Cost of New Entry determined for any other LDA in which the first LDA resides (immediately or successively) including the Net Cost of New Entry for the RTO. The Net Cost of New Entry for use in an LDA in any Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years shall be the Net Cost of New Entry used for such LDA in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

iii) Procedure for ongoing review of Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform a review of the shape of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, as established by the requirements of the foregoing subsection. Such analysis shall be based on simulation of market conditions to quantify the ability of the market to invest in new Capacity Resources and to meet the applicable reliability requirements on a probabilistic basis. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall prepare a recommendation to either modify or retain the existing Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the recommendation and shall review the recommendation through the stakeholder process to solicit stakeholder input. If a modification of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape is recommended, the following process shall be followed:

- A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- B) The PJM Members shall review the proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.
- C) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed modification, (ii) propose alternate modifications or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- D) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider a proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

# iv) Cost of New Entry

A) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region and for each LDA shall be the respective value used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and LDA. For the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2018, and continuing thereafter unless and until changed pursuant to subsection (B) below, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region shall be the average of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area listed in this section as adjusted pursuant to subsection (a)(iv)(B).

Geographic Location Within the	Cost of New Entry
PJM Region Encompassing These	in \$/MW-Year
Zones	
PS, JCP&L, AE, PECO, DPL, RECO	132,200
("CONE Area 1")	
BGE, PEPCO ("CONE Area 2")	130,300
AEP, Dayton, ComEd, APS, DQL,	128,900
ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, Dominion,	
OVEC ("CONE Area 3")	
PPL, MetEd, Penelec ("CONE Area	130,300
4")	

- B) Beginning with the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, the CONE for each CONE Area shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs based on changes in the Applicable United States Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") Composite Index, in accordance with the following:
- (1) The Applicable BLS Composite Index for any Delivery Year and CONE Area shall be the most recently published twelve-month change, at the time CONE values are required to be posted for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, in a composite of the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for Utility System Construction (weighted 20%), the BLS Producer Price Index for Construction Materials and Components (weighted 50%), and the BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets (weighted 30%), as each such index is further specified for each CONE Area in the PJM Manuals.
- (2) The CONE in a CONE Area shall be adjusted prior to the Base Residual Auction for each Delivery Year by applying the Applicable BLS Composite Index for such CONE Area to the Benchmark CONE for such CONE Area.
- (3) The Benchmark CONE for a CONE Area shall be the CONE used for such CONE Area in the Base Residual Auction for the prior Delivery Year (provided, however that the Gross CONE values stated in subsection (a)(iv)(A) above shall be the Benchmark

CONE values for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year to which the Applicable BLS Composite Index shall be applied to determine the CONE for subsequent Delivery Years).

- (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, CONE values for any CONE Area for any Delivery Year shall be subject to amendment pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act, including, without limitation, any filings resulting from the process described in section 5.10(a)(vi)(C) or any filing to establish new or revised CONE Areas.
  - v) Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset
    - A) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset each year for the PJM Region as (A) the annual average of the revenues that would have been received by the Reference Resource from the PJM energy markets during a period of three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination, based on (1) the heat rate and other characteristics of such Reference Resource; (2) fuel prices reported during such period at an appropriate pricing point for the PJM Region with a fuel transmission adder appropriate for such region, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, assumed variable operation and maintenance expenses for such resource of \$6.47 per MWh, and actual PJM hourly average Locational Marginal Prices recorded in the PJM Region during such period; and (3) an assumption that the Reference Resource would be dispatched for both the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets on a Peak-Hour Dispatch basis; plus (B) ancillary service revenues of \$2,199 per MW-year.
    - B) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection will employ for purposes of the Variable Resourcce Requirement Curves for such Delivery Years the same calculations of the subregional Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offsets that were used in the Base Residual Auctions for such Delivery year and sub-region. For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection also shall determine a Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset each year for each Zone, using the same procedures and methods as set forth in the previous subsection; provided, however, that: (1) the average hourly LMPs for such Zone shall be used in place of the PJM Region average hourly LMPs; (2) if such Zone was not integrated into the PJM Region for the entire applicable period, then the offset shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years during which the Zone was integrated; and (3) a posted fuel pricing point in such Zone, if available, and (if such pricing point is not available in such Zone) a fuel transmission adder appropriate

to such Zone from an appropriate PJM Region pricing point shall be used for each such Zone.

vi) Process for Establishing Parameters of Variable Resource Requirement

#### Curve

- A) The parameters of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve will be established prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year and will be used for such Base Residual Auction.
- B) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction on or before February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values will be applied, in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- C) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the calculation of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Cost of New Entry values should be modified, the Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose new Cost of New Entry values on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed values.
  - 3) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed values, (ii) propose alternate values or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider Cost of New Entry values, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Cost of New Entry values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

- D) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the methodology set forth in this Attachment for determining the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset for the PJM Region and for each Zone.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed methodology.
  - The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed methodology, (ii) propose an alternate methodology or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider the Net Revenue Offset methodology, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

# b) Locational Requirements

The Office of Interconnection shall establish locational requirements prior to the Base Residual Auction to quantify the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be committed in each Locational Deliverability Area, in accordance with the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## c) Resource Requirements and Constraints

Prior to the Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction for the Delivery Years starting on June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and

Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Limited Resource Constraints and the Sub-Annual Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auctions for 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraints and the Base Capacity Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year.

d) Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Preliminary PJM Region Load Forecast for the Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

e) Updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecasts for Incremental Auctions

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for a Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year.

# Section(s) of the PJM Operating Agreement

(Clean Format)

#### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

# 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

## 3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for the Real-time Settlement Intervals in an hour.

Regulation Charge = Hourly Regulation Obligation Share \* (sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour)

- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- (c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the

generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) To determine the Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the Regulation market performance-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Regulation market capability-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the Regulation market performance-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the Regulation market capability-clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their

order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\label{eq:correlation} \begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5\ Min);} \\ & \delta \text{=-0 to 5 Min} \end{aligned} where \delta is delay.
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

## 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

## 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

- (a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.
- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

## 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

- (a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the applicable offer for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.
- (b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for Start-up Costs and Noload Costs and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price for Start-up Costs (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and No-load Costs and energy summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate

in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.
- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Realtime Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following Segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two Segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time specified at the time of commitment (minimum down time specified at the time of commitment for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is

limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's Total Operating Reserve Offer, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction (excluding quantity deviations caused by an increase in the Market Seller's Real-time Offer), from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for Segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits

accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

- (f) A Market Seller of a unit not defined in subsection (f-1), (f-2), or (f-4) hereof (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.
- (f-1) With the exception of Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource's Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market, a Market Seller of a Flexible Resource shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Generation Resource Maximum Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described in section 3.2.3 (f).
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:
    - the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer plus No-load Costs, plus (D) the Start-up Cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Dayahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set

- of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Dayahead Energy Market, or
- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.

Market Sellers of Flexible Resources that submit a Real-time Offer greater than their resource's Committed Offer in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be eligible to receive compensation for lost opportunity costs under any applicable provisions of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

- (f-2) A Market Seller of a hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the

generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h =the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour:

C = For each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.

- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.
- For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.
- (m) For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for

Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.

For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & \text{(UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1}) \\ & \text{(UDSLAtime}_{t-1}) \end{aligned} }_{t-1} \\ & \text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \left( \text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right) }_{t-1} \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not

following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing
  Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time
  Settlement Interval MWh –Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

- (p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.
  - (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
    - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that

occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).

- (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
- (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
- (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour

("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.

- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.
  - ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
  - iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each (d) Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.

- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized

Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

- (k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(1), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

## 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Realtime Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to

determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non- Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

## Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.

- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

# 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.
- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the

Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.

- (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
- (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
- (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, and are allocated as Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling

Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (ii) below.

- A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to (i) the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
- (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.
- (e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

(a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch

algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.

- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the Total Lost Opportunity Cost Offer, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.
- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Generation Resource Maximum Output, if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).
- (f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or

as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)}where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the lesser of the Final Offer or Committed Offer;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (i) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing

for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.

- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.
- (m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the

Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

## 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers (b) associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with postcontingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's applicable interval cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with postcontingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The

total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

# 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

## 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

# 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

- (a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.
- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.

- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

# **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant's internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

## 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

# 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.4. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3(b). If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) In accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.
  - (ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.1(d)(ii) shall be distributed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and

7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that

has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction (c) Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission

- Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.
- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed

- megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

# 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction

Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

#### 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

#### 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission

Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.

- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# Section(s) of the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement

(Clean Format)

#### **SCHEDULE 17**

#### PARTIES TO THE RELIABILITY ASSURANCE AGREEMENT

This Schedule sets forth the Parties to the Agreement:

Abest Power & Gas, LLC

AEP Energy, Inc.

AEP Retail Energy Partners LLC

AES Ohio Generation, LLC

Agera Energy LLC

Aggressive Energy LLC

Agway Energy Services, LLC

Algonquin Energy Services Inc.

All American Power and Gas, LLC

Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Allegheny Energy Supply Company, L.L.C.

Alpaca Energy LLC

Alpha Gas and Electric LLC

Ambit Northeast, LLC

American Electric Power Service Corporation on behalf of its affiliates:

**Appalachian Power Company** 

Indiana Michigan Power Company

Kentucky Power Company

Kingsport Power Company

**Ohio Power Company** 

Wheeling Power Company.

American Municipal Power, Inc.

American Power & Gas of IL, LLC

American Power & Gas of MD, LLC

American Power & Gas of NJ, LLC

American Power & Gas of Ohio, LLC

American Power & Gas of Pennsylvania, LLC

American Power Partners LLC

American PowerNet Management, L.P.

American Transmission Systems, Inc.

AP Gas and Electric (PA), LLC

APN Starfirst, LP

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Copy of the Revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, PJM Operating Agreement and Reliability Assurance Agreement

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- 15.0 Addendum of Non-Standard Terms and Conditions for Interconnection Service

- 16.0 Addendum of Interconnection Requirements for a Wind Generation Facility
- 17.0 Infrastructure Security of Electric System Equipment and Operations and Control Hardware and Software is Essential to Ensure Day-to-Day Reliability and Operational Security

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

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- 14.0 Addendum of Interconnection Customer's Agreement to Conform with IRS Safe Harbor Provisions for Non-Taxable Status
- 15.0 Addendum of Non-Standard Terms and Conditions for Interconnection Service
- 16.0 Addendum of Interconnection Requirements for a Wind Generation Facility
- 17.0 Infrastructure Security of Electric System Equipment and Operations and Control Hardware and Software is Essential to Ensure Day-to-Day Reliability and Operational Security

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# 10 Assignment

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- 10.2 Assignment Without Prior Consent
- 10.3 Successors and Assigns

#### 11 Insurance

- 11.1 Required Coverages For Generation Resources Of More Than 20 Megawatts and Merchant Transmission Facilities
- 11.1A Required Coverages For Generation Resources of
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ATTACHMENT HH – RATES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE FOR PJMSETTLEMENT, INC.

ATTACHMENT II – MTEP PROJECT COST RECOVERY FOR ATSI ZONE

ATTACHMENT J.I – MTEP PROJECT COST RECOVERY FOR DEOK ZONE

#### ATTACHMENT KK - FORM OF DESIGNATED ENTITY AGREEMENT

ATTACHMENT LL - FORM OF INTERCONNECTION COORDINATION AGREEMENT

ATTACHMENT MM – FORM OF PSEUDO-TIE AGREEMENT – WITH NATIVE BA AS PARTY

ATTACHMENT MM-1 – FORM OF SYSTEM MODIFICATION COST REIMBURSEMENT AGREEMENT – PSEUDO-TIE INTO PJM

ATTACHMENT NN – FORM OF PSEUDO-TIE AGREEMENT WITHOUT NATIVE BA AS PARTY

ATTACHMENT OO – FORM OF DYNAMIC SCHEDULE AGREEMENT INTO THE PJM REGION

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 3.2

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#### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

## 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

#### 3.2.2 Regulation.

- (a) Each Market *Participant* that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market *Participant with an* hourly Regulation *Obligation shall* be charged the *pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of regulation provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.*
- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability. The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market *Participant* selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the *last three Real-time Settlement Intervals* of the preceding shoulder hour and the *first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* following shoulder hour, *in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.* 

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the *Real-time Settlement Interval* in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of the* preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval*) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market *Participant* in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer

for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.
- (k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the

correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5 \ Min);} \\ & \delta \text{=-0 to 5 Min} \end{aligned}
```

where  $\delta$  is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

## 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

#### 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as

determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

## 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer

Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals* exceeds the total value summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals*, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations .
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to

maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of *Real-time Settlement Intervals* the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Intervals* when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty

calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and *Real-time Settlement Interval share of the* Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding *Real-time Settlement Interval*(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each *Real-time Settlement Interval* the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement* 

Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:
    - 1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, inclusive of no-load costs, plus (D) the start-up cost,

divided by the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.
- (f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller *of a* wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the

Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit. For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant *based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:*

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-Time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic

Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.
- (l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as

provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

- For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (1) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Realtime Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.
- For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in

its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & (\mathsf{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1}) / (\mathsf{UDSLAtime}_{t-1}) \\ & \mathsf{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \left( \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathsf{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right) } \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired *MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval*.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh is within 5% of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh*—Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource tripped and the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to

resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
  - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
  - (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible

to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.
  - ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are

operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event *in a Real-time Settlement Interval* initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each (d) Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to

determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; *and* 

D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation:* 

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

- C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and
- D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

- (g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market *Participant* in excess of that Market *Participant's* Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the *Market Participant's* obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.
- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a *Real-time Settlement Interval* than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that *Real-time Settlement Interval* due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all *Real-time* Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market

Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all *intervals* the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation

resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

## 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve

Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation*:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

- A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;
- B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;
- C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

## 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves

schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
  - (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
  - (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW

usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

- (d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement ("Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Charges per paragraph (ii) below.
  - (i) A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
  - (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers

and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

- (a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.
- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that market-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)} where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market *Participant* accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.
- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service,

in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

## 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- (b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each *applicable interval* a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's *applicable interval* cost

to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the *applicable interval* product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

## 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

## 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.
- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each *applicable interval* of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net *withdrawals and injections* in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

## **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market *Participant* in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market *Participant*. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market *Participant's* internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market *Participant* that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market *Participant*, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market *Participant* and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 3.2

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#### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

## 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

## 3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of regulation provided in each Real time Settlement Interval times the clearing price Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits for all the Real-time Settlement Intervals in thean hour associated with that obligation.

<u>Regulation Charge = Hourly Regulation Obligation Share \* (sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour)</u>

- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- (c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a

generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour ,in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a

Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the performance-Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance-Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market performance—clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the <u>capability</u>-Regulation market <u>capability</u>-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the <u>performance</u>-Regulation market <u>performance</u>-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the <u>capability</u>-Regulation market <u>capability</u> clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits

factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5 \ Min);} \\ & \delta = 0 \ to \ 5 \ Min \end{aligned}
```

Energy Score =  $1 - 1/n \sum Abs$  (Error);

where  $\delta$  is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and
```

n = the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

#### 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

## 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

- (a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.
- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

# 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

- (a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.
- (b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate

in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.
- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement

Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:

- 1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, inclusive of no-load costs, plus (D) the start-up cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or
- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.
- (f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the

requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit. For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\textstyle\sum_h\left(A+B+C\right)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-Time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations:

B = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour:

C = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at

interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

- (1) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.
- For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (1) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to

the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & \text{(UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1} ) / \\ & \text{(UDSLAtime}_{t-1} ) \end{aligned} }_{\text{$t-1$}} \\ & \text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \begin{cases} \text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \\ \end{cases} }_{\text{$t-1$}} \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL\_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing
  Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time
  Settlement Interval MWh –Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

- (p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.
  - (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
    - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
    - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
    - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
  - (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
    - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that

resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
  - (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's

PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

- Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an (a) agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or

the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.

- ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

- C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and
- D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

- (g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.
- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption

achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(1) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

## 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves

and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non- Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

 $(A \times B) - C$ 

#### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

- B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;
- C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

## 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-

ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
  - (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
  - (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the

"ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

- (d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement ("Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Charges per paragraph (ii) below.
  - A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to (i) the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
  - (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of

operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

- (a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.
- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time

Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that market-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is

above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)} where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining (i) reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.
- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service,

in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

# 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- (b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's applicable interval cost to

provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

## 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

# 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.
- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

## **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant's internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 3.2

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#### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

## 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

#### 3.2.2 Regulation.

- (a) Each Market *Participant* that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market *Participant with an* hourly Regulation *Obligation shall* be charged the *pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of regulation provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.*
- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability. The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market *Participant* selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the *last three Real-time Settlement Intervals* of the preceding shoulder hour and the *first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* following shoulder hour, *in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.* 

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the *Real-time Settlement Interval* in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of the* preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval*) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market *Participant* in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer

for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.
- (k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the

correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5 \ Min);} \\ & \delta \text{=-0 to 5 Min} \end{aligned}
```

where  $\delta$  is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

## 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

#### 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as

determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

# 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer

Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals* exceeds the total value summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals*, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations .
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to

maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of *Real-time Settlement Intervals* the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Intervals* when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty

calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and *Real-time Settlement Interval share of the* Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding *Real-time Settlement Interval*(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each *Real-time Settlement Interval* the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement* 

Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:
    - 1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, inclusive of no-load costs, plus (D) the start-up cost,

divided by the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.
- (f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller *of a* wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the

Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit. For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant *based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:*

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h =the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-Time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic

Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.
- (l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as

provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

- For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (1) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Realtime Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.
- For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in

its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & (\mathsf{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1}) / (\mathsf{UDSLAtime}_{t-1}) \\ & \mathsf{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \left( \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathsf{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right) } \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired *MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval*.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh is within 5% of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh*—Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource tripped and the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to

resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
  - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
  - (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible

to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.
  - ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are

operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event *in a Real-time Settlement Interval* initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each (d) Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to

determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; *and* 

D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation:* 

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

- C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and
- D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

- (g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market *Participant* in excess of that Market *Participant's* Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the *Market Participant's* obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.
- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a *Real-time Settlement Interval* than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that *Real-time Settlement Interval* due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all *Real-time* Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market

Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all *intervals* the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation

resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

# 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve

Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation*:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

- A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;
- B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;
- C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

## 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves

schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
  - (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
  - (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW

usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

- (d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement ("Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Charges per paragraph (ii) below.
  - (i) A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
  - (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers

and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

- (a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.
- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that market-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP – UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)} where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market *Participant* accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.
- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service,

in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

## 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- (b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each *applicable interval* a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's *applicable interval* cost

to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the *applicable interval* product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

### 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

# 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.
- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each *applicable interval* of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net *withdrawals and injections* in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

### **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market *Participant* in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market *Participant*. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market *Participant's* internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market *Participant* that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market *Participant*, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market *Participant* and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

## 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

# 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation

Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical

generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue

Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during

the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the

generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

- megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

# 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

# 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

# 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To FTRARR hHolders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sSection 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sSection 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the

Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for

Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may

request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these

cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

- v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.
- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

# 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an

allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

### 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each

prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

# 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

## 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.4. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3(b). If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To ARR holders <u>Ii</u>n accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.
  - (ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.1(d)(ii) shall be distributed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load

Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in

a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the

megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation

without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation (i) process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's

- FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.
- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

### 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the

right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

# 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

#### 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OATT Attachment K-Appendix, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

### 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation

Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical

generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue

Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during

the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the

generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

- megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

### 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

### 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

## 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OATT Attachment DD 5.10

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# **5.10** Auction Clearing Requirements

The Office of the Interconnection shall clear each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction for a Delivery Year in accordance with the following:

a) Variable Resource Requirement Curve

The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and for such Locational Deliverability Areas as determined appropriate in accordance with subsection (a)(iii) for such Delivery Year to establish the level of Capacity Resources that will provide an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards. It is recognized that the variable resource requirement reflected in the Variable Resource Requirement Curve can result in an optimized auction clearing in which the level of Capacity Resources committed for a Delivery Year exceeds the PJM Region Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target) or Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Year through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the Zones associated with such LDA) for such Delivery Year. For any auction, the Updated Forecast Peak Load, and Short-Term Resource Procurement Target applicable to such auction, shall be used, and Price Responsive Demand from any applicable approved PRD Plan, including any associated PRD Reservation Prices, shall be reflected in the derivation of the Variable Resource Requirement Curves, in accordance with the methodology specified in the PJM Manuals.

i) Methodology to Establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve

Prior to the Base Residual Auction, in accordance with the schedule in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region as follows:

- Each Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be plotted on a graph on which Unforced Capacity is on the x-axis and price is on the y-axis;
- For the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), and (iv) a vertical line from point (3) to the x-axis, where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 3%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years

- through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For point (2), price equals: (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset) divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 1%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
- For point (3), price equals [0.2 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 5%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), and (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 0.2%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
  - For point (2), price equals: [0.75 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 2.9%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
  - For point (3), price equals zero and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target.

- ii) For any Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for each LDA for which:
  - A. the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with NERC and Applicable Regional Entity guidelines; or
  - B. such LDA had a Locational Price Adder in any one or more of the three immediately preceding Base Residual Auctions; or
  - C. such LDA is determined in a preliminary analysis by the Office of the Interconnection to be likely to have a Locational Price Adder, based on historic offer price levels; provided however that for the Base Residual Auction conducted for the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2012, the Eastern Mid-Atlantic Region ("EMAR"), Southwest Mid-Atlantic Region ("SWMAR"), and Mid-Atlantic Region ("MAR") LDAs shall employ separate Variable Resource Requirement Curves regardless of the outcome of the above three tests; and provided further that the Office of the Interconnection may establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for an LDA not otherwise qualifying under the above three tests if it finds that such is required to achieve an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards, in which case the Office of the Interconnection shall post such finding, such LDA, and such Variable Resource Requirement Curve on its internet site no later than the March 31 last preceding the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The same process as set forth in subsection (a)(i) shall be used to establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for any such LDA, except that the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for such LDA shall be substituted for the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be substituted for the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target. For purposes of calculating the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit under this section, all generation resources located in the PJM Region that are, or that qualify to become, Capacity Resources, shall be modeled at their full capacity rating, regardless of the amount of capacity cleared from such resource for the immediately preceding Delivery Year.

For each such LDA, for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall (a) determine the Net Cost of New Entry for each Zone in such LDA, with such Net Cost of New Entry equal to the applicable Cost of New Entry value for such Zone minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset value for such Zone, and (b) compute the average of the Net Cost of New Entry values of all such Zones to determine the Net Cost of New Entry for such LDA; provided however, that the Net Cost of New Entry for an LDA may

be greater than, but shall be no less than, the Net Cost of New Entry determined for any other LDA in which the first LDA resides (immediately or successively) including the Net Cost of New Entry for the RTO. The Net Cost of New Entry for use in an LDA in any Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years shall be the Net Cost of New Entry used for such LDA in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

iii) Procedure for ongoing review of Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform a review of the shape of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, as established by the requirements of the foregoing subsection. Such analysis shall be based on simulation of market conditions to quantify the ability of the market to invest in new Capacity Resources and to meet the applicable reliability requirements on a probabilistic basis. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall prepare a recommendation to either modify or retain the existing Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the recommendation and shall review the recommendation through the stakeholder process to solicit stakeholder input. If a modification of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape is recommended, the following process shall be followed:

- A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- B) The PJM Members shall review the proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.
- C) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed modification, (ii) propose alternate modifications or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- D) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider a proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

### iv) Cost of New Entry

A) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region and for each LDA shall be the respective value used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and LDA. For the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2018, and continuing thereafter unless and until changed pursuant to subsection (B) below, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region shall be the average of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area listed in this section as adjusted pursuant to subsection (a)(iv)(B).

Geographic Location Within the PJM Region Encompassing These	Cost of New Entry in \$/MW-Year
Zones	
PS, JCP&L, AE, PECO, DPL, RECO	132,200
("CONE Area 1")	
BGE, PEPCO ("CONE Area 2")	130,300
AEP, Dayton, ComEd, APS, DQL,	128,900
ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, Dominion,	
OVEC ("CONE Area 3")	
PPL, MetEd, Penelec ("CONE Area	130,300
4")	

- B) Beginning with the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, the CONE for each CONE Area shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs based on changes in the Applicable United States Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") Composite Index, in accordance with the following:
- (1) The Applicable BLS Composite Index for any Delivery Year and CONE Area shall be the most recently published twelve-month change, at the time CONE values are required to be posted for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, in a composite of the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for Utility System Construction (weighted 20%), the BLS Producer Price Index for Construction Materials and Components (weighted 50%), and the BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets (weighted 30%), as each such index is further specified for each CONE Area in the PJM Manuals.
- (2) The CONE in a CONE Area shall be adjusted prior to the Base Residual Auction for each Delivery Year by applying the Applicable BLS Composite Index for such CONE Area to the Benchmark CONE for such CONE Area.
- (3) The Benchmark CONE for a CONE Area shall be the CONE used for such CONE Area in the Base Residual Auction for the prior Delivery Year (provided, however that the Gross CONE values stated in subsection (a)(iv)(A) above shall be the Benchmark

CONE values for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year to which the Applicable BLS Composite Index shall be applied to determine the CONE for subsequent Delivery Years).

- (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, CONE values for any CONE Area for any Delivery Year shall be subject to amendment pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act, including, without limitation, any filings resulting from the process described in section 5.10(a)(vi)(C) or any filing to establish new or revised CONE Areas.
  - v) Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset
    - A) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset each year for the PJM Region as (A) the annual average of the revenues that would have been received by the Reference Resource from the PJM energy markets during a period of three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination, based on (1) the heat rate and other characteristics of such Reference Resource; (2) fuel prices reported during such period at an appropriate pricing point for the PJM Region with a fuel transmission adder appropriate for such region, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, assumed variable operation and maintenance expenses for such resource of \$6.47 per MWh, and actual PJM hourly average Locational Marginal Prices recorded in the PJM Region during such period; and (3) an assumption that the Reference Resource would be dispatched for both the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets on a Peak-Hour Dispatch basis; plus (B) ancillary service revenues of \$2,199 per MW-year.
    - B) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection will employ for purposes of the Variable Resourcce Requirement Curves for such Delivery Years the same calculations of the subregional Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offsets that were used in the Base Residual Auctions for such Delivery year and sub-region. For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection also shall determine a Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset each year for each Zone, using the same procedures and methods as set forth in the previous subsection; provided, however, that: (1) the average hourly LMPs for such Zone shall be used in place of the PJM Region average hourly LMPs; (2) if such Zone was not integrated into the PJM Region for the entire applicable period, then the offset shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years during which the Zone was integrated; and (3) a posted fuel pricing point in such Zone, if available, and (if such pricing point is not available in such Zone) a fuel transmission adder appropriate

to such Zone from an appropriate PJM Region pricing point shall be used for each such Zone.

vi) Process for Establishing Parameters of Variable Resource Requirement

#### Curve

- A) The parameters of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve will be established prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year and will be used for such Base Residual Auction.
- B) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction on or before February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values will be applied, in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- C) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the calculation of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Cost of New Entry values should be modified, the Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose new Cost of New Entry values on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed values.
  - 3) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed values, (ii) propose alternate values or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider Cost of New Entry values, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Cost of New Entry values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

- D) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the methodology set forth in this Attachment for determining the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset for the PJM Region and for each Zone.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed methodology.
  - The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed methodology, (ii) propose an alternate methodology or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider the Net Revenue Offset methodology, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

### b) Locational Requirements

The Office of Interconnection shall establish locational requirements prior to the Base Residual Auction to quantify the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be committed in each Locational Deliverability Area, in accordance with the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

#### c) Resource Requirements and Constraints

Prior to the Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction for the Delivery Years starting on June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and

Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Limited Resource Constraints and the Sub-Annual Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auctions for 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraints and the Base Capacity Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year.

d) Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Preliminary PJM Region Load Forecast for the Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

e) Updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecasts for Incremental Auctions

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for a Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year.

# OATT Attachment DD 5.10

Docket No. ER17-775-003

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Version: 24.0.0

## **5.10** Auction Clearing Requirements

The Office of the Interconnection shall clear each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction for a Delivery Year in accordance with the following:

a) Variable Resource Requirement Curve

The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and for such Locational Deliverability Areas as determined appropriate in accordance with subsection (a)(iii) for such Delivery Year to establish the level of Capacity Resources that will provide an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards. It is recognized that the variable resource requirement reflected in the Variable Resource Requirement Curve can result in an optimized auction clearing in which the level of Capacity Resources committed for a Delivery Year exceeds the PJM Region Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target) or Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Year through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the Zones associated with such LDA) for such Delivery Year. For any auction, the Updated Forecast Peak Load, and Short-Term Resource Procurement Target applicable to such auction, shall be used, and Price Responsive Demand from any applicable approved PRD Plan, including any associated PRD Reservation Prices, shall be reflected in the derivation of the Variable Resource Requirement Curves, in accordance with the methodology specified in the PJM Manuals.

i) Methodology to Establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve

Prior to the Base Residual Auction, in accordance with the schedule in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region as follows:

- Each Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be plotted on a graph on which Unforced Capacity is on the x-axis and price is on the y-axis;
- For the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), and (iv) a vertical line from point (3) to the x-axis, where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 3%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years

- through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For point (2), price equals: (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset) divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 1%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
- For point (3), price equals [0.2 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 5%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), and (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 0.2%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
  - For point (2), price equals: [0.75 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 2.9%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
  - For point (3), price equals zero and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target.

- ii) For any Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for each LDA for which:
  - A. the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with NERC and Applicable Regional Entity guidelines; or
  - B. such LDA had a Locational Price Adder in any one or more of the three immediately preceding Base Residual Auctions; or
  - C. such LDA is determined in a preliminary analysis by the Office of the Interconnection to be likely to have a Locational Price Adder, based on historic offer price levels; provided however that for the Base Residual Auction conducted for the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2012, the Eastern Mid-Atlantic Region ("EMAR"), Southwest Mid-Atlantic Region ("SWMAR"), and Mid-Atlantic Region ("MAR") LDAs shall employ separate Variable Resource Requirement Curves regardless of the outcome of the above three tests; and provided further that the Office of the Interconnection may establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for an LDA not otherwise qualifying under the above three tests if it finds that such is required to achieve an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards, in which case the Office of the Interconnection shall post such finding, such LDA, and such Variable Resource Requirement Curve on its internet site no later than the March 31 last preceding the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The same process as set forth in subsection (a)(i) shall be used to establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for any such LDA, except that the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for such LDA shall be substituted for the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be substituted for the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target. For purposes of calculating the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit under this section, all generation resources located in the PJM Region that are, or that qualify to become, Capacity Resources, shall be modeled at their full capacity rating, regardless of the amount of capacity cleared from such resource for the immediately preceding Delivery Year.

For each such LDA, for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall (a) determine the Net Cost of New Entry for each Zone in such LDA, with such Net Cost of New Entry equal to the applicable Cost of New Entry value for such Zone minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset value for such Zone, and (b) compute the average of the Net Cost of New Entry values of all such Zones to determine the Net Cost of New Entry for such LDA; provided however, that the Net Cost of New Entry for an LDA may

be greater than, but shall be no less than, the Net Cost of New Entry determined for any other LDA in which the first LDA resides (immediately or successively) including the Net Cost of New Entry for the RTO. The Net Cost of New Entry for use in an LDA in any Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years shall be the Net Cost of New Entry used for such LDA in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

iii) Procedure for ongoing review of Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform a review of the shape of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, as established by the requirements of the foregoing subsection. Such analysis shall be based on simulation of market conditions to quantify the ability of the market to invest in new Capacity Resources and to meet the applicable reliability requirements on a probabilistic basis. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall prepare a recommendation to either modify or retain the existing Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the recommendation and shall review the recommendation through the stakeholder process to solicit stakeholder input. If a modification of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape is recommended, the following process shall be followed:

- A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- B) The PJM Members shall review the proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.
- C) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed modification, (ii) propose alternate modifications or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- D) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider a proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

# iv) Cost of New Entry

A) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region and for each LDA shall be the respective value used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and LDA. For the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2018, and continuing thereafter unless and until changed pursuant to subsection (B) below, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region shall be the average of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area listed in this section as adjusted pursuant to subsection (a)(iv)(B).

Geographic Location Within the	Cost of New Entry
PJM Region Encompassing These	in \$/MW-Year
Zones	
PS, JCP&L, AE, PECO, DPL, RECO	132,200
("CONE Area 1")	
BGE, PEPCO ("CONE Area 2")	130,300
AEP, Dayton, ComEd, APS, DQL,	128,900
ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, Dominion	
("CONE Area 3")	
PPL, MetEd, Penelec ("CONE Area	130,300
4")	

- B) Beginning with the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, the CONE for each CONE Area shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs based on changes in the Applicable United States Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") Composite Index, in accordance with the following:
- (1) The Applicable BLS Composite Index for any Delivery Year and CONE Area shall be the most recently published twelve-month change, at the time CONE values are required to be posted for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, in a composite of the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for Utility System Construction (weighted 20%), the BLS Producer Price Index for Construction Materials and Components (weighted 50%), and the BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets (weighted 30%), as each such index is further specified for each CONE Area in the PJM Manuals.
- (2) The CONE in a CONE Area shall be adjusted prior to the Base Residual Auction for each Delivery Year by applying the Applicable BLS Composite Index for such CONE Area to the Benchmark CONE for such CONE Area.
- (3) The Benchmark CONE for a CONE Area shall be the CONE used for such CONE Area in the Base Residual Auction for the prior Delivery Year (provided, however that the Gross CONE values stated in subsection (a)(iv)(A) above shall be the Benchmark

CONE values for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year to which the Applicable BLS Composite Index shall be applied to determine the CONE for subsequent Delivery Years).

- (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, CONE values for any CONE Area for any Delivery Year shall be subject to amendment pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act, including, without limitation, any filings resulting from the process described in section 5.10(a)(vi)(C) or any filing to establish new or revised CONE Areas.
  - v) Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset
    - A) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset each year for the PJM Region as (A) the annual average of the revenues that would have been received by the Reference Resource from the PJM energy markets during a period of three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination, based on (1) the heat rate and other characteristics of such Reference Resource; (2) fuel prices reported during such period at an appropriate pricing point for the PJM Region with a fuel transmission adder appropriate for such region, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, assumed variable operation and maintenance expenses for such resource of \$6.47 per MWh, and actual PJM hourly average Locational Marginal Prices recorded in the PJM Region during such period; and (3) an assumption that the Reference Resource would be dispatched for both the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets on a Peak-Hour Dispatch basis; plus (B) ancillary service revenues of \$2,199 per MW-year.
    - B) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection will employ for purposes of the Variable Resourcce Requirement Curves for such Delivery Years the same calculations of the subregional Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offsets that were used in the Base Residual Auctions for such Delivery year and sub-region. For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection also shall determine a Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset each year for each Zone, using the same procedures and methods as set forth in the previous subsection; provided, however, that: (1) the average hourly LMPs for such Zone shall be used in place of the PJM Region average hourly LMPs; (2) if such Zone was not integrated into the PJM Region for the entire applicable period, then the offset shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years during which the Zone was integrated; and (3) a posted fuel pricing point in such Zone, if available, and (if such pricing point is not available in such Zone) a fuel transmission adder appropriate

to such Zone from an appropriate PJM Region pricing point shall be used for each such Zone.

vi) Process for Establishing Parameters of Variable Resource Requirement

#### Curve

- A) The parameters of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve will be established prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year and will be used for such Base Residual Auction.
- B) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction on or before February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values will be applied, in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- C) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the calculation of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Cost of New Entry values should be modified, the Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose new Cost of New Entry values on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed values.
  - 3) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed values, (ii) propose alternate values or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider Cost of New Entry values, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Cost of New Entry values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

- D) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the methodology set forth in this Attachment for determining the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset for the PJM Region and for each Zone.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed methodology.
  - The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed methodology, (ii) propose an alternate methodology or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider the Net Revenue Offset methodology, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

# b) Locational Requirements

The Office of Interconnection shall establish locational requirements prior to the Base Residual Auction to quantify the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be committed in each Locational Deliverability Area, in accordance with the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## c) Resource Requirements and Constraints

Prior to the Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction for the Delivery Years starting on June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and

Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Limited Resource Constraints and the Sub-Annual Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auctions for 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraints and the Base Capacity Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year.

d) Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Preliminary PJM Region Load Forecast for the Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

e) Updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecasts for Incremental Auctions

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for a Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year.

# OATT Attachment DD 5.10

Docket No. ER18-459-002

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Version: 22.1.0

## **5.10** Auction Clearing Requirements

The Office of the Interconnection shall clear each Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auction for a Delivery Year in accordance with the following:

a) Variable Resource Requirement Curve

The Office of the Interconnection shall determine Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and for such Locational Deliverability Areas as determined appropriate in accordance with subsection (a)(iii) for such Delivery Year to establish the level of Capacity Resources that will provide an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards. It is recognized that the variable resource requirement reflected in the Variable Resource Requirement Curve can result in an optimized auction clearing in which the level of Capacity Resources committed for a Delivery Year exceeds the PJM Region Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target) or Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement (for Delivery Year through May 31, 2018, less the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target for the Zones associated with such LDA) for such Delivery Year. For any auction, the Updated Forecast Peak Load, and Short-Term Resource Procurement Target applicable to such auction, shall be used, and Price Responsive Demand from any applicable approved PRD Plan, including any associated PRD Reservation Prices, shall be reflected in the derivation of the Variable Resource Requirement Curves, in accordance with the methodology specified in the PJM Manuals.

i) Methodology to Establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve

Prior to the Base Residual Auction, in accordance with the schedule in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region as follows:

- Each Variable Resource Requirement Curve shall be plotted on a graph on which Unforced Capacity is on the x-axis and price is on the y-axis;
- For the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), and (iv) a vertical line from point (3) to the x-axis, where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 3%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years

- through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For point (2), price equals: (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset) divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 1%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
- For point (3), price equals [0.2 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 5%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)], and for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for the PJM Region shall be plotted by combining (i) a horizontal line from the y-axis to point (1), (ii) a straight line connecting points (1) and (2), and (iii) a straight line connecting points (2) and (3), where:
  - For point (1), price equals: {the greater of [the Cost of New Entry] or [1.5 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)]} divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus the approved PJM Region Installed Reserve Margin ("IRM")% minus 0.2%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
  - For point (2), price equals: [0.75 times (the Cost of New Entry minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset)] divided by (one minus the pool-wide average EFORd) and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM% plus 2.9%) divided by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target; and
  - For point (3), price equals zero and Unforced Capacity equals: [the PJM Region Reliability Requirement multiplied by (100% plus IRM%)] minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target.

- ii) For any Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for each LDA for which:
  - A. the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit is less than 1.15 times the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with NERC and Applicable Regional Entity guidelines; or
  - B. such LDA had a Locational Price Adder in any one or more of the three immediately preceding Base Residual Auctions; or
  - C. such LDA is determined in a preliminary analysis by the Office of the Interconnection to be likely to have a Locational Price Adder, based on historic offer price levels; provided however that for the Base Residual Auction conducted for the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2012, the Eastern Mid-Atlantic Region ("EMAR"), Southwest Mid-Atlantic Region ("SWMAR"), and Mid-Atlantic Region ("MAR") LDAs shall employ separate Variable Resource Requirement Curves regardless of the outcome of the above three tests; and provided further that the Office of the Interconnection may establish a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve for an LDA not otherwise qualifying under the above three tests if it finds that such is required to achieve an acceptable level of reliability consistent with the Reliability Principles and Standards, in which case the Office of the Interconnection shall post such finding, such LDA, and such Variable Resource Requirement Curve on its internet site no later than the March 31 last preceding the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year. The same process as set forth in subsection (a)(i) shall be used to establish the Variable Resource Requirement Curve for any such LDA, except that the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for such LDA shall be substituted for the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and, for Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the LDA Short-Term Resource Procurement Target shall be substituted for the PJM Region Short-Term Resource Procurement Target. For purposes of calculating the Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit under this section, all generation resources located in the PJM Region that are, or that qualify to become, Capacity Resources, shall be modeled at their full capacity rating, regardless of the amount of capacity cleared from such resource for the immediately preceding Delivery Year.

For each such LDA, for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall (a) determine the Net Cost of New Entry for each Zone in such LDA, with such Net Cost of New Entry equal to the applicable Cost of New Entry value for such Zone minus the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset value for such Zone, and (b) compute the average of the Net Cost of New Entry values of all such Zones to determine the Net Cost of New Entry for such LDA; provided however, that the Net Cost of New Entry for an LDA may

be greater than, but shall be no less than, the Net Cost of New Entry determined for any other LDA in which the first LDA resides (immediately or successively) including the Net Cost of New Entry for the RTO. The Net Cost of New Entry for use in an LDA in any Incremental Auction for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years shall be the Net Cost of New Entry used for such LDA in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

iii) Procedure for ongoing review of Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.

Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform a review of the shape of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, as established by the requirements of the foregoing subsection. Such analysis shall be based on simulation of market conditions to quantify the ability of the market to invest in new Capacity Resources and to meet the applicable reliability requirements on a probabilistic basis. Based on the results of such review, PJM shall prepare a recommendation to either modify or retain the existing Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the recommendation and shall review the recommendation through the stakeholder process to solicit stakeholder input. If a modification of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape is recommended, the following process shall be followed:

- A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- B) The PJM Members shall review the proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape.
- C) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed modification, (ii) propose alternate modifications or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
- D) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider a proposed modification to the Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Variable Resource Requirement Curve shape with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

## iv) Cost of New Entry

A) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017, and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region and for each LDA shall be the respective value used in the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year and LDA. For the Delivery Year commencing on June 1, 2018, and continuing thereafter unless and until changed pursuant to subsection (B) below, the Cost of New Entry for the PJM Region shall be the average of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area listed in this section as adjusted pursuant to subsection (a)(iv)(B).

Geographic Location Within the PJM Region Encompassing These	Cost of New Entry in \$/MW-Year
Zones	
PS, JCP&L, AE, PECO, DPL, RECO	132,200
("CONE Area 1")	
BGE, PEPCO ("CONE Area 2")	130,300
AEP, Dayton, ComEd, APS, DQL,	128,900
ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, Dominion,	
OVEC ("CONE Area 3")	
PPL, MetEd, Penelec ("CONE Area	130,300
4")	

- B) Beginning with the 2019/2020 Delivery Year, the CONE for each CONE Area shall be adjusted to reflect changes in generating plant construction costs based on changes in the Applicable United States Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") Composite Index, in accordance with the following:
- (1) The Applicable BLS Composite Index for any Delivery Year and CONE Area shall be the most recently published twelve-month change, at the time CONE values are required to be posted for the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year, in a composite of the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for Utility System Construction (weighted 20%), the BLS Producer Price Index for Construction Materials and Components (weighted 50%), and the BLS Producer Price Index Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets (weighted 30%), as each such index is further specified for each CONE Area in the PJM Manuals.
- (2) The CONE in a CONE Area shall be adjusted prior to the Base Residual Auction for each Delivery Year by applying the Applicable BLS Composite Index for such CONE Area to the Benchmark CONE for such CONE Area.
- (3) The Benchmark CONE for a CONE Area shall be the CONE used for such CONE Area in the Base Residual Auction for the prior Delivery Year (provided, however that the Gross CONE values stated in subsection (a)(iv)(A) above shall be the Benchmark

CONE values for the 2018/2019 Delivery Year to which the Applicable BLS Composite Index shall be applied to determine the CONE for subsequent Delivery Years).

- (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, CONE values for any CONE Area for any Delivery Year shall be subject to amendment pursuant to appropriate filings with FERC under the Federal Power Act, including, without limitation, any filings resulting from the process described in section 5.10(a)(vi)(C) or any filing to establish new or revised CONE Areas.
  - v) Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset
    - A) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset each year for the PJM Region as (A) the annual average of the revenues that would have been received by the Reference Resource from the PJM energy markets during a period of three consecutive calendar years preceding the time of the determination, based on (1) the heat rate and other characteristics of such Reference Resource; (2) fuel prices reported during such period at an appropriate pricing point for the PJM Region with a fuel transmission adder appropriate for such region, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, assumed variable operation and maintenance expenses for such resource of \$6.47 per MWh, and actual PJM hourly average Locational Marginal Prices recorded in the PJM Region during such period; and (3) an assumption that the Reference Resource would be dispatched for both the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets on a Peak-Hour Dispatch basis; plus (B) ancillary service revenues of \$2,199 per MW-year.
    - B) For the Incremental Auctions for the 2015/2016, 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection will employ for purposes of the Variable Resourcce Requirement Curves for such Delivery Years the same calculations of the subregional Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offsets that were used in the Base Residual Auctions for such Delivery year and sub-region. For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection also shall determine a Net Energy and Ancillary Service Revenue Offset each year for each Zone, using the same procedures and methods as set forth in the previous subsection; provided, however, that: (1) the average hourly LMPs for such Zone shall be used in place of the PJM Region average hourly LMPs; (2) if such Zone was not integrated into the PJM Region for the entire applicable period, then the offset shall be calculated using only those whole calendar years during which the Zone was integrated; and (3) a posted fuel pricing point in such Zone, if available, and (if such pricing point is not available in such Zone) a fuel transmission adder appropriate

to such Zone from an appropriate PJM Region pricing point shall be used for each such Zone.

vi) Process for Establishing Parameters of Variable Resource Requirement

#### Curve

- A) The parameters of the Variable Resource Requirement Curve will be established prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for a Delivery Year and will be used for such Base Residual Auction.
- B) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine the PJM Region Reliability Requirement and the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a Variable Resource Requirement Curve has been established for such Base Residual Auction on or before February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values will be applied, in accordance with the Reliability Assurance Agreement.
- C) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the calculation of the Cost of New Entry for each CONE Area.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Cost of New Entry values should be modified, the Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose new Cost of New Entry values on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed values.
  - 3) The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed values, (ii) propose alternate values or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider Cost of New Entry values, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Cost of New Entry values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

- D) Beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2018, and continuing no later than for every fourth Delivery Year thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the methodology set forth in this Attachment for determining the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset for the PJM Region and for each Zone.
  - 1) If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology should be modified, Staff of the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a new Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset methodology on or before May 15, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 2) The PJM Members shall review the proposed methodology.
  - The PJM Members shall either vote to (i) endorse the proposed methodology, (ii) propose an alternate methodology or (iii) recommend no modification, by August 31, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new methodology would be applied.
  - 4) The PJM Board of Managers shall consider the Net Revenue Offset methodology, and the Office of the Interconnection shall file any approved modified Net Energy and Ancillary Services Revenue Offset values with the FERC by October 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for the first Delivery Year in which the new values would be applied.

# b) Locational Requirements

The Office of Interconnection shall establish locational requirements prior to the Base Residual Auction to quantify the amount of Unforced Capacity that must be committed in each Locational Deliverability Area, in accordance with the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement.

## c) Resource Requirements and Constraints

Prior to the Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction for the Delivery Years starting on June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and

Incremental Auctions for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Limited Resource Constraints and the Sub-Annual Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year. Prior to the Base Residual Auction and Incremental Auctions for 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraints and the Base Capacity Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which the Office of the Interconnection is required under section 5.10(a) of this Attachment DD to establish a separate VRR Curve for such Delivery Year.

d) Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for the Delivery Year

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the Preliminary PJM Region Load Forecast for the Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year.

e) Updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecasts for Incremental Auctions

The Office of the Interconnection shall establish the updated PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for a Delivery Year in accordance with the PJM Manuals by February 1, prior to the conduct of the First, Second, and Third Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 3.2

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## 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

## 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

## 3.2.2 Regulation.

- (a) Each Market *Participant* that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market *Participant with an* hourly Regulation *Obligation shall* be charged the *pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of regulation provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.*
- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability. The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market *Participant* selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the *last three Real-time Settlement Intervals* of the preceding shoulder hour and the *first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* following shoulder hour, *in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.* 

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the *Real-time Settlement Interval* in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of the* preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval*) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market *Participant* in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer

for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.
- (k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the

correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5 \ Min);} \\ & \delta \text{=-0 to 5 Min} \end{aligned}
```

where  $\delta$  is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

## 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

## 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as

determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

# 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer

Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals* exceeds the total value summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals*, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations .
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to

maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of *Real-time Settlement Intervals* the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Intervals* when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty

calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and *Real-time Settlement Interval share of the* Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding *Real-time Settlement Interval*(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each *Real-time Settlement Interval* the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement* 

Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:
    - 1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, inclusive of no-load costs, plus (D) the start-up cost,

divided by the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.
- (f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller *of a* wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the

Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit. For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant *based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:*

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-Time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic

Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.
- (l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as

provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

- For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (1) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Realtime Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.
- For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in

its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & (\mathsf{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1}) / (\mathsf{UDSLAtime}_{t-1}) \\ & \mathsf{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \left( \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathsf{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right) } \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired *MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval*.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh is within 5% of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh*—Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource tripped and the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to

resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
  - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
  - (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible

to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.
  - ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are

operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event *in a Real-time Settlement Interval* initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each (d) Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to

determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; *and* 

D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation:* 

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

- C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and
- D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

- (g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided *in a Real-time Settlement Interval* by a Market *Participant* in excess of that Market *Participant's* Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the *Market Participant's* obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.
- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a *Real-time Settlement Interval* than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that *Real-time Settlement Interval* due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all *Real-time Settlement Intervals* the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market

Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all *intervals* the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation

resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

# 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve

Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation:* 

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

- A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;
- B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;
- C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

# 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves

schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
  - (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
  - (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW

usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

- (d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement ("Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Charges per paragraph (ii) below.
  - (i) A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
  - (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers

and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

- (a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.
- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that market-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)} where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market *Participant* accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.
- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service,

in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

# 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- (b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each *applicable interval* a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's *applicable interval* cost

to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the *applicable interval* product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

## 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

# 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.
- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each *applicable interval* of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net *withdrawals and injections* in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

## **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market *Participant* in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market *Participant*. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market *Participant's* internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market *Participant* that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market *Participant*, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market *Participant* and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 3.2

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#### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

# 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

# 3.2.2 Regulation.

(a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market Participant with an hourly Regulation Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the Regulation market performance clearing price credits and Regulation market capability clearing price credits quantity of regulation provided in each Real time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for allthe Real-time Settlement Intervals in thean hour associated with that obligation.

<u>Regulation Charge = Hourly Regulation Obligation Share \* (sum of the Real-time Settlement Interval Regulation credits in an hour)</u>

- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- (c) The total Regulation market-clearing price in each Regulation Zone shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the Real-time Settlement Interval is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those Real-time Settlement Intervals during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market Participant selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a

generation resource shall be determined for (1) each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the last three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the preceding shoulder hour and the first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the following shoulder hour, in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the Real-time Settlement Interval in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the preceding three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating Real-time Settlement Interval) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating Real-time Settlement Interval in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in each of the following three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

(f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in a

Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.

(g) To determine the performance-Regulation market performance-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance-Regulation market performance-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market performance—clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the <u>capability</u>-Regulation market <u>capability</u>-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the <u>performance</u>-Regulation market <u>performance</u>-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the <u>capability</u>-Regulation market <u>capability</u> clearing price for that market Real-time Settlement Interval.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits

factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.

(k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5 \ Min);} \\ & \delta = 0 \ to \ 5 \ Min \end{aligned}
```

where  $\delta$  is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

 $\label{eq:conservation} Error = Average \ of \ Abs \ ((Response - Regulation \ Signal) / \ (Hourly \ Average \ Regulation \ Signal)); \ and$ 

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the Real-time Settlement Interval accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

#### 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

# 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

- (a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.
- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

# 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

- (a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.
- (b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals exceeds the total value summed over all Day-ahead Settlement Intervals, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate

in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.

- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.
- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous Real-time Settlement Intervals when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Real-time Settlement Interval share of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each Real-time Settlement Interval the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement

Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:

- 1) the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, inclusive of no-load costs, plus (D) the start-up cost, divided by the Real-time Settlement Intervals committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or
- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.
- (f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller of a wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the

requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited for each Real-time Settlement Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit. For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$\textstyle\sum_h\left(A+B+C\right)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-Time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations:

B = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour:

C = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at

interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.

- (1) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.
- For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (1) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (n) For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to

the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & \text{(UDStarget}_{t-1} - \text{AOutput}_{t-1} ) / \\ & \text{(UDSLAtime}_{t-1} ) \end{aligned} }_{\text{$t-1$}} \\ & \text{RL\_Desired}_t = \text{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \begin{cases} \text{Ramp\_Request}_t * \text{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \\ \end{cases} }_{\text{$t-1$}} \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL\_Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value for each Real-time Settlement Interval. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time Settlement Interval MWh is within 5% of the Real-time Settlement Interval ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing
  Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time
  Settlement Interval MWh –Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the Real-time Settlement Interval is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the Real-time Settlement Interval the resource tripped and the Real-time Settlement Intervals it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time Settlement Interval MWh Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

- (p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.
  - (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
    - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
    - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
    - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
  - (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
    - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that

resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
  - (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's

PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

- Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an (a) agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or

the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.

- ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and

D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

- C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and
- D = The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

- (g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided by a Market Participant in excess of that Market Participant's Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the Market Participant's obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.
- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a Real-time Settlement Interval than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that Real-time Settlement Interval due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all Real-time Settlement Intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all intervals the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption

achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(1) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

## 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market Participant's total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves

and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non- Synchronized Reserve and shall be in accordance with the following equation:

 $(A \times B) - C$ 

#### Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

- B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;
- C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a Real-time Settlement Interval in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that Real-time Settlement Interval shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous Real-time Settlement Interval the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

## 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-

ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement. Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
  - (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
  - (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the

"ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

- (d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement ("Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Charges per paragraph (ii) below.
  - A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to (i) the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
  - (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of

operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

- (a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.
- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time

Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that market-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is

above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)} where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Participant accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining (i) reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.
- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service,

in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

## 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- (b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each applicable interval a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's applicable interval cost to

provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the applicable interval product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

## 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

#### 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

## 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.
- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each applicable interval of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

## **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market Participant in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market Participant. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market Participant's internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market Participant that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market Participant, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market Participant and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 3.2

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#### 3.2 Market Settlements.

If a dollar-per-MW-hour value is applied in a calculation under this section 3.2 where the interval of the value produced in that calculation is less than an hour, then for purposes of that calculation the dollar-per-MW hour value is divided by the number of Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour.

## 3.2.1 Spot Market Energy.

- (a) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate System Energy Prices in the form of Day-ahead System Energy Prices and Real-time System Energy Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.
- (b) Each Market Participant shall be charged for all of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be served in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (c) Each Market Participant shall be paid for all of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead System Energy Price to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (d) For each Day-ahead Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its Market Participant Energy Withdrawals scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price and the sum of its Market Participant Energy Injections scheduled times the Day-ahead System Energy Price.
- (e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Spot Market Energy charges for each Market Participant as the difference between the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals less its scheduled Market Participant Energy Withdrawals times the Real-time System Energy Price and the sum of its real-time Market Participant Energy Injections less scheduled Market Participant Energy Injections times the Real-time System Energy Price. The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time Market Participant Energy Withdrawals and Market Participant Energy Injections used to calculate Spot Market Energy charges under this subsection (e).
- (f) For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the megawatts of real-time energy injections to be delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region

#### 3.2.2 Regulation.

- (a) Each Market *Participant* that is a Load Serving Entity in a Regulation Zone shall have an hourly Regulation objective equal to its pro rata share of the Regulation requirements of such Regulation Zone for the hour, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Regulation Zone for the hour ("Regulation Obligation"). A Market *Participant with an* hourly Regulation *Obligation shall* be charged the *pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of regulation provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.*
- (b) Each Market Participant supplying Regulation in a Regulation Zone at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited for each of its resources such that the calculated credit for each increment of Regulation provided by each resource shall be the higher of: (i) the Regulation market-clearing price; or (ii) the sum of the applicable Regulation offers for a resource determined pursuant to Section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule, the unit-specific shoulder hour opportunity costs described in subsection (e) of this section, the unit-specific intertemporal opportunity costs, and the unit-specific opportunity costs discussed in subsection (d) of this section.
- determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. The total Regulation market-clearing price shall include: (i) the performance Regulation market-clearing price in a Regulation Zone that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (g) of this section; (ii) the capability Regulation market-clearing price that shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (h) of this section; and (iii) a Regulation resource's unit-specific opportunity costs during the 5-minute period, determined as described in subsection (d) below, divided by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score of the resource from among the resources selected to provide Regulation. A resource's Regulation offer by any Market Seller that fails the three-pivotal supplier test set forth in section 3.2.2A.1 of this Schedule shall not exceed the cost of providing Regulation from such resource, plus twelve dollars, as determined pursuant to the formula in section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule.
- (d) In determining the Regulation 5-minute clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the estimated unit-specific opportunity costs of a generation resource offering to sell Regulation in each regulating hour, except for hydroelectric resources, shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times, (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

For hydroelectric resources offering to sell Regulation in a regulating hour, the estimated unitspecific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals will be the full value of the Locational Marginal Price at that generation bus for each megawatt of Regulation capability. The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and has a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource and the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating is higher than the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The estimated unit-specific opportunity costs for each hydroelectric resource that is not in spill conditions as defined in the PJM Manuals and does not have a day-ahead megawatt commitment greater than zero shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the set point of the hydroelectric resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Regulation from the hydroelectric resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the difference between the average of the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period as defined in the PJM Manuals, excluding those hours during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating and the expected Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the hydroelectric resource. Estimated opportunity costs shall be zero for hydroelectric resources for which the actual Locational Marginal Price at the generator bus for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is higher than the average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the appropriate on-peak or off-peak period, excluding those *Real-time Settlement Intervals* during which all available units at the hydroelectric resource were operating.

For the purpose of committing resources and setting Regulation market clearing prices, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize day-ahead Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources. For the purposes of settlements, the Office of the Interconnection shall utilize the real-time Locational Marginal Prices to calculate opportunity costs for hydroelectric resources.

Estimated opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a Market *Participant* selected to provide Regulation in a Regulation Zone and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for (1) each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Regulation, and (2) the *last three Real-time Settlement Intervals* of the preceding shoulder hour and the *first three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* following shoulder hour, *in accordance with the PJM Manuals and below.* 

The unit-specific opportunity cost incurred during the *Real-time Settlement Interval* in which the Regulation obligation is fulfilled shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the actual megawatt level of the resource when the actual megawatt level is within the tolerance defined in the PJM Manuals for the Regulation set point, or at the Regulation set point for the resource when it is not within the corresponding tolerance) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Opportunity costs for Demand Resources to provide Regulation are zero.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of the* preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the preceding *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in the initial regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval*) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

The unit-specific opportunity costs associated with uneconomic operation during *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour shall be equal to the product of (i) the deviation between the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in the final regulating *Real-time Settlement Interval* in order to provide Regulation and the resource's expected output in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour times (ii) the absolute value of the difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource in *each of* the following *three Real-time Settlement Intervals of the* shoulder hour and the lesser of the available market-based or highest available cost-based energy offer from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Regulation set point for the resource in final regulating hour) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market all as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- (f) Any amounts credited for Regulation in an hour in excess of the Regulation market-clearing price in that hour shall be allocated and charged to each Market *Participant* in a Regulation Zone that does not meet its hourly Regulation obligation in proportion to its purchases of Regulation in such Regulation Zone in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) To determine the performance Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone, the Office of the Interconnection shall adjust the submitted performance offer

for each resource in accordance with the historical performance of that resource, the amount of Regulation that resource will be dispatched based on the ratio of control signals calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, and the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section for which that resource is qualified. The maximum adjusted performance offer of all cleared resources will set the performance Regulation market-clearing price.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions, will be credited for Regulation performance by multiplying the assigned MW(s) by the performance Regulation market-clearing price, by the ratio between the requested mileage for the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to the Regulation resource and the Regulation dispatch signal assigned to traditional resources, and by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall divide each Regulation resource's capability offer by the unit-specific benefits factor described in subsection (j) of this section and divided by the historic accuracy score for the resource for the purposes of committing resources and setting the market clearing prices.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the capability Regulation market-clearing price for each Regulation Zone by subtracting the performance Regulation market-clearing price described in subsection (g) from the total Regulation market clearing price described in subsection (c). This residual sets the capability Regulation market clearing price for that market *Real-time Settlement Interval*.

The owner of each Regulation resource that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's Regulation signals and instructions will be credited for Regulation capability based on the assigned MW and the capability Regulation market-clearing price multiplied by the Regulation resource's accuracy score calculated in accordance with subsection (k) of this section.

- (i) In accordance with the processes described in the PJM Manuals, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) calculate inter-temporal opportunity costs for each applicable resource; (ii) include such inter-temporal opportunity costs in each applicable resource's offer to sell frequency Regulation service; and (iii) account for such inter-temporal opportunity costs in the Regulation market-clearing price.
- (j) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a unit-specific benefits factor for each of the dynamic Regulation signal and traditional Regulation signal in accordance with the PJM Manuals. Each resource shall be assigned a unit-specific benefits factor based on their order in the merit order stack for the applicable Regulation signal. The unit-specific benefits factor is the point on the benefits factor curve that aligns with the last megawatt, adjusted by historical performance, that resource will add to the dynamic resource stack. The unit-specific benefits factor for the traditional Regulation signal shall be equal to one.
- (k) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate each Regulation resource's accuracy score. The accuracy score shall be the average of a delay score, correlation score, and energy score for each ten second interval. For purposes of setting the interval to be used for the

correlation score and delay scores, PJM will use the maximum of the correlation score plus the delay score for each interval.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the correlation score using the following statistical correlation function (r) that measures the delay in response between the Regulation signal and the resource change in output:

```
\begin{aligned} & Correlation \ Score = r_{Signal,Response(\delta,\delta+5 \ Min);} \\ & \delta \text{=-0 to 5 Min} \end{aligned}
```

where  $\delta$  is delay.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the delay score using the following equation:

```
Delay Score = Abs ((\delta- 5 Minutes) / (5 Minutes)).
```

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an energy score as a function of the difference in the energy provided versus the energy requested by the Regulation signal while scaling for the number of samples. The energy score is the absolute error  $(\varepsilon)$  as a function of the resource's Regulation capacity using the following equations:

```
Energy Score = 1 - 1/n \sum Abs (Error);
```

Error = Average of Abs ((Response - Regulation Signal) / (Hourly Average Regulation Signal)); and

n =the number of samples in the hour and the energy.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate an accuracy score for each Regulation resource that is the average of the delay score, correlation score, and energy score for a five-minute period using the following equation where the energy score, the delay score, and the correlation score are each weighted equally:

```
Accuracy Score = max ((Delay Score) + (Correlation Score)) + (Energy Score).
```

The historic accuracy score will be based on a rolling average of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* accuracy scores, with consideration of the qualification score, as defined in the PJM Manuals.

## 3.2.2A Offer Price Caps.

#### 3.2.2A.1 Applicability.

(a) Each hour, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a three-pivotal supplier test as described in this section. Regulation offers from Market Sellers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test shall be capped in the hour in which they failed the test at their cost based offers as

determined pursuant to section 1.10.1A(e) of this Schedule. A Regulation supplier fails the three-pivotal supplier test in any hour in which such Regulation supplier and the two largest other Regulation suppliers are jointly pivotal.

- (b) For the purposes of conducting the three-pivotal supplier test pursuant to this section, the following applies:
  - (i) The three-pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of available supply all offers from resources capable of satisfying the Regulation requirement of the PJM Region multiplied by the historic accuracy score of the resource and multiplied by the unit-specific benefits factor for which the capability cost-based offer plus the performance cost-based offer plus any eligible opportunity costs is no greater than 150 percent of the clearing price that would be calculated if all offers were limited to cost (plus eligible opportunity costs).
  - (ii) The three-pivotal supplier test will apply on a Regulation supplier basis (i.e. not a resource by resource basis) and only the Regulation suppliers that fail the three-pivotal supplier test will have their Regulation offers capped. A Regulation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Regulation from resources controlled by a Regulation supplier or its affiliates, whether by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that Regulation supplier. Regulation provided by resources owned by a Regulation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party, whether by contract or otherwise, will be included as Regulation of that third party.
  - (iii) Each supplier shall be ranked from the largest to the smallest offered megawatt of eligible Regulation supply adjusted by the historic performance of each resource and the unit-specific benefits factor. Suppliers are then tested in order, starting with the three largest suppliers. For each iteration of the test, the two largest suppliers are combined with a third supplier, and the combined supply is subtracted from total effective supply. The resulting net amount of eligible supply is divided by the Regulation requirement for the hour to determine the residual supply index. Where the residual supply index for three pivotal suppliers is less than or equal to 1.0, then the three suppliers are jointly pivotal and the suppliers being tested fail the three pivotal supplier test. Iterations of the test continue until the combination of the two largest suppliers and a third supplier result in a residual supply index greater than 1.0, at which point the remaining suppliers pass the test. Any resource owner that fails the three-pivotal supplier test will be offer-capped.

## 3.2.3 Operating Reserves.

(a) A Market Seller's pool-scheduled resources capable of providing Operating Reserves shall be credited as specified below based on the prices offered for the operation of such resource, provided that the resource was available for the entire time specified in the Offer

Data for such resource. To the extent that Section 3.2.3A.01 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement does not meet the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule additional Operating Reserves pursuant to Section 1.7.17 and 1.10 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. In addition the Office of the Interconnection shall schedule Operating Reserves pursuant to those sections to satisfy any unforeseen Operating Reserve requirements that are not reflected in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

(b) The following determination shall be made for each pool-scheduled resource that is scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market: the total offered price for start-up and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, shall be compared to the total value of that resource's energy – as determined by the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Day-ahead Prices applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market. PJM shall also (i) determine whether any resources were scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control during the Operating Day because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day in order to minimize the total cost of Operating Reserves associated with the provision of such services and reflect the most accurate possible expectation of real-time operating conditions in the day-ahead model, which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security-constrained dispatch and (ii) report on the day following the Operating Day the megawatt quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the above-enumerated purposes for the entire RTO.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(n), if the total offered price summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals* exceeds the total value summed over all *Day-ahead Settlement Intervals*, the difference shall be credited to the Market Seller.

The Office of the Interconnection shall apply any balancing Operating Reserve credits allocated pursuant to this Section 3.2.3(b) to real-time deviations or real-time load share plus exports, pursuant to Section 3.2.3(p), depending on whether the balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated to real-time deviations .
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to

maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RA Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.

- (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be segmented and separately allocated pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) or 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof. Balancing Operating Reserve credits for such resources will be identified in the same manner as units committed during the reliability analysis pursuant to subsections 3.2.3(b)(i)(A) and 3.2.3(b)(i)(B) hereof.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Reliability, shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits will be applied pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the credits for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category (RT Credits for Reliability or RT Credits for Deviations) as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(b)(ii)(A) hereof to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve credits, identified as RT Credits for Deviations, shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (iii) PJM shall post on its Web site the aggregate amount of MWs committed that meet the criteria referenced in subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) hereof.
- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits calculated in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b) plus any unallocated charges from Section 3.2.3(h) and 5.1.7, and any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the Day-ahead Economic Load Response Program, shall be the cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market.

- The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) scheduled load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) and accepted Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day; and (ii) scheduled energy sales in the Day-ahead Energy Market from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours for that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside such area pursuant to Section 1.12, except to the extent PJM scheduled resources to provide Black Start service, Reactive Services or transfer interface control. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Black Start service for the Operating Day which resources would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff. The cost of Operating Reserves in the Day-ahead Energy Market for resources scheduled to provide Reactive Services or transfer interface control because they are known or expected to be needed to maintain system reliability in a Zone during the Operating Day and would not have otherwise been committed in the day-ahead security constrained dispatch shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its real-time deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such Zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such Zone.
- (e) At the end of each Operating Day, the following determination shall be made for each synchronized pool-scheduled resource of each Market Seller that operates as requested by the Office of the Interconnection. For each calendar day, pool-scheduled resources in the Real-time Energy Market shall be made whole for each of the following segments: 1) the greater of their day-ahead schedules or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources); and 2) any block of *Real-time Settlement Intervals* the resource operates at PJM's direction in excess of the greater of its day-ahead schedule or minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources). For each calendar day, and for each synchronized start of a generation resource or PJM-dispatched economic load reduction, there will be a maximum of two segments for each resource. Segment 1 will be the greater of the day-ahead schedule and minimum run time (minimum down time for Demand Resources) and Segment 2 will include the remainder of the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Intervals* when the resource is operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, provided that a segment is limited to the Operating Day in which it commenced and cannot include any part of the following Operating Day.

A Generation Capacity Resource that operates outside of its unit-specific parameters will not receive Operating Reserve Credits nor be made whole for such operation when not dispatched by the Office of the Interconnection, unless the Market Seller of the Generation Capacity Resource can justify to the Office of the Interconnection that operation outside of such unit-specific parameters was the result of an actual constraint. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection its request to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or to be made whole for such operation, along with documentation explaining in detail the reasons for operating its resource outside of its unit-specific parameters, within thirty

calendar days following the issuance of billing statement for the Operating Day. The Market Seller shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request for compensation and provide its determination of whether there was an exercise of market power to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than twenty-five calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation. The Office of the Interconnection shall make its determination whether the Market Seller justified that it is entitled to receive Operating Reserve Credits and/or be made whole for such operation of its resource for the day(s) in question, by no later than thirty calendar days after receiving the Market Seller's request for compensation.

Credits received pursuant to this section shall be equal to the positive difference between a resource's total offered price for start-up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) and no-load fees and energy, determined on the basis of the resource's scheduled output, and the total value of the resource's energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market plus any credit or change for quantity deviations, at PJM dispatch direction, from the Day-ahead Energy Market during the Operating Day at the real-time LMP(s) applicable to the relevant generation bus in the Real-time Energy Market. The foregoing notwithstanding, credits for segment 2 shall exclude start up (shutdown costs for Demand Resources) costs for generation resources.

Except as provided in Section 3.2.3(m), if the total offered price exceeds the total value, the difference less any credit as determined pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b), and less any amounts credited for Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, and less any amounts credited for providing Reactive Services as specified in Section 3.2.3B, and less any amounts for Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve in excess of the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve offer plus the resource's opportunity cost, shall be credited to the Market Seller.

Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and *Real-time Settlement Interval share of the* Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits applied against Operating Reserve credits pursuant to this section shall be netted against the Operating Reserve credits earned in the corresponding *Real-time Settlement Interval*(s) in which the Synchronized Reserve, Non-Synchronized Reserve, and Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve credits accrued, provided that for condensing combustion turbines, Synchronized Reserve credits will be netted against the total Operating Reserve credits accrued during each *Real-time Settlement Interval* the unit operates in condensing and generation mode.

(f) A Market Seller's steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement* 

Interval in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments and limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (f-1) A Market Seller's combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as directed by the PJM dispatcher), then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above for a steam unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) If the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a Day-ahead Settlement Interval, but the unit is not called on by the Office of the Interconnection and does not operate in the corresponding Real-time Settlement Interval(s), then the Market Seller shall be credited in an amount equal to the higher of:
    - the product of (A) the amount of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit, and (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus the sum of (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market, inclusive of no-load costs, plus (D) the start-up cost,

divided by the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* committed for each set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - (C+D). The startup cost, (D), shall be excluded from this calculation if the unit operates in real time following the Office of the Interconnection's direction during any portion of the set of contiguous hours for which the unit was scheduled in Day-ahead Energy Market, or

- 2) the Real-time Price at the unit's bus minus the Day-ahead Price at the unit's bus, multiplied by the number of megawatts committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market for the generating unit.
- (f-2) A Market Seller's hydroelectric resource that is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), the output of which is altered at the request of the Office of the Interconnection from the schedule submitted by the owner, due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (f-3) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for opportunity cost associated with following PJM dispatch instructions and reducing or suspending a unit's output due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market Seller accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.
- (f-4) A Market Seller *of a* wind generating unit that is pool-scheduled or self-scheduled, has SCADA capability to transmit and receive instructions from the Office of the Interconnection, has provided data and established processes to follow PJM basepoints pursuant to the requirements for wind generating units as further detailed in this Agreement, the Tariff and the PJM Manuals, and which is operating as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, the output of which is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection due to a transmission constraint or other reliability issue, and for which the , real-time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the unit's offer corresponding to the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall be credited *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the

Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generation bus for the generating unit, minus (C) the applicable offer for energy on which the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) - C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit. For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (g) The sum of the foregoing credits, plus any cancellation fees paid in accordance with Section 1.10.2(d), such cancellation fees to be applied to the Operating Day for which the unit was scheduled, plus any shortfalls paid pursuant to the Market Settlement provision of the real-time Economic Load Response Program, less any payments received from another Control Area for Operating Reserves shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market in each Operating Day.
- (h) The cost of Operating Reserves for the Real-time Energy Market for each Operating Day, except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant *based on their daily total of hourly deviations determined in accordance with the following equation:*

$$\sum_h (A + B + C)$$

Where:

h = the hours in the applicable Operating Day;

A = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the withdrawal deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy withdrawals (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in the Real-Time Energy Market, except as noted in subsection (h)(ii) below and in the PJM Manuals divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of each Real-Time Settlement Interval's withdrawal deviation in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly withdrawal deviations. Market Participant bilateral transactions that are Dynamic

Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to section 1.12 of this Schedule are not included in the determination of withdrawal deviations;

B = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of generation deviations (in MW and not including deviations in Behind The Meter Generation) as determined in subsection (o) divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour;

C = For each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour, the sum of the absolute value of the injection deviations (in MW) between the quantities scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Market Participant's energy injections in the Real-Time Energy Market divided by the number of Real-Time Settlement Intervals for that hour. The summation of the injection deviations for each Real-Time Settlement Interval in an hour will be the Market Participant's total hourly injection deviations. The determination of injection deviations does not include generation resources.

The Revenue Data for Settlements determined for each Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with section 3.1A of this Schedule shall be used in determining the real-time withdrawal deviations, generation deviations and injection deviations used to calculate Operating Reserve under this subsection (e).

The costs associated with scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units shall be allocated by ratio share of the monthly transmission use of each Network Customer or Transmission Customer serving Zone Load or Non-Zone Load, as determined in accordance with the formulas contained in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff.

Notwithstanding section (h)(1) above, as more fully set forth in the PJM Manuals, load deviations from the Day-ahead Energy Market shall not be assessed Operating Reserves charges to the extent attributable to reductions in the load of Price Responsive Demand that is in response to an increase in Locational Marginal Price from the Day-ahead Energy Market to the Real-time Energy Market and that is in accordance with a properly submitted PRD Curve.

Deviations that occur within a single Zone shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region, as defined in Section 3.2.3(q) of this Schedule, and shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(q). Deviations at a hub shall be associated with the Eastern or Western Region if all the buses that define the hub are located in the region. Deviations at an Interface Pricing Point shall be associated with whichever region, the Eastern or Western Region, with which the majority of the buses that define that Interface Pricing Point are most closely electrically associated. If deviations at interfaces and hubs are associated with the Eastern or Western region, they shall be subject to the regional balancing Operating Reserve rate. Demand and supply deviations shall be based on total activity in a Zone, including all aggregates and hubs defined by buses that are wholly contained within the same Zone.

The foregoing notwithstanding, netting deviations shall be allowed *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- (i) Generation resources with multiple units located at a single bus shall be able to offset deviations in accordance with the PJM Manuals to determine the net deviation MW at the relevant bus.
- (ii) Demand deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead demand transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time demand transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface; except that the positive values of demand deviations, as set forth in the PJM Manuals, will not be assessed Operating Reserve charges in the event of a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage in real-time or where PJM initiates the request for emergency load reductions in real-time in order to avoid a Primary Reserve or Synchronized Reserve shortage.
- (iii) Supply deviations will be assessed by comparing all day-ahead transactions at a single transmission zone, hub, or interface against the real-time transactions at that same transmission zone, hub, or interface.
- (i) At the end of each Operating Day, Market Sellers shall be credited on the basis of their offered prices for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, as well as the credits calculated as specified in Section 3.2.3(b) for those generators committed solely for the purpose of providing synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection.
- (j) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Section 3.2.3(i) shall be the cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for the PJM Region for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for the PJM Region.
- (k) The cost of Operating Reserves for synchronous condensing for purposes other than providing Synchronized Reserve or Reactive Services, or in association with post-contingency operation for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to the sum of its (i) deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day; and (ii) deliveries of energy sales from within the PJM Region to load outside such region in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, but not including its bilateral transactions that are Dynamic Transfers to load outside the PJM Region pursuant to Section 1.12, as compared to the sum of all such deliveries for all Market Participants.
- (l) For any Operating Day in either, as applicable, the Day-ahead Energy Market or the Real-time Energy Market for which, for all or any part of such Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues an alert that a Maximum Generation Emergency may be declared ("Maximum Generation Emergency Alert"); or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, the Operating Reserves credit otherwise provided by Section 3.2.3.(b) or Section 3.2.3(e) in connection with market-based offers shall be limited as

provided in subsections (n) or (m), respectively. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide timely notice on its internet site of the commencement and termination of any of the actions described in subsection (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subsection (l) (collectively referred to as "MaxGen Conditions"). Following the posting of notice of the commencement of a MaxGen Condition, a Market Seller may elect to submit a cost-based offer in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, in which case subsections (m) and (n) shall not apply to such offer; provided, however, that such offer must be submitted in accordance with the deadlines in Section 1.10 for the submission of offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market or Real-time Energy Market, as applicable. Submission of a cost-based offer under such conditions shall not be precluded by Section 1.9.7(b); provided, however, that the Market Seller must return to compliance with Section 1.9.7(b) when it submits its bid for the first Operating Day after termination of the MaxGen Condition.

- For the Real-time Energy Market, if the Effective Offer Price (as defined below) for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. For purposes of this subsection (m), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (1) and (m), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(e) plus the Real-time Energy Market revenues for the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic divided by the megawatt hours of energy provided during the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic. The Realtime Settlement Intervals that the offer is economic shall be: (i) the Real-time Settlement Intervals that the offer price for energy is less than or equal to the Real-time Price for the relevant generation bus, (ii) the Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the offer for energy is greater than Locational Marginal Price and the unit is operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection that are in addition to any Real-time Settlement Intervals required due to the minimum run time or other operating constraint of the unit, and (iii) for any unit with a minimum run time of one hour or less and with more than one start available per day, any hours the unit operated at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection.
- For the Day-ahead Energy Market, if notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided prior to 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price for a market-based offer is greater than \$1,000/MWh and greater than the Market Seller's lowest available and applicable cost-based offer, the Market Seller shall not receive any credit for Operating Reserves. If notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided after 10:30 a.m. on the day before the Operating Day for which transactions are being scheduled and the Effective Offer Price is greater than \$1,000/MWh, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. If the Effective Offer Price is less than or equal to \$1,000/MWh, regardless of when notice of a MaxGen Condition is provided, the Market Seller shall receive credit for Operating Reserves determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), subject to the limit on total compensation stated below. For purposes of this subsection (n), the Effective Offer Price shall be the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day divided by the megawatt hours of energy offered during the Specified Hours, plus the offer for energy during such hours. The Specified Hours shall be the lesser of: (1) the minimum run hours stated by the Market Seller in

its Offer Data; and (2) either (i) for steam-electric generating units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combined-cycle mode, the six consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running or (ii) for combustion turbine units and for combined-cycle units when such units are operating in combustion turbine mode, the two consecutive hours of highest Day-ahead Price during such Operating Day when such units are running. Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the total compensation to a Market Seller on any Operating Day that includes a MaxGen Condition shall not exceed \$1,000/MWh during the Specified Hours, where such total compensation in each such hour is defined as the amount that, absent subsections (l) and (n), would have been credited for Operating Reserves for such Operating Day pursuant to Section 3.2.3(b) divided by the Specified Hours, plus the Day-ahead Price for such hour, and no Operating Reserves payments shall be made for any other hour of such Operating Day. If a unit operates in real time at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection consistently with its day-ahead clearing, then subsection (m) does not apply.

(o) Dispatchable pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Pool-scheduled generation resources and dispatchable self-scheduled generation resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations in accordance with the calculations described below and in the PJM Manuals.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate a ramp-limited desired MW value for generation resources where the economic minimum and economic maximum are at least as far apart in real-time as they are in day-ahead according to the following parameters:

- (i) real-time economic minimum <= 105% of day-ahead economic minimum or day-ahead economic minimum plus 5 MW, whichever is greater.
- (ii) real-time economic maximum >= 95% day-ahead economic maximum or day-ahead economic maximum minus 5 MW, whichever is lower.

The ramp-limited desired MW value for a generation resource shall be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t = \underbrace{ & (\mathsf{UDStarget}_{t-1} - \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1}) / (\mathsf{UDSLAtime}_{t-1}) \\ & \mathsf{RL\_Desired}_t = \mathsf{AOutput}_{t-1} + \underbrace{ \left( \mathsf{Ramp\_Request}_t * \mathsf{Case\_Eff\_time}_{t-1} \right) } \end{aligned}$$

where:

- 1. UDStarget = UDS basepoint for the previous UDS case
- 2. AOutput = Unit's output at case solution time
- 3. UDSLAtime = UDS look ahead time
- 4. Case\_Eff\_time = Time between base point changes
- 5. RL Desired = Ramp-limited desired MW

To determine if a generation resource is following dispatch the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by using the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS Basepoint or the actual output and ramplimited desired MW value *for each Real-time Settlement Interval*. If the UDS Basepoint and the ramp-limited desired MW for the resource are unavailable, the Office of the Interconnection will determine the unit's MW off dispatch and % off dispatch by calculating the lesser of the difference between the actual output and the UDS LMP Desired *MW for each Real-time Settlement Interval*.

A pool-scheduled or dispatchable self-scheduled resource is considered to be following dispatch if its actual output is between its ramp-limited desired MW value and UDS Basepoint, or if its % off dispatch is <= 10, or its Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh is within 5% of the *Real-time Settlement Interval* ramp-limited desired MW. A self-scheduled generator must also be dispatched above economic minimum. The degree of deviations for resources that are not following dispatch shall be determined *for each Real-time Settlement Interval* in accordance with the following provisions:

- A dispatchable self-scheduled resource that is not dispatched above economic minimum shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.
- A resource that is dispatchable day-ahead but is Fixed Gen in real-time shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MW.
- Pool-scheduled generators that are not following dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh*—Ramp-Limited Desired MW.
- If a resource's real-time economic minimum is greater than its day-ahead economic minimum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is greater, or its real-time economic maximum is less than its Day Ahead economic maximum by 5% or 5 MW, whichever is lower, and UDS LMP Desired MWh for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* is either below the real time economic minimum or above the real time economic maximum, then balancing Operating Reserve deviations for the resource shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % Off Dispatch is <= 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Ramp-Limited Desired MW. If deviation value is within 5% of Ramp-Limited Desired MW, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall not be assessed.

- If a resource is not following dispatch and its % off Dispatch is > 20%, balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh UDS LMP Desired MWh.
- If a resource is not following dispatch, and the resource has tripped, for the *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource tripped and the *Real-time Settlement Intervals* it remains offline throughout its day-ahead schedule balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real time *Settlement Interval* MWh Day-Ahead MWh.
- For resources that are not dispatchable in both the Day-Ahead and Real-time Energy Markets balancing Operating Reserve deviations shall be assessed according to the following formula: Real-time *Settlement Interval MWh* Day-Ahead MWh.

If a resource has a sum of the absolute value of generator deviations for an hour that is less than 5 MWh, then the resource shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations for that hour.

(o-1) Dispatchable economic load reduction resources that follow dispatch shall not be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations. Economic load reduction resources that do not follow dispatch shall be assessed balancing Operating Reserve deviations as described in this subsection and as further specified in the PJM Manuals.

The Desired MW quantity for such resources for each hour shall be the hourly integrated MW quantity to which the load reduction resource was dispatched for each hour (where the hourly integrated value is the average of the dispatched values as determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the resource for each hour).

If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour deviates by no more than 20% above or below the Desired MW quantity, then no balancing Operating Reserve deviation will accrue for that hour. If the actual reduction quantity for the load reduction resource for a given hour is outside the 20% bandwidth, the balancing Operating Reserve deviations will accrue for that hour in the amount of the absolute value of (Desired MW – actual reduction quantity). For those hours where the actual reduction quantity is within the 20% bandwidth specified above, the load reduction resource will be eligible to be made whole for the total value of its offer as defined in section 3.3A of this Appendix. Hours for which the actual reduction quantity is outside the 20% bandwidth will not be eligible for the make-whole payment. If at least one hour is not eligible for make-whole payment based on the 20% criteria, then the resource will also not be made whole for its shutdown cost.

(p) The Office of the Interconnection shall allocate the charges assessed pursuant to Section 3.2.3(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules or real-time load share plus exports depending on whether the underlying balancing Operating Reserve credits are related to

resources scheduled during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, or during the actual Operating Day.

- (i) For resources scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated based on the reason the resource was scheduled according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to operate in real-time to augment the physical resources committed in the Day-ahead Energy Market to meet the forecasted real-time load plus the Operating Reserve requirement, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
  - (B) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource was committed to maintain system reliability, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of real time load plus export transactions.
  - (C) If the Office of the Interconnection determines during the reliability analysis for an Operating Day that a resource with a day-ahead schedule is required to deviate from that schedule to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated pursuant to (A) or (B) above.
- (ii) For resources scheduled during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to the following provisions:
  - (A) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource to operate during an Operating Day to provide balancing Operating Reserves, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to ratio share of load plus exports. The foregoing notwithstanding, charges will be assessed pursuant to this section only if the LMP at the resource's bus does not meet or exceed the applicable offer of the resource for at least four-5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during each period the resource operated and produced MWs during the relevant Operating Day. If a resource operated and produced MWs for less than four 5-minute intervals during one or more discrete clock hours during the relevant Operating Day, the charges for that resource during the hour it was operated less than four 5-minute intervals will be identified as being in the same category as identified for the Operating Reserves for the other discrete clock hours.

- (B) If the Office of the Interconnection directs a resource not covered by Section 3.2.3(h)(ii)(A) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement to operate in real-time during an Operating Day, the associated balancing Operating Reserve charges shall be allocated according to real-time deviations from day-ahead schedules.
- (q) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine regional balancing Operating Reserve rates for the Western and Eastern Regions of the PJM Region. For the purposes of this section, the Western Region shall be the AEP, APS, ComEd, Duquesne, Dayton, ATSI, DEOK, EKPC, OVEC transmission Zones, and the Eastern Region shall be the AEC, BGE, Dominion, PENELEC, PEPCO, ME, PPL, JCPL, PECO, DPL, PSEG, RE transmission Zones. The regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate regional adder rates for the Eastern and Western Regions. Regional adder rates shall be equal to the total balancing Operating Reserve credits paid to generators for transmission constraints that occur on transmission system capacity equal to or less than 345kv. The regional adder rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are designated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates. RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be equal to balancing Operating Reserve credits except those associated with the scheduling of units for Black Start service or testing of Black Start Units as provided in Schedule 6A of the PJM Tariff, in excess of the regional adder rates calculated pursuant to Section 3.2.3(q)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be separated into reliability and deviation charges, which shall be allocated to real-time load or real-time deviations, respectively. Whether the underlying credits are allocated as reliability or deviation charges shall be determined in accordance with Section 3.2.3(p).
  - (iii) Reliability and deviation regional balancing Operating Reserve rates shall be determined by summing the relevant RTO balancing Operating Reserve rates and regional adder rates.
  - (iv) If the Eastern and/or Western Regions do not have regional adder rates, the relevant regional balancing Operating Reserve rate shall be the reliability and/or deviation RTO balancing Operating Reserve rate.
- (r) Market Sellers that incur incremental operating costs for a generation resource that are either greater than \$1,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and PJM Manual 15, but are not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule, or greater than \$2,000/MWh as determined in accordance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement, and PJM Manual 15, will be eligible

to receive credit for Operating Reserves upon review of the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, and approval of the Office of the Interconnection. Market Sellers must submit to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit all relevant documentation demonstrating the calculation of costs greater than \$2,000/MWh, and costs greater than \$1,000/MWh which were not verified at the time of dispatch of the resource under section 6.4.3 of this Schedule. The Office of the Interconnection must approve any Operating Reserve credits paid to a Market Seller under this subsection (r).

## 3.2.3A Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Synchronized Reserve requirements for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Synchronized Reserve Obligation"), less any amount obtained from condensers associated with provision of Reactive Services as described in section 3.2.3B(i) and any amount obtained from condensers associated with post-contingency operations, as described in section 3.2.3C(b). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) A resource supplying Synchronized Reserve at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, in excess of its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation, shall be credited as follows:
  - i) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are then subject to the energy dispatch signals and instructions of the Office of the Interconnection and that increase their current output or Demand Resources that reduce their load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event ("Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve") shall be at the Synchronized Energy Premium Price, as described in 3.2.3A (c), with the exception of those Real-time Settlement Intervals in which the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone is not equal to zero. During such hours, Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve resources shall be compensated at the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for the applicable Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone for the lesser of the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve attributed to the resource as calculated by the Office of the Interconnection, or the actual amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve provided should a Synchronized Reserve Event occur in a Real-time Settlement Interval.
  - ii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are synchronized to the grid but, at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection, are

operating at a point that deviates from the Office of the Interconnection energy dispatch signals and instructions ("Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve") shall be the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the sum of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer, and (B) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection to a Synchronized Reserve Event in a Real-time Settlement Interval in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.

- iii) Credits for Synchronized Reserve provided by Demand Resources that are synchronized to the grid and accept the obligation to reduce load in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event *in a Real-time Settlement Interval* initiated by the Office of the Interconnection shall be the sum of (i) the higher of (A) the Synchronized Reserve offer or (B) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price and (ii) if a Synchronized Reserve Event is actually initiated by the Office of the Interconnection and the Demand Resource reduced its load in response to the event, the fixed costs associated with achieving the load reduction, as specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Synchronized Reserve Energy Premium Price is an adder in an amount to be determined periodically by the Office of the Interconnection not less than fifty dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars per megawatt hour.
- The Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each (d) Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each Real-time Settlement Interval of the Operating Day. The hourly Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of serving the next increment of demand for Synchronized Reserve in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, inclusive of Synchronized Reserve offer prices and opportunity costs. When the Synchronized Reserve Requirement or Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met, the 5-minute clearing price shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the sum of the Reserve Penalty Factors for the Primary Reserve Requirement and the Synchronized Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$850/MWh.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Synchronized Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to

determine whether any changes to the Synchronized Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(e) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the estimated unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where

A = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;

B = The megawatts of energy used to provide Synchronized Reserve submitted as part of the Synchronized Reserve offer;

C = The deviation of the set point of the generation resource that is expected to be required in order to provide Synchronized Reserve from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; *and* 

D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

(f) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and that actively follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation:* 

$$(A \times B) + (C \times D)$$

Where:

A = The megawatts of energy used by the resource to provide Synchronized Reserve as submitted as part of the generation resource's Synchronized Reserve offer;

B = the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus of the generation resource;

- C = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order; and
- D=The difference between the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource and the offer price for energy from the generation resource (at the megawatt level of the Synchronized Reserve set point for the generation resource) in the PJM Interchange Energy Market when the Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus is greater than the offer price for energy from the generation resource.

The opportunity costs for a Demand Resource shall be zero.

- (g) Charges for Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve will be allocated in proportion to the amount of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to each Synchronized Reserve Obligation. In the event Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve is provided *in a Real-time Settlement Interval* by a Market *Participant* in excess of that Market *Participant's* Synchronized Reserve Obligation, the Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve that is not utilized to fulfill the *Market Participant's* obligation will be allocated proportionately among all other Synchronized Reserve Obligations.
- (h) Any amounts credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (i) In the event the Office of the Interconnection needs to assign more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve during a *Real-time Settlement Interval* than was estimated as needed at the time the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price was calculated for that *Real-time Settlement Interval* due to a reduction in available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve, the costs of the excess Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve shall be allocated and charged to those providers of Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve whose available Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve was reduced from the needed amount estimated during the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price calculation, in proportion to the amount of the reduction in Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve availability.
- assigned by the Office of the Interconnection or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned or self-scheduled amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for all *Real-time Settlement Intervals* the resource was assigned or self-scheduled Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on the Operating Day during which the event occurred. The determination of the amount of Synchronized Reserve credited to a resource shall be on an individual resource basis, not on an aggregate basis.

The resource shall refund payments received for Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it failed to provide. For purposes of determining the amount of the payments to be refunded by a Market

Participant, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve on an individual resource basis unless the Market Participant had multiple resources that were assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, in which case the shortfall will be determined on an aggregate basis. For performance determined on an aggregate basis, the response of any resource that provided more Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide will be used to offset the performance of other resources that provided less Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve than they were assigned or self-scheduled to provide during a Synchronized Reserve Event, as calculated in the PJM Manuals. The determination of a Market Participant's aggregate response shall not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve credited to each individual resource.

The amount refunded shall be determined by multiplying the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price by the amount of the shortfall of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve, measured in megawatts, for all *intervals* the resource was assigned or self-scheduled to provide Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve for a period of time immediately preceding the Synchronized Reserve Event equal to the lesser of the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events, or the number of days since the resource last failed to provide the amount of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve it was assigned or self-scheduled to provide in response to a Synchronized Reserve Event. The average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events for purposes of this calculation shall be determined by an annual review of the twenty-four month period ending October 31 of the calendar year in which the review is performed, and shall be rounded down to a whole day value. The Office of the Interconnection shall report the results of its annual review to stakeholders by no later than December 31, and the average number of days between Synchronized Reserve Events shall be effective as of the following January 1. The refunded charges shall be allocated as credits to Market Participants based on its pro rata share of the Synchronized Reserve Obligation megawatts less any Tier 1 Synchronized Reserve applied to its Synchronized Reserve Obligation in the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event for the Reserve Sub-zone or Reserve Zone, except that Market Participants that incur a refund obligation and also have an applicable Synchronized Reserve Obligation during the hour(s) of the Synchronized Reserve Event shall not be included in the allocation of such refund credits. If the event spans multiple hours, the refund credits will be prorated hourly based on the duration of the event within each clock hour.

(k) The magnitude of response to a Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource or a Demand Resource, except for Batch Load Demand Resources covered by section 3.2.3A(l), is the difference between the generation resource's output or the Demand Resource's consumption at the start of the event and its output or consumption 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output or Demand Resource consumption at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output or greatest Demand Resource consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output or a Demand Resource's consumption 10 minutes after the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output or lowest Demand Resource consumption achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation

resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter. The response actually credited to a Demand Resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt consumption of the Demand Resource exceeds the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.

(l) The magnitude of response by a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the start of a Synchronized Reserve Event shall be the difference between (i) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption at the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the end of the Synchronized Reserve Event in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the magnitude of the response shall be zero if, when the Synchronized Reserve Event commences, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than ten minutes.

## 3.2.3A.001 Non-Synchronized Reserve.

- (a) Each Market Participant that is a Load Serving Entity that is not part of an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have an obligation for hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve equal to its pro rata share of Non-Synchronized Reserve assigned for the hour for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone of the PJM Region, based on the Market *Participant's* total load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in such Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone for the hour ("Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation"). Those entities that participate in an agreement to share reserves with external entities subject to the requirements in BAL-002 shall have their reserve obligations determined based on the stipulations in such agreement. A Market Participant with an hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation shall be charged the pro rata share of the sum of the quantity of Non-Synchronized Reserves provided in each Real-time Settlement Interval times the clearing price for all Real-time Settlement Intervals in the hour associated with that obligation.
- (b) Credits for Non-Synchronized Reserve provided by generation resources that are not operating for energy at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection specifically for the purpose of providing Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be the higher of (i) the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price or (ii) the specific opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Non-Synchronized Reserve, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals.
- (c) The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be determined for each Reserve Zone and Reserve Sub-zone by the Office of the Interconnection for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* of the Operating Day. The Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price shall be calculated as the 5-minute clearing price. Each 5-minute clearing price shall be calculated as the marginal cost of procuring sufficient Non-Synchronized Reserves and/or Synchronized Reserves in each Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone inclusive of opportunity costs associated with meeting the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve

Requirement. When the Primary Reserve Requirement or Extended Primary Reserve Requirement in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone cannot be met at a price less than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor, the 5-minute clearing price for Non-Synchronized Reserve shall be at least greater than or equal to the applicable Reserve Penalty Factor for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone, but less than or equal to the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for the Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone. If the Office of the Interconnection has initiated in a Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone either a Voltage Reduction Action as described in the PJM Manuals or a Manual Load Dump Action as described in the PJM Manuals, the 5-minute clearing price shall be the Reserve Penalty Factor for the Primary Reserve Requirement for that Reserve Zone or Reserve Sub-zone.

The Reserve Penalty Factor for the Extended Primary Reserve Requirement shall be \$300/MWh.

By no later than April 30 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection will analyze Market Participants' response to prices exceeding \$1,000/MWh on an annual basis and will provide its analysis to PJM stakeholders. The Office of the Interconnection will also review this analysis to determine whether any changes to the Primary Reserve Penalty Factors are warranted for subsequent Delivery Year(s).

(d) For each Real-time Settlement Interval and for determining the 5-minute Non-Synchronized Reserve clearing price, the unit-specific opportunity cost for a generation resource that is not providing energy because they are providing Non-Synchronized Reserves will be determined in accordance with the following equation:

$$(A \times B) - C$$

Where:

A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;

B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource; and

C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

(e) In determining the credit under subsection (b) to a resource selected to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and that follows the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions, the unit-specific opportunity cost of a generation resource shall be determined for each *Real-time Settlement Interval* that the Office of the Interconnection requires a generation resource to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve and shall be *in accordance with the following equation:* 

$$(A \times B) - C$$

#### Where:

- A = The deviation of the generation resource's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and instructions from the generation resource's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order;
- B = The Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus for the generation resource;
- C = The applicable offer for energy from the generation resource in the PJM Interchange Energy Market.
- (f) Any amounts credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve in a *Real-time Settlement Interval* in excess of the Non-Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price in that *Real-time Settlement Interval* shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant that does not meet its hourly Non-Synchronized Reserve Obligation in proportion to its purchases of Non-Synchronized Reserve in megawatt-hours during that hour.
- (g) The magnitude of response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event by a generation resource is the difference between the generation resource's output at the start of the event and its output 10 minutes after the start of the event. In order to allow for small fluctuations and possible telemetry delays, generation resource output at the start of the event is defined as the lowest telemetered generator resource output between one minute prior to and one minute following the start of the event. Similarly, a generation resource's output 10 minutes after the start of the event is defined as the greatest generator resource output achieved between 9 and 11 minutes after the start of the event. The response actually credited to a generation resource will be reduced by the amount the megawatt output of the generation resource falls below the level achieved after 10 minutes by either the end of the event or after 30 minutes from the start of the event, whichever is shorter.
- (h) In the event a generation resource that has been assigned by the Office of the Interconnection to provide Non-Synchronized Reserve fails to provide the assigned amount of Non-Synchronized Reserve in response to a Non-Synchronized Reserve Event, the resource will be credited for Non-Synchronized Reserve capacity in the amount that actually responded for the contiguous *Real-time Settlement Interval* the resource was assigned Non-Synchronized Reserve during which the event occurred.

## 3.2.3A.01 Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall satisfy the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement by procuring Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market from Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources, provided that Demand Resources shall be limited to providing the lesser of any limit established by the Reliability First Corporation or SERC, as applicable, or twenty-five percent of the total Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources that clear in the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market shall receive a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves

schedule from the Office of the Interconnection for the relevant Operating Day. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in the PJM Interchange Energy Market; provided that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to bilateral transactions between Market Participants or with respect to a self-schedule or self-supply of generation resources by a Market Buyer to satisfy its Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement.

- (b) A Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resource that receives a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid the hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Market clearing price for the cleared megawatt quantity of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves in each hour of the schedule, subject to meeting the requirements of subsection (c) of this section.
- (c) To be eligible for payment pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources shall comply with the following provisions:
  - (i) Generation resources with a start time greater than thirty minutes are required to be synchronized and operating at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule and shall have a dispatchable range equal to or greater than the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule.
  - (ii) Generation resources and Demand Resources with start times or shutdown times, respectively, equal to or less than 30 minutes are required to respond to dispatch directives from the Office of the Interconnection during the resource's Dayahead Scheduling Reserves schedule. To meet this requirement the resource shall be required to start or shut down within the specified notification time plus its start or shut down time, provided that such time shall be less than thirty minutes.
  - (iii) Demand Resources with a Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves schedule shall be credited based on the difference between the resource's MW consumption at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load (starting MW usage) and the resource's MW consumption at the time when the Demand Resource is no longer dispatched by PJM (ending MW usage). For the purposes of this subsection, a resource's starting MW usage shall be the greatest telemetered consumption between one minute prior to and one minute following the issuance of a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection, and a resource's ending MW usage shall be the lowest consumption between one minute before and one minute after a dispatch instruction from the Office of the Interconnection that is no longer necessary to reduce.
  - (iv) Notwithstanding subsection (iii) above, the credit for a Batch Load Demand Resource that is at the stage in its production cycle when its energy consumption is less than the level of megawatts in its offer at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load shall be the difference between (i) the "ending MW usage" (as defined above) and (ii) the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption during the minute within the ten minutes after the time of the "ending MW

usage" in which the Batch Load Demand Resource's consumption was highest and for which its consumption in all subsequent minutes within the ten minutes was not less than fifty percent of the consumption in such minute; provided that, the credit shall be zero if, at the time the resource is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to reduce its load, the scheduled off-cycle stage of the production cycle is greater than the timeframe for which the resource was dispatched by PJM.

Resources that do not comply with the provisions of this subsection (c) shall not be eligible to receive credits pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

- (d) The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources satisfying the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement ("Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits") shall equal the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charges per paragraph (i) below. The hourly credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Resources satisfying the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve Requirement ("Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement, multiplied by the total credits paid to Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Resources and are allocated as Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Charges per paragraph (ii) below.
  - (i) A Market Participant's Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves charge is equal to the ratio of the Market Participant's hourly obligation to the total hourly obligation of all Market Participants in the PJM Region, multiplied by the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits. The hourly obligation for each Market Participant is a megawatt representation of the portion of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits that the Market Participant is responsible for paying to PJM. The hourly obligation is equal to the Market Participant's load ratio share of the total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources (described below), based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region. The total megawatt volume of Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves resources equals the ratio of the Base Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement to the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement multiplied by the total volume of Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves megawatts paid pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. A Market Participant's hourly Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves obligation can be further adjusted by any Day-ahead Scheduling Reserve bilateral transactions.
  - (ii) Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits shall be charged hourly to Market Participants that are net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market based on its positive demand difference ratio share. The positive demand difference for each Market Participant is the difference between its real-time load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) and cleared Demand Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, net of cleared Increment Offers

and cleared Decrement Bids in the Day-ahead Energy Market, when such value is positive. Net purchasers in the Day-ahead Energy Market are those Market Participants that have cleared Demand Bids plus cleared Decrement Bids in excess of its amount of cleared Increment Offers in the Day-ahead Energy Market. If there are no Market Participants with a positive demand difference, the Additional Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves credits are allocated according to paragraph (i) above.

(e) If the Day-ahead Scheduling Reserves Requirement is not satisfied through the operation of subsection (a) of this section, any additional Operating Reserves required to meet the requirement shall be scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 3.2.3 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

#### 3.2.3B Reactive Services.

- (a) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection shall be credited as specified below for the operation of its resource. These provisions are intended to provide payments to generating units when the LMP dispatch algorithms would not result in the dispatch needed for the required reactive service. LMP will be used to compensate generators that are subject to redispatch for reactive transfer limits.
- (b) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's resource is reduced or suspended at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Sections 3.2.3B(c) & 3.2.3B(d).
- (c) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, where such unit is pool-scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override) shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost by receiving a credit in an amount equal to the product of (A) the deviation of the generating unit's output necessary to follow the Office of the Interconnection's signals and the generating unit's expected output level if it had been dispatched in economic merit order, times (B) the Real-time Price at the generating unit was committed in the Real-time Energy Market, provided that the resulting outcome is greater than \$0.00. This equation is represented as (A\*B) C.

The deviation of the generating unit's output is equal to the lesser of the PJM forecasted output for the unit or level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the hourly integrated real time Locational Marginal Price, and shall be limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, minus the actual hourly integrated output of the unit.

For pool-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy is the offer on which the resource was committed. For self-scheduled generating units, their applicable offer for energy shall equal the real-time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that price schedule is less than the cost-based offer provided for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined from the cost-based schedule.

- (d) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a combustion turbine unit or combined cycle unit operating in simple cycle mode that is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), operated as requested by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost, limited to the lesser of the unit's Economic Maximum or the unit's Maximum Facility Output, if either of the following conditions occur:
  - (i) if the unit output is reduced at the direction of the Office of the Interconnection and the real time LMP at the unit's bus is higher than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection as directed by the PJM dispatcher, then the Market Seller shall be credited in a manner consistent with that described above in Section 3.2.3B(c) for a steam unit or a combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode.
  - (ii) if the unit is scheduled to produce energy in the day-ahead market, but the unit is not called on by PJM and does not operate in real time, then the Market Seller shall be credited hourly in an amount equal to the higher of (i) {(URTLMP UDALMP) x DAG, or (ii) {(URTLMP UB) x DAG where:

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus;

UDALMP equals the day-ahead LMP at the unit's bus;

DAG equals the day-ahead scheduled unit output for the hour;

UB equals the offer price for the unit determined according to the schedule on which the unit was committed day-ahead, unless such schedule was a market-based schedule and the offer associated with that market-based schedule is less than the cost-based offer for the unit, in which case the offer for the unit will be determined based on the cost-based schedule; and

where URTLMP - UDALMP and URTLMP - UB shall not be negative.

(e) At the end of each Operating Day, where the active energy output of a Market Seller's unit is increased at the request of the Office of the Interconnection for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability within the PJM Region and the offered price of the energy is above the real-time LMP at the unit's bus, the Market Seller shall be credited according to Section 3.2.3B(f).

(f) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from either a steam-electric generating unit, combined cycle unit or combustion turbine unit, where such unit is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the real time LMP at the unit's bus is lower than the price offered by the Market Seller for energy from the unit at the level of output requested by the Office of the Interconnection (as indicated either by the desired MWs of output from the unit determined by PJM's unit dispatch system or as directed by the PJM dispatcher through a manual override), shall receive a credit hourly in an amount equal to {(AG - LMPDMW) x (UB - URTLMP)} where:

AG equals the actual output of the unit;

LMPDMW equals the level of output for the unit determined according to the point on the scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating corresponding to the real time LMP at the unit's bus and adjusted for any Regulation or Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve assignments;

UB equals the unit offer for that unit for which output is increased, determined according to the real time scheduled offer curve on which the unit was operating;

URTLMP equals the real time LMP at the unit's bus; and

where UB - URTLMP shall not be negative.

- (g) A Market Seller providing Reactive Services from a hydroelectric resource where such resource is pool scheduled (or self-scheduled, if operating according to Section 1.10.3 (c) hereof), and where the output of such resource is altered from the schedule submitted by the Market Seller for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be compensated for lost opportunity cost in the same manner as provided in sections 3.2.2(d) and 3.2.3A(f) and further detailed in the PJM Manuals.
- (h) If a Market Seller believes that, due to specific pre-existing binding commitments to which it is a party, and that properly should be recognized for purposes of this section, the above calculations do not accurately compensate the Market Seller for lost opportunity cost associated with following the Office of the Interconnection's dispatch instructions to reduce or suspend a unit's output for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, then the Office of the Interconnection, the Market Monitoring Unit and the individual Market Seller will discuss a mutually acceptable, modified amount of such alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, taking into account the specific circumstances binding on the Market Seller. Following such discussion, if the Office of the Interconnection accepts a modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, the Office of the Interconnection shall invoice the Market *Participant* accordingly. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the modified amount of alternate lost opportunity cost compensation, as accepted by the Office of the Interconnection, it will exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns.

- The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by generating units maintaining reactive reliability shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the overall PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generating units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generating unit's operator indicates that the generating unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each Real-time Settlement Interval a generating unit provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generating unit's cost to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the product of MW energy usage for providing synchronous condensing multiplied by the real time LMP at the generating unit's bus, (C) the generating unit's startup-cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unitspecific lost opportunity cost of the generating resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated to provide Reactive Services was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generating unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (1) below.
- (j) A Market Seller's pool scheduled steam-electric generating unit or combined cycle unit operating in combined cycle mode, that is not committed to operate in the Day-ahead Market, but that is directed by the Office of the Interconnection to operate solely for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability, at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, shall be credited in the amount of the unit's offered price for start-up and no-load fees. The unit also shall receive, if applicable, compensation in accordance with Sections 3.2.3B(e)-(f).
- (k) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in Sections 3.2.3B(b)-(j) shall be the cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in such transmission zone.
- (l) The cost of Reactive Services for the purpose of maintaining reactive reliability in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service,

in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

(m) Generating units receiving dispatch instructions from the Office of the Interconnection under the expectation of increased actual or reserve reactive shall inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher if the requested reactive capability is not achievable. Should the operator of a unit receiving such instructions realize at any time during which said instruction is effective that the unit is not, or likely would not be able to, provide the requested amount of reactive support, the operator shall as soon as practicable inform the Office of the Interconnection dispatcher of the unit's inability, or expected inability, to provide the required reactive support, so that the associated dispatch instruction may be cancelled. PJM Performance Compliance personnel will audit operations after-the-fact to determine whether a unit that has altered its active power output at the request of the Office of the Interconnection has provided the actual reactive support or the reactive reserve capability requested by the Office of the Interconnection. PJM shall utilize data including, but not limited to, historical reactive performance and stated reactive capability curves in order to make this determination, and may withhold such compensation as described above if reactive support as requested by the Office of the Interconnection was not or could not have been provided.

## 3.2.3C Synchronous Condensing for Post-Contingency Operation.

- (a) Under normal circumstances, PJM operates generation out of merit order to control contingency overloads when the flow on the monitored element for loss of the contingent element ("contingency flow") exceeds the long-term emergency rating for that facility, typically a 4-hour or 2-hour rating. At times however, and under certain, specific system conditions, PJM does not operate generation out of merit order for certain contingency overloads until the contingency flow on the monitored element exceeds the 30-minute rating for that facility ("post-contingency operation"). In conjunction with such operation, when the contingency flow on such element exceeds the long-term emergency rating, PJM operates synchronous condensers in the areas affected by such constraints, to the extent they are available, to provide greater certainty that such resources will be capable of producing energy in sufficient time to reduce the flow on the monitored element below the normal rating should such contingency occur.
- (b) The amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operation shall be counted as Synchronized Reserve satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. Operators of these generation units shall be notified of such provision, and to the extent a generation unit's operator indicates that the generation unit is capable of providing Synchronized Reserve, shall be subject to the same requirements contained in Section 3.2.3A regarding provision of Tier 2 Synchronized Reserve. At the end of each Operating Day, to the extent a condenser operated in conjunction with post-contingency operation also provided Synchronized Reserve, a Market Seller shall be credited for providing synchronous condensing in conjunction with post-contingency operation at the request of the Office of the Interconnection, in an amount equal to the higher of (i) the Synchronized Reserve Market Clearing Price for each *applicable interval* a generation resource provided synchronous condensing multiplied by the amount of Synchronized Reserve provided by the synchronous condenser or (ii) the sum of (A) the generation resource's *applicable interval* cost

to provide synchronous condensing, calculated in accordance with the PJM Manuals, (B) the *applicable interval* product of the megawatts of energy used to provide synchronous condensing multiplied by the real-time LMP at the generation bus of the generation resource, (C) the generation resource's start-up cost of providing synchronous condensing, and (D) the unit-specific lost opportunity cost of the generation resource supplying the increment of Synchronized Reserve as determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with procedures specified in the PJM Manuals. To the extent a condenser operated in association with post-contingency constraint control was not also providing Synchronized Reserve, the Market Seller shall be credited only for the generation unit's cost to condense, as described in (ii) above. The total Synchronized Reserve Obligations of all Load Serving Entities under section 3.2.3A(a) in the zone where these condensers are located shall be reduced by the amount counted as satisfying the PJM Synchronized Reserve requirements. The Synchronized Reserve Obligation of each Load Serving Entity in the zone under section 3.2.3A(a) shall be reduced to the same extent that the costs of such condensers counted as Synchronized Reserve are allocated to such Load Serving Entity pursuant to subsection (d) below.

- (c) The sum of the foregoing credits as specified in section 3.2.3C(b) shall be the cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations for the Operating Day and shall be separately determined for each transmission zone in the PJM Region based on whether the resource was dispatched in association with post-contingency operation in such transmission zone.
- (d) The cost of synchronous condensers associated with post-contingency operations in a transmission zone in the PJM Region for each Operating Day shall be allocated and charged to each Market Participant in proportion to its deliveries of energy to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation) in such transmission zone, served under Network Transmission Service, in megawatt-hours during that Operating Day, as compared to all such deliveries for all Market Participants in such transmission zone.

## 3.2.4 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

### 3.2.5 Transmission Loss Charges.

Each Market Buyer shall be assessed Transmission Loss Charges as specified in Section 5 of this Schedule.

## 3.2.6 Emergency Energy.

(a) When the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures, resources offering Emergency energy are eligible to set real-time Locational Marginal Prices, capped at the energy offer cap plus the sum of the applicable Reserve Penalty Factors for the Synchronized Reserve Requirement and Primary Reserve Requirement, provided that the Emergency energy is needed to meet demand in the PJM Region.

- (b) Market Participants shall be allocated a proportionate share of the net cost of Emergency energy purchased by the Office of the Interconnection. Such allocated share during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy purchase shall be in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Dayahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales. This deviation shall not include any reduction or suspension of output of pool scheduled resources requested by PJM to manage an Emergency within the PJM Region.
- (c) Net revenues in excess of Real-time Prices attributable to sales of energy in connection with Emergencies to other Control Areas shall be credited to Market Participants during each applicable interval of such Emergency energy sale in proportion to the sum of (i) each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net withdrawals and injections in the Day-ahead Energy Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market purchases or decreases its spot market sales, and (ii) each Market Participant's energy sales from within the PJM Region to entities outside the PJM Region that have been curtailed by PJM.
- (d) The net costs or net revenues associated with sales or purchases of energy in connection with a Minimum Generation Emergency in the PJM Region, or in another Control Area, shall be allocated during each *applicable interval* of such Emergency sale or purchase to each Market Participant in proportion to the amount of each Market Participant's real-time deviation from its net *withdrawals and injections* in the Day-ahead Market, whenever that deviation increases the Market Participant's spot market sales or decreases its spot market purchases.

## **3.2.7** Billing.

- (a) PJMSettlement shall prepare a billing statement each billing cycle for each Market *Participant* in accordance with the charges and credits specified in Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.6 of this Schedule, and showing the net amount to be paid or received by the Market *Participant*. Billing statements shall provide sufficient detail, as specified in the PJM Manuals, to allow verification of the billing amounts and completion of the Market *Participant's* internal accounting.
- (b) If deliveries to a Market *Participant* that has PJM Interchange meters in accordance with Section 14 of the Operating Agreement include amounts delivered for a Market Participant that does not have PJM Interchange meters separate from those of the metered Market *Participant*, PJMSettlement shall prepare a separate billing statement for the unmetered Market Participant based on the allocation of deliveries agreed upon between the Market *Participant* and the unmetered Market Participant specified by them to the Office of the Interconnection.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 7.4

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### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

## 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources , and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation

Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical

generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue

Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during

the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the

generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

- megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

## 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

## 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

## 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To FTRARR hHolders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sSection 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, sSection 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

### 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the

Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for

Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may

request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these

cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

- v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.
- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an

allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

## 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each

prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

# 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

## 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.4. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.3(b). If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To ARR holders iIn accordance with Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.
  - (ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 7.4.1(d)(ii) shall be distributed pursuant to Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load

Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in

a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the

megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation

without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation (i) process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's

- FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.
- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights or the

right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

## 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

## 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# OA, Schedule 1, Section 7.4

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#### 7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

## 7.4.1 Eligibility.

- (a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.
- (b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.
- (c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:
  - (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
  - (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
  - (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.
- (d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

# 7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the Business Day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second Business Day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the Active Historical Generation Resources or Qualified Replacement Resources , and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. Active Historical Generation Resources shall mean those historical resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year, and which have not since been deactivated and, further, only up to the current installed capacity value of such resource as of the annual allocation of ARRs for the target PJM Planning Period. Qualified Replacement Resources shall mean those resources the Office of the Interconnection designates for the ensuing Planning Period to replace historical resources that no longer qualify as Active Historical Generation Resources and that maximize the economic value of ARRs while maintaining Simultaneous Feasibility, as further described in the PJM Manuals.

Prior to the stage 1A of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine, for each Zone, the amount of megawatts of ARRs available from Active Historical Generation

Resources in that Zone and the amount of megawatts required from Qualified Replacement Resources. The Office of the Interconnection shall designate Qualified Replacement Resources as follows, and as further described in the PJM Manuals. Qualified Replacement Resources shall be either from a (1) capacity resource that has been included in the rate base of a specific Load Serving Entity in a particular Zone, using criteria for rate-based as specified in sections 7.6 and 7.7 hereof concerning New Stage 1 Resources and Alternative Stage 1 Resources; or (2) from a non-rate-based capacity resource.

Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period the Office of the Interconnection will determine which Stage 1 Resources are no longer viable for the next PJM Planning Period and then will replace such source points with Qualified Replacement Resources (i.e., Capacity Resources that pass the Simultaneous Feasibility Test and which are economic). The Office of Interconnection will determine the replacement source points as follows. First, the Office of the Interconnection will compile a list of all Capacity Resources that are operational as of the beginning of the next Planning Period, that are not currently designated as source points and will post such list on the PJM website prior to finalizing the Stage 1 eligible resource list for each transmission zone for review by Market Participants. In the first instance, all such resources will be considered to be non-rate-based. Market Participants will be asked to review the posted resource list and provide evidence to the Office of the Interconnection, if any, of the posted resources that shall be classified as rate-based resources. Once the replacement resource list along with the resource status is finalized after any input from Market Participants, the Office of the Interconnection will create two categories of resources for each Stage 1 transmission zone based on economic order: one for rate-based; and a second for non-rate-based resources. When determining economic order, the Office of the Interconnection will utilize historical source and sink Day-ahead Energy Market Congestion Locational Marginal Prices ("CLMPs"). Historical value will be based on the previous three years' CLMP sink versus CLMP source differences weighted by 50% for the previous calendar year, weighted by 30% for the year prior and weighted by 20% for the year prior. To the extent replacement resources do not have three years' worth historical data, weighting will be performed either 50/50% in the case of two years or 100% in the case of one year worth of historical data. If a full year of historical data is not available, PJM will utilize the CLMP from the closest electrically equivalent location to compose an entire year of historical data. Once the economic order is established for each Stage 1 zonal rate-based and non-ratebased generator categories, the Office of the Interconnection will begin to replace Stage 1 zonal retirements with the Qualified Replacement Resources by first utilizing rate-based resources in the economic order while respecting transmission limitations. And once the rate-based resource determination is concluded, the Office of the Interconnection will then utilize non-rate-based resources, in economic order, while respecting transmission limitations as described previously.

The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; 2018 for the OVEC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical

generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue

Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

- (d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).
- (e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.
- (f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during

the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Pointto-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

- (g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.
- (h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.
- (i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an event of force majeure that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

- (j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:
  - The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a
    designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM
    Region to load located outside the PJM Region.
  - ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.
  - iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.
  - iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.
  - v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the

generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

- vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.
- viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.
- x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.
- xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights

- megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.
- xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).
- xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.
- xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.
- xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

## 7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

- (a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its FTR reporting tools.
- (b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.
- (c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the

bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation Revenue Rights.

- (d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.
- (e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.
- (f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

### 7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.
- (b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

## 7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

- (a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.6.
- (b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.
- (c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

# RAA, Schedule 17

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#### **SCHEDULE 17**

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Agway Energy Services, LLC

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Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Allegheny Energy Supply Company, L.L.C.

Alpaca Energy LLC

Alpha Gas and Electric LLC

Ambit Northeast, LLC

American Electric Power Service Corporation on behalf of its affiliates:

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Indiana Michigan Power Company

**Kentucky Power Company** 

Kingsport Power Company

Ohio Power Company

Wheeling Power Company.

American Illuminating Company, LLC

American Municipal Power, Inc.

American Power & Gas of IL, LLC

American Power & Gas of MD, LLC

American Power & Gas of NJ, LLC

American Power & Gas of Ohio, LLC

American Power & Gas of Pennsylvania, LLC

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American PowerNet Management, L.P.

American Transmission Systems, Inc.

AP Gas and Electric (PA), LLC

APN Starfirst, LP

Approved Energy II LLC

Archer Energy, LLC

ArcelorMittal USA LLC

Arrow Energy RRH, LLC

Aspirity Energy, LLC

Astral Energy LLC

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Atlantic Energy MD, LLC

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

**Baltimore Power Company LLC** 

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Bativa, IL (City of)

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Blackstone Wind Farm, LLC

Blue Ridge Power Agency, Inc.

BlueRock Energy, Inc.

Borough of Butler, Butler Electric Division

Borough of Chambersburg

Borough of Columbia, PA

Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey

Borough of Milltown

Borough of Mont Alto, PA

Borough of Park Ridge, New Jersey

Borough of Pemberton

Borough of Pitcairn, Pennsylvania

Borough of Seaside Heights, New Jersey

Borough of South River, New Jersey

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Capital Energy, LLC

Cargill Power Markets LLC

Central Virginia Electric Cooperative

Centre Lane Trading Limited

Champion Energy Marketing LLC

Champion Energy, LLC

Choice Energy, LLC dba 4 Choice Energy, LLC

Cincinnati Bell Energy, LLC

Citigroup Energy Inc.

Citizens' Electric Company of Lewisburg, PA

City of Cleveland, Department of Public Utilities, Division of Cleveland Public Power

City of Dover, Delaware

City of New Martinsville - WV

City of Philippi - West VA

City of Rochelle

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Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Collegiate Clean Energy, LLC

Commonwealth Edison Company

ConocoPhillips Company

Consolidated Edison Energy, Inc.

Consolidated Edison Solutions, Inc.

Constellation Energy Power Choice, LLC

Constellation Energy Services, Inc.

Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.

Constellation Power Source Generation, LLC

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Delmarva Power & Light Company

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Devonshire Energy LLC

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Direct Energy Business Marketing, LLC

Direct Energy Services, LLC

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DTE Energy Trading, Inc.

Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.

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Dynegy Kendall Energy, LLC

Dynegy Marketing and Trade, LLC

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**Easton Utilities Commission** 

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Energy.me Midwest llc d/b/a energy.me

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ENGIE Retail, LLC

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Exelon Generation Co., LLC

First Point Power, LLC

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.

Freepoint Energy Solutions LLC

Frontier Utilities Northeast, LLC

Front Royal (Town of)

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GenOn Power Midwest, LP

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Great American Power, LLC

Greenlight Energy Inc.

Green Mountain Energy Company

Hagerstown Light Department

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Harrison REA, Inc. - Clarksburg, WV

HIKO Energy, LLC

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Illinois Municipal Electric Agency

Illinois Power Marketing Company

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Jersey Central Power & Light Company

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Kiwi Energy NY LLC

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Liberty Power Holdings LLC

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Linde Energy Services, Inc.

Lower Electric, LLC

LSC Communications US, LLC

Lykins Oil Company d/b/a Lykins Energy Solutions

Macquarie Cook Energy LLC

Mansfield Power and Gas, LLC

Major Energy Electric Services LLC

MC Squared Energy Services, LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm II LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm III LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm IV LLC

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Median Energy Corp.

Mega Energy Holdings, LLC

Metropolitan Edison Company

MidAmerican Energy Company

MidAmerican Energy Services, LLC

Mint Energy, LLC

Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc.

Morgan Stanley Services Group Inc.

MP2 Energy NE, LLC

MPower NJ LLC

NATGASCO d/b/a/ Supreme Energy, Inc.

National Choice Energy, LLC

National Gas & Electric, LLC

NextEra Energy Marketing, LLC

Nextera Energy Services New Jersey, LLC

Nextera Energy Services, Illinois, LLC

Nittany Energy, LLC

Noble Americas Energy Solutions LLC

Noble Americas Gas & Power Corp.

Nordic Energy Services LLC

North American Power and Gas LLC.

North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation

North Carolina Municipal Power Agency Number 1

Northeastern REMC

Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative – NOVEC

NRG Power Marketing, L.L.C.

NYSEG Solutions, Inc.

Oasis Power, LLC dba Oasis Energy

Occidental Power Services, Inc.

Ohio Edison Company

#### Ohio Valley Electric Corporation

Old Dominion Electric Cooperative

Oxford Energy Services, LLC

Palmco Power DC, LLC

PALMco Power DE, LLC

Palmco Power IL, LLC

Palmco Power MD, LLC

Palmco Power NJ, LLC

Palmco Power OH, LLC

Palmco Power PA, LLC

PALMco Power VA, LLC

Park Power LLC

Parma Energy, LLC

PBF Power Marketing LLC

PECO Energy Company

Pennsylvania Electric Company

Pennsylvania Grain Processing LLC

Pennsylvania Power Company

PEPCO Energy Services, Inc.

Pinnacle Power LLC

Plymouth Rock Energy, LLC

Potomac Electric Power Company

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation d/b/a PPL Utilities

Prairieland Energy, Inc.

Provision Power and Gas, LLC

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RRI Energy Solutions East, LLC

Rushmore Energy, LLC (new)

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Santanna Energy Services

SFE Energy, Inc.

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Shipley Choice LLC

Solios Power Mid-Atlantic Trading LLC

Source Power & Gas LLC

South Bay Energy Corp.

South Jersey Energy Company

Southeastern Power Administration

Southern Indiana Gas & Electric

Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Spark Energy, LLC

Sperian Energy Corp

Spring Energy RRH, LLC dba Spring Power & Gas

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Star Energy Partners LLC

Starion Energy PA Inc.

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Stream Energy Delaware, LLC

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Titan Gas and Power

Toledo Edison Company (The)

Town of Berlin, Maryland

Town of Williamsport

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TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd.

Tri-County Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Trident Retail Energy, LLC

TriEagle Energy, LP

Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania

Twin Eagle Resource Management, LLC

UGI Energy Services, LLC

UGI Utilities, Inc. - Electric Division

VCharge, Inc.

Verde Energy USA DC, LLC

Verde Energy USA Illinois, LLC

Verde Energy USA Maryland, LLC

Verde Energy USA Ohio, LLC

Verde Energy USA, Inc.

Vineland Municipal Electric Utility (City of Vineland)

Virginia Electric & Power Company

Viridian Energy PA LLC

Vista Energy Marketing, L.P.

Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.

Wellsboro Electric Company

West Penn Power Company d/b/a Allegheny Power

WGL Energy Services, Inc.

Xoom Energy Maryland, LLC

Xoom Energy New Jersey, LLC

XOOM Energy Ohio, LLC

Xoom Energy, LLC

York Generation Company, LLC

# RAA, Schedule 17

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Twin Eagle Resource Management, LLC

UGI Energy Services, LLC

UGI Utilities, Inc. - Electric Division

VCharge, Inc.

Verde Energy USA DC, LLC

Verde Energy USA Illinois, LLC

Verde Energy USA Maryland, LLC

Verde Energy USA Ohio, LLC

Verde Energy USA, Inc.

Vineland Municipal Electric Utility (City of Vineland)

Virginia Electric & Power Company

Viridian Energy PA LLC

Vista Energy Marketing, L.P.

Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.

Wellsboro Electric Company

West Penn Power Company d/b/a Allegheny Power

WGL Energy Services, Inc.

## Wolverine Holdings, L.P.

Xoom Energy Maryland, LLC

Xoom Energy New Jersey, LLC

XOOM Energy Ohio, LLC

Xoom Energy, LLC

York Generation Company, LLC

# RAA, Schedule 17

Docket No. ER18-1483-000

Filed: 4/30/2018

Effective: 3/31/2018

Version: 35.0.2

#### **SCHEDULE 17**

#### PARTIES TO THE RELIABILITY ASSURANCE AGREEMENT

This Schedule sets forth the Parties to the Agreement:

Abest Power & Gas, LLC

AEP Energy, Inc.

AEP Retail Energy Partners LLC

AES Ohio Generation, LLC

#### Agera Energy LLC

Aggressive Energy LLC

Agway Energy Services, LLC

Algonquin Energy Services Inc.

Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Allegheny Energy Supply Company, L.L.C.

Alpaca Energy LLC

Alpha Gas and Electric LLC

Ambit Northeast, LLC

American Electric Power Service Corporation on behalf of its affiliates:

Appalachian Power Company

Indiana Michigan Power Company

Kentucky Power Company

Kingsport Power Company

**Ohio Power Company** 

Wheeling Power Company.

## American Illuminating Company, LLC

American Municipal Power, Inc.

American Power & Gas of IL, LLC

American Power & Gas of MD, LLC

American Power & Gas of NJ, LLC

American Power & Gas of Ohio, LLC

American Power & Gas of Pennsylvania, LLC

American Power Partners LLC

American PowerNet Management, L.P.

American Transmission Systems, Inc.

AP Gas and Electric (PA), LLC

APN Starfirst, LP

Approved Energy II LLC

Archer Energy, LLC

ArcelorMittal USA LLC

Arrow Energy RRH, LLC

Aspirity Energy, LLC

Astral Energy LLC

Atlantic City Electric Company

Atlantic Energy MD, LLC

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

Baltimore Power Company LLC

Barclays Capital Services, Inc

Bargain Energy, LLC

Bativa, IL (City of)

BBPC LLC d/b/a Great Eastern Energy

Blackstone Wind Farm, LLC

Blue Ridge Power Agency, Inc.

BlueRock Energy, Inc.

Borough of Butler, Butler Electric Division

Borough of Chambersburg

Borough of Columbia, PA

Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey

Borough of Milltown

Borough of Mont Alto, PA

Borough of Park Ridge, New Jersey

Borough of Pemberton

Borough of Pitcairn, Pennsylvania

Borough of Seaside Heights, New Jersey

Borough of South River, New Jersey

Boston Energy Trading and Marketing LLC

**BP** Energy Company

Brighten Energy LLC

BTG Pactual Commodities (US) LLC

Capital Energy, LLC

Calpine Energy Service, L.P.

Calpine Energy Solutions, LLC

Cargill Power Markets LLC

Central Virginia Electric Cooperative

Centre Lane Trading Limited

Champion Energy Marketing LLC

Champion Energy, LLC

Choice Energy, LLC dba 4 Choice Energy, LLC

Cincinnati Bell Energy, LLC

Citigroup Energy Inc.

Citizens' Electric Company of Lewisburg, PA

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City of Dover, Delaware

City of New Martinsville - WV

City of Philippi - West VA

City of Rochelle

Clearview Electric, Inc.

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Collegiate Clean Energy, LLC

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ConocoPhillips Company

Consolidated Edison Energy, Inc.

Consolidated Edison Solutions, Inc.

Constellation Energy Power Choice, LLC

Constellation Energy Services, Inc.

Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.

Constellation Power Source Generation, LLC

Credit Suisse (USA), Inc.

Current Power & Gas Inc.

Dayton Power & Light Company (The)

DC Energy LLC

Delaware Municipal Electric Corporation

Delmarva Power & Light Company

Denver Energy, LLC

Devonshire Energy LLC

Direct Energy Business, LLC

Direct Energy Business Marketing, LLC

Direct Energy Services, LLC

Downes Associates, Inc.

DPL Energy Resources, Inc.

DTE Energy Trading, Inc.

Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.

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Dynegy Marketing and Trade, LLC

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Meadow Lake Wind Farm LLC

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Meadow Lake Wind Farm III LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm IV LLC

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Median Energy PA LLC

Mega Energy Holdings, LLC

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Metropolitan Edison Company

MidAmerican Energy Company

MidAmerican Energy Services, LLC

Mint Energy, LLC

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Morgan Stanley Services Group Inc.

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MPower NJ LLC

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National Choice Energy, LLC

National Gas & Electric, LLC

NextEra Energy Marketing, LLC

Nextera Energy Services New Jersey, LLC

Nextera Energy Services, Illinois, LLC

Nittany Energy, LLC

## Noble Americas Energy Solutions LLC

Noble Americas Gas & Power Corp.

Nordic Energy Services LLC

North American Power and Gas LLC.

North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation

North Carolina Municipal Power Agency Number 1

Northeastern REMC

Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative – NOVEC

NRG Power Marketing, L.L.C.

#### **NYSEG Solutions, Inc.**

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Ohio Edison Company

Old Dominion Electric Cooperative

Oxford Energy Services, LLC

Palmco Power DC, LLC

PALMco Power DE, LLC

Palmco Power IL, LLC

Palmco Power MD, LLC

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Palmco Power OH, LLC

Palmco Power PA, LLC

PALMco Power VA, LLC

Park Power LLC

Parma Energy, LLC

PBF Power Marketing LLC

PECO Energy Company

Pennsylvania Electric Company

Pennsylvania Grain Processing LLC

Pennsylvania Power Company

PEPCO Energy Services, Inc.

Pinnacle Power LLC

Plymouth Rock Energy, LLC

Potomac Electric Power Company

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation d/b/a PPL Utilities

Prairieland Energy, Inc.

Provision Power and Gas, LLC

PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC

**PSEG Energy Solutions LLC** 

#### Public Power, LLC (CT)

Public Service Electric & Gas Company

Pure Energy USA, LLC

Realgy, LLC

Red Oak Power, LLC

Renaissance Power & Gas, Inc.

ResCom Energy, LLC

Residents Energy, L.L.C.

Respond Power LLC

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Rolling Hills Generating, LLC

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Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC

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Texas Retail Energy, LLC

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XOOM Energy Ohio, LLC

Xoom Energy, LLC

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# RAA, Schedule 17

Docket No. ER18-2109-000

Filed: 7/31/2018

Effective: 6/30/2018

Version: 35.0.3

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City of Rochelle

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Consolidated Edison Solutions, Inc.

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**Easton Utilities Commission** 

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Energy Services Providers, Inc.

Energy Technology Savings, Inc.

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Energy.me Midwest llc d/b/a energy.me

EnerPenn USA, LLC

Engie Energy Marketing NA, Inc.

ENGIE Retail, LLC

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FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.

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Great American Power, LLC

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Green Mountain Energy Company

Hagerstown Light Department

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Harrison REA, Inc. - Clarksburg, WV

Hartee Parnters, LP

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Illinois Power Marketing Company

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Ioway Energy, LLC

J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation

Jack Rich, Inc. d/b/a Anthracite Power & Light Company

J. Aron & Company LLC

Jersey Central Power & Light Company

Josco Energy USA, LLC

Just Energy Solutions Inc.

Kiwi Energy NY LLC

Kuehne Chemical Company, Inc.

L & P Electric Inc., d/b/a Leggett & Platt Electric Inc.

Lamarr Energy, LLC

Land O'Lakes, Inc.

Liberty Power Corp., L.L.C.

Liberty Power Delaware LLC

Liberty Power Holdings LLC

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Lower Electric, LLC

LSC Communications US, LLC

Lykins Oil Company d/b/a Lykins Energy Solutions

Macquarie Cook Energy LLC

Mansfield Power and Gas, LLC

Major Energy Electric Services LLC

MC Squared Energy Services, LLC

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Meadow Lake Wind Farm II LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm III LLC

Meadow Lake Wind Farm IV LLC

MeadWestvaco Corporation

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Median Energy PA LLC

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Metropolitan Edison Company

MidAmerican Energy Company

MidAmerican Energy Services, LLC

Mint Energy, LLC

Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc.

Morgan Stanley Services Group Inc.

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MPower NJ LLC

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National Choice Energy, LLC

National Gas & Electric, LLC

NextEra Energy Marketing, LLC

Nextera Energy Services New Jersey, LLC

Nextera Energy Services, Illinois, LLC

Nittany Energy, LLC

# Noble Americas Gas & Power Corp.

Nordic Energy Services LLC

North American Power and Gas LLC.

North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation

North Carolina Municipal Power Agency Number 1

Northeastern REMC

# Northern States Power Company

Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative - NOVEC

NRG Power Marketing, L.L.C.

Oasis Power, LLC dba Oasis Energy

Occidental Power Services, Inc.

Ohio Edison Company

*Ohio Valley Electric Corporation* 

Old Dominion Electric Cooperative

Oxford Energy Services, LLC

Palmco Power DC, LLC

PALMco Power DE, LLC

Palmco Power IL, LLC

Palmco Power MD, LLC

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Palmco Power OH, LLC

Palmco Power PA, LLC

PALMco Power VA, LLC

Park Power LLC

# Parma Energy, LLCPay Less Energy, LLC

PBF Power Marketing LLC

PECO Energy Company

Pennsylvania Electric Company

Pennsylvania Grain Processing LLC

Pennsylvania Power Company

PEPCO Energy Services, Inc.

Pinnacle Power LLC

Plymouth Rock Energy, LLC

Potomac Electric Power Company

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation d/b/a PPL Utilities

Prairieland Energy, Inc.

# Presto Energy, LLC

Provision Power and Gas, LLC

PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC

**PSEG Energy Solutions LLC** 

Public Service Electric & Gas Company

# Pure Energy USA IL, LLC

Pure Energy USA, LLC

Realgy, LLC

Red Oak Power, LLC

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ResCom Energy, LLC

Residents Energy, L.L.C.

Respond Power LLC

Riverside Generating, LLC

Rolling Hills Generating, LLC

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RRI Energy Solutions East, LLC

Rushmore Energy, LLC (new)

S.J. Energy Partners, Inc.

Santanna Energy Services

SFE Energy, Inc.

SFE Energy NJ, Inc.

Shipley Choice LLC

Solios Power Mid-Atlantic Trading LLC

Source Power & Gas LLC

South Bay Energy Corp.

South Jersey Energy Company

Southeastern Power Administration

Southern Indiana Gas & Electric

Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Spark Energy, LLC

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Titan Gas and Power

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Wolverine Holdings, L.P.
Xoom Energy Maryland, LLC
Xoom Energy New Jersey, LLC
XOOM Energy Ohio, LLC
Xoom Energy, LLC

York Generation Company, LLC

# RAA, Schedule 17

Docket No. ER18-459-002

Filed: 7/12/2018

Effective: 12/1/2018

Version: 36.1.0

#### **SCHEDULE 17**

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BlueRock Energy, Inc.

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Borough of Chambersburg

Borough of Columbia, PA

Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey

Borough of Milltown

Borough of Mont Alto, PA

Borough of Park Ridge, New Jersey

Borough of Pemberton

Borough of Pitcairn, Pennsylvania

Borough of Seaside Heights, New Jersey

Borough of South River, New Jersey

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Capital Energy, LLC

Cargill Power Markets LLC

Central Virginia Electric Cooperative

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Champion Energy, LLC

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Cincinnati Bell Energy, LLC

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City of Cleveland, Department of Public Utilities, Division of Cleveland Public Power

City of Dover, Delaware

City of New Martinsville - WV

City of Philippi - West VA

City of Rochelle

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Commonwealth Edison Company

ConocoPhillips Company

Consolidated Edison Energy, Inc.

Consolidated Edison Solutions, Inc.

Constellation Energy Power Choice, LLC

Constellation Energy Services, Inc.

Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.

Constellation Power Source Generation, LLC

Credit Suisse (USA), Inc.

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DC Energy LLC

Delaware Municipal Electric Corporation

Delmarva Power & Light Company

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Devonshire Energy LLC

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Direct Energy Business Marketing, LLC

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Lower Electric, LLC

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Palmco Power IL, LLC

Palmco Power MD, LLC

Palmco Power NJ, LLC

Palmco Power OH, LLC

Palmco Power PA, LLC

PALMco Power VA, LLC

Park Power LLC

Parma Energy, LLC

PBF Power Marketing LLC

PECO Energy Company

Pennsylvania Electric Company

Pennsylvania Grain Processing LLC

Pennsylvania Power Company

PEPCO Energy Services, Inc.

Pinnacle Power LLC

Plymouth Rock Energy, LLC

Potomac Electric Power Company

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation d/b/a PPL Utilities

Prairieland Energy, Inc.

Provision Power and Gas, LLC

PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC

**PSEG Energy Solutions LLC** 

Public Power, LLC (CT)

Public Service Electric & Gas Company

Pure Energy USA, LLC

Realgy, LLC

Red Oak Power, LLC

Renaissance Power & Gas, Inc.

ResCom Energy, LLC

Residents Energy, L.L.C.

Respond Power LLC

Riverside Generating, LLC

Rolling Hills Generating, LLC

RPA Energy, Inc.

R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company

RRI Energy Services, LLC

RRI Energy Solutions East, LLC

Rushmore Energy, LLC (new)

S.J. Energy Partners, Inc.

Santanna Energy Services

SFE Energy, Inc.

SFE Energy NJ, Inc.

Shipley Choice LLC

Solios Power Mid-Atlantic Trading LLC

Source Power & Gas LLC

South Bay Energy Corp.

South Jersey Energy Company

Southeastern Power Administration

Southern Indiana Gas & Electric

Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Spark Energy, LLC

Sperian Energy Corp

Spring Energy RRH, LLC dba Spring Power & Gas

Standard Gas & Electric, LLC

Star Energy Partners LLC

Starion Energy PA Inc.

Stream Energy Columbia, LLC

Stream Energy Delaware, LLC

Stream Energy Illinois, LLC

Stream Energy Maryland, LLC

Stream Energy New Jersey, LLC

Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC

Summer Energy of Ohio LLC

Switch Energy, LLC

Talen Energy Marketing, LLC

Tenaska Power Services Co.

TERM Power & Gas, LLC

Texas Retail Energy, LLC

Thurmont Municipal Light Company

Titan Gas and Power

Toledo Edison Company (The)

Town of Berlin, Maryland

Town of Williamsport

Town Square Energy East, LLC

TransAlta Energy Marketing (U.S.) Inc.

TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd.

Tri-County Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Trident Retail Energy, LLC

TriEagle Energy, LP

Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania

Twin Eagle Resource Management, LLC

UGI Energy Services, LLC

UGI Utilities, Inc. - Electric Division

VCharge, Inc.

Verde Energy USA DC, LLC

Verde Energy USA Illinois, LLC

Verde Energy USA Maryland, LLC

Verde Energy USA Ohio, LLC

Verde Energy USA, Inc.

Vineland Municipal Electric Utility (City of Vineland)

Virginia Electric & Power Company

Viridian Energy PA LLC

Vista Energy Marketing, L.P.

Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.

Wellsboro Electric Company

West Penn Power Company d/b/a Allegheny Power

WGL Energy Services, Inc.

Xoom Energy Maryland, LLC

Xoom Energy New Jersey, LLC

XOOM Energy Ohio, LLC

Xoom Energy, LLC

York Generation Company, LLC