



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Introduction

This document provides information for PJM stakeholders regarding the results of the 2014/2015 Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) First Incremental Auction. Incremental Auctions provide both a forum for capacity suppliers to purchase replacement capacity, and a means for PJM to adjust previously committed capacity levels due to reliability requirement increases or decreases combined with the appropriate share of the deferred Short-Term Resource Procurement Target.

The 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction opened on September 10, 2012 and the results were posted on September 21, 2012. This is the first Incremental Auction conducted with multiple Demand Resource (DR) products in effect (Annual DR, Extended Summer DR and Limited DR) as these additional DR products were implemented starting with the 2014/2015 Delivery Year. This document begins with a high level summary of the Incremental Auction results followed by sections containing detailed descriptions of the configuration and results of the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction.

Summary of 2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 1 summarizes the clearing prices and cleared participant activity of the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction. The First Incremental Auction cleared with unique prices in three regions of the RTO. In the PS-NORTH LDA, the resource clearing price for Limited, Extended Summer and Annual capacity was \$399.62/MW-Day, \$410.95/MW-Day and \$410.95/MW-Day, respectively. In the MAAC region outside of the PS-NORTH LDA, which is comprised of the AECO, BGE, DPL, JCPL, Met-Ed, Penelec, PEPCO, PPL, PSEG (outside of PS-NORTH LDA) and RECO Zones, the resource clearing price for Limited, Extended Summer and Annual capacity was \$5.23/MW-Day, \$16.56/MW-Day and \$16.56/MW-Day, respectively. In the rest of the RTO, which is comprised of the AEP, APS, ATSI, ComEd, Dayton, DEOK, DOM, and Duquesne Zones, the resource clearing price for Limited, Extended Summer and Annual capacity was \$0.03/MW-Day, \$5.54/MW-Day and \$5.54/MW-Day, respectively.

Across the entire RTO, total cleared participant buy bids (6,849.8 MW) exceeded total cleared participant sell offers (4239.8 MW) by 2,610 MW; participants procured a total net capacity amount of 2,610 MW of replacement capacity meaning that PJM effectively released 2,610 MW of previously procured capacity. Across the entire RTO, PJM effectively released 2,702.4 MW of previously procured Limited DR capacity and 87.6 MW of previously procured Extended Summer DR capacity and procured an additional 180 MW of capacity from Annual Resources.



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 1 – Summary of 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction Results

Region	Capacity Type	Clearing Price (\$/MW-Day)	Cleared Participant Sell Offers (UCAP MW)	Cleared Participant Buy Bids (UCAP MW)	Net Cleared Participant Buy Bids (UCAP MW)
RTO (minus MAAC) ⁽¹⁾	Limited	\$0.03	25.2	1,480.9	1,455.7
	Extended Summer	\$5.54	0.0	13.3	13.3
	Annual	\$5.54	2,565.7	2,552.4	-13.3
	TOTAL	--	2,590.9	4,046.6	1,455.7
MAAC (minus PS-NORTH) ⁽²⁾	Limited	\$5.23	32.6	1,250.0	1,217.4
	Extended Summer	\$16.56	25.9	103.3	77.4
	Annual	\$16.56	1,447.1	1,399.0	-48.1
	TOTAL	--	1,505.6	2,752.3	1,246.7
PS-NORTH	Limited	\$399.62	21.6	50.9	29.3
	Extended Summer	\$410.95	3.1	0.0	-3.1
	Annual	\$410.95	118.6	0.0	-118.6
	TOTAL	--	143.3	50.9	-92.4
TOTAL RTO	Limited	--	79.4	2,781.8	2,702.4
	Extended Summer	--	29.0	116.6	87.6
	Annual	--	4,131.4	3,951.4	-180.0
	TOTAL	--	4,239.8	6,849.8	2,610.0

(1) Comprised of AEP, APS, ATSI, ComEd, Dayton, DEOK, DOM and Duquesne Zones

(2) Comprised of AECO, BGE, DPL, JCPL, Met-Ed, PECO, Penelec, PEPCO, PPL, PSEG (excluding PS-North sub-zone) and RECO Zones



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Configuration

Participant Buy Bids and Sell Offers

RPM Incremental Auctions provide capacity suppliers with an opportunity to sell or purchase capacity for the Delivery Year through a PJM-administered auction process. Resource-specific sell offers are submitted into this auction by suppliers with available, uncommitted capacity. All resource-specific sell offers into an Incremental Auction are subject to market power mitigation through the application of the Market Structure Test. All Generation Capacity Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources are of the Annual Capacity type. Demand Resources offering into the Incremental Auction must specify the type of Capacity being offered. A Demand Resource with the potential to qualify as two or more of the capacity types may submit separate but coupled Sell Offers for each Demand Resource type for which it qualifies at different prices and the auction clearing algorithm will select the Sell Offer that yields the least-cost solution. For such coupled Demand Resource offers, the offer price of an Annual Demand Resource offer must be at least \$.01 per MW-day greater than the offer price of a coupled Extended Summer Demand Resource offer and the offer price of a Extended Summer Demand Resource offer must be at least \$.01 per MW-day greater than the offer price of a coupled Limited Demand Resource offer.

Any party that desires to purchase replacement capacity for the Delivery Year may do so by submitting a buy bid into the Incremental Auction. In addition to quantity, price and LDA-specific location, participants submitting a buy bid must also specify the desired capacity type (Annual, Extended Summer or Limited). Cleared Buy Bids purchased in an Incremental Auction may be used as replacement capacity to cover a Delivery Year commitment provided the cleared buy bid has the same locational characteristics and same or better temporal characteristics than the resource that it is replaces. Cleared buy bids of Annual capacity type may replace commitments of Annual Resources, Extended Summer DR and/or Limited DR. Cleared buy bids of Extended Summer capacity type may replace commitments on Extended Summer DR and/or Limited DR but may not replace commitments of Annual Resources. Cleared buy bids of Limited capacity type may replace commitments of Limited DR but may not replace commitments of Annual Resources or Extended Summer DR.

PJM Buy Bids and Sell Offers

Sections 5.4 and 5.12 of Attachment DD of the Tariff define the Incremental Auction requirements regarding the procurement or sale of capacity by PJM. Section 5.4 describes the triggering tests used by PJM prior to an Incremental Auction to determine the need for the procurement and/or sale of capacity by PJM in relation to updates of the reliability requirement and capacity already procured. Section 5.12 describes the determination of the MW quantities, capacity types and prices of buy bids and/or sell offers that PJM will submit when the various tests in section 5.4 are triggered.



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Prior to each Incremental Auction, PJM recalculates the Reliability Requirement, Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the RTO and each LDA based on an updated peak load forecast, updated Installed Reserve Margin and an updated Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (CETO). For the RTO and each LDA, PJM sums the following component quantities to determine the total quantity that it will seek to procure or release in each Incremental Auction:

- the Updated Reliability Requirement minus the Reliability Requirement utilized in the most recent prior auction conducted for that Delivery Year. Note that this quantity is negative if the Updated Reliability Requirement is less than the Reliability Requirement utilized in the most recent prior auction. For a 1st or 2nd Incremental Auction, this difference is only considered if the change in Reliability Requirement is greater than the lesser of 500 MW or 1% of the prior auction's Reliability Requirement,
- plus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share (STRPTAS). For a 1st or 2nd Incremental Auction, the STRPTAS is equal to 0.2 times the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target (STRPT) used in the Base Residual Auction (BRA). For a 3rd Incremental Auction, the STRPTAS is equal to 0.6 times the STRPT used in the BRA,
- plus/minus the amount of committed capacity that PJM sought to procure/release that did not clear in previous Incremental Auctions for the same Delivery Year,
- minus any capacity PJM seeks to release in a parent LDA as a result of any Conditional Incremental Auction commitments for the same Delivery Year.

If the result of such summation is a positive quantity, PJM will seek to procure such quantity by employing a PJM buy bid. The price of the PJM buy bid is based on the Updated VRR Curve Increment which is the portion of the Updated VRR Curve located to the right of the point representing all capacity already procured for the Delivery year. If previously procured levels of Annual Resources and Extended Summer DR are short of the updated Minimum Annual and Extended Summer Resource Requirements then the PJM buy bid may be broken into multiple, smaller buy bids of the capacity types needed to make up any shortage. If no shortage exists then the PJM buy bid will be of the Limited capacity type.

If the result of such summation is a negative quantity, PJM will seek to release such quantity by employing a PJM sell offer. The price of the PJM sell offer is based on the Updated VRR Curve Decrement which is the portion of the Updated VRR curve to the left of the point representing all capacity already procured for the Delivery year. The capacity type of a PJM sell offer is determined in a manner such that PJM will not release prior committed capacity from Annual Resources and Extended Summer DR below the updated Minimum Annual and Extended Summer Resource Requirements.



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Based on an application of the Incremental Auction requirements of Sections 5.4 and 5.12 of Attachment DD of the Tariff and summarized above, PJM submitted the buy bids and sell offers, shown in Table 2, into the 1st Incremental Auction for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year¹. Note that a PJM sell offer is indicated by a negative PJM buy bid in Table 2 and that PJM submitted sell offers for the 1st Incremental Auction for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year in each LDA with the exception of the PS-NORTH. All PJM sell offers were of the Limited capacity type and the single PJM buy bid was for Extended Summer capacity. Table 2 also defines the pricing points associated with the PJM buy bids and PJM sell offers.

Table 2 – PJM Buy Bids and PJM Sell Offers for 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction

Location	Change in Reliability Requirement (MW)	STRPT (MW)	Uncleared PJM Buy Bids from Prior IA (MW)	PJM Buy Bid		Price Points for PJM Buy Bids and PJM Sell Offers							
				(MW)*	Capacity Type	Point 1	Point 2	Point 3	Point 4				
						x-axis (MW)	y-axis (\$/MW-Day)	x-axis (MW)	y-axis (\$/MW-Day)	x-axis (MW)	y-axis (\$/MW-Day)	x-axis (MW)	y-axis (\$/MW-Day)
RTO (Rest of)	-1,863.8	408.1	NA	-1455.7	Limited	0.0	\$0.00	1455.7	\$0.00	--	--	--	--
MAAC (Rest of)	-133.0	73.7	NA	-59.3	Limited	0.0	\$0.00	59.3	\$0.00	--	--	--	--
EMAAC (Rest of)	-869.6	110.3	NA	-759.3	Limited	0.0	\$0.00	759.3	\$0.00	--	--	--	--
SWMAAC (Rest of)	-350.1	40.0	NA	-310.1	Limited	0.0	\$0.00	159.5	\$0.00	159.5	\$48.20	310.1	\$97.75
PS (Rest of)	-523.2	32.1	NA	-491.1	Limited	0.0	\$0.00	268.6	\$0.00	268.6	\$54.79	491.1	\$166.03
PS NORTH	70.2	26.8	NA	97.0	Ext Summer	0.0	\$410.95	97.0	\$410.95	--	--	--	--
DPL SOUTH	-16.1	12.8	NA	-3.3	Limited	0.0	\$116.54	3.3	\$123.49	--	--	--	--
PEPCO	-106.8	37.8	NA	-69.0	Limited	0.0	\$79.51	69.0	\$122.90	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	-3,792.4	741.6	0.0	-3,050.8									

* A PJM Sell Offer is indicated by a negative PJM Buy Bid.

¹ The determination of the PJM buy bid sell offer quantities is detailed in the 2014/2015 1st IA Planning Parameters located at <http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm/~media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2014-2015-first-incremental-auction-parameters.ashx>.



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

LDA Capacity Import Limits

Section 5.11A of Attachment DD of the Tariff describes the milestones that a Backbone Transmission Project must meet for it to be included and remain in the system model for a given Delivery Year. Based on an application of these milestone requirements, the Jacks Mountain 500 kV substation (and associated reactive reinforcements), the Conemaugh 500 kV capacitor and the Keystone-Conemaugh wavetrapp replacements were removed from the 2014/2015 Delivery Year model prior to the 1st Incremental Auction.

Table 3 shows each LDAs' Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit (CETL) for the Base Residual Auction and each LDAs' CETL as updated for the 1st Incremental Auction for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year. The CETL remaining for use in the 1st IA for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year shown in the last row of Table 3 represents the LDA capacity import limits that were employed in the 1st IA for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year and are equal to the LDA CETL as updated for the 1st IA minus the total capacity import levels into the LDA from the BRA.

Table 3 – LDA Capacity Import Capability for 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction

	LDA						
	MAAC	EMAAC	SWMAAC	PS	PS NORTH	DPL SOUTH	PEPCO
Base Residual Auction (BRA) CETL	5,694.0	8,189.0	7,718.5	5,720.7	2,372.0	1,925.0	5,606.3
1st Incremental Auction (IA) CETL *	5,467.0	7,871.0	7,686.0	5,720.7	2,372.0	1,925.0	5,576.0
Capacity Import Level (BRA Imports)	5,476.2	7,820.8	6,357.5	5,643.9	2,372.0	1,612.2	3,411.8
Capacity Import Limit for 1st Incremental Auction	-9.2	50.2	1,328.5	76.8	0.0	312.8	2,164.2

* reflects removal of following backbone projects from 2014/2015 model: Jacks Mountain 500 kV substation (and associated reactive reinforcement), Conemaugh 500 kV capacitor and Keystone-Conemaugh 500 kV wavetrapp replacement



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Incremental Auction Clearing

Participant supply offers and buy bids are combined with the PJM sell offers and buy bids shown in Table 2 to form the supply and demand curves. The solution algorithm clears all buy bids and sell offers in a least-cost manner while respecting the capacity import limits into each LDA². Annual capacity buy bids may only clear against sell offers from Annual Resources; Extended Summer buy bids may only clear against sell offers from Annual Resources and/or Extended Summer DR; and Limited buy bids may clear against sell offers of any capacity type.

² To the extent possible, negative capacity import limits are resolved through the clearing of additional supply offers located in the constrained-side area of each transfer limit coupled with the clearing of an equal and off-setting amount of buy bids located in the unconstrained-side area of each transfer limit. Capacity transfers are forced from child LDA to parent LDA in order to resolve the negative capacity import limit but only if the cost to achieve the transfer is less than a predetermined cost threshold. The cost threshold assigned to each negative transfer limit is based on the price at the intersection of the updated VRR curve of the LDA with the level of previously procured capacity for the LDA adjusted by the quantity of the negative capacity import limit. Once the cost threshold is reached, the algorithm will no longer force the transfer even if the full desired capacity transfer was not accomplished and the constraint is relaxed even if continued transfers are available but at a higher cost.



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Auction Clearing Prices

Table 4 summarizes the clearing prices of the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction. The First Incremental Auction cleared with unique prices in three regions of the RTO. In the PS-NORTH LDA, the resource clearing price for Limited, Extended Summer and Annual capacity was \$399.62/MW-Day, \$410.95/MW-Day and \$410.95/MW-Day, respectively. In the MAAC region outside of the PS-NORTH LDA, which is comprised of the AECO, BGE, DPL, JCPL, Met-Ed, Penelec, PEPCO, PPL, PSEG (outside of PS-NORTH LDA) and RECO Zones, the resource clearing price for Limited, Extended Summer and Annual capacity was \$5.23/MW-Day, \$16.56/MW-Day and \$16.56/MW-Day, respectively. In the rest of the RTO, which is comprised of the AEP, APS, ATSI, ComEd, Dayton, DEOK, DOM, and Duquesne Zones, the resource clearing price for Limited, Extended Summer and Annual capacity was \$0.03/MW-Day, \$5.54/MW-Day and \$5.54/MW-Day, respectively.

Table 4 – Auction Clearing Prices by LDA and Product Type

Region	Clearing Price (\$/MW-Day)		
	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual
RTO (minus MAAC) ⁽¹⁾	\$0.03	\$5.54	\$5.54
MAAC (minus PS-NORTH) ⁽²⁾	\$5.23	\$16.56	\$16.56
PS-NORTH	\$399.62	\$410.95	\$410.95

(1) Comprised of AEP, APS, ATSI, ComEd, Dayton, DEOK, DOM and Duquesne Zones

(2) Comprised of AECO, BGE, DPL, JCPL, Met-Ed, PECO, Penelec, PEPCO, PPL, PSEG (excluding PS-North sub-zone) and RECO Zones



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Participant Buy Bids and Sell Offers

Table 5 shows the offered and cleared quantities for participant sell offers. A total of 11,126.3 MW of supply was offered into the First Incremental Auction composed of uncleared capacity from prior 2014/2015 auctions, new capacity in the form of uprates or new resources that were not previously capacity resources in PJM. Across the entire RTO, 4,239.8 MW of participant sell offers cleared mostly in the form of Annual capacity.

Table 5 – Participant Sell Offers (Offered and Cleared Quantities)

LDA	Sell Offers (UCAP MW)				Cleared Sell Offers (UCAP MW)			
	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total
DPL-SOUTH	0.0	0.0	10.3	10.3	0.0	0.0	10.3	10.3
PS-NORTH	34.0	27.9	329.9	391.8	21.6	3.1	118.6	143.3
PSEG (rest of)	47.3	41.5	66.4	155.2	0.6	0.0	31.2	31.8
EMAAC (rest of)	162.4	116.0	938.7	1,217.1	20.9	10.5	37.6	69.0
EMAAC Total	243.7	185.4	1,345.3	1,774.4	43.1	13.6	197.7	254.4
PEPCO	59.4	31.8	22.1	113.3	0.0	15.4	9.1	24.5
SWMAAC (rest of)	22.9	22.4	974.3	1,019.6	0.5	0.0	764.0	764.5
SWMAAC Total	82.3	54.2	996.4	1,132.9	0.5	15.4	773.1	789.0
MAAC (rest of)	180.1	110.7	703.8	994.6	10.6	0.0	594.9	605.5
MAAC Total	506.1	350.3	3,045.5	3,901.9	54.2	29.0	1,565.7	1,648.9
RTO (rest of)	1,002.1	96.2	6,126.1	7,224.4	25.2	0.0	2,565.7	2,590.9
RTO Total	1,508.2	446.5	9,171.6	11,126.3	79.4	29.0	4,131.4	4,239.8



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Participant demand in an Incremental Auction is composed of buy bids submitted by participants. The buy bids are specified in UCAP terms and, if cleared, are binding commitments to purchase capacity for the entire Delivery Year. Cleared Buy Bids purchased in an Incremental Auction may be used as replacement capacity to cover Delivery Year commitment and compliance shortfalls. Table 6 shows offered and cleared quantities of participant buy bids. There was a total of 13,231.1 MW of buy bids submitted by participants into the auction. Across the entire RTO, 6,849.8 MW of participant buy bids cleared comprised of 2,781.1 MW of Limited capacity buy bids, 116.6 MW of Extended Summer buy bids and 3,951.4 MW of Annual capacity buy bids.

Table 6 – Participant Buy Bids (Bid and Cleared Quantities)

LDA	Buy Bids (UCAP MW)				Cleared Buy Bids (UCAP MW)			
	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total
DPL-SOUTH	62.9	33.1	1.3	97.3	48.4	29.9	1.3	79.6
PS-NORTH	204.9	90.9	93.8	389.6	50.9	0.0	0.0	50.9
PSEG (rest of)	374.6	42.2	171.7	588.5	147.8	2.7	41.5	192.0
EMAAC (rest of)	888.0	134.5	722.2	1,744.7	337.5	9.2	393.1	739.8
EMAAC Total	1,530.4	300.7	989.0	2,820.1	584.6	41.8	435.9	1,062.3
PEPCO	188.2	58.4	2.7	249.3	151.8	6.1	2.0	159.9
SWMAAC (rest of)	244.0	94.6	59.8	398.4	213.6	2.5	54.3	270.4
SWMAAC Total	432.2	153.0	62.5	647.7	365.4	8.6	56.3	430.3
MAAC (rest of)	834.4	194.6	1,409.9	2,438.9	350.9	52.9	906.8	1,310.6
MAAC Total	2,797.0	648.3	2,461.4	5,906.7	1,300.9	103.3	1,399.0	2,803.2
RTO (rest of)	1,640.2	294.7	5,389.5	7,324.4	1,480.9	13.3	2,552.4	4,046.6
RTO Total	4,437.2	943.0	7,850.9	13,231.1	2,781.8	116.6	3,951.4	6,849.8



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 7 provides a further breakdown of the capacity offered and cleared into the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction. A total of 10,602.3 MW of supply was offered into the First Incremental Auction composed of uncleared capacity from prior 2014/2015 auctions, new capacity in the form of uprates or new resources that were not previously capacity resources in PJM.

Table 7 - 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction Supply Resource Mix

Resource Type	Type	Total Sell Offers (MW UCAP)	Cleared Sell Offers (MW UCAP)
DEMAND	DEMAND	1,562.1	108.4
EE	EE	149.7	134.3
GEN	New Generation (including Uprates)	1,260.0	4.8
	Uncleared from Prior Auction	7,630.5	3,992.3
		10,602.3	4,239.8



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

PJM Buy Bids and Sell Offers

The total net amount of capacity procured or released by PJM is a function of the clearing of the PJM sell offers and buy bids. Tables 8a and 8b show the offered and cleared quantities of PJM sell offers and PJM buy bids, respectively, employed in the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction. For the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction, across the entire RTO region, cleared PJM sell offers totaled 2,702.4 MW and cleared PJM buys bids totaled 92.4 MW therefore PJM released a total net capacity amount of 1,979.3 MW.

Table 8a – PJM Sell Offers (Offered and Cleared Quantities)

LDA	Sell Offers (UCAP MW)				Cleared Sell Offers (UCAP MW)			
	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total
DPL-SOUTH	3.3	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PS-NORTH	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PSEG (rest of)	491.1	0.0	0.0	491.1	268.6	0.0	0.0	268.6
EMAAC (rest of)	759.3	0.0	0.0	759.3	759.3	0.0	0.0	759.3
EMAAC Total	1,253.7	0.0	0.0	1,253.7	1,027.9	0.0	0.0	1,027.9
PEPCO	69.0	0.0	0.0	69.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SWMAAC (rest of)	310.2	0.0	0.0	310.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SWMAAC Total	379.2	0.0	0.0	379.2	159.5	0.0	0.0	159.5
MAAC (rest of)	59.3	0.0	0.0	59.3	59.3	0.0	0.0	59.3
MAAC Total	1,692.2	0.0	0.0	1,692.2	1,246.7	0.0	0.0	1,246.7
RTO (rest of)	1,455.7	0.0	0.0	1,455.7	1,455.7	0.0	0.0	1,455.7
RTO Total	3,147.9	0.0	0.0	3,147.9	2,702.4	0.0	0.0	2,702.4



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

Table 8b – PJM Buy Bids (Bid and Cleared Quantities)

LDA	Buy Bids (UCAP MW)				Cleared Buy Bids (UCAP MW)			
	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total	Limited	Extended Summer	Annual	Total
DPL-SOUTH	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PS-NORTH	0.0	0.0	97.0	97.0	0.0	92.4	0.0	92.4
PSEG (rest of)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EMAAC (rest of)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EMAAC Total	0.0	0.0	97.0	97.0	0.0	92.4	0.0	92.4
PEPCO	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SWMAAC (rest of)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SWMAAC Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MAAC (rest of)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MAAC Total	0.0	0.0	97.0	97.0	0.0	92.4	0.0	92.4
RTO (rest of)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RTO Total	0.0	0.0	97.0	97.0	0.0	92.4	0.0	92.4



2014/2015 RPM First Incremental Auction Results

LDA Capacity Import Margins

The LDA capacity import limit margins prior to and after the clearing of the First Incremental Auction for the 2014/2015 Delivery Year are shown in Table 9. The LDA capacity import limit margin represents the difference between the updated LDA capacity import limit and the capacity imported into the LDA. The negative capacity import limit margin for the MAAC LDA prior to and after the First Incremental Auction indicates that the procured capacity import level exceeds the updated capacity import limit for this LDA. This situation does not represent a reliability criteria violation since the CETL of this LDA exceeds the respective LDA CETO; however, the auction is cleared in such a manner as to attempt to restore the capacity import margin to be non-negative if cost-effective to do so (i.e. restore capacity import levels to be at or below updated capacity import limits). Again, this situation does not represent a reliability criteria violation but will be reflected in the parameters for future incremental auctions for 2014/2015.

Table 9 – PJM Capacity Import Margins

	LDA						
	MAAC	EMAAC	SWMAAC	PS	PS NORTH	DPL SOUTH	PEPCO
Capacity Import Limit Margin prior to 1st Incremental Auction	-9.2	50.2	1,328.5	76.8	0.0	312.8	2,164.2
Capacity Import Limit Margin after 1st Incremental Auction	-9.2	177.8	1,846.7	185.2	0.0	243.5	2,028.8

Mitigation in the 2014/2015 First Incremental Auction

All regions of the RTO, including the RTO as a whole, failed the Market Structure Test. As a result, mitigation was applied to all existing generation resources in the execution of the RPM auction clearing. Therefore in the event a generator’s price-based offer exceeded the calculated offer cap, cost-based offers were utilized in the RPM auction clearing. Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency Resources are not subject to market mitigation.