

5.12 Conduct of RPM Auctions

The Office of the Interconnection shall employ an optimization algorithm for each Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction to evaluate the Sell Offers and other inputs to such auction to determine the Sell Offers that clear such auction.

a) Base Residual Auction

For each Base Residual Auction, the optimization algorithm shall consider:

- all Sell Offers submitted in such auction;
- the Variable Resource Requirement Curves for the PJM Region and each LDA;
- any constraints resulting from the Locational Deliverability Requirement and any applicable Capacity Import Limit;
- for Delivery Years starting June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate VRR Curve is required by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a) ~~of this Attachment DD~~; for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Limited Resource Constraints and the Sub-Annual Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate VRR Curve is required by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a) ~~of this Attachment DD~~; and for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraints and the Base Capacity Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate VRR Curve is required by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a) ~~of this Attachment DD~~;
- For the Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the PJM Region Reliability Requirement minus the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the PJM Reliability Requirement; and
- For the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the requirement that the cleared quantity of Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources equal the cleared quantity of Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources for the PJM Region.

The optimization algorithm shall be applied to calculate the overall clearing result to minimize the cost of satisfying the reliability requirements across the PJM Region, regardless of whether the quantity clearing the Base Residual Auction is above or below the applicable target quantity, while respecting all applicable requirements and constraints, including any restrictions specified in any Credit-Limited Offers. Where the supply curve formed by the Sell Offers submitted in an auction falls entirely below the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, the auction shall clear at the price-capacity point on the Variable Resource Requirement Curve corresponding to the total Unforced Capacity provided by all such Sell Offers. Where the supply curve consists only of Sell Offers located entirely below the Variable Resource Requirement Curve and Sell Offers located entirely above the Variable Resource Requirement Curve, the auction shall clear at the price-capacity point on the Variable Resource Requirement Curve corresponding to the total Unforced Capacity provided by all Sell Offers located entirely below the Variable Resource Requirement Curve. In determining the lowest-cost overall clearing result that satisfies all applicable constraints and requirements, the optimization may select from among multiple possible alternative clearing results that satisfy such requirements, including, for example (without limitation by such example), accepting a lower-priced Sell Offer that intersects the Variable Resource Requirement Curve and that specifies a minimum capacity block, accepting a higher-priced Sell Offer that intersects the Variable Resource Requirement Curve and that contains no minimum-block limitations, or rejecting both of the above alternatives and clearing the auction at the higher-priced point on the Variable Resource Requirement Curve that corresponds to the Unforced Capacity provided by all Sell Offers located entirely below the Variable Resource Requirement Curve. For the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the supply curve formed by the Sell Offers submitted within an LDA for which a separate VRR Curve is established, shall only consider the quantity of MW from Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources that are equally matched with Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources within the LDA, such that only the equally matched quantity of opposite-season Sell Offers are considered in satisfying the LDA's reliability requirement.

The Sell Offer price of a Qualifying Transmission Upgrade shall be treated as a capacity price differential between the LDAs specified in such Sell Offer between which CETL is increased, and the Import Capability provided by such upgrade shall clear to the extent the difference in clearing prices between such LDAs is greater than the price specified in such Sell Offer. The Capacity Resource clearing results and Capacity Resource Clearing Prices so determined shall be applicable for such Delivery Year. The Capacity Resource clearing results and Capacity Resource Clearing Prices determined for Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources shall be applicable for the calendar months of June through October and the following May of such Delivery Year; and shall be applicable for Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources for the calendar months of November through April of such Delivery Year.

b) Scheduled Incremental Auctions.

For purposes of a Scheduled Incremental Auction, the optimization algorithm shall consider:

- For the Delivery years through May 31, 2018, the PJM Region Reliability Requirement, less the Short-term Resource Procurement Target;

- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the PJM Reliability Requirement;
- Updated LDA Reliability Requirements taking into account any updated Capacity Emergency Transfer Objectives;
- The Capacity Emergency Transfer Limit used in the Base Residual Auction, or any updated value resulting from a Conditional Incremental Auction;
- All applicable Capacity Import Limits;
- For the Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, for each LDA, such LDA's updated Reliability Requirement, less such LDA's Short-Term Resource Procurement Target;
- For the 2018/2019 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, for each LDA, such LDA's updated Reliability Requirement
- ~~For Delivery Years starting June 1, 2014 and ending May 31, 2017, the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for the PJM Region and for each LDA for which PJM is required to establish a separate VRR Curve for the Base Residual Auction for the relevant Delivery Year; for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Limited Resource Constraints and the Sub-annual Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate VRR Curve is required by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a) ~~of this Attachment DD~~; and for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the Base Capacity Demand Resource Constraints and the Base Capacity Resource Constraints for the PJM Region and for each Locational Deliverability Area for which a separate VRR Curve is required by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a) ~~of this Attachment DD~~;~~
- For the 2020/2021 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the requirement that the cleared quantity of Summer-Period Capacity Performance Resources equal the cleared quantity of Winter-Period Capacity Performance Resources for the PJM Region;
- A demand curve consisting of the Buy Bids submitted in such auction and, if indicated for use in such auction in accordance with the provisions below, the Updated VRR Curve Increment;
- The Sell Offers submitted in such auction; and
- The Unforced Capacity previously committed for such Delivery Year.

(i) When the requirement to seek additional resource commitments in a Scheduled Incremental Auction is triggered by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c)(2) ~~of this Attachment~~, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of such auction the Updated VRR Curve Increment.

(ii) When the requirement to seek additional resource commitments in a Scheduled Incremental Auction is triggered by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c)(1) ~~of this Attachment~~, and the conditions stated in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c)(2) do not apply, the Office of the Interconnection first shall determine the total quantity of (A) the amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to procure in prior Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year that does not clear such auction, plus, for the Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share for such auction, minus (B) the amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to sell back in prior Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year that does not clear such auction, plus (C) the difference between the updated PJM Region Reliability Requirement or updated LDA Reliability Requirement and, respectively, the PJM Region Reliability Requirement, or LDA Reliability Requirement, utilized in the most recent prior auction conducted for such Delivery Year plus any amount required by section 5.4(c)(2)(ii), plus (D) the reduction in Unforced Capacity commitments associated with the transition provisions of Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14B, 5.14C, 5.14E, and 5.5A(c)(i)(B) ~~of this Attachment DD~~ and RAA, Schedule 6, section L.9, minus (E) the quantity of new Unforced Capacity commitments for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years associated with the transition provisions in Attachment DD, section 5.14D ~~of this Attachment DD~~ where this quantity is assumed to have been procured in the form of non-Capacity Performance Resources for purposes of this paragraph E. If the result of such equation is a positive quantity, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of such auction a portion of the Updated VRR Curve Increment extending right from the left-most point on that curve in a megawatt amount equal to that positive quantity defined above, to seek to procure such quantity. If the result of such equation is a negative quantity, with exception for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of the auction a portion of the Updated VRR Curve Decrement, extending and ascending to the left from the right-most point on that curve in a megawatt amount corresponding to the negative quantity defined above, to seek to sell back such quantity. In seeking to sell back such quantity for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of the auction a curve represented by a straight line connecting two points with the first point located at 0 megawatts and at a price set to the lowest price point of the Updated VRR Curve Decrement and the second point located at a megawatt amount corresponding to the negative quantity defined above and at a price set to the Resource Clearing Price of the 2017/2018 Base Residual Auction.

(iii) When the possible need to seek agreements to release capacity commitments in any Scheduled Incremental Auction is indicated for the PJM Region or any LDA by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c)(3)(i) ~~of this Attachment~~, the Office of the Interconnection first shall determine the total quantity of (A) the amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to procure in prior Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery

Formatted: Indent: First line: 1"

Year that does not clear such auction, plus, for the Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share for such auction, minus (B) the amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to sell back in prior Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year that does not clear such auction, plus (C) the difference between the updated PJM Region Reliability Requirement or updated LDA Reliability Requirement and, respectively, the PJM Region Reliability Requirement, or LDA Reliability Requirement, utilized in the most recent prior auction conducted for such Delivery Year minus any capacity sell-back amount determined by PJM to be required for the PJM Region or such LDA by Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.4(c)(3)(ii) of this Attachment, plus (D) the reduction in Unforced Capacity commitments associated with the transition provisions of Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 5.14B, 5.14C, 5.14E, and 5.5A(c)(i)(B) of this Attachment DD and RAA, Schedule 6, section L.9, minus (E) the quantity of new Unforced Capacity commitments for the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 Delivery Years associated with the transition provisions in Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.14D of this Attachment DD where this quantity is assumed to have been procured in the form of non-Capacity Performance Resources for purposes of this paragraph E; provided, however, that the amount sold in total for all LDAs and the PJM Region related to a delay in a Backbone Transmission upgrade may not exceed the amounts purchased in total for all LDAs and the PJM Region related to a delay in a Backbone Transmission upgrade. If the result of such equation is a positive quantity, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of such auction a portion of the Updated VRR Curve Increment extending right from the left-most point on that curve in a megawatt amount equal to that positive quantity defined above, to seek to procure such quantity. If the result of such equation is a negative quantity, with exception for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of the auction a portion of the Updated VRR Curve Decrement, extending and ascending to the left from the right-most point on that curve in a megawatt amount corresponding to the negative quantity defined above, to seek to sell back such quantity. In seeking to sell back such quantity for the Third Incremental Auction for the 2017/2018 Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of the auction a curve represented by a straight line connecting two points with the first point located at 0 megawatts and at a price set to the lowest price point of the Updated VRR Curve Decrement and the second point located at a megawatt amount corresponding to the negative quantity defined above and at a price set to the Resource Clearing Price of the 2017/2018 Base Residual Auction.

Formatted: Indent: Left: 0", First line: 1", Right: 0"

(iv) If none of the tests for adjustment of capacity procurement in subsections (i), (ii), or (iii) is satisfied for the PJM Region or an LDA in a Scheduled Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection first shall determine the total quantity of (A) the amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to procure in prior Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year that does not clear such auction, plus, for the Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share for such auction, minus (B) the amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to sell back in prior Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year that does not clear such auction. If the result of such equation is a positive quantity, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of such auction a portion of the Updated VRR Curve Increment extending right from the left-most point on that curve in a megawatt amount equal to that positive quantity defined above, to seek to procure such quantity. If the result of such equation is a negative quantity, the

Office of the Interconnection shall employ in the clearing of the auction a portion of the Updated VRR Curve Decrement, extending and ascending to the left from the right-most point on that curve in a megawatt amount corresponding to the negative quantity defined above, to seek to sell back such quantity. For the Delivery Years through May 31, 2018, if more than one of the tests for adjustment of capacity procurement in subsections (i), (ii), or (iii) is satisfied for the PJM Region or an LDA in a Scheduled Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall not seek to procure the Short-Term Resource Procurement Target Applicable Share more than once for such region or area for such auction

(v) If PJM seeks to procure additional capacity in an Incremental Auction for the 2014-15, 2015-16 or 2016-17 Delivery Years due to a triggering of the tests in subsections (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) then the Minimum Annual Resource Requirement for such Auction will be equal to the updated Minimum Annual Resource Requirement (based on the latest DR Reliability Targets) minus the amount of previously committed capacity from Annual Resources, and the Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement for such Auction will be equal to the updated Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement (based on the latest DR Reliability Targets) minus the amount of previously committed capacity in an Incremental Auction for the 2014-15, 2015-16 or 2016-17 Delivery Years from Annual Resources and Extended Summer Demand Resources. If PJM seeks to release prior committed capacity due to a triggering of the test in subsection (iii) then PJM may not release prior committed capacity from Annual Resources or Extended Summer Demand Resources below the updated Minimum Annual Resource Requirement and updated Minimum Extended Summer Resource Requirement, respectively.

(vi) If the above tests are triggered for an LDA and for another LDA wholly located within the first LDA, the Office of the Interconnection may adjust the amount of any Sell Offer or Buy Bids otherwise required by subsections (i), (ii), or (iii) above in one LDA as appropriate to take into account any reliability impacts on the other LDA.

(vii) The optimization algorithm shall calculate the overall clearing result to minimize the cost to satisfy the Unforced Capacity Obligation of the PJM Region to account for the updated PJM Peak Load Forecast and the cost of committing replacement capacity in response to the Buy Bids submitted, while satisfying or honoring such reliability requirements and constraints, in the same manner as set forth in subsection (a) above.

(viii) Load Serving Entities may be entitled to certain credits (“Excess Commitment Credits”) under certain circumstances as follows:

- (A) For either or both of the Delivery Years commencing on June 1, 2010 or June 1, 2011, if the PJM Region Reliability Requirement used for purposes of the Base Residual Auction for such Delivery Year exceeds the PJM Region Reliability Requirement that is based on the last updated load forecast prior to such Delivery Year, then such excess will be allocated to Load Serving Entities as set forth below;

- (B) For any Delivery Year beginning with the Delivery Year that commences June 1, 2012, the total amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to sell back pursuant to subsection (b)(iii) above in the Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Year that does not clear such auctions, less the total amount that the Office of the Interconnection sought to procure pursuant to subsections (b)(i) and (b)(ii) above in the Scheduled Incremental Auctions for such Delivery Years that does not clear such auctions, will be allocated to Load Serving Entities as set forth below;
- (C) the amount from (A) or (B) above for the PJM Region shall be allocated among Locational Deliverability Areas pro rata based on the reduction for each such Locational Deliverability Area in the peak load forecast from the time of the Base Residual Auction to the time of the Third Incremental Auction; provided, however, that the amount allocated to a Locational Deliverability Area may not exceed the reduction in the corresponding Reliability Requirement for such Locational Deliverability Area; and provided further that any LDA with an increase in its load forecast shall not be allocated any Excess Commitment Credits;
- (D) the amount, if any, allocated to a Locational Deliverability Area shall be further allocated among Load Serving Entities in such areas that are charged a Locational Reliability Charge based on the Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation of such Load Serving Entities as of June 1 of the Delivery Year and shall be constant for the entire Delivery Year. Excess Commitment Credits may be used as Replacement Capacity or traded bilaterally.

c) Conditional Incremental Auction

For each Conditional Incremental Auction, the optimization algorithm shall consider:

- The quantity and location of capacity required to address the identified reliability concern that gave rise to the Conditional Incremental Auction;
- All applicable Capacity Import Limits;
- the same Capacity Emergency Transfer Limits that were modeled in the Base Residual Auction, or any updated value resulting from a Conditional Incremental Auction; and
- the Sell Offers submitted in such auction.

The Office of the Interconnection shall submit a Buy Bid based on the quantity and location of capacity required to address the identified reliability violation at a Buy Bid price equal to 1.5 times Net CONE.

The optimization algorithm shall calculate the overall clearing result to minimize the cost to address the identified reliability concern, while satisfying or honoring such reliability requirements and constraints.

d) Equal-priced Sell Offers

If two or more Sell Offers submitted in any auction satisfying all applicable constraints include the same offer price, and some, but not all, of the Unforced Capacity of such Sell Offers is required to clear the auction, then the auction shall be cleared in a manner that minimizes total costs, including total make-whole payments if any such offer includes a minimum block and, to the extent consistent with the foregoing, in accordance with the following additional principles:

1) as necessary, the optimization shall clear such offers that have a flexible megawatt quantity, and the flexible portions of such offers that include a minimum block that already has cleared, where some but not all of such equal-priced flexible quantities are required to clear the auction, pro rata based on their flexible megawatt quantities; and

2) when equal-priced minimum-block offers would result in equal overall costs, including make-whole payments, and only one such offer is required to clear the auction, then the offer that was submitted earliest to the Office of the Interconnection, based on its assigned timestamp, will clear.