The PJM ARR/FTR Design: LEI and IMM Observations

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LEI: The Purpose of the ARR/FTR Design

- Based on a review of the history of ARR/FTRs LEI concludes that the purpose of the ARR/FTR construct is to:
 - Return congestion (caused by LMPs) to load (at 3,5)
 - Congestion is the surplus caused by differences in LMP in a transmission constrained system.
 - Load should get congestion back to in order to get market results similar to pre-LMP market.
 - Load should get congestion returned because load pays for the transmission system and pays congestion charges.
 - Supports self supply and bilateral supply (at 4,5,10,14-16)
 - Path specific product allows price discovery and supports secondary market activity.



IMM: The Purpose of the ARR/FTR Design

- Based on a review of the history of ARR/FTRs the purpose of the ARR/FTR construct is to:
 - Return congestion (caused by LMPs) to load
 - Congestion is the surplus is caused by differences in LMP in a transmission constrained system.
 - Load should get the congestion back because load pays the congestion and because load pays for the transmission system.
 - Supports self supply and bilateral supply
 - $_{\circ}\,$ If congestion is returned to load, this result follows
 - Do not need path based FTRs to get this result
 - ^o Price discovery is dependent on well defined property rights
 - There is an issue with the assignment of rights

LEI: Is the ARR/FTR Design Working?

- LEI: the current ARR/FTR construct is working reasonably well, but it could be improved (7, 8, 11-14, 17-19, 56, 85)
 - Load cannot claim all the congestion paid (at 58)
 - Limited ability of load to participate as the supply side in the ARR/FTR construct
 - Cannot set reserve prices
 - Binary sell decisions
 - Profits by third party purchaser of FTRs
 - ARR holders cannot claim all FTR paths, misalignment of rights relative to network use



LEI: Improving the ARR/FTR Design

- LEI: To correct for the misalignments of rights and unclaimed paths(22-23, 111)
 - Align source and points more in line with actual network use by ARR holders
 - Expand eligible source points to include all point available to FTR paths
- LEI: To improve the value of the ARR rights (at 22, 111-112) give ARR holders more control over how the rights are sold:
 - Introduce seasonal, monthly and/or peak and off peak ARR
 - Allow ARR reserve prices on the ARR paths in the FTR auctions





IMM: Is the ARR/FTR Design Working?

- IMM: The failure to return congestion to load is caused by a misalignment of ARR path based rights relative to actual congestion paid.
- IMM: Path based congestion rights cannot be modified such that actual congestion is returned to load.
- IMM: Path based rights are a premarket concept that cannot match actual congestion in a dynamic network.
- IMM: Recognize load's right to congestion based on actual network use

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IMM: Improving the ARR/FTR Design

- IMM: The ARR/FTR design inappropriately limits the ability of load to participate as the supply side of the FTR market.
- The ARR/FTR design provides the load the option to swap a variable payment based on congestion for a fixed payment.
- Load should have the ability to retain or sell their rights to congestion.
- Load should have the ability to set prices for the sale of their rights to congestion.

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Benefits of Network Based Rights

- A network based congestion right would return congestion paid back to the load that paid it.
 - Perfect alignment of actual network use and congestion rights

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- The network right is a perfect hedge of actual congestion.
- Load has the rights to all the congestion paid by load, on a locational basis.
- No leakage and no cross subsidies
- No need to undersell the system to guarantee funding





Benefits of Network Based Rights

- Reduced risk of default relative to current construct
 - Congestion revenues always available
- No underfunding
- No cross subsidies
- No negative rights
 - Congestion is never negative



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