

# CAPACITY REFORM WORKSHOP #2: PJM INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMER COALITION

**MARCH 4, 2021** 

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## WHAT PROBLEM ARE WE TRYING TO SOLVE?

Goal: Ensure market rules produce a reliable system and at the lowest cost

- Avoid customers paying twice for capacity
- Minimize risk of states viewing PJM capacity market as ill-suited to support state public policies
  - State public policy accommodation should include those states with decarbonization mandates and those that do not
- Risk of investing in PJM footprint because of uncertainty around MOPR and potential state exit

## IS NOW THE TIME TO REVISIT CAPACITY MARKETS?

- Yes, but recommend deferring/limiting other PJM- or other stakeholder-driven endeavors during pendency
- Recommend clear-eyed understanding of implications of undertaking this initiative during pendency of appeals of MOPR Orders
  - All stakeholders need to understand how the endproduct of these discussions would be presented to FERC and how such presentation interfaces with existing appeals and scheduled auctions
- Emphasize PJM role is not to set policy but serve as a trusted information source for policy makers

- Maintain as PJM's guiding principle the concept of reliability at lowest cost
  - Even if accommodating state resource adequacy decisions, PJM's mandate should not be viewed as changing; the objective function should remain the same
- Agree that competition should be leveraged wherever possible to benefit customers
  - Minimize drag of uneconomic resources; shift risk away from customers
- Develop common understanding of the capacity product
  - Accommodate flexibility and diversity in the means of achieving resource adequacy

- PJM's capacity market must be technology neutral, while recognizing the appropriate capacity value of each type of resource
  - Even if PJM seeks to be more accommodating to state laws, the RTO should continue to be technology neutral
  - Not all states have the same environmental mandates and timelines
  - PJM markets should not subvert bilateral competitive market activity and innovation
- Identify and address reliability implications of changing resource mix given accommodation of state public policies
  - Conduct scenario analysis of diversity of generation responding to extreme weather and potential for "over-saturation" of particular operating profiles
  - PJM's role as an independent source of technical analysis



- Customer preferences regarding levels of "firm service" should be honored
  - Consider not only states' supply decisions but also demand policy decisions (e.g., capturing state DR/peak reduction programs
  - Large customers should only have to buy the amount of capacity they need
  - Expand "customer preference" trend beyond macro level to reflect individual end-use customer preferences
    - Consequences to customer if "buy through"
  - May support efforts to address "bad" over procurement
  - Supplemental to existing DR options

- Better integrate distributed energy development while respecting jurisdictional boundaries
  - Consistent with accommodating state policy decisions
- Strong market power protection remains essential, especially in small LDAs with only a few suppliers
- Recovery of costs of any reform should continue to be grounded in cost causation principles
- Advance stability in market design and long-term durability of contracts
  - Note the proliferation of long-term contracts to support renewable energy projects
  - Adverse implications of persistent "changes in law"

- Limiting the scope of changes to expedite resolution may not result in a durable solution
  - Market Seller Offer Cap?
  - Performance Assessment Hours?
  - Coordination with Quadrennial?

## DO YOU HAVE PARTICULAR ISSUES OR PROPOSED PRIORITIZATION?

- Any capacity reforms must be considered in the context of, and not independently from, energy and ancillary service markets
  - For example, energy prices will increase with ORDC changes in
     2022 and fast-start pricing upon implementation