



Gaps in Current Pricing Methodology


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- There are times when the LMP is unable to send market signals that support the efficient commitment and dispatch of the system
- When this occurs, market participants may have the incentive to deviate from PJM's instructions
- We use uplift (make whole and LOC) to remove the incentive for generation resources to deviate from dispatch
- PJM believes all known pricing methods require some level of uplift to support commitment and dispatch instructions

Example: Unit Commitment Process

EcoMax = 300 MW
 EcoMin = 50 MW
 Offer = \$50/MWh
 Startup Cost = \$0
 No-Load = \$200/hr
 Sched. Rate (EcoMax) = \$50.67/MWh

EcoMax = 200 MW
 EcoMin = 50 MW
 Offer = \$80/MWh
 Startup Cost = \$100
 No-Load = \$200/hr
 Sched. Rate (EcoMax) = \$81.50/MWh




- Goals (in no specific order):**
1. Achieve power balance (supply = demand)
 2. Adhere to all limitations (ecomin/max, transmission limits, etc.)
 3. Minimize bid production cost (BPC) in the process

Example 1: Commitment and Dispatch Solution

EcoMax = 300 MW
 EcoMin = 50 MW
 Offer = \$50/MWh
 Startup Cost = \$0
 No-Load = \$200/hr
 Sched. Rate (EcoMax) = \$50.67/MWh

EcoMax = 200 MW
 EcoMin = 50 MW
 Offer = \$80/MWh
 Startup Cost = \$100
 No-Load = \$200/hr
 Sched. Rate (EcoMax) = \$81.50/MWh



$$G\# \text{ COST} = \text{Start-up} + \text{No-load} + (\text{Offer} * \text{Output Level}) = \text{Cost}$$

$$G1 \text{ COST} = \$0 + (\$200/\text{hr} * 1\text{hr}) + (150 \text{ MWh} * \$50/\text{MWh}) = \$7,700$$

$$G2 \text{ COST} = \$100 + (\$200/\text{hr} * 1\text{hr}) + (50 \text{ MWh} * \$80/\text{MWh}) = \$4,300$$


$$\text{BPC} = G1 \text{ COST} + G2 \text{ COST} = \$12,000$$

- If the limit on the line were 100 MW or greater only G1 would be needed to serve all load
 - LMP = \$50/MWh across the system
- G2 has an EcoMin = 50 MW which must be adhered to in the commitment/dispatch process
- Because G2 is committed at 50 MW, G1's output is reduced to 150 MW to maintain power balance

Example 1: Current LMP Calculation

EcoMax = 300 MW
 EcoMin = 50 MW
 Offer = \$50/MWh
 Startup Cost = \$0
 No-Load = \$200/hr
 Sched. Rate (EcoMax) = \$50.67/MWh

EcoMax = 200 MW
 EcoMin = 50 MW
 Offer = \$80/MWh
 Startup Cost = \$100
 No-Load = \$200/hr
 Sched. Rate (EcoMax) = \$81.50/MWh



$$G\# \text{ UPLIFT} = \text{MAX}(0, \text{COST} - (\text{LMP} * \text{OUTPUT}))$$

$$G1 \text{ UPLIFT} = \$7,700 - (\$50/\text{MWh} * 150 \text{ MWh}) = \$200$$


$$G2 \text{ UPLIFT} = \$4,300 - (\$50/\text{MWh} * 50 \text{ MWh}) = \$1,800$$

$$\text{TOTAL UPLIFT} = \$2,000$$

- The next MW of load would be served by G1 thus the LMP = \$50/MWh
- The transmission constraint is not binding so prices are uniform across the system
- **Prices do not reflect G2 as being needed**
- **The need for G2 is reflected through uplift payments which are not transparent and shift costs**

- Assume this scenario occurs in the Day-ahead Market
 - DA Uplift is allocated to all withdrawal transactions on a pro-rata basis
 - Cleared DA demand, DECs, price-sensitive demand, exports
 - L1 and L2 will both be allocated a pro-rata share of the cost to make units G1 and G2 whole (\$1,000 each)
 - L1 and L2 pay the same price despite the fact that G2 is needed to serve load at L2 and not L1

Example 2: Impacts on Balancing Settlement



- Units G1-G4 able to be scheduled to serve load in the DAM
- DA Demand = 550 MW
- G1 and G2 are flexible
- G3 and G4 are inflexible

G1 Unit Parameters

EcoMax = 300 MW

EcoMin = 100 MW

Offer @ EcoMax = \$60/MWh

Offer @ EcoMin = \$40/MWh

Startup Cost = \$0

No-Load = \$200/hr

G3 Unit Parameters

EcoMin = EcoMax = 100 MW

Offer = \$70/MWh

Startup Cost = \$300

No-Load = \$0/hr

G2 Unit Parameters

EcoMax = 400 MW

EcoMin = 200 MW

Offer @ EcoMax = \$40/MWh

Offer @ EcoMin = \$20/MWh

Startup Cost = \$0

No-Load = \$200/hr


G4 Unit Parameters

EcoMin = EcoMax = 100 MW


Offer = \$75/MWh

Startup Cost = \$300

No-Load = \$0/hr



- At 550 MW of load
 - G1 = 150 MW
 - G2 = 400 MW
 - G3 = 0 MW
 - G4 = 0 MW
- G1 is marginal
 - LMP = \$45.10/MWh




- G1 trips in real-time
- Load is still 550 MW
 - G1 = 0 MW
 - G2 = 350 MW
 - G3 = 100 MW
 - G4 = 100 MW
- G2 is marginal
 - LMP = \$35.10/MWh

- G1 has tripped
- The real-time LMP is set by G2 as it is the only dispatchable unit on the system
 - LMP is set consistent with the cost of the next MW at \$35.10/MWh
- G1 must purchase out of its DA commitment at the RT LMP
 - This nets a margin of \$10/MWh
- The uplift costs to G3 and G4 (~\$8,080) are allocated to deviations between DA and RT
 - Assuming G3 and G4 are not for conservative operations


- **Real-time prices do not reflect the need or commitment of G3 and G4**
- G1 is not held accountable for this deviation...it actually profits!
 - G1 will receive a pro-rata share of the deviation charges.*
- **This significantly diminishes performance incentives.**

**Due to the simplicity of this example, G1 is the only resource deviating. In reality, there are many that will all pay a share of uplift created by G1 in this case.*



- Step 1 - \$850/MWh
 - Largest single system contingency
 - Usually the largest unit
- Step 2A - \$300/MWh
 - Additional reserves added July 2017
 - Intended to mitigate significant pricing impacts from transient shortages
- Step 2B (optional) - \$300/MWh
 - Intended to reflect additional reserves added by operators

- Step 1
 - Load is not willing to pay more than \$850/MWh to maintain the system's largest single contingency in reserves
 - PJM system operators will commit reserves beyond this cost to maintain reliability and compliance
 - **In these cases, the market prices are not reflecting operator actions**
- \$850/MWh was determined in 2007 based on the average cost of reserves during shortage events during that time
 - Offer cap was \$1,000/MWh at that time
- There are similar interpretations for Steps 2A and 2B



- PJM estimates the amount of Tier 1 on the system every 5 minutes
- If PJM estimates more than 1190 MW in Tier 1 the price for Synchronized Reserves is \$0/MWh
- **This indicates reserves have no value. This is inconsistent with the reliability value in terms reducing the loss of load probability in real-time**
- If PJM cannot meet the requirement at the specified price, even if its by 1 MW, the price goes to the applicable penalty factor