ARRs and FTRs

AFMTF April 29, 2020 **IMM**



ARRs and FTRs

- Two parts of current design
 - ARRs
 - FTRs
- ARRs
 - A mechanism to assign congestion rights to load
- FTRs
 - A mechanism to permit load to sell its rights to congestion
 - Load can sell the rights to an uncertain level of congestion for a fixed payment

ARRs

- ARRs are a mechanism to assign congestion rights to load
- Assigning congestion rights is equivalent to identifying who pays congestion
- The goal is to assign the rights to congestion revenues to the customers who pay the congestion
- ARRs currently assign congestion rights based on generation to load paths
 - Some paths from before 1999
- Generation to load paths is not a sensible way to assign congestion rights

ARRs

- It is possible to define who pays congestion
- That should be the goal



FTRs

- When rights to congestion are assigned, a market mechanism is needed to permit load to sell its rights to congestion
 - Load can choose to sell or not sell. Load can choose to receive actual congestion payments.
 - Load can also set a reservation price below which they will not sell

FTRs

- That market mechanism is the FTR auction(s)
- FTR auction design can take many forms
 - The FTR auction design can look a lot like the current design
 - The FTR auction design can include paths
 - The FTR design cannot pay out more than actual congestion

Next Steps

- Agree on the actual math of congestion and therefore how to assign the rights to congestion
- Develop FTR auction design options to permit load to sell the rights to congestion in a flexible way

Monitoring Analytics, LLC
2621 Van Buren Avenue
Suite 160
Eagleville, PA
19403
(610) 271-8050

MA@monitoringanalytics.com www.MonitoringAnalytics.com