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What problem are we trying to solve through this effort?



It's Important to Start by Stating the Problem We're Trying to Solve

MOPR

The capacity market needs to accommodate state resource decisions without causing the risk of double procurement for load.

Competitive Auctions for Policy Resources

Given several state programs driving toward decarbonization and customer preferences, can PJM run auctions for state-mandated and consumer-preferred clean capacity?

Capacity Procurement Levels

PJM has high reserve margins. Is there a way to achieve desired reliability more efficiently over time?

Additional Reliability Attribute Products

With anticipated increase in penetration of intermittent resources, are there additional reliability attributes that need to be procured?

Are we missing any?



- What problem are we trying to solve through this effort?
 - Restore the ability for the public power business model to serve its members without double payment for capacity resources
 - If public power members desire resources with specific environmental attributes, even if more expensive, they should have the ability to choose those resources
 - Potential MOPR rules should account for self supply decisions that are made on long-term economics of a resource
 - A core benefit of the RPM model is the locational requirements that should be maintained in any future construct



- Do you agree with PJM that we should be attempting to advance this discussion at this time?
 - Yes



- What are the principles that possible enhancement should be build upon?
 - Competition and choice has many forms the capacity construct should not restrict the public power members from entering into long-term agreements for the supply of capacity
 - Load should not pay twice for capacity resources
 - Self supply choices do not suppress capacity prices
 - Net long or net short provisions can be developed if needed